Structure Of Evolutionary Theory Research Articles

Biological constraints as norms in evolution

Biology seems to present local and transitory regularities rather than immutable laws. To account for these historically constituted regularities and to distinguish them from mathematical invariants, Montévil and Mossio (Journal of Theoretical Biology 372:179–191, 2015) have proposed to speak of constraints. In this article we analyse the causal power of these constraints in the evolution of biodiversity, i.e., their positivity, but also the modality of their action on the directions taken by evolution. We argue that to fully account for the causal power of these constraints on evolution, they must be thought of in terms of normativity. In this way, we want to highlight two characteristics of the evolutionary constraints. The first, already emphasised as reported by Gould (The structure of evolutionary theory, Harvard University Press, 2002), is that these constraints are both produced by and producing biological evolution and that this circular causation creates true novelties. The second is that this specific causality, which generates unpredictability in evolution, stems not only from the historicity of biological constraints, but also from their internalisation through the practices of living beings.

Mocroevolution, minimalism, and the paleobiological revolution


 It is a basic question of evolutionary theory what sort of connections there are between microevolutionary and macroevolutionary processes, i. e. between changes below the level of species in the present and changes above the level of a given species in the long run. The paper argues that this question about the structure of evolutionary theory cannot be answered just by comparing arguments by modern synthesis theory on the one hand and those of paleobiology on the other. Modern synthesis theory remains sceptical of the use of microevolutionary mechanisms, while paleobiology maintains their importance. The paper claim that the question can only be answered within the context of the history of science that has been shaping it since the publication of Darwin’s The Origin of Species. So the question about the use of microevolutionary mechanisms should be considered to be a struggle about the scope of evolutionary science and its methodologies rather than a scientific question about the reducibility of macroevolution.

Functionalism and structuralism as philosophical stances: van Fraassen meets the philosophy of biology

I consider the broad perspectives in biology known as ‘functionalism’ and ‘structuralism’, as well as a modern version of functionalism, ‘adaptationism’. I do not take a position on which of these perspectives is preferable; my concern is with the prior question, how should they be understood? Adapting van Fraassen’s argument for treating materialism as a stance, rather than a factual belief with propositional content, in the first part of the paper I offer an argument for construing functionalism and structuralism as stances also. The argument draws especially on Gould’s (The structure of evolutionary theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002) insights concerning functionalism and structuralism, in particular their apparent historical continuity from the pre-Darwinian period through to today. In the second part of the paper I consider Godfrey-Smith’s distinction between empirical and explanatory adaptationism, and suggest that while the former is an empirical scientific hypothesis, the latter is closely related to the functionalist stance.

Many ways of being human, the Stephen J. Gould's legacy to Palaeo-Anthropology (2002-2012).

As an invertebrate palaeontologist and evolutionary theorist, Stephen J. Gould did not publish any direct experimental results in palaeo-anthropology (with the exception of Pilbeam and Gould, 1974), but he did prepare the stage for many debates within the discipline. We argue here that his scientific legacy in the anthropological fields has a clear and coherent conceptual structure. It is based on four main pillars: (1) the famed deconstruction of the "ladder of progress" as an influential metaphor in human evolution; (2) Punctuated Equilibria and their significance in human macro-evolution viewed as a directionless "bushy tree" of species; (3) the trade-offs between functional and structural factors in evolution and the notion of exaptation; (4) delayed growth, or neoteny, as an evidence in human evolution. These keystones should be considered as consequences of the enduring theoretical legacy of the eminent Harvard evolutionist: the proposal of an extended and revised Darwinism, coherently outlined in the last twenty years of his life (1982-2002) and set out in 2002 in his final work, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. It is in the light of his "Darwinian pluralism", able to integrate in a new frame the multiplicity of explanatory patterns emerging from different evolutionary fields, that we understand Stephen J. Gould's legacy in palaeo-anthropology today, both in terms of provocative shocks to comfortable visions of human evolution and, above all, in terms of specific scientific predictions about future research.

