Philosophical Structure Research Articles

Structuralism in differential equations

Structuralism in philosophy of mathematics has largely focused on arithmetic, algebra, and basic analysis. Some have doubted whether distinctively structural working methods have any impact in other fields such as differential equations. We show narrowly construed structuralism as offered by Benacerraf has no practical role in differential equations. But Dedekind’s approach to the continuum already did not fit that narrow sense, and little of mathematics today does. We draw on one calculus textbook, one celebrated analysis textbook, and a monograph on the Navier–Stokes equation to show structural methods like Dedekind’s have long been central to differential equations, and have philosophically respectable ontology and epistemology.

Philosophical and methodological bases of cut and sentence interpretation in formal linguistics

Philosophical and methodological bases of cut and sentence interpretation in formal linguistics. Now it remains to answer the question of which of these units - logical units or linguistic units - is more scientifically older. Science has already answered this question - linguistics (broader philology) was separated from the structure of philosophy only in the XVIII century, that is, linguistic definitions were copied from philosophy - from logic. This can be proved by another incident. This section of our work can be concluded with the following general conclusion: In Uzbek formal linguistics, the interpretation of the position of the cut in the sentence structure was given not based on the internal (native, ontological) features of the Uzbek language, but based on the understanding of the cut in Russian formal linguistics. In formal linguistics itself, the interpretation of the cut is based on the understanding of the logical predicate.

Socrates and Lao Tzu: philosophy and “Sophiphilia”

This article discusses the problem of the lost meaning of the philosophy, which emerged as a result of its “technematization” in modern world. The question of “What is philosophy?” is being raised again. The author refers to the two key representatives of philosophical thought of the ancient West and East: Socrates and Lao Tzu, using the comparative approach and considering the category of Tao in the contrast to the main categories of ancient Greek philosophy: being, truth, logos, and action. Reconstruction of the teachings of Socrates and Lao Tzu contributes to the disclosure of philosophy through the four crucial aspects: ontological, gnoseological, anthropological, and ethical. The explanation of these aspects or dimensions of the philosophy gives the key to its initial meaning. The author concludes on the borderline and specificity between “wisdom” and “discretion”, where the latter is the primary foundation of the existence of philosophy. The philosophy itself is viewed as a being and process of cognition, directed not only to the outwards, which is characteristic to the Western European tradition overall, but also to within, which is typical to the Eastern thought. The disclosure of the structure of philosophy indicated the need for coming back to its basic meaning through the ethical dominant, which was initially embedded in the concepts of “wisdom” and “love”. The author introduces a peculiar term of “Sophiphilia”, which corresponds to the level of “discretion” as a pre-philosophical field of existence.

The Antinomies of Serendipity How to Cognitively Frame Serendipity for Scientific Discoveries

During the second half of the last century, the importance of serendipitous events in scientific frameworks has been progressively recognized, fueling hard debates about their role, nature, and structure in philosophy and sociology of science. Alas, while discussing the relevance of the topic for the comprehension of the nature of scientific discovery, the philosophical literature has hardly paid attention to the cognitive significance of serendipity, accepting rather than examining some of its most specific features, such as its game-changing effect, the unexpectedness of its occurrence, and its affinity with the concept of “luck”. Thus, in this paper we aim at analyzing these characteristics in the light of their cognitive implications in the recognition, performance, and possible stimulation of serendipitous events in relation to scientific discoveries.

Bertrand Russell: Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism and Ethical Critical Thinking

Bertrand Russell converted from ethical cognitivism to ethical non-cognitivism and this was historically important, as it gave rise in part, to meta-ethics. It also clarified the central problem between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Russell’s view was that defining “good” is the basic problem of ethics. If “good” is not amorphous, the rest of ethics will follow. He did not believe in ethical knowledge per se and asserted that reason is, and must only be, the servant of desire. A factual statement is thus true if there is an equivalent fact, but as ethical statements do not state facts, there is no issue of a corresponding fact or the statement being true or false in the sense in which factual statements are. Ethics has no statement whether true or false, but consists only of desires of a general kind and people know intuitively what is “right” or “wrong”. To Russell critical thinking is entrenched in the structure of philosophy. His epistemological conviction was that knowledge is difficult to attain, while his ethical conviction showed that people should be expected to exercise freedom of inquiry when arriving at conclusions of something being either “good” or “bad”.

