This paper addresses the formation of discrete representations from continuous processes by intelligent systems of varying natures. It explores a range of philosophical approaches—such as monism, sensationalism, dualism, physicalism, behaviorism, cybernetics, and semiotics—that present different interpretations of how intelligence and consciousness transform continuous phenomena into discrete forms. The limitations of existing theories in articulating the mechanisms underlying this transformation are critically examined. By incorporating the concept of discretization, which is traditionally associated with digital signal processing, into interdisciplinary research on artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive sciences, the paper provides a novel perspective on the functions of both natural and artificial intelligence. Discretization emerges as a pivotal function of AI, enabling the conversion of continuous processes into discrete representations. An analogy is drawn between the discretization occurring in human consciousness and the mechanisms employed in artificial intelligence, underscoring the significance of forming discrete representations in the realms of perception and intellectual information processing. A discussion of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle within the context of discretization reveals how this process can lead to information loss and uncertainty within artificial intelligence systems. The concept of discretization has the potential to immensely enrich our understanding of information processing in human consciousness, elucidating how unique sensations and qualities of the perceived world are constructed, and how these processes relate to notions of self-organization and strange loops, as proposed by Douglas Hofstadter. Furthermore, the exploration of qualia contributes to the argument that qualia—which represent a collection of conscious, subjective experiences—must inherently include a discretization function as a fundamental aspect of organizing subjective perceptions. If this proposition holds true, then the philosophical zombie presented in Chalmers's thought experiment becomes conceptually untenable, rendering his criticisms of physicalism and materialism less convincing. This research offers new avenues for exploring the interaction between continuous and discrete phenomena, thereby proposing directions for future investigations in the philosophy of consciousness and the cognitive sciences.