Study Of African Politics Research Articles

Introduction: The ideology of the illiberal modernisers in Africa

The 21st century has seen a major political and developmental shift in Africa involving the rise of new authoritarian states and a return to infrastructure-led, economically interventionist state-building programmes. Many studies have examined the international political economy of this shift, from the commodity boom to the rise of China and the political power underpinning development-focused regimes at the national level. This special issue argues instead that this authoritarian state-building drive is also the product of ideas, beliefs, and principles. An ideology of development has led a group of ruling parties to pursue distinctive programmes of leap-frogging modernization. Authors in this special issue present a set of case studies ranging from old parties in government since independence, in Tanzania and Mozambique, to former insurgents in Rwanda and Ethiopia, and detail their ideologies. While acknowledging their considerable variation and uniqueness, we group the common features of these cases together, presenting the ‘illiberal modernisers’ ideological programme. Many of its elements look like resurgent 20th-century High Modernism, however, we demonstrate that there are profoundly new features combining postmodern aesthetics, elements of neoliberal orthodoxy, and new public management. Such ideological dimensions remain overlooked in the study of African politics, with materialist perspectives touting rational interests and strategy, largely dominating.

Reviewing the South African Political Studies Curriculum: Evaluating Responses to Calls for Decolonisation

ABSTRACT The 2015 and 2016 student protests amplified criticism of university curricula which protesters proclaimed to be ill-suited to our context. This paper engages with such criticism by evaluating the South African political studies curriculam it terms of whether or not it can be considered to be ‘decolonised’. I ask three questions, all of which arise from comments made by student protesters about the need for curriculum change: ‘Who is teaching our students?’, ‘Which scholars’ work is being prescribed?’ and ‘Which geographical areas receive attention?’ These questions are answered based on data gathered from undergraduate political studies course outlines from seven South African universities. In answer to the first question, I show that while white academics are still over-represented, the demographics of those teaching undergraduate politics are shifting towards demographic representivity. In answer to the second question, I show that our political studies departments still mostly prescribe the work of male scholars, white scholars and Western scholars. Responding to the third question, I show that politics departments include courses focused on Africa and particularly on South Africa while other regions of the world receive little attention. The paper concludes by raising some difficult questions with the hope of stimulating further debate.

Manipulating Africa? Perspectives on the experimental method in the study of African politics

Manipulating Africa? Perspectives on the experimental method in the study of African politics

Introduction

Introduction

Ideology and interests in the Rwandan patriotic front: Singing the struggle in pre-genocide Rwanda

Abstract In the study of African Politics, the analysis of political ideologies as a normative engine of political action seems to have receded in favour of a treatment of ideology as the support of actors in their pursuit of material interests. Rwanda is not an exception. The ideology of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has been predominantly analysed as a self-serving strategy geared towards the reinforcement of the party’s power. Such treatment of ideology prevents a full understanding of the RPF. This article argues that ideology should also be conceptualized as a matrix that can reshape material incentives and through which the RPF’s interests have emerged. To do so, the article analyses new sources of material, the songs of mobilization from RPF members and supporters composed before the Front took power during the genocide, to systematically delineate the RPF’s early ideology. The analysis centres on four main themes—Rwandan national unity, the RPF’s depiction of itself, its depiction of its enemy, and its relationship with the international community—and traces their influence on RPF interests in the post-genocide era. It reveals the surprisingly long-lasting power of ideas despite fast-changing material circumstances.

Confronting the Colonial Library: Teaching Political Studies Amidst Calls for a Decolonised Curriculum

ABSTRACTThis paper engages with Mudimbe's concept of the ‘colonial library’ with the aim of using this engagement to contribute to current debates about decolonising South African university curricula. The term ‘colonial library’ refers to the body of texts and epistemological order which construct Africa as a symbol of otherness and inferiority. Mudimbe shows that even the most determined attempts to resist the colonial library draw on this same epistemological order. This presents a profound challenge for attempts to decolonise university curricula as it suggests that the colonial library's reach extends into attempts to dismantle it. In response to this challenge, I discuss ways in which we can oppose epistemological ethnocentrism and argue that we need to be open to the possibility of the emancipatory reappropriation of aspects of the colonial library. The paper concludes by relating the foregoing discussion to the South African political studies classroom.