Bertrand Russell: cognitivism, non-cognitivism and ethical critical thinking

Bertrand Russell converted from ethical cognitivism to ethical non-cognitivism and this was historically important, as it gave rise in part, to meta-ethics. It also clarified the central problem between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Russell’s view was that defining “good” is the basic problem of ethics. If “good” is not amorphous, the rest of ethics will follow. He did not believe in ethical knowledge per se and asserted that reason is, and must only be, the servant of desire. A factual statement is thus true if there is an equivalent fact, but as ethical statements do not state facts, there is no issue of a corresponding fact or the statement being true or false in the sense in which factual statements are. Ethics has no statement whether true or false, but consists only of desires of a general kind and people know intuitively what is “right” or “wrong”. To Russell critical thinking is entrenched in the structure of philosophy. His epistemological conviction was that knowledge is difficult to attain, while his ethical conviction showed that people should be expected to exercise freedom of inquiry when arriving at conclusions of something being either “good” or “bad”.

Claiming Kant for Feminism: A Discussion of Anderson's Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion

I wish to expose the possibility of a Kantian feminism made actual by Pamela Sue Anderson’s recent book Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion: Reason, Love and Epistemic Locatedness. In this paper I show how Kantian philosophy structures Anderson’s project, and I argue that in embodying the spirit of Kantian critique, this project may be used to turn that spirit against the letter of its expression in an act that would claim Kant for feminism.

Ricœur and the Autonomy of Philosophy

It is well known that for much of his career Paul Ricoeur held stead- fastly to autonomy of philosophical from theological contamination.1 There may well be deep religious motivations for being a philosopher, he acknowledges, but there is no religious trace in his philosophical arguments themselves.2 The lodestar term to which Ricoeur returns in charac- terising this relation is autonomy: the philosophical I maintain is, as I like to repeat, and bears responsibility for itself.3 The determination to preserve autonomous philosophical discourse of Oneself as Another 4 is eloquently attested by separate publication of his final two Gifford lectures which take a theological approach. This commitment to autonomy of philo- sophical can be traced all way back to Ricoeur's student days when it was commended by Gabriel Marcel at his famous soirees,5 through to Ricoeurian Nachlass, in which he continues to maintain liberty of thought and autonomy-I would even say autarky, self-sufficiency-proper to philosophical investigation and way it structures its discourse.6The question of autonomy of philosophical has also exercised Ricoeur scholars both during his lifetime and since his death in 2004.7 A number of different attempts have been made to suggest that theology, in some way or other, has upper hand in relationship or that philosophical is not, after all, autonomous.Henry Isaac Venema critiques thesis of autonomy of philosophical though he does not interrogate notion of autonomy itself, concluding rather that level [of discourse] opens to other by way of attestation to a surplus of meaning, to more-than-possible of superabundance.8 I will show below why this way of considering relation between philosophy and theology is falsely symmetrical. Merold Westphal argues that philosopher's rationality is not but is rather already shaped by symbols, narratives, and traditions to be interpreted and thus 'contaminated' with contingency and particularity of texts themselves, with result that conflict of interpretations is a debate among theologians.9 Kevin Vanhoozer and David Ford both see Ricoeur philosopher as a latter day John Baptist preparing way for religious proclamation. Whereas for Vanhoozer Ricoeur's philosophy does not itself proclaim Christian message but has the more humble task of 'making space' for this proclamation and of rendering this proclamation intel- ligible by providing philosophical approximations,10 Ford goes further to claim that preparation and proclamation for Ricoeur are not in a relation of either/or but of both/and.11What is missing from each of these discussions is an acknowledgement of full extent to which very relation between philosophy and theology cannot be neutral with regard to their respective claims. This is because, as I will show below, what is at stake in determining nature of relation is same as what is at stake in determining status of philosophy itself, namely autonomy. We can see this clearly when we follow Ricoeur's own counsel to look to structural elements of philosophy and theology rather than to their local motifs.For Ricoeur question of relation between philosophy and theology is not a matter of deploying specific terms, but of overall structure of philosophy and theology. He makes this point emphatically in relation to comparing differ- ent philosophical systems in his 1985 essay Irrationality and Plurality of Philosophical Systems:It is so tempting to make punctual comparisons between systems, concerning alleged eternal problems, such as mind-body relationships, freedom and determinism, place of man in universe, happiness and wisdom, and so on. What is overlooked here is that each philosophy determines, by reason of its immanent efficiency, its way of dealing with basic problems raised by ordinary and by physical and noetic sciences. …

