Strong Democratic Institutions Research Articles

Applying up: How ethnographers powered public health changes in the United States during the COVID‐19 pandemic

Abstract“Studying up” was Laura Nader's provocation to anthropologists to scrutinize the actions of the powerful few in relation to the ordeals of the powerless many. Engaging this lineage, this article describes CommuniVax, a rapid ethnographic research coalition supporting an equitable COVID‐19 vaccine rollout in the United States. By tapping hyperlocal knowledge as well as that held by public health and governmental authorities at higher reaches, the coalition opened the possibility for a more just pandemic response and stronger democratic institutions. The project also broke with prevailing features in the studying up tradition: It operated as a multidisciplinary collective rather than a lone ethnographer, partnered with elites rather than a priori holding them at arm's length, and emphasized pragmatic solutions over scholastic critiques. These departures embody an “applying up” modality, supporting the idea ethnographers have plural strategies for studying actors who exert strong influence over others’ lives.

Attracting Foreign Venture Capital Investment: The Institutions that Matter Most for Emerging Economies

This study explores the critical institutions and challenges influencing the attraction of international venture capital (VC) investment in emerging economies. By examining governance indicators such as "Voice and Accountability" and "The Rule of Law," the research highlights the importance of strong democratic institutions and robust legal frameworks in creating an attractive investment environment. It also identifies the complexities of regulatory frameworks, political stability, and corruption control in this context. The findings suggest that while effective governance fosters VC investment, over-reliance on government assistance can be counterproductive. The study emphasizes the need for collaboration among governments, regulatory bodies, and local organizations to create an investor-friendly climate, unlocking the potential for innovation and economic growth in emerging markets. Further research is recommended to understand the nuanced interactions between these factors and VC investments across diverse settings.

Civic space and its effects on advocacy Non‐Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Tanzania

AbstractGlobal trends show that the civic space is shrinking. Specifically, civic space for Civil Society Organizations draws more attention. The shrinkage is caused by increased authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. Experience shows that advocacy based Non‐Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are more affected. The situation in Tanzania is comparable to other parts of the world. However, literature in Tanzania does not establish experiences to characterize the civic space of advocacy NGOs and does not explore the effects of existing civic space on advocacy NGOs. Drawing on Tanzania, this study examines NGOs experience and the effects of civic space on their roles. This study is anchored in interpretivism and case studies, following a qualitative path. Four NGOs and 10 activists were included. Interviews and documentary reviews were used to collect data, and a thematic approach was used to analyse the data. The findings reveal that the civic spaces for advocacy NGOs is changing, unpredictable and contested. There has been negative and positive experiences due to change of political regimes. This causes advocacy NGOs to fail to have long‐term plans, increased fear, loose focus and fail to emerge as strong democratic institutions. NGOs must push for, and the government should accept constitutional, and legal changes to ensure NGOs effective functioning. This specific focus could be extended to other parts of Africa, Asia and Europe, where advocacy NGOs face the same challenges.

HOW CORRECT ARE THE CLAIMS OF GOODNESS OF ASSOCIATIONALISM?

Discussions about how associational life is understood in western societies typically center on the relationship between its robustness and strong democratic institutions. Associations provide the dispersed persons a sense of rootedness. The backdrop of democratization and the introduction of other concepts and categories to understand the significance of associativeness and its connections to democracy are the problems, though. Furthermore, using associations to achieve ones own or communal interests is more essential than whether a person is a associated self since it shows initiative and leadership on the part of the individual. Overall, the relationship could be viewed as a dynamic process where associational actions are considered as an essential component of the state rather than as something separate from or outside of it.

Firms and Technology Adoption: The Role of Political Institutions and Market Size

The study presents a political economy model and analyses how firms behave towards technology up-gradation given the different dynamics of political and market institutions. The model presented here depicts that political power is controlled by the elite, who formulate trade policy to consolidate power. While the middle-class access the production technology and the labour class provides labour inelastically. The model shows that the technology adoption decision of a firm essentially depends upon the political institutions and the market size of the country. Firms in a country with strong democratic institutions adopt new technology more rapidly. While in a weak democracy, firms successfully persuade the elite policymaker to impose higher trade restrictions and obtain higher protection from technologically advanced foreign firms. Moreover, the model also shows that firms operating in a large market adopt technology more rapidly since a large market has a high price elasticity of demand and supports a large number of larger firms. Furthermore, firms adopt technologies more swiftly when the productivity gains from the adoption are relatively large.

