Stoic Virtue Research Articles

ПОНЯТИЕ «INTELLEGENTIA» В ТРАКТОВКЕ ЦИЦЕРОНА

The article analyses Cicero’s use of the concept of intellegentia which means “knowledge”, “understanding”, “reason”, “ability of perception” or “concept”. It is used in various works (speeches, political-philosophical treatises, dialogues on oratory) 48 times: 4 times in speeches, 14 times in rhetorical works and most often (30 times) in ethical-political and philosophical writings. It is not found in surviving letters. Based on the definitions of this concept, we conclude that intellegentia denotes the Stoic virtue of knowledge, occurring much less frequently than its synonyms sapientia, prudentia, scientia and cognitio. Intellegentia is almost always used in the singular form (45 times), very rarely in the plural (3 times). The concept has such attributes as adumbrata, communis, impressa, inchoata, insignita, mediocris, popularis, praestans, prima and vulgaris, which allow us to conclude that intellegentia denotes general or basic information about any subject. The complements to intellegentia (juris (civilis), in rusticis rebus, pecuniae quaerendae, etc.) define the field of knowledge expressed by intellegentia (jurisprudence, agriculture, economics, etc.). The concept is used in the same context with such words as ratio, natura, prudentia, animus, sensus, mens, justitia, jus, etc. Like intellegentia, they are associated with the mental activity of a person, his soul, lifestyle or feelings. Less commonly, the concept is combined with negatively connoted words (avaritia, malitia, simulation or vitium) and partly opposed to them.

How Might Stoic Virtue Ethics Inform Sustainable Clothing Choices?

ABSTRACT This paper explores sustainable fashion choices from a Stoic philosophical perspective. Ancient Stoic teachings can help us reexamine our relationship with clothes in the 21st century and provide direction for the considerable number of people that are influenced by contemporary Stoicism. Stoicism provides a clear justification for sustainable living, given its call to live in harmony with Nature. Given the environmental facts, contemporary Stoics would do well to reduce the size of their wardrobe to what is necessary and functional. They should mindfully select clothing made of organic natural fibers, which are of sufficient quality as to reduce wasteful practices.

Amor Fati and Memento Mori in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: The Synthesis of Stoicism

This article examines the philosophy of Stoicism in Marcus Aurelius’ philosophical work Meditations. Stoicism empowers us to embrace the pleasures and pains that come in our life without any reaction. It creates a mental disposition that leads to the stage of equanimity. Meditations exposes the power of stoic virtues like Amor fati (love of fate) and the Memento Mori (remember that you will die). These virtues pave the path for the cardinal virtues like wisdom, moderation, courage, and justice. The stoic virtues make us realize that we are in the abyss of infinity, and we do not exist only for ourselves. Aurelius’ Meditations muses on these great mysteries of life, echoing the vibrations of eastern and western lyre of Stoic philosophy. This article implements a qualitative approach to research, and interpretive paradigm to crystallize the radiance of stoic wisdom in Meditations. It is equally significant to discuss the applications of Stoic norms in the pedagogy that transform the junior citizens into the new humans to face the challenges of the modern age.

Empire of Eloquence: The Classical Rhetorical Tradition in Colonial Latin America and the Iberian World

Empire of Eloquence: The Classical Rhetorical Tradition in Colonial Latin America and the Iberian World

Paul on Humility

Paul on Humility

Scipio Aemilianus and the Morality of Power

Scholarship is divided on the moral justification of Roman imperialism. Division returns to the reception of Capelle’s seminal article arguing that Panaetius of Rhodes formulated an ethical defence of Roman imperialism in the second half of the second century BC. Whereas some accepted Capelle’s argument, others preferred utilitarian explanation of Roman imperialism. This article focusses on Scipio Aemilianus and the Numantine war, contending, with Capelle, that Panaetius legitimised the waging of war on ethical grounds. I argue that Scipio’s actions were presented through the prism of Stoic virtues and legitimised by the construction of a moral imperative of imperial power.

Shaftesbury, Third Earl of [Anthony Ashley Cooper

Shaftesbury, Third Earl of [Anthony Ashley Cooper

Cicero on Temperance as a Stoic Virtue (Based on the Concept of <i>Temperantia</i>)

Cicero on Temperance as a Stoic Virtue (Based on the Concept of <i>Temperantia</i>)

Corporate Beneficence and COVID-19

This article explores the motives underlying corporate responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis begins with Thomas Dunfee’s Statement of Minimum Moral Obligation (SMMO), which specifies, more precisely than any other contribution to the business ethics canon, the level of corporate beneficence required during a pandemic. The analysis then turns to Milton Friedman’s neoliberal understanding of human nature, critically contrasting it with the notion of stoic virtue that informs the works of Adam Smith. Friedman contends that beneficence should play no role in corporate settings. Smith, by contrast, emphasizes the need for prudence, beneficence and self-command in all human endeavours. The article then uses these competing frameworks to reflect on a published survey of 145 corporate responses to COVID-19. In many of these responses, the benefit to a non-financial stakeholder is clear, while the financial consequence to the firm remains nebulous. This supports the contention that during a pandemic, beneficence provides a more complete explanation of many corporate actions than the profit motive alone. The article contests Friedman’s Chicago School profit imperative and goes beyond Dunfee’s SMMO by endorsing the more full-throated embrace of beneficence and stoic virtue found in the works of Smith.

