The builder of the Canadian revenue system, Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt, said this to the provinces during the Confederation debate of 1865: 'We may ... place just confidence in the development of our resources, and repose in the belief that we shall find in our territorial domain, our valuable mines, and our fertile lands, additional sources of revenue far beyond the requirements of the public service.' (Waite, 1963:53) Sir Alexander could not know fully whereof he spoke, but he spoke definitively and authoritatively. Sixty-five years later, in 1930, Alberta was authorized to enjoy the resource rents Ontario had been deriving from its gold and nickel, Quebec from its asbestos, and Nova Scotia from its coal. Seventeen years later, in 1947, Alberta began to derive substantial revenues from oil. Twenty-six years later, in 1973, oil prices began their sharp upward movement. By now, it is pleasantly obvious to Albertans, and painfully obvious to the Government of Ontario, what Galt really was talking about. It is the Alberta of the seventies, and predictably of the eighties, that finds in her resources 'additional sources of revenue far beyond the requirements of the public service.' It is not (and here I disagree with Premier Davis) a federal system per se that gives Alberta revenue while all of Canada pays higher oil prices; it is rather the Canadian brand of federalism, devised by central Canadians, with provincial ownership of resources. I have no qualm with Richard Simeon's basic statement of the conflict between Alberta and Ontario, and I have much sympathy with his suggested solution a province of Alberta standing firmly on its rights but being generous in the sharing of what some would call its excess rents. I am thoroughly convinced as well that the recent oil price increases and heightened expectations on the part of the provinces with potential oil reserves have propelled Ontario into the forefront of the struggle with Alberta, with Queen's Park acting for Ottawa. Tout comprendre, however, is not tout pardonner. In his brilliant exposition of the centralist view of Confederation, G. Stevenson (1979) tellingly points his finger at Ontario as the first provincebuilding province and as strong protagonist of the provincial interest whenever this has suited Ontario's purpose. I do not agree with Simeon's point that the best, or even the easiest, resolution of the problem is a bilateral or multilateral provincial one, without Ottawa. As he now maintains, however, he did not mean to exclude the government of Canada. Like him, I feel that the federalprovincial climate has improved since the 1979 election; unlike him, I feel that this improved climate can be used. During the Trudeau era of confrontation, there was real danger that the federal government might use the declaratory power or that Alberta might leave the oil in the ground. We have now moved to what I hope will turn out to be a more conciliatory climate. Simeon might want to base his conclusion on his statement, with which I agree, that the Clark government in 1979 had 'a strong incentive to act as a conciliator, and perhaps a greater political capacity to do so than the previous government.' The Conservative party will not likely be cavalier about giving up Alberta seats while it vies for new ones in Ontario, in the East, and in Quebec. It is crucially interested in presiding over the conciliation of regional and provincial conflict without giving up what was once called the Dominion. I am inclined to believe Mr. Hnatyshyn's statement, quoted by Simeon, that the federal govenment must, i.e. is determined to, 'deal with the macroeconomic and regional problems caused by the increase