Strategic Logic Research Articles

Coercion, Credibility, and Mid-Air Interceptions of Military Planes

AbstractPointing out the remarkable levels of hostile interaction in the air space over contested territory between states like China and Japan or Greece and Turkey we argue that air space incursions can be interpreted as a rational strategy with ultimately political aims. In our interpretation deliberate intrusions of military aircraft into sensitive air space serve as an indirect risk-generating mechanism, as they will trigger scrambles of the opposed government’s air force which may escalate into a military crisis. We derive testable hypotheses from a game-theoretic model, which we developed in earlier work to explore the strategic logic behind this risk-generating mechanism more rigorously. In order to test whether the model’s predictions regarding the effect of short-term economic developments on the states’ interaction hold, we built a database of daily event observations from the Hellenic National Defence General Staff reports of the last 4 years, containing time series data of Turkish intrusions into Greek-claimed air space and the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter planes. What we find is that not only Greek engagements of Turkish intruders but also massed, provocative Turkish intrusions have become significantly less likely after the onset of the Greek economic crisis. These findings are well in line with the predictions of the model and thus supportive of our theory.

Observing War — Keeping Peace?

This study aims to increase the understanding on the strategic logic behind the un-led military non-force missions. Six out of 25 missions are evaluated to determine how strategy is elaborated within the un-system. The cases include observer missions, liaison missions and advisory missions. The analysis illuminates the interaction between the political and military strategic levels as well as the strategic awareness displayed by the un regarding non-force missions. Also the potential added value of non-force missions in peacekeeping is discussed. The authors conclude that there is an imbalance between the strategic preferences of the unsc and the unsg. The strategic awareness as well as the mission character is shown to differ between types of non-force missions. Their purpose seems to be keeping peace by observing war. It is up to the unsc and the unsg to judge whether passive oversight of the ongoing crisis is sufficient or if more active measures are justified.

Terror and Insecurity: The Impact of Boko Haram Crisis on Nigeria’s External Image

The use of terror as a ratio for resolving internal fundamental differences is not uncommon in neo-colonial societies. This is not saying that flashes of same are not recogn ised in the developed environment. The prevalence of this alternative appears as old as the political history of Nigeria. This work underscores the theoretical and historical basis of rebellion in Nigeria primarily focusing on the rise, fundamental philosophy and the vision of the Boko Haramists. The central thesis of this work is that Boko Haram activities have negative effects on Nigeria’s external image and fundamentally, it exposes the nature and dynamics of Nigeria’s security problems. The work contributes in part to the literature on this issue but significantly, it situates the problems within strategic logic which amplifies the degeneration of the problems and the incessant rebellion against the Nigerian State.

The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention

While the normative and legal aspects of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine have been explored in great detail, scholars have largely overlooked the more practical question of whether and how international military action can avert mass atrocities. To shed light on this question, this article investigates the ‘strategic logic’ of preventive humanitarian intervention, or the assumed link between external military action and the desired outcome of preventing or stopping mass killing. It contends that there are five fundamental and seemingly irremediable tensions in this logic, all of which cast doubt on the feasibility of preventive humanitarian intervention and on the long-term prospects of R2P.

The logic of cartel car bombings in México

The war on drugs in Mexico has seen an unprecedented level of violence committed against civilians, the government and rival groups. The bulk of this violence has occurred since 2006, including mass killings and the adoption of new tactics such as car bombings. The aim of this article is to place car bombings within a strategic logic. A total of 16 car bombs between July 15, 2010 and July 3, 2012 were examined, following the extant literature on strategies behind violence and terrorism. The authors affirm that the use of car bombings in Mexico’s context followed various strategic pathways associated with the strength of the group and the government. These group characteristics were applied to both the cartels and the government followed by an example to illustrate support for the assertion.

The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation

When do states acquire nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. To acquire nuclear weapons, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat against which no ally offers reliable protection. Opportunity requires that the state pursuing nuclear weapons possess high relative power vis-à-vis its adversaries or enjoy the protection of a powerful ally. Whereas a relatively weak state without a powerful ally lacks the opportunity to develop a nuclear capability, one with such an ally lacks the willingness to do so. Therefore, only powerful states or relatively weak states with allies that do not guarantee fulfillment of at least some of their key security goals will acquire the bomb. These claims are supported by the overall pattern of nuclear proliferation as well as detailed analyses of the Soviet, Iraqi, Pakistani, South Korean, and West German nuclear development cases.

Trading Coups for Civil War: The Strategic Logic of Tolerating Rebellion

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While “coup-proofing” practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of “coup-proofing” counterweights significantly worsens a state’s security prospects, specifically in regards to civil conflict. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to -- or can even potentially benefit from -- the existence of an insurgency.