Joseph Adams in the judgment of Paris

Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and ReviewsVolume 17, Issue 6 p. 245-249 Crotchets & QuidditiesFree Access Joseph Adams in the judgment of Paris Evolution's remarkable little book 45 years before Darwin Kenneth M. Weiss, Kenneth M. Weiss [email protected] edu Kenneth M. Weiss is Evan Pugh Professor of Anthropology and Genetics at Penn State University.Search for more papers by this author Kenneth M. Weiss, Kenneth M. Weiss [email protected] edu Kenneth M. Weiss is Evan Pugh Professor of Anthropology and Genetics at Penn State University.Search for more papers by this author First published: 22 December 2008 https://doi.org/10.1002/evan.20186Citations: 6 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References 1 Eiseley LC. 1958. Darwin's century: evolution and the men who discovered it. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 2 Mayr E. 1954. Change of genetic environment and evolution. In: J Huxley, AC Hardy, EB Ford, editors. Evolution as a process. London: Alleen and Unwin. p 157– 180. 3 Green JC. 1959. The death of Adam: evolution and its impact on Western thought. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press. 4 Gould SJ. 2002. The structure of evolutionary theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 5 Lamarck JBP. 1809. Philosophie zoologique, ou, Exposition des considérations relative à l'histoire naturelle des animaux. Paris: Chez Dentu et L'Auteur. 6 Weiss KM. 2006. The clergyman's wife and the parrot. Evol Anthropol 15: 3– 7. 7 Matthew P. 1831. On naval timber and arboriculture. Edinburgh: A. Black. 8 Eiseley LC. 1959. Charles Darwin, Edward Blyth, and the theory of natural selection. Proc Am Philos Soc 103: 94– 158. 9 Mayr E. 1982. The growth of biological thought: diversity, evolution, and inheritance. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 10 Gould SJ. 1987. An urchin in the storm. New York: W.W. Norton. 11 Wallace AR. 1912. Darwinism. London: Macmillan. 12 Portal A. 1808. Considerations sur la nature et le traitement de quelques maladies héreditaires ou de famille. Memoires Institute Nationale de France 8(Semestre 2): 156– 180. 13 Lòpez-Beltràn C. 2004. In the cradle of heredity: French physicians and L'Héredité Naturelle in the early 19th century. J Hist Biol 37: 39– 72. 14 Motulsky A. 1959. Joseph Adams (1756–1818): a forgotten founder of medical genetics. AMA Arch Int Med 104: 490– 496. 15 Motulsky A. 2002. The work of Joseph Adams and Archibald Garrod: possible examples of prematurity in human genetics. In: E Hook, editor. Prematurity and scientific discovery. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. p 200– 212. 16 Adams J. 1814. A treatise on the hereditary properties of disease. London: J. Callow. 17 Pollard TM. 2008. Western diseases: an evolutionary perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 18 Ewald P. 2000. Plague time: how stealth infections cause cancers, heart disease, and other deadly ailments. New York: Free Press. 19 Wallace AR. 1858. On the tendency of varieties to depart indefinitely from the original type. Proc Linn Soc 3: 53– 62. 20 Well WC. 1818. An account of a female of the white race of mankind, part of whose skin resembles that of a negro. In: WC Wells. Two essays, London: Archibald Constable. p. 425–439. Citing Literature Volume17, Issue6November/December 2008Pages 245-249 ReferencesRelatedInformation

Stephen Jay Gould on species selection: 30 years of insight

Stephen Jay Gould made impressive contributions to macroevolutionary theory; one of the topics in this area that particularly interested him was how to define and recognize species selection. Here we explore how and why Gould's ideas on concepts related to species selection evolved over 30 years, from the punctuated equilibria paper of 1972 to his “Structure of Evolutionary Theory” magnum opus published in 2002. Throughout his career his ideas on species selection shifted between three phases. Initially, Gould favored a definition of species selection that was more descriptive. Later, he came to distinguish between species sorting, which he called species selection in the broad sense, and true species selection, which is tied to the concept of species-level aptations. Finally, he came to view species selection in a broader, more inclusive way, effectively merging the two earlier viewpoints. His ideas on species selection changed over the years because he was trying to square his views on complex concepts like adaptation, natural selection, emergence, and the independence of macroevolutionary theory. Gould's thoughts on species selection not only help to define the history of debate on the concept but also help set a course for the future.

Constraints and Spandrels in Gould's Structure of Evolutionary Theory

Gould's Structure ofEvolutionary Theory argues that Darwinism hasundergone significant revision. Although Gouldsucceeds in showing that hierarchicalapproaches have expanded Darwinism, hiscritique of adaptationism is less successful. Gould claims that the ubiquity of developmentalconstraints and spandrels has forced biologiststo soften their commitment to adaptationism. Iargue that Gould overstates his conclusion; hisprincipal claims are compatible with at leastsome versions of adaptationism. Despite thisweakness, Gould's discussion of adaptationism –particularly his discussions of the exaptivepool and cross-level spandrels – shouldprovoke new work in evolutionary theory and thephilosophy of biology.

