Since Belknap and Campbell tied concept of party identification to political behavior in 1951, party affiliation has played central role in explanations of individual political behavior in United States. Indeed, as Nie, Verba, and Petrocik noted in 1979, in 1950s and 1960s, party identification central thread running through interpretations of American politics, where it was considered a stable characteristic of individual: it was likely to be inherited, it was likely to remain steady throughout citizen's political life, and it was likely to grow in strength during that lifetime (47). However, political scientists also argue that party identification is continually updated to reflect economic performance and presidential approval (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 1998; Fiorina 1981; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989). Efforts by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (1998, 2002) to replicate macropartisanship effect found less influence for economic sentiment and evaluation than MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson (1989) identified and elicited questions about proper form of time-series model and measurement (Johnston 2006). Johnston (2006) concluded that impact of partisan predisposition on opinion and values, on perceptions of performance and of candidates, and on vote itself is strong, but what is unclear is resistance of PID to external forces. Party identification is important, in part, because of its power to predict presidential vote choice (Barrels 2000). Recent evidence suggests that it has become more important over time. Analyzing data from American National Election Study (ANES) from 1952 to 2004, Bafumi and Shapiro (2009) showed that party identification achieved its highest predictive value in 1996 and 2004. Consistent with that analysis, 2008 National Exit Poll revealed that 9 out of 10 self-identified Republicans reported casting their ballot for Arizona senator John McCain, and 89% of self-styled Democrats sided with nominee of their party (CNN 2008). Moreover, Gallup tracking data revealed that in 2008, the rank-ordering of on Democratic-to-Republican continuum generally follows election results quite closely--Obama won 22 of 23 most Democratic (West Virginia being only exception), and McCain won 17 most Republican states (Jones 2009a). Indeed, strong party attachment predicts straight-ticket voting (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). The drop in number of citizens reporting strong tie to party, drop that occurred between mid-1960s and mid-1970s and leveled off in late 1970s and early 1980s, did not change fact that most continued to identify with party. But change in partisan affiliation did focus scholars on its change from one election to another. 2004, both National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) and surveys conducted by Pew Research Center for People and Press showed that gap in self-identified party affiliation between Democrats and Republicans was closing. However, because Republicans turned out in higher numbers than Democrats in 2004, this difference did not produce net Democratic advantage on election day when, for first time since modern exit polling began in 1976, number of self-identified Republicans who voted equaled number of people saying they were Democrats (37% each) (CNN 2004; Pew Research Center 2005). As Kerry-Edwards pollster Mark Mellman observed at 2004 Annenberg election debriefing, In '70s and '80s, Democrats on Election Day had 15-point margins. By time we got to '80s, those were 2 and 3 and 4-point margins. It is right to say that today this was first election where exit polls showed parity (Jamieson 2005). 2000, NAES and ANES observed narrowing of gap (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004, 42-43). Since 2004, gap has instead widened. …