Plastic Reading

In her book Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, philosopher Catherine Malabou tells a story about the historical end of reading and writing and their reinvention in a new form. The new mode is seen most vividly, suggests Malabou, in the cerebral plasticity of the brain, but also holds sway in philosophy and literature. The concept of the plastic—which she defines, using the image of plastic explosive, as the capacity to give form and the capacity to take form—refers to mutability, change, exchange, morphing, metamorphosis, and transformation. Plastic reading is a structural approach that aims to document the “structure of philosophy” that remains after a text has been subjected to certain analyses. This essay describes Malabou's vision of plastic reading as a living relation to texts in which metamorphosis regulates the metabolism between stasis and aleatory change.

On the Teaching of Virtue in Plato's Meno and the Nature of Philosophical Authority

Socrates and Meno reach two different conclusions: in the first part of the dialogue, that virtue is knowledge and can therefore be taught; in the second, that it is reliable true opinion and can therefore be acquired only by divine inspiration. Taking into account Socrates’ role as a teacher (of his interlocutors and of Plato) and Plato’s role as a teacher (of us), I show that neither of these conclusions is consistent with the existence of philosophy as a human institution, and argue that, for this reason, Plato refuses ultimately to endorse either of them. Meno’s question — “Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is something teachable?” (701–2) — is important for the obvious reason that it concerns what we must do: if there is some way of acquiring virtue, then we are obliged to acquire it. But it has further implications, as well, both for political philosophy and for philosophical politics: that is, the political structure of philosophy itself. It is therefore worth understanding how Plato answers it, or fails to, in the course of the dialogue. Much discussion of the Meno has focused on epistemological issues, and on the passages in which Socrates explains his theory of learning as recollection. Given the confusing nature of those passages, it is no surprise that many competing interpretations have emerged. I do have ideas about how (and to what Parenthetical references to Plato’s works are to Platonis Opera, 5 vols., Oxford Classical Texts (1902–1913), and unless otherwise indicated to the Meno (in vol. 3, ed. John Burnet). Translations are my own. There is a vast literature (of the kind we call “secondary”) on Plato in general, on this dialogue in particular. I unfortunately do not have space here for a proper discussion of it, though I will sometimes mention other authors below for one reason or another. Some recent interpretations usefully compared to mine are: Rosemary Desjardins, “Knowledge and Virtue: Paradox in Plato’s Meno,” Review of Metaphysics 39 (1985): 261–81; Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (Evanston, IL: Northwestern

ISPC 2007 second editorial

I am pleased to present the second set of papers from the ISPC symposium held at the University of San Francisco in August 2007. The third and final set will be published in another issue of Foundations later this year. The papers contained in this issue cover a greater variety of topics related to the philosophy and history of chemistry than those from the symposium published in Foundations of Chemistry 10.3. These disparate topics have the advantage of revealing how diverse the field of philosophy of chemistry has become. Thus, N. Sukumar’s ‘‘The Chemist’s Conception of Molecular Structure’’ and James Salmon’s paper on emergence tread different paths, but both provide new perspectives on topics that have received relatively cursory attention from scholars within the field; by contrast, Pio Garcia, Richard Pagni, and Meredith Tromble’s papers on serendipity, the history of the acidity function, and Sonia Rapaport’s art, respectively, provide virtually new pathways for philosophers of chemistry to investigate. N. Sukumar’s ‘‘The Chemist’s Conception of Molecular Structure’’ provides a chemist’s-eye view on the current debate on structure in philosophy of chemistry. Rather than arguing for or against the realism of molecular structures and representations he provides a thorough review of ways physical chemists have theorized molecular structure. Starting with the Born–Oppenheimer Approximation (BOA) he shows us the limits of the BOA approach, its modification via virial partitioning into the Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules, and how chemists have moved beyond the BOA altogether to formulate new theories, like Nuclear Orbital plus Molecular Orbital theory, that include, among other things, the dynamic aspects of molecular structure such as Jahn–Teller Molecules, tautomers and the conformational flexibility of biomolecules. James Salmon’s ‘‘Emergence in Evolution’’ argues that explanations for emergence in evolution, including the evolution of life forms, cosmic evolution and the evolution of chemical/biochemical systems, goes beyond that captured by the quantitative notion of ‘‘frequency of occurrences’’. As an alternative to Whitehead’s process metaphysics, which others have applied to emergence in chemical systems, Salmon suggests Teilhard de Chardin’s informal metaphysics of spirit-matter as an equally valid, and more accessible,