Evolutionary Anatomy of the Primate Cerebral Cortex, 2001 et S.J. Gould : regards croisés

Evolutionary Anatomy of the Primate Cerebral Cortex, 2001 and S.J. Gould: crossed paths. The book Evolutionary Anatomy of the Primate Cerebral Cortex (Falk and Gibson, 2001) is a report of the congress in honor of H.J. Jerison held in USA (1998). Gould wrote the foreword of that book and Jerison its epilogue. For some participants, Gould’s successive works on organisms' evolution have given an important background to their own research. Jerison and Gould met for the first time something like 40 years ago and all along they have shared common scientific interests. In this article, we shall attempt an overview of Evolutionary Anatomy of the Primate Cerebral Cortex, one of the themes close to an ‘influential’ (fide Gould) book entitled: Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence (Jerison 1973). Tendencies in the organization of the brain volume of Vertebrates, and especially in still-living or fossils mammals, is a major question (cf. recent publications and the debate in Nature). If Jerison was a leader for the encephalization concept ( sensu 1D, 2D), Gould clearly introduced modern research (nD) on encephalization. From him, the representation through hyperspace could describe the complexity of the paths followed by Vertebrate brain evolution. From this, the new concept of neurotaxonomy (see Thireau et al., Bull. Soc. Zool. France 122 (4) (1997) 393–411) relates encephalic organisation to species taxonomy. So, in the future, paleoneurologists should be using some results from the neurotaxonomy of existing species, for help in completing interpretation of endocranian casts. Throughout this article, special attention is given to Gould’s arguments, proposed in his foreword to Falk et Gibson, 2001. Each of these deserves to be discussed, thus benefiting evolutive neurobiology, and should be completed by the reading of his major contribution to modern biology: The structure of Evolutionary Theory (Gould 2002). To cite this article: L. Thireau, J.-C. Doré, C. R. Palevol 2 (2003).

Struggle in The Structure of Evolutionary Theory

Struggle in <i>The Structure of Evolutionary Theory</i>

Knowing your ancestors: themes in the history of evo-devo.

In his magnum opus on the structure of evolutionary theory, Stephen Jay Gould offers the following justification for his extensive attention to the history of evolutionary ideas: ‘‘I regard such analysis not as an antiquarian indulgence, but as an optimal path to [a] proper understanding of our current commitments, and the underlying reasons for our decisions about them’’ (Gould 2002). Evolutionary developmental biology (‘‘evo-devo’’) has become a legitimate research discipline in contemporary biology, and it is time to more adequately trace its origins. A number of articles and conferences have begun an attempt at addressing the historical background to the emergence of evo-devo. The Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology has held two workshops entitled ‘‘From Embryology to EvoDevo’’ (summer 2001 at Marine Biological Laboratories in Woods Hole, MA; fall 2002 at the Dibner Institute in Cambridge, MA), with biologists, historians, and philosophers attempting to seek key contours for a history of evodevo. Some participants have attempted to highlight the relevance of particular researchers, whereas others have tried to isolate key institutional changes that fostered evo-devo as we now see it. Similar work is also emerging in refereed journals (Guralnick 2002). Our goal here is to suggest that a different sorting of the

Last Will and Testament: Stephen Jay Gould's The Structure of Evolutionary Theory

I outline Gould's conception of evolutionary theory and his ways of contrasting it with contemporary Darwinism; a contemporary Darwinism that focuses on the natural selection of individual organisms. Gould argues for a hierarchical conception of the living world and of the evolutionary processes that have built that living world: organisms are built from smaller components (genes, cells) and are themselves components of groups, populations, species, lineages. Selection, drift and constraint are important to all of these levels of biological organization, not just that of individual organisms. Moreover, both drift and constraint are more important than orthodoxy supposes. While having some sympathy for both of these lines of argument, I argue that they are more problematic than Gould supposes, and that he understates the power and the heterogeneity of orthodox conceptions of life's evolution.

A Season with Steve Gould

The Structure of Evolutionary Theory; by Stephen Jay Gould, 2002: Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1433 pages, $39.95.— T.S. Eliot, wrote in Burnt Norton, from his famous Four Quartets, “Time past and time future Allow but a little consciousness. To be

Stephen Jay Gould à la recherche du temps perdu

The Structure of Evolutionary Theory . By Stephen Jay Gould . Belknap (Harvard University Press), Cambridge, MA, 2002. 1457 pp. $39.95, £27.50, €45.90. ISBN 0-674-00613-5. In this magnum opus, Gould offers a history of the core concepts of Darwinism, considers recent critiques of these ideas, and provides a detailed account of his own synthesis of evolutionary theories.