Localizing Islam in the West : Mazrui's Journey from the Study of African Politics to Global Cultures

Localizing Islam in the West : Mazrui's Journey from the Study of African Politics to Global Cultures

African Studies in the Other Europe: A Legitimate Perspective on Africa

African Studies in the countries that were under communist rule and that today are known as post‑communist, have originally developed an interest in Africa based on ideological, political and economic interests of the state. There has been a gradual shift from ideology to economy while the study of African politics seems to follow the vagaries of the influence that Africa exerts on the world scene. Characteristically, until recently AEGIS did not include a single centre or association based in post‑communist Europe even though in countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary African studies currently experience considerable growth. This reflects both the hegemony of Western Europe with its strong colonial and neo‑colonial emphases and weak official interest that post‑communist Europe shows for Africa. The article describes changing emphases of eastern European Africanist scholarship and discusses the question of legitimacy of the marginal but non‑colonial approach to African studies. In contradistinction to the Western European African studies and with Eastern European approaches it shows that the latter perspective is useful for a critical look at the hitherto dominant paternalistic style of African studies in Europe.

Decentralisation and Elections in Benin

IntroductionDecentralisation is a type of governance reform that has been undertaken all over the world. African countries are also following this trend. The decentralisation process started in the 1990s as aid conditionality, that is, donor countries required it several years after the commencement of the democratisation process in African countries. Decentralisation is not only an administrative governance reform; it also brought political change and turbulence in African countries. The political impact of decentralisation in Africa has extended from the local level to the national and eventually to its international relations.Many African countries ended the one-party system or the military regimes, and adopted a multi-party system in the 1990s. Elections were carried out under the new democratic system. Some African countries had their very first experience of a legal and peaceful regime turnover through elections. We cannot undervalue the African actors' efforts to develop democratisation even if a sceptical evaluation of the democratisation process in Africa is dominant among political scientists.In African political studies, election were never considered a focal issue especially during the period of military and one-party regimes. However, some African countries continued their democratic process despite difficult conditions. As such, election became a crucial issue. If democratisation advances, decentralisation should have a more direct and greater impact on the political situation in Africa.This article tries to understand the political impact of decentralisation in Africa through case studies on Benin. Since the 1990s, donor countries as well as the Benin Government have considered Benin a model of democratisation in Africa. Hence, it would be meaningful to analyse Benin's case and relate it to the decentralisation process in Africa. Here we study the presidential, the legislative and the local elections held in 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively, focussing on the first impact of decentralisation on the elections in Benin.Political Influence of Decentralisation in African CountriesBy the beginning of the 1990s, African countries were required to start a political reform process-democratisation by the international community, particularly the donor countries. Several years after, the international community required the African countries to decentralise for the purpose of administration reform. According to the donors, the over-centralisation of executive power and financial resources led to inefficient governance and corruption. These long time failed experiences of development assistance were examined by the donor countries and international organisations which resolved for the need to empower the local government through devolution so as to enable them to achieve social and economic development in the local communities. Decentralisation was therefore recognised as a panacea for governance reform. Eventually however, decentralisation began to expose its dysfunction in Africa (Nack Mback, 2003, 8, 40-41).There are numerous studies on decentralisation in Africa; researchers have analysed decentralisation within the framework of international co-operation and administration studies. They have focused on administrative institutions, but not on political and economic dynamism. Saito mentioned that decentralisation is a process to redefine the roles and responsibilities of the central and the local governments. In addition, decentralisation is essentially a political process (Saito, 2008, 284).As mentioned above, decentralisation is a major political challenge; it increased resources and changed the power balance in local politics. Election monitoring teams were sent by the international community to watch over the local elections in African countries, but not many researchers are interested in the impact of decentralisation on the elections in Africa. In fact, neither did many African countries initiate repeated peaceful elections after the start of decentralisation reforms. …

