Stolen Assets Research Articles

Theft of public assets in developing countries and the ineffective legal frameworks on cross-border asset tracing and confiscation

In most developing countries with weak rule of law and fledgling democratic institutions, theft of public assets by public office holders is rampant and has a strong correlation with the excruciating level of poverty and underdevelopment that besiege these countries (Ijewereme, 2013). While a myriad number of reasons may be responsible for this situation, the absence of a mature legal framework as well as the scant availability of sufficiently trained government personnel to trace and recover stolen assets, hidden domestically and abroad, arguably remain contributory factors. Granted that corrupt public office holders are typically enabled by porous (domestic) legal frameworks that provide them wide escape routes for their crimes, contestably however, the laws bordering on confiscation of assets in many foreign countries (safe havens) seem intentionally designed to frustrate any recovery of stolen assets by developing countries. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the rate of stealing public assets by public office holders in developing countries is foreseen to rise astronomically and is likely to deepen their existing levels of poverty and hopelessness (Ayode, 2020). Using Nigeria as an example of a developing country, the paper critically examines the underlying defects in the cross-border legal framework on asset recovery and confiscation and proffers suggestions on how these defects could be remedied.

THE OWNERSHIP OF CONFISCATED PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION UNDER THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION

AbstractArticle 51 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption sets forth the return of assets diverted through corruption as a fundamental principle of the Convention. This raises the question of whether the State where the stolen assets are located is entitled to refuse their repatriation or subject it to certain conditions. This article analyses the Convention and the policy considerations behind it and argues that such a State has a wider discretion over the return of stolen assets than is often thought. Furthermore, the article argues that the rule of law may be better served if States take vigorous action to confiscate the proceeds of corruption regardless of whether they are ultimately repatriated.

Why Must Forcible Action be the Only Way?: A New Approach for Initiating Quality Value of Voluntarily-Forcible Action (VF Action) in Stolen Asset Recovery

Recovering the proceeds of corruption is generally managed through forcible actions and leaving behind voluntary efforts. The preference for these forcible efforts can be seen from various international treaties regulating the seizure of the proceeds of crime. In reality, international treaties prioritizing forcible acts stumble upon many barriers especially in facing the difference in legal systems between the victim countries and recipient countries. On national level, forcible efforts also experience difficulties when perpetrators, stashing their stolen assets, are competing with law enforcement officials tracing and seizing their proceeds of corruption. This article provides a notion of the importance of combined voluntary and forcible actions to spend less efforts, time, and expenses during asset recovery process. This article using quality value approach on FuzzyServe and benchmarking to implement Voluntarily-Forcible Action (VF Action) in Stolen Asset Recovery. DOI: 10.5901/jesr.2014.v4n6p429

Kuomintang, Chinese Nationalist Party, and the Disputed Assets

KMT, often translated as the Chinese Nationalist Party, seized assets from the Japanese colonial government and private business at the end of World War II. As the current ruling party, KMT remains one of the richest political organizations in the world. The entire KMT property and division of wealth in Taiwan after WW II is often referred to as the “disputed assets.” Under the early years of the authoritarian regime, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was able to conceal most of its stolen assets by setting its own set of rules and regulation. Outside of the KMT organization, political parties and social groups have all demanded that KMT accept more social and political responsibility by releasing a complete history of all its assets and transactions, including the documentation of title transfers, account management, and account transfers. There are several dimensions to this issue: politics, policy, history, and law. This research predicts how KMT will solve the issue, and the ultimate result is very close to that predicted in advance, with an expected utility model.

Prosecution politics: Recalibrating the role of prosecution within the anticorruption agency agenda

It is the age of anti-corruption, or so we have been told. The new millennium has ushered in a wave of international, regional and domestic initiatives designed to combat public corruption, curtail financial crime, and facilitate the repatriation of stolen assets. To affirm their allegiance to the movement - and meet their international treaty obligations - African nations have promulgated anti-corruption agencies charged with prosecuting corrupt officials without fear or favour. Yet the politics of prosecution have spelled both peril and promise for these young institutions, raising new questions about the stability of their existing anti-corruption strategies.

Advancing international understanding and cooperation in combating fraud and corruption: Recovering stolen assets—a new issue?

This paper analyses the latest developments in the rapidly moving world of international asset recovery. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption of 2005 has fast become the global benchmark not only in efforts to combat corruption but also in the field of asset recovery. This article attempts to identify where the main developments have occurred in international asset recovery but also considers the historical efforts in the European Union to try to take the profit out of crime and analyses the effectiveness of the current plethora of European Union directives and initiatives in this area. The points made are illustrated with a number of prominent cases.

Protecting capital investment in plant and equipment: case study observations of post‐theft recovery

PurposePlant and equipment theft (PET) is inherent throughout the construction sector. Its effect places direct financial burden on those who have invested in such assets, but additionally, induces “indirect” costs for many other stakeholders including project owners, plant hirers and construction managers. The paper's objective is to take and discuss a snapshot of PET, the overriding aim being to aid greater understanding of it and in particular, the application of (post‐theft) recovery technologies.Design/methodology/approachDescriptive case study data are considered along with informal, anecdotal evidence provided by practitioners. These data are qualitatively considered; observations are discussed; a model representation of PET and recovery is developed; and conclusions are drawn.FindingsPlant and equipment thieves are shown to be audacious and determined, but it is identified that in addressing these characteristics, recent advances in plant security and recovery technologies (PSRT) have been significant. Arguably, PSRT are not being adopted as broadly as they should be to offset the PET problem.Research limitations/implicationsThe formal model of PET might help inform future academic endeavour in the subject of plant and equipment management generally and PET specifically.Practical implicationsThe model suggests that more widespread use of PSRT may not only help defeat plant thieves, but additionally help recover stolen assets and identify organised criminal networks.Originality/valueThe work is novel in setting and will be of interest to both academics and practitioners in the field.

MISUSE AND OPTIMUM INSPECTING STRATEGY IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

ABSTRACTAssets misuse by an agent and the optimal audit inspecting strategy are analyzed in this paper. The agent and the principal are acting to maximize their expected utility and both are characterized by risk aversion. The agent's decision about a theft takes into account the probability of benefiting from the stolen assets but also the probability of being penalized if caught. The principal's decision about the optimal number of audit teams, hence, the probability of uncovering the theft, takes into account the cost involved, the probability of one team of auditors uncovering the theft and the agent's decision about the theft. We get two response curves which describe the optimal behavior of both the agent and the principal and show that there may be a Nash solution to the problem. Since in real life there are often many principals (shareholders) with different utility functions, a set of efficient strategies is offered using the First and Second degree Stochastic Dominance rules. A numerical illustration which clarifies the methodology and displays the applicability of the model is also provided.