Strength Of Patent Protection Research Articles

Export quality and patent protection: Stage‐dependent effects in development

AbstractThis paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of patent protection on the vertical innovation of developing country exporters. We find that the relationship between export quality upgrading and patent protection is dependent on the technological stage of an economy. Specifically, patent protection promotes quality growth if an economy's product quality is sufficiently close to the world frontier level. We characterize the density of the distribution of country products, determining the share of country–product combinations that fall under or pass a threshold, and draw some implications for patent policy design. While a majority of combinations exceed the critical threshold, the results nevertheless call for differentiation in the strength of patent protection by income group and product class. To establish these findings, we employ a very extensive index of export product quality at the four‐digit SITC level and utilize a country‐level measure of effective patent protection for the period 1990–2010.

Distance Puzzle in Knowledge Spillovers: A Revisit from the Legal Perspective

Recent studies found that the localization effect of knowledge spillovers has strengthened during the past few decades, a surprising trend amid the age of digitalization. In this paper, we develop an analytic model to understand this phenomenon from a legal perspective. Our model shows that potential litigations and licenses impose a legal cost on follow-on innovators. The strength of patent protection thus shapes the pattern of knowledge spillovers such that a stronger protection leads to more localized spillovers. We test the model predictions exploiting the introduction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982, a remarkable pro-patent shift in the US. Using a matched sample of approximately 2.6 million actual and control citations around the shift, we find that knowledge spillovers became more localized after the creation of the CAFC and this change in the localization effect was more pronounced for judicial areas that were less friendly to patent owners in pre-CAFC litigations, compatible with model predictions. Our study contributes to the literature on knowledge spillovers by introducing a novel legal perspective and offers important policy implications.

WELFARE EFFECTS OF PATENT PROTECTION IN A GROWTH MODEL WITH R&D AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

This study explores the welfare effects of patent protection in a Romer-type expanding variety model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of growth. It shows that the comparison between the productivity of R&D and that of capital plays an important role in the welfare analysis. When the relative productivity of R&D compared to capital is high (low), social welfare takes an inverted-U shape for (is decreasing in) the strength of patent protection, and the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection is no greater than (identical to) the growth-maximizing degree. Moreover, the model is calibrated to the US economy and the numerical results support these welfare implications.

Patenting in the shadow of independent discoveries by rivals

This paper studies the decision of whether to apply for a patent in a dynamic model in which firms innovate stochastically and independently. In the model, a firm can choose between patenting and maintaining secrecy to protect a successful innovation. I consider a legal environment characterized by imperfect patent protection and no prior user rights. Thus, patenting grants probabilistic protection, and secrecy is effectively maintained until rivals innovate. I show that (1) firms that innovate early are more inclined to choose secrecy, whereas firms that innovate late have a stronger tendency to patent; (2) the incentives to patent increase with the innovation arrival rate; and (3) an increase in the number of firms may cause patenting to occur earlier or later, depending on the strength of patent protection. The socially optimal level of patent protection, which balances the trade-off between the provision of patenting incentives and the avoidance of deadweight loss caused by a monopoly, is lower with a higher innovation arrival rate or a larger number of firms.

Against the Strength of Patent Protection

Against the Strength of Patent Protection

Patents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment

Public policy towards patents has assumed a robust positive relationship between the strength of patent protection and the level of innovative research effort even though economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the impact of patents on research varies considerably by industry.This classroom experiment provides students with an introduction to two competing models of the impact of patents on R&D: the ‘winner-take-all’ model contains incentives for excessive research effort and the ‘knowledge spillover’ model contains incentives for free riding. Class discussion explores potential changes to current patent policy and policy alternatives for stimulating R&D.

The Empirical Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Innovation: Puzzles and Clues

Economists have long seen the patent system as a crucial lever through which policymak ers affect the speed and nature of innovation in the economy. It is not surprising, then, that the profound changes that have roiled the global patent system over the past 25 years are attract ing increasing attention from the economics profession. A critical question relates to the impact of these shifts: to what extent do they really affect the pace of innovative discovery and diffu sion? Much of the theoretical economics litera ture, such as Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro (1990), has assumed an unambiguous relation ship between the strength of patent protection and the rate of innovation. This assumption has been relaxed in a line of work on sequential innovation, beginning with Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry Green (1990). This research addresses this question by examining the impact of major patent policy shifts in 60 nations over the past 150 years. I examine the changes in patent applications by residents of the nation undertaking the policy change. While I tabulate domestic filings by residents and nonresidents alike, confounding factors may influence this measure. Thus, I also examine filings made by residents of the nation undertaking the policy change in a nation with a relatively constant patent policy, Great Britain. Much of the earlier empirical work has focused on understanding the impacts of a sin

TOWARDS DESIGNING AN IDEAL PATENT SYSTEM

An ideal patent system balances the returns to inventors and the dissemination of new technologies. This article examines legal policy instruments ‐ encompassing duration, scope and strength of patent protection, as well as invention disclosure and novelty requirements ‐ and R&D subsidies that help sustain growth in GDP. The paper studies the issues associated with designing an effective patent system, surveys the industrial property literature and delineates the focal points of debate among researchers and policy‐makers.

150 Years of Patent Protection

This paper examines three sets of explanations for variations in the strength of patent protection across sixty countries and a 150-year period. Wealthier nations are more likely to have patent systems, to allow patentees a longer time to put their patents into practice, and to ratify treaties assuring equal treatment of other nations. But they are also likely to charge higher fees and limit patent protection in some important ways. Countries with democratic political institutions are consistently more likely to have patent protection appear to be determined by historical factors. The origin of a country's commercial law appears particularly important in explaining the presence of restrictions on patentees' privileges and discriminatory provisions against foreign patentees.

150 Years of Patent Protection

This paper examines three sets of explanations for variations in the strength of patent protection across sixty countries and a 150-year period. Wealthier nations are more likely to have patent systems, to allow patentees a longer time to put their patents into practice, and to ratify treaties assuring equal treatment of other nations. But they are also likely to charge higher fees and limit patent protection in some important ways. Countries with democratic political institutions are consistently more likely to have patent protection appear to be determined by historical factors. The origin of a country's commercial law appears particularly important in explaining the presence of restrictions on patentees' privileges and discriminatory provisions against foreign patentees.

Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics

Innovation and the management of intellectual capital are playing an increasingly important role in competition in high-technology industries. To operate in markets where innovation is cumulative, such as in electronics and semiconductors, firms frequently need to engage in extensive licensing and cross-licensing. This need is amplified by recent increases in the strength of patent protection and by the more active licensing stance of intellectual property owners. A high-quality patent portfolio not only reflects the firm's inventive capacity, but may significantly increase its crosslicensing bargaining ability and reduce royalty payments. In addition, it may directly contribute to its product and process innovation.