Strategic Payoff Research Articles

Impact of the baseline payoff on evolutionary outcomes.

Do individuals enjoying a higher baseline payoff behave similarly in competitive scenarios compared to their counterparts? The classical replicator equation does not answer such a question since it is invariant to the background or baseline payoff of individuals. In reality, however, if one's baseline payoff is higher than the possible payoffs of an interaction (or game), the individual may respond generously or indifferently if s(he) is satisfied with the prevailing benchmark payoff. This work intends to explore such a phenomenon within the realm of pairwise interactions-taking the prisoner's dilemma as a metaphor-in well-mixed finite and infinite populations. In this framework, a player uses the payoff (comprising baseline and game payoffs) -expectation difference to estimate a degree of eagerness and, with that degree of eagerness, revises his or her strategy with a certain probability. We adopt two approaches to explore such a context, naming them as the Fermi and imitation processes, in which the former uses a pairwise Femi function and the latter considers the relative fitness to estimate probabilities for strategy revision. In a finite population, we examine the effect of intensities to payoff-expectation and strategic payoff differences (denoted by k_{1} and k_{2}, respectively) as well as the level of contentment (ω) on the fixation probability and fixation time (for a single defector). We observe that the fixation probability surges with the increase of intensity parameters. Nevertheless, the maximum fixation probability may require a substantially larger time to fixate, especially when the expectation is lower than the baseline payoff. This means that cooperators can persist for a longer period of time. A higher expectation or greed, however, considerably reduces the fixation time. Interestingly, our numerical simulation reveals that both approaches are equivalent under weak k_{2}(≪1) in the Fermi process. We further derive mean-field equations for both approaches in the context of an infinite population, where we observe two possible evolutionary consequences: either full-scale defection or the persistence of the initial frequency of cooperators. The latter scenario indicates players' uninterested or neutral behavior in relation to the interaction due to their satisfaction on the baseline payoff.

Relational contracts with and between agents

We study a dynamic multi-agent model with a verifiable team performance measure and non-verifiable individual measures. The optimal contract can be interpreted as an explicit contract that specifies a minimum bonus pool as a function of the verifiable measure and an implicit contract that gives the principal discretion to increase the size of the pool and to allocate it among the agents. To mitigate the threat of collusion, the optimal contract often converts any exogenous productive interdependence into strategic payoff independence for the agents. Under productive complements, an unconditional bonus pool (pay without performance) can be less costly than one conditioned on the verifiable team measure.

When Optimal Strategy Matters to Prey Fish.

Predator-prey interactions are commonly studied with an interest in determining the optimal strategy for prey. However, the implications of deviating from optimal strategy are often unclear. The present study considered these consequences by studying how the direction of an escape response affects the strategy of prey fish. We simulated these interactions with numerical and analytical mathematics and compared our predictions with measurements in zebrafish larvae (Danio rerio), which are preyed upon by adults of the same species. Consistent with existing theory, we treated the minimum distance between predator and prey as the strategic payoff that prey aim to maximize. We found that these interactions may be characterized by three strategic domains that are defined by the speed of predator relative to the prey. The "fast predator" domain occurs when the predator is more than an order of magnitude faster than the prey. The escape direction of the prey had only a small effect on the minimum distance under these conditions. For the "slow predator" domain, when the prey is faster than the predator, we found that differences in direction had no effect on the minimum distance for a broad range of escape angles. This was the regime in which zebrafish were found to operate. In contrast, the optimal escape angle offers a large benefit to the minimum distance in the intermediate strategic domain. Therefore, optimal strategy is most meaningful to prey fish when predators are faster than prey by less than a factor of 10. This demonstrates that the strategy of a prey animal does not matter under certain conditions that are created by the behavior of the predator.

Strategic Payoff from EDI as a Function of EDI Embeddedness

:A key issue facing IT researchers and practitioners has been the difficulty in realizing strategic payoff from IT investment. This study, drawn on sociological theories of embeddedness, addresses this key issue, with particular attention to the perspective of EDI network initiator. Cross-case analysis is conducted comparing three initiators of sophisticated EDI networks, who realized different levels of strategic payoffs. Results reveal that the achievement of strategic payoffs is a function of EDI embeddedness, which is defined as how central or peripheral a specific EDI network is to managing interfirm interdependence. In a model of EDI initiator strategic payoff, we argue that EDI embeddedness, which is influenced by existing interfirm relationship, moderates the impact of adopter EDI use on initiator strategic payoff derived from the EDI investment. Specifically, while high embeddedness motivates adopter strategic use, low embeddedness deters such use. The model is validated against three reported cases in the literature.

Is Funding Higher Education the Best Strategic Payoff for Blacks?

Is Funding Higher Education the Best Strategic Payoff for Blacks?