AngolaandMozambique:TheWeight ofHistory PATRICK CHABAL In trying to explainthecivilconflicts whichhave ravagedAngolaand Mozambique, mostobservers havefocused their attention onthespecificities ofeach case. This articlewillconsiderwhether a morecomparative approachwouldhelpto shedsomeadditional lighton theseevents. The aim,therefore, is notprimarily togivean accountoftheinternal warsin these twosouthern African Portuguese-speaking countries, itistoconsider whether theirmuchtroubledpostcolonialfortune can be made more intelligible by means of a comparative historicalanalysisof the two cases.1 Thetwomainquestions are:whyhasthesituation inAngolabecomeso intractable, and whyis it thatMozambiquehas managedto resolvea conflict whichinmany respects appearedworsethaninAngola?The most common response tothefirst isthatthesituation inAngolawas boundto be difficult to resolvebecauseof thehistorical divisionof thecountry betweenthethreemainethnicconstituencies (Bakongo,Kimbundu and Ovimbundu). The standard reply tothesecondis that,following theend ofapartheid inSouthAfrica, RENAMO simply ranoutofsteamandhad to settle. Thereis sometruth inbothofthesepointsbutI willshowhere whythey areover-simplifications. The article isinthree parts.Thereis,first, an examination oftherecent situation in Angolaand Mozambique.Therefollowsa discussionof a number ofissuesconnected withthehistory ofthecolonialperiodandof the anti-colonial struggle. Finally,the chapterseeks to providea reinterpretation ofwhathashappened sinceindependence inthelight ofthat history. The recent situationinAngola and Mozambique:Hypothesesand causalities The present condition ofAngolaremains precarious. Following the1991 peace agreement, electionswere held in 1992 underUnitedNations supervision. Contrary to expectations theyreturned a majority forthe government in powersinceindependence. The leaderof theopposition refused theelectoral verdict.2 Warstarted again.Another peaceaccord(the 1For usefulbackgroundto the historicalsituationof Angola and Mozambique see, among others,Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa (London: Hurst, 1981) and David Birmingham, Frontline NationalisminAngolaand Mozambique (London:Currey,1992). 2 For an insideaccountof the failuresof theUN see MargaretÀnstee,Orphans of theCold War: The insideStoryof theCollapse of theAngolanPeace Process (Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1996). ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE: THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY 217 Lusaka Protocol)was signedin November1994.3Againa cease-fire was agreed anditsimplementation wassupervised bya muchstrengthened UN presence - until warresumed againinlate1998.4 Between1994 and 1998,an attempt was made by the international community to facilitatethe executionof the 1994 Lusaka Accord: consolidating peace and establishing powersharingarrangements. UN supervision made possible the stage by stage implementation of the Protocol, encouraging boththegovernment andUNITAtoconform tothe terms oftheagreement. UNITAforces wereatthetimebelieved largely to havedemobilized andthenewintegrated nationalarmy was supposedto havebeensetup.Thedistribution ofpostsatthelocal,regional, provincial andnational levelhadbeensettled andbothsidesshowedsomewillingness to conform to theletter, ifperhapsnotthespirit, oftheaccord.UNITA agreed totakeitsplaceintheNationalAssembly. EvenJonasSavimbi was reported tohaveaccepted theposition of'LeaderoftheOpposition'. The reality,unfortunately, was utterly different fromthis edifying assessment. Although formally therehad beenprogress in termsof demilitarization and politicalintegration, thesituation was veryfarfrom stabilized.First,UNITA had not fullydemobilized.Althoughit had disarmed a number ofitssoldiers, there isevidence boththatithadkeptits besttroopsin reserveand thatit was activelyre-arming. Second,the country was neither safenorintegrated. Thereremained areascontrolled byUNITAinwhichnormal politicalandeconomiclifecouldnotresume. Conversely, thegovernment was slow inimplementing powersharing in regions ofthecountry whereit was in control.In short, therewas still much violence throughout thecountry thatthreatened theconsolidation of peace. Third, there waslittle evidence thatpowersharing, suchas itwas,atthe regional andnational levels ledtocollaboration, evenlesstoreconciliation. The structure of politicalauthority in Angolais suchthat,despitethe notional placeofUNITAintheNationalAssembly andother administrativebodies ,authority liesfirmly inthehandsoftheMPLA. Powersharing was simply notan effective reality - nor,perhaps, couldit be. Finally, Savimbi remained as elusive as ever.Therewasmuch evidence, abundantly confirmed since,thattheUNITA leaderhadno intention ofaccepting the offer ofopposition leaderandvice-president andthathewassimply biding histimeuntilhe was in a positionto relaunch hismilitary campaignto seizepoweroutright. The factthathe had refused to signtheLusaka Protocol personally wasa significantly ominous token ofhisintentions.5 3 Although significantly itwas notsignedbyeither ofthetwoleaders. tviüenceorthedihiculty orthepeace processinAngolacan be foundinWhyAngolaMatters, ed. byKeithHart&cJoannaLewis (London:Currey,1996). See here,amongothers, KarlMaier,Angola: Promisesand Lies (London:Serif,1996). 2l8 PATRICK CHABAL Moreover,and despitetheoverwhelming desireforpeace throughout thecountry, therewerestrong indications thatthegovernment was not unanimous on thequestion. Whiletheofficial policywas clearly gearedto showing thattheregime wascomplying scrupulously withUN injunctions and workinghard forthe successof the Lusaka Accord,therewere perennial reports ofa faction within theMPLAwhich favoured eliminating UNITAmilitarily onceandforall. Fromtheir perspective, themistakes of 1992 - when the MPLA began to disarmfollowingthe first peace accord- werenotto be repeated. In short, then, there werewithin both theMPLA andUNITApowerful 'warparties' whoseultimate aimwas to defeat theother sideandassert solecontrol ofthecountry. The resumption ofwarin1998wasampleconfirmation thattheLusaka Protocol hadlittle chanceofsuccess, evenwith strong UN support, because neither side was willingto sacrifice supremacy forpeace. The recent government assaulton theUNITA armedforceshas markeda decisive breakthrough inthattherebelmovement hasbeenejected from thecities it heldandits'conventional' heavy weapons(suchas tanksandlargeartillery pieces)havebeenlargely destroyed. Fromthegovernment's pointofview, itis nowa matter of'mopping up'. Yet,there is little doubtthatUNITA hasnotbeendestroyed as a guerrilla force andthat, despite theenormous military setbacks hehassuffered, Savimbi isfully prepared tocontinue his armed opposition byallpossiblemeans. Nor is itclearthatregional andinternational factors arefavourable to peace.ItistruethattheUnited Stateshasforsometimenowbeenputting pressure on...