The cost of debt and political institutions: the influence of corruption

PurposeThis cross-border study’s main purpose is to examine whether there is a significant association between political institutions and the cost of debt. In addition, it also investigates whether this association is moderated by the country’s corruption levels.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a unique cross-border data set comprising 45,848 firms from 117 countries from 2002 to 2017 to investigate these research questions. Further, the authors use the two-stage least squares method to mitigate issues of endogeneity.FindingsThis study finds that political institutions are significantly associated with cost of debt. Specifically, the cost of debt is lower in countries with stronger democratic institutions, smaller government bureaucracies and higher adherence to the rule of law. Further, this association is strengthened by low corruption levels.Originality/valueThis study provides new insights into the relationship between political institutions and the cost of debt. Overall, the results reveal that democratic institutions, government bureaucracy and the rule of law are significantly associated with cost of debt. This association is stronger in countries with low levels of corruption and consistent with Transparency’s International notion that accountability and transparency by government political institutions promote sustainable economic growth.

The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

Democracies rarely fight interstate wars against one another, but democratic dyads frequently engage in hostile acts short of war, such as militarized interstate disputes and the backing of coups. Do democracies wage proxy war against other elected regimes by aiding rebels with weapons and other assistance? Scholars have found that democracies generally avoid doing so—a phenomenon we term the “democratic embargo.” However, the democratic embargo remains under-theorized. Using both datasets and close examination of purported instances of democratic aid to rebels fighting other democracies, we show that the democratic embargo is stronger than first thought. In addition, we explain the democratic embargo by arguing that strong democratic institutions prevent elected leaders from engaging in proxy war against sister regimes, and embargo violations tend to occur when democratic institutions are weak. We test our theory in two ways. First, using large-N qualitative analysis (LNQA), we examine all potential exceptions to the democratic embargo between 1945 and 2011 to establish the external validity of our claim. Second, we use case studies of the Irish decision not to aid rebels fighting the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland and Pakistan’s decision to support rebels fighting India in Kashmir to assess the internal validity of our theoretical logic. The results provide clear support for our institutional explanation of the democratic embargo. Our argument has significant implications for the democratic peace theory, the study of proxy wars, and the capacity of democracies to fight rebellions.

Democracy, national culture and greenhouse gas emissions: An international study

AbstractThis study examines whether a country's level of democracy is associated with greenhouse gas emission intensity of corporations and if national culture influences this association. Using cross‐country evidence, we find that firms operating in countries with strong democratic institutions are negatively associated with carbon emission intensity controlling for other country‐level variables. Democracy also moderates the positive effect of individualistic cultures on greenhouse gas emission intensity, whereas countries with high uncertainty avoidance and indulgence are associated with high emissions despite high democratic scores. That is, while the effects of democracy and culture on greenhouse gas emission intensity supplement each other, culture shapes a firm's strategy on environmental matters to a greater extent than democracy. The results are robust to alternative variable measurement.

ПОЗИТИВНИЙ МИР ДЛЯ АНАЛІЗУ РОСІЙСЬКО- УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ

Positive peace is an important concept in studying international conflicts. It is urgent to study the viability of positive peace theory to Russia-Ukraine war analysis. The applied method is historical and comparative approach. As a result, it can be concluded that positive peace framework is, overall, applicable for Russia-Ukraine war analysis. In line with the positive peace agenda, it is necessary to develop strong democratic institutions, promote fair business growth, civil liberties, diplomacy and rule of law. Ukraine is further progressing toward this goal, while Russia, on the contrary, demonstrates a trend toward strengthening of authoritaorianism and even outright violation of international law after recognition of «DPR» and «LPR» and the ongoing military aggression against Ukraine. Such different political stances of the two countries’ leadership complicate effective settlement of Russian-Ukrainian war. It can be concluded that much depends on skillfulness and diplomatic experience of primary negotiators, as well as mediators. One should carefully consider use of mediator services and good offices and thereby select mediators who are objective, impartial, trusted by both parties and, besides, who have successful experience of previous mediation cases and establishing dialogue. One of the main international organizations involved in the war settlement since its start have been the UN and the OSCE. However, international organizations, overall, demonstrated partial effectiveness in preventing the Russian-Ukrainian war and achieving de-escalation of violence. One should keep in mind the statement that every peace process is unique, moreover, it is imperative to take into consideration local contexts and strive to achieve positive peace conditions.