Positivism, ethics and politics in Africa

Despite the fact that the study of African politics is dominated by ethical postures, as can be seen with the self-proclaimed qualifications of African states and leaders, the debate on ethics per se is not common. The first challenge of this article is to address ethics as an entry point for African political studies. The second challenge is epistemological. It is related to my efforts to examine values and ideals as facts that should be considered seriously in political science. Therefore, positivism is not incompatible with values and ideals. They are part of the political universe. In this regard, African politics shows the symbolic triumph of democratic ethics. Current facts militate for the upholding of those values.

AFRICANS LIKE MARKETS; WHY DON’T THEY FAVOR CAPITALISM?

ABSTRACT The recent study of African politics suggests that while African voters tend to be ambivalently positive about democratic reforms, they are even less supportive of market reforms. African states have, if anything, been ahead of their publics in instituting economic reforms. But African leaders have failed to explain or defend these policies to their electorates. This may reflect their own ambivalence—at best—about capitalism.

Thandika Mkandawire, ed. African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development. London: Zed Books/Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005. 234 pp. Notes. References. Index. $85.00. Cloth. $29.95. Paper.

Thandika Mkandawire, ed. African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development. London: Zed Books/Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005. 234 pp. Notes. References. Index. $85.00. Cloth. $29.95. Paper. This book grew out of papers presented at the thirtieth anniversary of CODESRIA, a Pan-African institution that continues to play a vital role in the sustenance and promotion of intellectual activities in Africa. Despite talk of democratization and renaissance, the great majority of Africans remain mired in poverty and development continues to elude Africa. The continent's economic and political marginalization in world affairs appears to be more extreme than at any stage since the 1960s. The proliferation of recent conflicts undermines the organs of civil society, infrastructures, systems of exchange, and the state itself across broad swathes of the continent. While the idea of an African Renaissance is not really new, it has lately picked up momentum. However, for an African Renaissance to succeed, the emerging educated elite will have to be its bearers. An analysis of African intellectuals' roles, if any, in the new Africa is what African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development has attempted. In the face of high rates of Africa's brain drain, African Intellectuals sets out to explore the nature and extent of the emigration of Africa's intelligentsia, the indigenous language of African intellectuals, women intellectuals, and the role of the expanding African academic diaspora. It takes as its starting point the uniquely difficult circumstances confronting intellectuals: regimes intolerant of independent debate, economies in sharp decline, societies wracked by violent conflict, and official languages different from people's mother tongues. Because of the intertwined nature of literature, politics, and society, African literature remains a legitimate expression of political ideas and valid descriptions of both society and politics. As reflections of the human condition in Africa, works of literature provide valuable insights into both the past and the present by sketching the African reaction to colonialism, racism, and independence. Until the very foundations of colonialism were shattered by African writers, the political debate in Africa had effectively been set-with varying degrees of foresight and responsiveness-by European powers. Several specialists in African political studies have identified the importance of the works of intellectuals in the African revolution. After a shortlived honeymoon between African leaders and writers, the latter began articulating themes of disenchantment and disillusionment. While some intellectuals joined the ruling elite, most postindependence writers reevaluated the objectives and deeds of their nations' ruling classes and criticized the political, social, and economic structures through which elites operated. …

