Strategic Delegation Research Articles

In pursuit of power: Land tenancy contracts and local political business cycles in Indonesia

This study examines whether strategic delegation of land tenancy contracts is linked to local-level political business cycles in the context of a village institution – bengkok land – prevalent since the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Bengkok land refers to communal village land that incumbent village heads receive usufruct rights over until their term in the office ends. We test whether incumbent village heads utilize time-bound access to bengkok land for political consolidation. Based on a novel cross-sectional household survey fielded in 2018 across 130 Javanese villages, we find robust evidence of a positive correlation between the percentage of total tenancy contracts as sharecropping and proximity (before or after) to the village election. As vulnerability of the sharecroppers makes them a pro-poor target for the incumbent village heads, these results implicate political capture.

Lessons in Leadership

In this edition of “In the Public Interest,” Chris Brown, Chicago Public Library Commissioner, interviews Cathy Sanford, former Deputy County Librarian at Contra Costa County Library. Sanford reflects on her extensive career, including her innovative contributions at Memphis Public Library, San Francisco Public Library, and Contra Costa County Library. She shares her leadership philosophy, emphasizing the importance of combining high expectations with robust support, fostering organizational safety, and nurturing staff development. Sanford’s approach to leadership, which includes hands-on involvement, strategic delegation, and a focus on individual strengths, has not only driven numerous award-winning initiatives but also cultivated future library leaders. The conversation also touches on current challenges in the library field, such as book banning, and Sanford’s hopes for the future of library services. This interview provides valuable insights into effective leadership and the evolving role of public libraries.

Cultivating Resilience: Multiple Case Study of School Heads’ Leadership in Integrated Senior High Schools

School leaders must be resilient in order to navigate the always shifting challenges in the field of education. This study employed a qualitative multiple case study, having three (3) distinct cases aimed to explore the perspectives of the school heads on resilient leadership in integrated senior high schools of Division of Davao de Oro. There were three (3) participants and six (6) informants underwent in-depth interviews. Participants were chosen through a purposive sampling technique. Each data was analyzed through thematic analysis and cross-case analysis. Case 1’s unique characteristics were resource management and optimization, hierarchical communication and strategic delegation, and crisis management and contingency planning. Participant experiences were complex stakeholder management, innovative problem-solving, and resilience amidst bureaucratic challenges. In times of challenges, the coping mechanism was structured decision-making processes delegation and team empowerment professional support networks. The policy recommendations were promotion of interpersonal communication skills, development of community engagement strategies, and investment in staff well-being programs. Further, Case 3’s unique characteristics were the following: strategic financial management and sustainability, stakeholder engagement and partnerships, brand differentiation and market positioning. The experiences were cultivating philanthropic relationships, navigating parental expectations, and ensuring financial sustainability. The coping mechanisms were strategic partnerships and fundraising initiatives, ethical leadership and values integration, and self-care and well-being practices while the policy recommendations were introduction of ethics and values integration policies, creation of leadership succession plans, and investment in infrastructure and technology. Moreover, cross-case analysis shows each case about distinct characteristics and commonalities such as strategic vision and planning, effective communication and collaboration, and resource management and optimization. Each case has distinct experiences, the common themes were resourcefulness and creativity, and community engagement and collaboration. Their coping mechanisms were effective leadership practices and ethical leadership and well-being. Their policy recommendations were leadership development policies and data-informed policies. This suggests that resilient leadership was crucial for school heads in managing and leading integrated senior high schools, despite the challenges and circumstances they faced in their workplace. Both teachers and learners benefit from the leadership styles promoted by the school heads.

Does the winner take it all? Federal policies and political extremism

Whether citizens like or dislike federal policies often depends on regional differences. Because of geography, (economic) history or other path-dependent factors, certain regions are perceived to get more out of the union than others. We show that citizens, therefore, have a strategic incentive to elect Federal delegates that are more extreme than the representative voter. The intensity of such strategic delegation is U-shaped in expected benefits. The predictions of our model hence rationalise the voting differences we observe in the data between national and EU elections.

Optimizing Construction Project Team Management: Identifying Team Development Strategies and Techniques

This qualitative research investigation explores the intersection of team development with team management, specifically within the construction industry context. Qualitative data was meticulously gathered through in-depth interviews with nine highly experienced construction project managers and team members. Employing a qualitative approach, we rigorously applied content analysis to scrutinize the amassed data, centering on the core inquiry: 'What precise strategies and techniques of team development are indispensable for effectively overseeing construction teams?' The principal objectives were dual-fold: firstly, to elucidate the nuanced interplay between team development and team management, and secondly, to outline and underscore the critical strategies essential for fostering effective team development within construction projects. Subsequently, the research unearthed three foundational factors pivotal in facilitating and optimizing effective team development, each underscored by its corresponding techniques. These factors encompass the empowerment of team members, strategic delegation coupled with robust support mechanisms, fostering an environment conducive to building effective teamwork and collaboration and fostering continuous personal development within the team context.This comprehensive study delivers invaluable insights into the intrinsic correlation between team development and successful management of construction teams, identifying pivotal strategies and techniques to augment overall productivity, team cohesion, and operational efficiency within construction team dynamics. These findings present a valuable guide for enhancing the efficacy of construction team management practices, thereby contributing significantly to the field.Keywords: coaching, content analysis, debriefing, qualitative study, skills development, team development, team intervention, team management, teamwork, training.

