ABSTRACT This study examines the conditions under which insurgent groups can be successfully integrated into the state at political and military levels during post-conflict stabilization. While previous research emphasizes disarmament, demobilization, and integration, these steps are neither universal nor linear. Our research proposes an alternative approach: integrating insurgent groups into military and political institutions without requiring disarmament. This strategy hinges on a two-pronged method that divides insurgent groups into leaders and soldiers. Leaders are integrated into the political system, ensuring their power, legitimacy, and regional influence, while soldiers retain their arms within the military, reducing the risk of splinter groups and resentment. This approach provides insurgents with a compelling incentive to join state structures, discouraging a return to violent non-state activities. Through a mixed-methods analysis, including t-tests and case studies from the Philippines and El Salvador, we demonstrate that maintaining armed insurgents within state institutions reduces violence and fosters stability. This study builds on previous research by exploring tactics to draw insurgent groups into negotiations and offers significant contributions to state-building literature.
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