Exchange: Misunderstanding Gradualism

ExchangeMisunderstanding Gradualism Thomas Carothers (bio) I greatly appreciate the serious, thoughtful responses by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder and by Francis Fukuyama to my January 2007 Journal of Democracy essay entitled "How Democracies Emerge: The 'Sequencing' Fallacy." Unfortunately, Professors Mansfield and Snyder attribute to me ideas that I do not express in that article, mischaracterize some of the points that I do make there, and fail to engage at all with some of my fundamental arguments. The very first sentence of their response hints at the problems to come. For nowhere in my article do I, as they claim, "acknowledge the now widely recognized fact that countries taking early steps on the journey from dictatorship toward electoral politics are especially prone to civil and international war, violent revolutions, and ethnic and sectarian bloodshed." I make no such acknowledgement because in fact I reject this view, and I find the evidence for it set out in their book Electing to Fight unpersuasive. Their use of highly refined statistical methods to make their case is undermined, in my view, by some significant problems with their classification of cases. Thus they somehow categorize the 1982 Falklands War—a conflict started by the Argentine military junta—as an example of the warlike propensities of democratizing countries. Similarly, most observers of Balkan politics will be surprised to learn from Electing to Fight that it was the democratizing character of Serbia under the thuggish Slobodan Milošević that was responsible for Serbia's militaristic predations in Kosovo and elsewhere. More generally, Mansfield and Snyder base a sizeable part of their [End Page 18] case for the dangers of democratization on the internecine conflicts that flared up after the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia each broke apart. Blaming democratization for the wars that sprang from the collapse of multiethnic authoritarian federations—the messy, often violent process of establishing the borders of the newly emergent states—is a significant category mistake. As Francis Fukuyama stresses in his comment, the overwhelming bulk of the many wars that have raged in Europe over the last half a millennium have been related not to democracy, but to state-building. Throughout their response, Mansfield and Snyder steadfastly reassert the preferability of sequentialism and their disapproval of what they call "out-of-sequence" democratic transitions. They do not, however, actually address, let alone refute, my two core arguments. To recapitulate, these are: 1) Outside East Asia, autocratic governments in the developing world have a terrible record as builders of competent, impartial institutions due to deep-seated conflicts between autocracy and the second phase of state-building (that is, going beyond establishing a monopoly of force to creating effective institutions); and 2) Although emergent democratic governments struggle with this second, institution-strengthening phase of state-building and with rule-of-law development, they have some important advantages when it comes to tackling these tasks. Mansfield and Snyder maintain a strong skepticism about the wisdom of holding elections in places that lack what they believe are necessary preconditions for democracy. Yet this view overlooks the decades of authoritarian rule in Africa and other parts of the postcolonial world that have left so many states in such terrible condition. Prescribing the deferral of democracy—and consequently the prolongation of authoritarian rule—as a cure for the ills of prolonged authoritarianism makes little sense. In this regard, it is telling that a probing recent study of African politics since the early 1990s finds that those countries which moved early toward elections and persisted with elections thereafter have done better at consolidating all aspects of democracy than those countries that delayed holding elections.1 Mansfield and Snyder try to soften their sequentialism in two ways. First, they say that elections need to be deferred only until competent state institutions "have begun to take root" or even just until the development of such institutions has "barely begun." But then they return to their more standard sequentialist dictum that "it is necessary to have impartial state institutions" before risking elections. The gap between barely beginning to have competent, impartial state institutions and having them in place and functioning well is enormous, and bridging it can take fifty years, a century...

Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research Perspectives

The last decade of the twentieth century was characterised by a resurgence of multipartism in Africa. The return of political parties produced a discontinuity not only in the continent's political life, but also in the study of African politics. A number of new researches were carried out that were largely based on existing theories and concepts in political science. These new works thus contributed to an increased integration of the study of politics south of the Sahara with mainstream political science. The present article provides an overview of the insights and advances that these studies have produced, focusing on the key issues raised by the return of party pluralism in Africa and on the utility of existing models, theories and approaches for its understanding. There is little doubt that recent research efforts have advanced our knowledge of the changing politics of the continent. However, neither the elaboration of theoretical frameworks nor the detail of empirical knowledge has achieved adequate levels of development as yet.