Strategic delegation in Nash bargaining

AbstractBargainers can increase their outcome by delegation. This paper analyzes delegation contracts consisting of two components: First, a percentage of the outcome if the delegate concludes an agreement. Second, a bonus payment if the delegate fails to do so. This paper derives the effects of these components on the principal's payoff and shows that the optimal contract is unique. Optimally, the principal offers a small share and a high reward for failure to reach an agreement. Delegate's bargaining skills play no role in the optimal contract. The condition is derived under which the optimal contract benefits the principal.

Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict

Abstract This paper investigates the issue of strategic delegation by considering the role of management centrality in contracting with different stakeholders. In a sequential negotiation unionized duopoly model, the results obtained by profit-maximizing entrepreneurial firms (where strategic choices are taken by firm owners and wage bargaining involves owners and unions) are compared against those of managerial firms (where strategic choices are delegated to managers who are also involved in wage bargaining vis-à-vis unions). Differences in the relative bargaining power among stakeholders (owners, managers and unions) play a key role in determining optimal delegation contracts, as well as the endogenous choice by firm owners to delegate strategic decisions to the management. Moreover, the distribution of stakeholders’ relative bargaining power affects firms’ profitability and overall welfare. In particular, to minimize potential conflict of interests between firm owners and the overall society, regulation directed to soften the managers’ bargaining strength vis-à-vis shareholders must be designed and implemented.

Global Dynamics of an Oligopoly Game Model with Nonlinear Costs and Strategic Delegation

A dynamic oligopoly game model with nonlinear cost and strategic delegation is built on the basis of isoelastic demand in this paper. And the dynamic characteristics of this game model are investigated. The local stability of the boundary equilibrium points is analyzed by means of the stability theory and Jacobian matrix, and the stability region of the Nash equilibrium point is obtained by Jury criterion. It is concluded that the system may lose stability through Flip bifurcation and Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. And the effects of speed of adjustment, price elasticity, profit weight coefficient and marginal cost on the system stability are discussed through numerical simulation. After that, the coexistence of attractors is analyzed through the basin of attraction, where multiple stability always means path dependence, implying that the long-term behavior of enterprises is strongly affected by historical contingency. In other words, a small perturbation of the initial conditions will have a significant impact on the system. In addition, the global dynamical behavior of the system is analyzed by using the critical curves, the basin of attraction, absorbing areas and a noninvertible map, revealing that three global bifurcations, the first two of which are caused by the interconversion of simply-connected and multiply-connected regions in the basin of attraction, and the third global bifurcation, that is, the final bifurcation is caused by the contact between attractors and the boundary of the basin of attraction.

The strategic decentralization of recruiting

We propose a model of strategic delegation in professional labor markets in which big and fringe firms compete for heterogeneous workers. In this context, big firms decide whether to exercise their market power to suppress wages (wage suppression) or to delegate hiring to divisions, thereby committing to bidding more fiercely for more skilled workers (talent acquisition). This reduces the incentive for other firms to go toe-to-toe with the decentralizing firm. In equilibrium, a big firm commanding labor market power opts for either of these two strategies. We find that the presence of a big firm in the labor market is detrimental to social welfare only if its size exceeds the tipping point beyond which it ceases to decentralize. Moreover, our model is compatible with recent studies that negatively link labor market concentration and labor share. Finally, the introduction of a wage floor encourages the big firm to decentralize, increasing match quality, such that social welfare may increase despite a drop in employment.

Soft Budget Constraint, Strategic Delegation and Overcapacity of Chinese SOE

Overcapacity has become a major obstacle to the healthy development of China’s economy in recent years. Using a mixed oligopoly competition model, this paper studies how the government soft budget constraint and strategic delegation for State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) impact the capacity choice of SOE and private enterprise. Theoretical analysis shows that: 1) Generally, SOE tends to have excess capacity, while private enterprise tends to have undercapacity; 2) The government soft budget constraint and strategic delegation to SOE will not only aggravate the overcapacity of SOE, but the undercapacity of private enterprise. Based on the theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward policy recommendations on the issue of overcapacity for some industrial sectors in China.

