In recent years, researchers from a variety of fields within the life sciences, ranging from genomics (e.g., Rose and Oakley 2007; Koonin 2011) to epigenetics and EvoDevo (e.g., Danchin et al. 2011; Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Pigliucci and Muller 2010) to niche construction theory (Odling Smee et al. 2003) and the study of cultural evolution (Mesoudi 2011), have expressed dissatisfaction with the reigning Modern Synthesis framework, and proposed more or less radical extensions. In ‘‘Is Non-genetic Inheritance Just a Proximate Mechanism?’’ (this issue), Alex Mesoudi and ten co-authors point to increasing evidence for the existence and scope of non-genetic inheritance of an epigenetic, niche/ecological, and cultural nature. They call for an ‘‘extension to the Modern Synthesis’’— an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis—to deal adequately with these additional inheritance systems. Mesoudi and colleagues argue that their critics conflate non-genetic inheritance with earlier notions of ‘‘soft inheritance,’’ misrepresent phenotypic plasticity, and disregard that non-genetic inheritance ‘‘can generate novel targets for selection, create new genetic equilibria that would not exist in the absence of non-genetic inheritance, and generate phenotypic variation that is independent of genetic variation.’’ Defenders of the gene-centric, evolutionary orthodoxy such as Dickins and Rahman (2012) resist such a reform, arguing against the evolutionary significance of non-genetic inheritance systems on the basis of Mayr’s by now discredited distinction between proximate and ultimate mechanisms (see Laland et al. 2011). On another front, traditionalists meet EvoDevo enthusiasts’ claims concerning evolvability, macroevolution, novelty, etc., with similar skepticism. Some other instances of disagreement about the potential and limitations of the ‘‘framework’’ could be mentioned—but, actually, not so many. What this suggests to me is that the average biologist—a ‘‘normal scientist’’ in Thomas Kuhn’s sense—is ill prepared to deal with such conflicts, and indeed feels uneasy when having to face them. How should, say, a young researcher in the life sciences, keen on advancing her career, position herself in such debates? Here it may be useful to recall Kuhn’s view on the tension between tradition and innovation, which predates his controversial ‘‘stage model’’ of scientific change (normal science1 ? crisis ? scientific revolution ? normal science2; etc.). Participating in the Third University of Utah Research Conference on the Identification of Scientific Talent in 1959,