Book Review: Taylor, Ian. NEPAD: TOWARD AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT OR ANOTHER FALSE START? Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

Reviewed by: Nepad: Toward Africa's Development or Another False Start? Michael F. Lofchie Taylor, Ian . 2005. Nepad: Toward Africa's Development or Another False Start?Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 212 pp. $49.95 (cloth). The dramatic reappearance of famine in Niger is a painful reminder of how little has changed in Africa since the Sahel famines of the early 1970s. Today's images are eerily similar to the widely publicized images of thirty years ago. Heartbreaking pictures of failed crops and starving children are employed to pressure wealthy donor countries into the timely provision of food and financial assistance. The extent to which Africa's most visible realities remain unchanged is unnerving—widespread starvation, ethnic conflict, and pervasive elite corruption. The political discourse also has unnerving similarities: urgent cries for assistance are met with the same profound skepticism as aid critics ask what developmental benefits have been seen from the vast amounts of aid already pledged and delivered. In accessible and careful prose, Ian Taylor's volume, NEPAD: Toward Africa's Development or Another False Start? argues that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), founded in the fall of 2001, is unlikely to change things in any significant way. It shares the same fatal weakness as its long list of predecessors: an elitist, top-down approach, which fails to provide for popular participation. The rapidly proliferating organizations of African civil society are nowhere to be seen. Further, NEPAD depends upon a singularly dubious premise: that Africa's hopelessly corrupt political elites can be taken at their word, and this time, they truly intend to reform themselves. Readers who prefer a more optimistic scenario should immediately turn to pages 17 and 18 of the Taylor volume, where the author presents an extended inventory of the failed strategies of the past, beginning with the fabled Lagos Plan of Action of the early 1980s. Taylor's volume is not theoretically original. He accepts the concept of neopatrimonial authority, which, for some time now has been widely shared by political scientists of Africa. The earliest pages of his volume, however, present a useful and highly readable bibliographic essay on that concept, omitting perhaps only Pierre Englebert's highly useful volume, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Lynne Rienner, 2000). The neopatrimonial idea has been so widely discussed in African political studies that it needs no further refinement here. In brief, it describes the all-pervasive political reality of Africa: unchallenged political elites, who entrench themselves in power in part by their unchecked ability to appropriate state resources as private wealth. Big-man political leaders maintain [End Page 144] their political control by spreading around just enough corrupt opportunity to create coalitions of corrupt followers. If scholarly consensus alone were sufficient to consecrate the scientific validity of an idea, surely the concept of neopatrimonial authority would enjoy that status. Taylor does, however, raise an important question for advocates of the neopatrimonial approach: what is it about African economies that facilitates this form of authority? Regrettably, for an answer to this question, Taylor turns from the political-science conventional wisdom of the 1980s to the economic conventional wisdom of the 1960s: the problem is Africa's unusually great dependence on a small number of export crops, whose production is geographically concentrated in small export enclaves. Development in such enclaves, it was always said, does not spill over into other regions of the country, and the wealth of these regions therefore serves only to enrich and empower small elite groups—a process that only widens the socioeconomic disparity with the rest of society. The informed reader will undoubtedly experience "déjà vu all over again." It may be helpful at this point to remind the Africanist community that it was precisely this line of reasoning that was used to justify the disastrous statist and protectionist economic strategies of the 1960s and 1970s. Taylor's book includes a useful but all-too-brief discussion of the Berg Report and its place in the history of African development efforts. Much more should have been done here. Indeed, our field of study is now ready for a book-length treatment of that report, which, with Robert Bates...