It’s a Performance, Not an Orchestra! Rethinking Soft Coordination in Global Climate Governance

Abstract Global climate governance is in transition. As the focus shifts from negotiations to implementation, the quest for ways to effectively coordinate ambitious climate action has become a key concern. While existing studies frame this problem mostly in terms of institutional design (to “facilitate” state ambition) and strategic delegation of authority (to “orchestrate” nonstate action), this article builds on dramaturgical policy analysis to examine soft coordination in practice. Using ethnographic methods, we analyze public performances at the twenty-fifth Conference of the Parties (COP25) in Madrid. We find that these were shaped by preestablished governance scripts and social roles available to participants, but also by creative improvisations and interventions. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat and COP Presidency intervened to configure the physical setting of the conference, mold its narrative arch, and shape available roles. We conclude that performances and dramaturgical interventions are important tools of soft coordination in global climate governance. Their analysis constitutes a productive entry point for grasping contemporary transformations in global politics.

Strategic delegation and tariff protection with network externalities

Strategic delegation and tariff protection with network externalities

Strategic Delegation with Differentiated Products

Strategic Delegation with Differentiated Products

Global dynamics of an oligopoly competition model with isoelastic demand and strategic delegation

In this paper, we propose a dynamic Cournot duopoly game model based on isoelastic demand and strategic delegation. The local stability conditions of each equilibrium point of the system are discussed. We also investigate the influence of parameters on system stability, and we find that with smaller speed of adjustment, relatively large price elasticity, relatively small profit weight coefficient and marginal cost, the duopoly is more stable. Then the problem of coexistence of attractors is studied through the basin of attraction, and it is found that the jump phenomenon in the one-dimensional bifurcation diagram is due to coexistence of attractors. Finally, the structure of the basins of attraction and the global dynamics of the system are analyzed by using critical curves. It is found that when a critical curve or an attractor contact with the boundary of the basin of attraction, global bifurcations occur in the system.

Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly

This paper investigates optimal zoning of two managerial firms in an unconstrained linear city. Comparing with the case in which firms are not managerial type, the strategic delegation increases the incentives of one firm to locate farther from the rival. Then, a welfare function is introduced to highlight zoning regulation as an influential competition policy tool. Depending on the regulator's objective function and the timing of location choice, we provide a new mechanism that allows the regulator to attain the optimal locations of managerial firms and can lead to strong or weak competition.

Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability

Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability

Welfare-reducing price competition under relative performance delegation with convex costs

Price competition is thought to be more intense than quantity competition in oligopolies. By introducing strategic delegation contracts, this study challenges this belief. We consider management reward contracts based on relative performance, which is observed globally. We show that if marginal costs are increasing, quantity competition yields lower prices, smaller profits, and greater welfare than price competition. Then, we endogenize the mode of competition and find that both price and quantity competition can exist in equilibrium. Finally, we extend our analysis to include a mixed duopoly wherein a state-owned public firm competes with a private firm. We determine that the welfare-inferior outcome (price competition) appears in the unique equilibrium. Our findings suggest that price competition does not necessarily imply stricter competition among firms in either private or mixed oligopolies, which is important from an antitrust perspective. They also imply that coordination among firms regarding the mode of competition (contract form) may be harmful to society and should be monitored by antitrust agencies.

Oligopoly dynamics with isoelastic demand: The joint effects of market saturation and strategic delegation

In the framework of a Cournot oligopoly game with isoelastic demand, we examine the simultaneous presence of both market saturation and strategic delegation. Although these two (realistic) aspects have already been considered in the literature each on its own, we aim at deepening their joint interactions when matched together in oligopolistic competition. In addition, we admit the possibility that delegation activities actuated by firms to weaken or even exclude competitors from the market may cease if undertaken by successful players, which thus regain their pure profit maximizing behavior. In this context, a limited market saturation level (positively) influences the effectiveness of delegation strategies and, at the same time, can sustain equilibrium configurations for the winning (monopolistic) firm even under the isoelastic market structure. Through local stability analysis, we show how the combination of strategic delegation with market saturation contributes to determine the equilibrium number of active players and the local asymptotic stability of the (economically relevant) equilibrium. Moreover, non-equilibrium dynamics reveal the presence of periodic cycles along which a firm is active while its competitors alternatively exits and enters the market. We show why these interesting scenarios are due to the joint interplay between strategic delegation and market saturation.

Strategic Delegation and Collusion: An Experiment

Strategic Delegation and Collusion: An Experiment

Global Dynamics of an Oligopoly Competition Model with Isoelastic Demand and Strategic Delegation

Global Dynamics of an Oligopoly Competition Model with Isoelastic Demand and Strategic Delegation