The conflict of interest in tax scholarship

Problems linked to tax injustices have gained worldwide attention recently, as the aggressive tax planning practices of multinational companies have increasingly been exposed. Legislative reforms and enhanced corporate social responsibility practices have been introduced to deter tax avoidance, yet with little enduring success. However, little attention has been paid to the role of tax scholarship or to the statutory interpretation in the problems of tax avoidance. This paper contradicts the commonplace view that tax law scholarship serves the public interest. The paper approaches tax scholarship as a social practice, and argues that conflicting interests emerge when tax scholars conduct doctrinal study of law. As many tax scholars work for the tax advisory industry alongside their scholarly jobs, they have an incentive to propose legal arguments in their scholarly work that advance their private clients’ interests. Since judges use scholarship as an interpretive aid when defining the content of tax law, tax scholarship might bias the development of legal doctrine. It is argued that scholarship may therefore change the distributive effects of tax systems, in favor of the tax advisory firms’ clients. As a result, the democratic legitimacy of tax systems may be undermined. This article illustrates the problematic aspects of tax scholars’ double roles using empirical examples from Finnish legal culture and Finnish law reviews and codes of conduct in universities. This paper develops an argument that if such problems are prevalent in a country with little corruption and strong democratic institutions, they may be widespread in jurisdictions beyond Finland.

Legal rules, information transparency and Islamic bank capital decisions

ABSTRACT To what extent does the formal institutional environment influence Islamic bank capital decisions? We answer this question by assessing the effect of the legal rule index on a sample of 100 Islamic banks in 28 countries from 1999 to 2013. Our econometric analyses show that legal rule index positively and significantly influences capital ratios. The results can be explained by the idea that effective legal rules incentivize Islamic banks to hold higher capital ratios to signal better monitoring to depositors and regulators. In addition, we find that this positive association can be enhanced through strong information transparency channels, democratic and stable political institutions. These results provide insight into how a formal institutional environment can shape Islamic bank capital ratios. It further suggests that the formal institutional environment serves as a constraint on policymakers, as any given capital guideline may function very differently depending on the complexity of the formal institutional environment.

Political institutions and the control of corruption: a cross-country evidence

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the significant association between political institutions and the control of corruption.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses ordinary least squares model to examine the following: quality of political institutions; the association between the strength of democratic institutions and control of corruption; the association between government effectiveness and control of corruption; and the association between legal institutions and control of corruption.FindingsThe result shows that there is positive association between democratic institutions, government bureaucracy and rule of law with the control of corruption. From the political perspective, stronger democratic institutions are found to be associated with higher ability to control corruption in a country. When viewed from country’s economic and social well-being perspective, highly effective government bureaucracy is positively associated with ability to control corruption. Finally, rule of law is also associated with the control of corruption.Originality/valueThis study points toward clear priorities for reform as stronger democratic institutions, efficient government bureaucracy and adherence to the rule of law improve the control of corruption. The results show that stronger democratic institutions, highly effective government bureaucracy and rule of law are associated with higher control of corruption. This supports the theory that quality political institutions reduce corruption in the long-run. In addition, this study shows that press freedom, regulatory quality and political stability further enhance the capacity of such institutions to combat corruption. Conversely, crony capitalism systems undermine this positive association.

INTEGRATION WITHOUT GENTRIFICATION

Abstract Advocates for racial justice who are skeptical of racial integration frequently emphasize the disproportionate burdens that integration places on people of color, pointing, for example, to the fact that integration programs often focus on moving people of color into White communities, schools, and workplaces rather than the reverse. Despite renewed philosophical attention to the issue of racial integration, this concern about “one-way” integration has not been adequately addressed. This is surprising, since processes of gentrification have seen increasing numbers of White people moving into communities of color, reversing the mid-century trend of “White flight.” In this paper, I argue that, despite serious injustices associated with gentrification as it has unfolded, the trend holds some promise for a more equitable approach to integration, provided that it can be uncoupled from its role in initiating processes that lead to the displacement and exclusion of long-term residents. Resisting these effects, I argue, requires strong and effective democratic institutions at the city and neighborhood levels. With this in mind, I conclude with a brief review of some policy measures that might reinforce such institutions, focusing on community land trusts as a promising possibility for facilitating equitable racial integration.