Globalization and African Political Science

Globalisation poses a number of challenges which African political science must address. To be able to do this, there is need to rethink its theoretical and methodological underpinnings. In spite of the centrality of power in the affairs of the African state, the study of African politics has not shown a sufficient concern for the study of power. Various perspectives in the study of African politics tend to focus on the social character (interests) of the state as opposed to its political character (power). This marginalization of power in political analysis meant the absence of a theory of repression, domination or popular empowerment. When, therefore, African states relapsed into authoritarianism and dictatorship there was no analytical tool to understand this phenomenon in such a way as to point the way forward for the people. Any tool of analysis capable of adequately understanding contemporary African politics must be clearly oriented to and informed by political power. African Political Science Pre-Globalization Globalization has raised a number of issues that African Political Science needs to address. To do so, the latter must either continue its previous pattern of analy sis or change it in consonance with changing global conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to properly understand the past of this scientific activity in order to be able to predict possible changes in it. In order to understand African politics, African political science has focused study and analysis on the African state. This focus on the state is understandable. In general, the motive force of politics is the overwhelming power of the state, together with the possibility of its use for social, economic and cultural progress, but also for domination, oppression and exploitation. Of all forms of power, state power alone can enhance or threaten life, wealth and freedom legally. As the repository of sovereignty, the state has ultimate power. It monopolizes the means of coercion to an extent that is unknown to any substate or suprastate community. Professor Nnoli is a former president of AAPS, and Executive Director of PACREP,

Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes and Cures

David K. Leonard and Scott Strauss. Africa's Stalled Development: International Causes and Cures. Boulder, CoIo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Bibliography. Index. $42.00. Cloth. $17.95. Paper. Africa 's Stalled Development is an accessible and valuable contribution to the literature on Africa's troubled political economy. As the elaboration of a series of lectures first delivered by one of the authors, the book provides a concise summary of key debates in African politics: endemic poverty, administrative weakness, and violent ethnic conflict. Although the text is unlikely to redefine Africanists' understanding of African states and societies, the authors' central thesis is sensible and, especially for those first acquainting themselves with the continent's politics, subtly provocative. Rather than relying on culturalist arguments to explain sub-Saharan Africa's seemingly endemic poverty, patronage, and political instability, Leonard and Strauss posit that the root of the continent's frail states is to be found in the history of their formation and subsequent incorporation into the international economy. These processes, they argue, have resulted in the creation of weak and poorly embedded politico-administrative institutions and, more important, in the pervasiveness of enclave production. As a result, revenue generation is physically confined to small areas, and the main markets are external, thus making the general economic health of areas outside the enclave quite secondary, if not irrelevant (13). Enclave production provides no incentives for leaders to establish popular legitimacy through programmatic reform or a strong developmental agenda. Instead, leaders can rely on taxes or rents from exports to sustain themselves. Worse still, the physical sites for enclave production-mines, oil rigs, or concentrated agricultural estates-are easy targets for would-be rebel groups. And having once experienced conflict, the potential for repeated violence is greatly increased. all of these problems, combined with the failures of international aid, which does little more than keep African countries out of bankruptcy, have led to the crises that beset the continent. At various points throughout the book, especially in two chapters written exclusively by David Leonard on technical assistance and foreign humanitarian (military) intervention, the authors offer concrete proposals for remedying the situations they have identified. Although self-admittedly idealistic, these suggestions are well reasoned, based on solid evidence, and thought-provoking. At the same time, the authors are determined to normalize the study of African politics, first by making the subject intelligible, then by making it highly visible to an American academic audience. …

African studies and the postcolonial challenge

Postcolonial theory is frequently dismissed as too theoretical and esoteric, and hence irrelevant to the study of contemporary African politics and society. This article challenges this dismissal of postcolonialism, and argues for a more constructive dialogue between African studies and postcolonial approaches. Recognizing that postcolonialism cannot be regarded as a uniform body of theory, or a school of thought in the conventional academic sense, the article focuses on certain key themes and problematizations of relevance to contemporary Africa. In particular, it elaborates on postcolonialism's conceptualization of power, and argues that the recognition of the relationship between power, discourse and political institutions and practices has much to contribute to the study of African politics. These insights are further investigated through a discussion of development, hybridity and resistance. The article concludes that both African studies and postcolonial approaches stand to benefit from a more constructive engagement.