LESS WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE1

Stephen Jay Gould, remarkable paleontologist and revered popularizer of science, died of cancer on May 20, 2002. With his death, he passed into the history that he loved; a history, as he well knew, whose mills grind exceedingly fine. Those mills have started work on his writings, just as he ruminated memorably over books by Lamarck, Cuvier, Goethe, Geoffrey St. Hilaire, Darwin, Weismann, de Vries, Bateson, Fisher, Haldane, Wright, Goldschmidt, Simpson, Schindewolf, Dobzhansky, and many others. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, his intellectual last will and testament, was the first book he had written for a professional audience since 1977. He worked on it intermittently for twenty years and rushed to finish, so it seems, as he saw the end nearing. It summarizes, ties together, and places in historical context his major evolutionary interests: punctuated equilibria, especially stasis; hierarchical selection, especially species selection; internalist, as opposed to externalist, explanations of evolutionary patterns; exaptations and the exaptive pool; spandrels and other avatars of constraint; evo-devo and hoxology. It does so at great, needless, and self-defeating length: at about five pounds, it is heavy enough for a stewardess to have insisted that I store it in an overhead compartment for takeoff and landing lest it endanger the passengers. It will be bought more often than read and used as a bookend more often than as a book. Much of it deserves attention, some of it is exciting, and some of it is beautiful, but the gems are hard to locate amidst the sesquipedalian verbiage. Had you told me in 1970 that an evolutionary biologist would succeed in influencing the discourse of our field as much as Gould did for the last thirty years with so little use either of data or of equations, I would have laughed—but he did it, he did it well, and he did it primarily with rhetoric and historical analysis, tools deployed more often in the humanities than in the sciences. With those tools he helped to reinvigorate paleontology, launch macroevolution on a new course, and provide a context in which development could be integrated into evolution. Those are not minor accomplishments. But what was his contribution to evolutionary theory, the focus of this book? Here I argue that he deserves quite a bit more credit than his severest critics would grant (zero) but less than he has here attempted to award himself (a great deal indeed).2 To prepare that argument, I first consider an

Elisabeth A. Lloyd. The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory

The main goal of this book, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (Lloyd 1988), “is to introduce, develop, and demonstrate the usefulness of a precise analysis of the structure of evolutionary theory” (p. 23), an analysis that treats evolutionary theory as built up out of complexly interrelated mathematical models. The book has a second goal as well, namely, “to offer … evidence of the appropriateness and utility of the semantic view of scientific theories” (ibid.). The appropriate audience for the book is not obvious. It is well suited for graduate courses in philosophy of biology, though it demands substantial knowledge of both disciplines. Lloyd has attempted to make it accessible to wider biological and philosophical audiences by minimizing the technical treatment of mathematical models, but I doubt that she has succeeded in making the book accessible to those unfamiliar with the models of population genetics or to biologists previously unversed in the philosophy of science.

A LIKELIHOOD JUSTIFICATION OF PARSIMONY.

Abstract- A connection is established between maximally parsimonious cladograms and trees of highest likelihood. The assumptions needed to prove this are derivable from the structure of evolutionary theory and are independent of the frequency of homoplasy. The bearing of this justification on alternative methods of phylogenetic inference and on Felsenstein's (1978) proof that parsimony and other phylogenetic methods can be statistically inconsistent is discussed.

The structure of evolutionary theory: A semantic approach

The structure of evolutionary theory: A semantic approach

A Structural Description of Evolutionary Theory

What is the structure of evolutionary theory? The question seems to presuppose a unique right answer. But the relevant notion of structure is highly relative to broad philosophic theories about scientific theories. At present no one such theory dominates. One once did. It went by the name ‘Logical Positivism’. During its heyday a unique right answer to our question might have been expected. There is no reason to expect one now.Not only should one not suppose that there is a uniquely correct structural description of evolutionary theory, neither should one suppose that giving a structural description of evolutionary theory is essentially uncovering what is implicit in biological work. That approach is appropriate only when conceptual fossilization has occurred. In the case of evolutionary theory molding is more appropriate than uncovering.

Similarities and Differences between Evolutionary Theory and the Theories of Physics

In the 1950's and 60's there arose a plethora of claims that the structure of evolutionary theory was intrinsically different from the structures of the theories of physics—and thus from the structure that philosophers of science claimed to be the structure of scientific theories. There were claims:1)that evolutionary theory had no laws (Smart 1963);2)that evolutionary concepts were so peculiar that their definitions violated the ordinary standards for definitions (Beckner 1959);3)that evolutionary theory was not axiomatizable (Beckner 1959);4)that evolutionary theory made no falsifiable predictions (Scriven 1959, Manser 1965, Smart 1963);5)that evolutionary biology relied on teleological explanations which violated the deductive-nomological explanation form (Hempel 1965); and6)that evolutionary biology made significant use of narrative explanations which also violated the deductive-nomological explanation form (Goudge 1961)