U.S. Multinationals and Human Rights: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of Extractive Versus Nonextractive Sectors

The consequences of foreign direct investment (FDI) for human rights protection are poorly understood. We propose that the impact of FDI varies across industries. In particular, extractive firms in the oil and mining industries go where the resources are located and are bound to such investment, which creates a status quo bias among them when it comes to supporting repressive rulers (“ location-bound effect”). The same is not true for nonextractive multinational corporations (MNCs) in manufacturing or services, which can, in comparison, exit problematic countries more easily. We also propose that strong democratic institutions can alleviate negative impacts of extractive FDI on human rights (“ democratic safeguard effect”). Using U.S. FDI broken up into extractive and nonextractive industries in 157 host countries (1999–2015), we find support for these propositions.1 Extractive FDI is associated with more human rights abuse, but nonextractive FDI is associated with less abuse, after controlling for other factors, including concerns about endogeneity. We find also that the negative human rights impact of extractive FDI vanishes in countries where democratic institutions are stronger. Our results are robust to a range of alternative estimation techniques.

Многосторонний ответ Канады на вызовы пандемии COVID-19

This year the world is faced with a new global challenge of novel coronavirus, a strategy for responding to which each country has developed its own. For many countries, the spread of COVID-19 has highlighted problems and exposed weaknesses that have become more pronounced every month. Canada is no exception. Despite the developed economy, strong democratic institutions and effective governance at the federal, provincial and territorial levels, the pandemic has become a threat not only to people’s lives, but also to the economic and political systems. The federal government, as well as provincial and territorial authorities were placed in unprecedented conditions when it was necessary to make tough decisions on the introduction of restrictive measures (including a ban on mass events, restrictions on freedom of movement, mandatory quarantine for visitors) and at the same time timely financial support for the Canadian population. The federal center, together with regional authorities – provinces and territories – have formed an integral system of response measures in various areas, including support mechanisms for individuals (students, elderly people, persons with disabilities, indigenous people, etc.), Canadian NGOs, business – community, various sectors of the economy – from agriculture to energy. Also a system of timely exchange of information and data, increasing the dynamism and efficiency of political decision-making process was launched. This article is about the multidimensional focus of Canada's response to the COVID-19 outbreak, plans for responding to the new challenge at the federal and provincial-territorial levels, and how politically effective the federal government's decisions have been.

The New Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive authoritarianism—in which the coexistence of meaningful democratic institutions and serious incumbent abuse yields electoral competition that is real but unfair—is alive and well, nearly two decades after the concept was introduced in the Journal of Democracy. This is surprising, because the Western liberal hegemony of the 1990s, which led many full autocracies to become competitive authoritarian, has waned. Competitive politics persists because many autocrats lack the coercive and organizational capacity to consolidate hegemonic rule, and because the alternatives to multiparty elections lack legitimacy across the globe. Recently, new competitive authoritarian regimes have emerged in countries with strong democratic institutions, raising concerns about the diffusion of competitive authoritarianism to the West.

A Vital Report on Trends in Media Freedom and Its Link with the Future of Democracy

UNESCO’s report World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development is aimed at creating a heightened awareness about human development, media freedom and public access to information for which an enabling environment hinges on peoples’ awareness and participation. The report is like a tool for implementing UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which have a deadline of 2030. It reaffirms that an impartial and responsible media will thrive only in a just and sensible society with good governance, strong democratic institutions, and a healthy media landscape. It calls for media pluralism, diverse, transparent and non-monopolistic ownership, and a healthy communication environment. The report warns of authoritarianism of governments and goes on to show that the issue of media independence matters for both protecting freedom of speech and democracy.