Nationalism and development in Africa: selected essays

James Smoot Coleman was the leading theorist of his time in African political studies. His work fused liberal-democratic idealism and scientific realism. These essays represent the evolution of his thought, from deep insight into African nationalism, to a refined theory of modernization. The collection is a contribution to the intellectual history of comparative African politics, useful to both scholars and others who grapple with problems in African development.

Political Corruption: Strategies for Reform

Political CorruptionStrategies for Reform Robert Klitgaard (bio) Corruption is an embarrassing subject. Many citizens in developing countries are simply exhausted by it. They have watched their leaders posture and moralize and make half-hearted efforts against corruption, all to no avail. When Tanzanians debated a campaign against corruption in February 1990, for example, public reactions recorded in the government-run newspaper were overwhelmingly skeptical. "We have the Anti-Corruption Squad under the president's office, the Permanent Commission of Inquiry, the Leadership Code, the Control and Discipline Commission of the Party, and courts of law," noted an intellectual affiliated with the ruling party. "What else do we need?"1 Despite all, corruption still reigned. At about the same time, a Guatemalan journalist gave voice to another widespread view. "When... the shameless triumph; when the abuser is admired; when principles end and only opportunism prevails; when the insolent rule and the people tolerate it," she lamented, then "perhaps it is time to hide oneself; time to suspend the battle; time to stop being a Quixote."2 Such defeatism and despair are responses to ever deeper corruption in much of the developing world. Robert Wade's remarkable study of corruption in India describes systematic government predation. "The essential business of a state minister," he concludes, "is not to make [End Page 86] policy. It is to modify the application of rules and regulations on a particularistic basis, in return for money and/or loyalty."3 Jean-François Bayart's monumental study of African politics is subtitled la politique du ventre-"the politics of the belly." Corruption, he says, is now the abiding reality of the African state.4 A recent United Nations meeting concluded: Corruption in government is pervasive at all levels of public management, including, in some countries, the deliberate mismanagement of national economies for personal gain . . . . Corruption is pervasive and is apparently expanding . . . . [I]t has become systematic and a way of life in many countries.5 Around the globe, corruption is increasingly a central issue in election campaigns, popular uprisings, and military coups. If the current worldwide trend toward democracy and the free market continues, it will eventually help reduce corruption. Competition and accountability-both noteworthy features of democracy and free markets-are the enemies of corruption. Yet while democracy, the separation of powers, a free press, and freer markets are surely to be welcomed, it remains true that actions to control corruption must go beyond broad-gauged reforms at the top. More than one country has discovered that free elections and economic reform do not immediately reduce corruption. Whatever size and type of state a country chooses, the threat of bribery, extortion, influence peddling, kickbacks, fraud, and other illicit activities remains-in the private sector as well as the public. Even though almost every new Third World government-elected or not-places the fight against corruption at the top of its agenda, the scholarly literature on development offers little guidance. Indeed, a tradition in Western social science has excused corruption as a market-like response when markets malfunction, or as an analogue to democratic logrolling when democracy is absent. There are exceptions. Some new theoretical work does show how rent seeking and "directly unproductive profit-seeking activities" can cause harm by distorting incentives.6 And new empirical research shows-no surprise to people living in poor countries-that corruption in fact causes harm.7 But many students of development have been reluctant to investigate corruption. Scarce data and uncooperative countries are partly to blame. There is another factor as well: First World scholars do not want to be seen as calling Third World people corrupt. Over 20 years ago, the Nobel Prize-winning Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal decried the Western condescension that led to such a "taboo on research."8 Some social scientists have argued that bribes cannot be distinguished from transactions, that to try to do so is to import Western or one's own [End Page 87] normative assumptions. A bribe, a fee for service, a gift-analytically, it is said, they are the same. As many poor countries have slid into deeper economic distress, however, the sheer fact that corruption is so widespread...