The Logic and Contradictions of 'Peaceful Rise/Development' as China's Grand Strategy

Despite the widespread view that China does not have a coherent grand strategy, it does not need to invent one. China has already articulated a grand strategy that is based on the home-grown idea of ‘peaceful rise/ development’ (PRD). The key issue is whether the logic of this grand strategy, and the contradictions within it, are fully understood, and whether China has sufficient depth and coherence in its policy-making processes to implement such a strategy. Although there are elements of longer continuity in China’s strategic outlook, the transformation from Mao’s revolutionist strategy to Deng’s strategy of reform and opening up, involved a radical shift in China’s perception of itself, the world, and its place in the world. That shift provides a stable and coherent background against which to think about the ends and means of China’s grand strategy. The paper opens by looking at PRD’s status as a grand strategy. It then surveys the ends and the means of China’s foreign and security policy as they have evolved in practice and rhetoric. Finally, it assesses in depth China’s practice against three distinct strategic logics within PRD: cold, warm and hot peaceful rise. The conclusion is that China’s current practice points firmly towards cold peaceful rise, but that warm peaceful rise is perhaps still possible and offers many strategic advantages.

Intermodal Nodes for the European Metropolis: Amsterdam Zuidas as EURandstad's Gate

Since more than fifty years, in the Netherlands, the Randstad Holland [1,2] represents a model of reference within the international debate on the sustainable balance between urban areas, infrastructural development and preservation of natural environment. The polycentric urban structure of the country progressively built up a new metropolitan reality of Europe, based on a stable configuration of cities’ spatial relations around the maintenance of the Green Hearth core and on strategic logics of infrastructural developments. However today the double awareness to rebalance growing population of urban areas and to open the region towards North-Central Europe, create fundamental conditions for a renewed expanding vision [3]. The current Dutch metropolitan perspective looks at the densest cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam as main European and international gates, addressing large scale ambitions to clusters of urban developments at the intersection of main roads, railways and local infrastructures. This paper presents an investigative approach and intends to provoke academic discussion on the conflicting and possible relationships between urban policies and design strategies in the construction of a new metropolitan European perspective. Particular emphasis is put on the coordination between contemporary policies with spatial implications in the city of Amsterdam. Exploring its geographical advantages, the City tries to give form to policies’ abstraction of Randstad 2040 vision in the recent structural spatial Agenda, focused on strategic urban and economic cores. The current vision represents the metropolitan ambition of the Netherlands, where the project of Zuidas - literally South Axis - is a prime example of a new model of intermodal urban hub. Throughout the Dutch example, this paper attempts to presentZuidas testing its capability to enhance an innovative approach – in urban policy and spatial implication- to sustainable development.

Strategic capability architecture: The role of network capability

A firm's network capability refers to its ability to build, handle and exploit relationships. These capabilities are interwoven in a complex configuration with the other capabilities and competencies of the firm and in practice, are very difficult to separate from them. Rather than assuming that firms inherently possess network capability, our aim is to discover if the shared managerial logic of top management teams confirms its presence. In order to understand how managers perceive, process and interpret network capability, we guided the management teams of five industrial suppliers through a novel five-step process of introducing, identifying, critically screening, challenging and verifying the capabilities of the firm. The paper introduces a framework for strategic capability architecture and investigates how network capability emerges from among the configuration of other capabilities in industrial firms. We found that network capabilities are central to the formation of customer capabilities. Network capabilities also play an important role as assets contributing to the formation of other capability sets. Furthermore, we found that the networking capabilities act in unison with other capabilities through three different strategic logics termed partnering, value streaming, and horizontal allying.

Introduction

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

China's fissile-material production

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

Strategic stability and regional security

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

INDEX

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

Chinese views of nuclear weapons

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

Nuclear-weapons design and testing

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

China's Missile Forces

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

CONCLUSION

China's nuclear arsenal has long been an enigma. It is a small force, based almost exclusively on land-based ballistic missiles, maintained at a low level of alert and married to a no-first-use doctrine – all choices that would seem to invite attack in a crisis. Chinese leaders, when they have spoken about nuclear weapons, have articulated ideas that sound odd to the Western ear. Mao Zedong's oft-quoted remark that ‘nuclear weapons are a paper tiger’ seems to be bluster or madness. China's nuclear forces are now too important to remain a mystery. Yet Westerners continue to disagree about basic factual information concerning one of the world's most important nuclear-weapons states. This Adelphi book documents and explains the evolution of China's nuclear forces in terms of historical, bureaucratic and ideological factors. There is a strategic logic at work, but that logic is mediated through politics, bureaucracy and ideology. The simplest explanation is that Chinese leaders, taken as a whole, have tended to place relatively little emphasis on the sort of technical details that dominated US discussions regarding deterrence. Such profound differences in thinking about nuclear weapons could lead to catastrophic misunderstanding in the event of a military crisis between Beijing and Washington.

Response to Marc Sageman's “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”

Dr. Sageman makes a good point that despite the influx of government funding in the last decade, terrorism scholars have not been able to answer what he calls a “simple question”—what leads a perso...

Governing the suicide bomber: reading terrorism studies as governmentality

This article engages with the suicide bomber as he or she appears in the terrorism studies literature. In contrast to sensationalised narratives of the suicide bomber as pathological or fanatical, terrorism studies has increasingly come to view suicide bombing as a rational phenomenon that follows an identifiable strategic logic. Following Foucault’s articulation of governmentality, I read this literature as a governmental practice that attempts to understand the latent rationality of suicide bombing so that the phenomenon may be effectively governed and managed. With this understanding, I look specifically at the terrorism studies accounts of female suicide bombers and argue that the concerns they articulate regarding the superior capacity of these women to go undetected, such as with the use of fake pregnancies as disguises, produces the female suicide bomber as a uniquely risky and ungovernable subject.