Theories of Democratic Change III: Transitions from Conflict

The notion that robust democracy and violent conflict are linked is commonplace. Many observers of international politics attribute violent conflict in contexts as diverse as Myanmar and Syria to failures of democracy. Conversely, most agree that continuing political violence undermines any effort to build strong democratic institutions in Libya or South Sudan. As a matter of policy, democratization has often been promoted not only as an end in itself but as a means toward building peace in societies scarred by violence. Development professionals tackle these challenges daily, confronting vicious cycles of political violence and weak democratic institutions. At the same time, scholars have dedicated intense scrutiny to these questions, often finding that the interrelationships between conflict and democracy belie easy categorization. This report, the third in a series on democratic theories of change, critically engages with this literature to ask three questions: Under what circumstances do democratic practice or movement toward democracy quell (or exacerbate) the risk of different kinds of violent conflict? Under what circumstances do the risk and experience of violent conflict undermine democratic practice? How can external interventions mitigate risks and capitalize on opportunities inherent in transitions to democracy and peace? To answer these questions, a research team at George Mason University and Georgetown University spent eight months compiling, organizing, and evaluating the academic literature connecting democratic practice and violent conflict, which spans the fields of political science, economics, peace studies, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. This work was funded by USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (the DRG Center), under the Institute of International Education’s (IIE’s) Democracy Fellows and Grants Program. Beginning in May 2018, the authors organized a team of three research assistants, who read and summarized more than 600 journal articles, books, reports, and newspaper articles. The resulting White Paper was the subject of an August 2018 workshop with representatives from USAID and an interdisciplinary group of eight scholars with expertise in conflict and democracy. Based on their feedback, the authors developed a new Theories of Change Matrix and White Paper in October 2018. This draft received further written feedback from USAID and another three scholars. The core team then revised the report again to produce this final draft. This report’s approach to the literature differs from past phases of the Theories of Democratic Change project. While past reports detailed the hypothesized causes of democratic backsliding (Phase I) and democratic transitions (Phase II), this report focuses on the reciprocal relationship between democratic practice and conflict. The report therefore organizes hypotheses into two questions and then sub-categories within each question.

Pushing on a String? Public Financial Management Reform and Institutional Transmission in Fragile States

‘Institutions matter because they structure the incentives and constraints facing individuals. However...the same institutions work differently in different circumstances, particularly in the absence or presence of open access systems’ (North et al. 2010, p. 256). Development agencies typically recommend that fragile states adopt a range of standardised public financial management (PFM) ‘good practices’ that reflect the forms and functions of PFM systems utilised in advanced economy settings where strong democratic institutions prevail. Rules are established that limit discretion in decision-making and systems are put in place that generate better information to government officials and the public, with the expectation that this will lead directly to improved outcomes. In fragile states, however, PFM systems work in a very different institutional context to that which is present in advanced economies. The state does not exert a monopoly over violence, the rule of law is weak or contested, and political order is maintained through systems of patronage. In this context ‘good practice’ PFM rules, laws, and practices may be only inconsistently implemented or ignored wholesale. Further, even when such laws are followed, increased transparency and information provision may have only a limited impact on outcomes because the incentives of public servants and policymakers are shaped by patrimonial relationships rather than by performance accountability or policy-based electoral pressures. In this paper I present a conceptual framework showing how the institutional transmission mechanisms linking PFM ‘good practices’ to improved outcomes are typically missing in fragile states. I illustrate the framework through application to the extreme-case fragile state of Afghanistan, where there is an apparent contradiction between strong adoption of ‘good practice’ PFM systems and deteriorating outcomes. I conclude with some implications for the future design of PFM reform efforts in fragile states.

Europe’s “democratic culture” in the fight against corruption

This study investigates the influencing factors of corruption in Europe over the period of 1995–2013. Considering corruption as a cultural, multilevel phenomenon, the project proposes the design of models at both the micro and macro levels, allowing for panel-analyses as well as cross- and within-national comparisons. The findings reveal that a bundle of factors adding up to a specific “democratic culture” in Europe that hinders the growth of corruption by generating strong democratic institutions and fostering citizen norms and values aimed at monitoring and sanctioning corrupt actors. As a result, democracy promotion was and it is still the best remedy against corruption spread in Europe. The article emphasizes the relevance and need of area- and cultural-specific knowledge of factors affecting corruption.