Explaining Evolutionary Innovations and Novelties: Criteria of Explanatory Adequacy and Epistemological Prerequisites

It is a common complaint that antireductionist arguments are primarily negative. Here I describe an alternative nonreductionist epistemology based on considerations taken from multidisciplinary research in biology. The core of this framework consists in seeing investigation as coordinated around sets of problems (problem agendas) that have associated criteria of explanatory adequacy. These ideas are developed in a case study, the explanation of evolutionary innovations and novelties, which demonstrates the applicability and fruitfulness of this nonreductionist epistemological perspective. This account also bears on questions of conceptual change and theory structure in philosophy of science.

What structures could not be

James Ladyman has recently proposed a view according to which all that exists on the level of microphysics are structures “all the way down”. By means of a comparative reading of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics as proposed by Stewart Shapiro, I shall present what I believe structures could not be. I shall argue that, if Ladyman is indeed proposing something as strong as suggested here, then he is committed to solving problems that proponents of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics such as Shapiro are trying to solve. Attempting to do so, however, brings out a tacit tension in Ladyman's position. I shall argue that the upshot of this is that the ontological import that Ladyman attributes to structures is rather epistemological import properly understood.

Del silencio de Auschwitz a los silencios de la filosofía

The essay proposes a formal approach to the problem of determining the effect that that historical figure of modern absolute political evil referred to as Auschwitz has produced or ought to have produced in the structure of Philosophy. The premise is that Philosophy, faced with that unheard-of challenge of classical rationality, has been left internally conditioned by a tension or an irreductible opposition: between passion of silence and promise of memory, between the allegiance to the testimonies of an irreparable wrong ant the duty of memory, of blessing the ashes. Thus the necessity of a rigorous deconstruction of the idealistic axiomatics of dominant Western rationalism, and the contemplation of new possibilities of philosophically ellaborating silence and evil in the scope of Jewish thought, in dialogue with the Jewish and Christian theology of the Shoah : from Rosenzweig and Scholem to Adorno, Levinas and Derrida.

Natural Family Planning: Development of National Programs

This monograph which arises out of the proceedings of a seminar with delegates from natural family planning (NFP) programs in 35-40 countries focuses on NFP programs their development needs and characteristics. The goal in this monograph is to reflect the reality of developing national NFP programs on a worldwide basis and to analyze the development aspect. Specific characteristics and developmental approaches including various resources and instruments are described as an aid to the establishment of new programs. The monographs 1st section presents some 20 or more developing programs. 9 major programs were selected in the 4 geographical regions or zones of the International Federation for Family Life Promotion (IFFLP) -- Africa the Americas Asia-Oceania and Europe -- for detailed analysis. Another dozen programs are presented in a summary form. The more representative program descriptions were chosen from among 40 IFFLP affiliates. For the most part NFP programs and services have been developed in a private network outside the major public family planning programs and a majority of programs have a religious origin and basis of operation. The 2nd section of the monograph analyzes in greater depth program development training and service development and program evaluation. In addition to the presentations of the major themes comments were invited from additional speakers. The presentation on program development by Marie-Paule Doyle former IFFLP president from Canada introduces a discussion or primary orientations philosophy structure leadership and funding. Dr. Thomasina Borkman a social scientist offers a challenging analysis of the dominant characteristics of existing NFP programs and suggests a mechanism for monitoring the impact of new developments on NFP programs. There are 2 presentations on the quality training of NFP teachers and educational services. Dr. John Laing illustrates several years of research analysis in the Philippines on the demographic impact of rhythm and its potential as an integral part of the national family planning program.

The Structure of Philosophy.

The Structure of Philosophy.