ANALYSIS OF CICERO’S CONCEPT OF COGNITIO

The article is devoted to the analysis of the Latin concept of cognitio in Cicero’s writings. Based on the continuous sampling method, 173 cases of use of the concept were found. The meaning of 23 of them does not correspond to the semantic field “cognition” and the Stoic virtue of knowledge, therefore they are not analysed in the article. The concept of cognitio in the meaning of “cognition” is more often found in the singular form (143 times), less often – in the plural form (7 times). Cognitio is found in the synonymous series with the words contemplatio , exercitatio, perceptio, prudentia, ratio, scientia (most of all – with the word scientia ). Cognition ( cognitio ) is opposed to action ( actio ) and ignorance ( ignoratio ). Cognitio sometimes has a dependent word: rerum (33 cases), less often – animi , artis, deorum, naturae, virtutis, vitiorum , etc. In turn, cognitio itself is used as a complement to the words amor, appetitio, consultatio, cupiditas, genus, quaestio, studium , etc . In the same context with cognitio there are such words as res, natura, ratio, scientia, etc . Cicero’s reasoning about cognition ( cognitio ) is found mainly in his philosophical writings when he analyses the views of ancient Greek philosophers (Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics), in particular – the Stoics and their teaching on virtues, which includes cognition as well.

How Might a Stoic Eat in Accordance with Nature and “Environmental Facts”?

This paper explores how to deliberate about food choices from a Stoic perspective informed by the value of environmental sustainability. This perspective is reconstructed from both ancient and contemporary sources of Stoic philosophy. An account of what the Stoic goal of “living in agreement with Nature” would amount to in dietary practice is presented. Given ecological facts about food production, an argument is made that Stoic virtue made manifest as wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance compel Stoic practitioners to select locally sourced, low resource input, plant-based foods whenever circumstances allow.

“Such a mistake as I have often seen / In a play”: The Duchess of Malfi , a Tragedy of Errors

De nombreux critiques ont montré que la perspective de John Webster dans The Duchess of Malfi était souvent ambiguë: alors que les frères de la duchesse la condamnent parce qu’elle se remarie, elle est aussi représentée comme un modèle de vertu stoïque dans les souffrances qui lui sont imposées; quant à Bosola, dès le départ il apparaît comme une anomalie humorale, et tient le rôle du meurtrier aussi bien que du vengeur, même si dans cette dernière tâche il se révèle totalement incapable, et admet qu’il a tué Antonio sans le vouloir. Les erreurs, dans la pièce, sont envisagées d’un point de vue moral, et permettent à Webster de peindre le tableau d’une société corrompue, mais, surtout, elles participent en plein de l’esthétique irrégulière de la pièce, où, comme le dit Ferdinand de sa sœur, l’erreur et la beauté sont inséparables.

Education for the Sustainable Global Citizen: What Can We Learn from Stoic Philosophy and Freirean Environmental Pedagogies?

In support of sustainable development, the United Nations (UN) launched its Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) with the aims of accelerating progress towards universal access to education, good quality learning and the fostering of global citizenship. This paper explores how and to what extent Stoic virtue ethics and critical Freirean ecopedagogies can advance the UN’s vision for progressive educational systems with transformative societal effects. We propose an integrated solution that provides ecopedagogical concepts a more robust philosophical foundation whilst also offering Stoicism additional tools to tackle 21st-century problems, such as climate change and environmental degradation. The result of the paper is the preliminary theoretical underpinnings of an educational framework that encompasses planetary-level concerns and offers a fuller expression of the terms “sustainable development” and “global citizen”.

Augustine's immanent critique of Stoicism

AbstractThe broad contours of Augustine's critique of Stoic virtue theory in De civitate dei 19.4 finds a fascinating analogue in Theodor Adorno's theory of immanent critique: Augustine ‘enters’ into Stoic virtue theory and criticises it from its own postulates, illustrating the striking implausibility of Stoic orthodoxy when lived out in concreto and the absurd, but logical, conclusions to which one is necessarily carried by Stoic ethics. Through this deconstruction, Augustine clears a space to propose his own virtue ethic. Augustine maintains that a Stoic virtue ethic fails to deliver on its promised eudaimonistic ends because it lacks a robust eschatological vision. For Augustine, the Christian faith offers a more viable virtue ethic.

Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics. By ChristophJedan. Pp. xi, 230, London/NY,Continuum, 2009, $23.49.

Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics. By ChristophJedan. Pp. xi, 230, London/NY,Continuum, 2009, $23.49.

Stoic Virtues in Tertullian’s Works and Their Relation to Cicero

Abstract Q. S. F. Tertullian was one of the most prominent writers and apologists of the early Christian Church. He had two important goals with his works: on the one hand, to introduce, according to the spirit of the age, the Christian teachings embedded in contemporary Roman culture; on the other hand, to highlight and emphasize the difference between the Christian teachings and the pagan ideas. This dichotomy is characteristic of his ethical teachings as well: while he emphasizes the importance of the Christian virtues, he does not forget about their philosophical background either. Tertullian demonstrably considered Stoic philosophy as the most acceptable philosophical thinking. Virtues have an important status in the teachings of the stoic body, just as they are a fundamental part of Christian ethics. The question arises whether Tertullian’s views on virtues could have been influenced by his pagan Roman ancestor, M. T. Cicero, who also shared stoic doctrines. This is the question the present lecture tries to answer.

« Au nom de Dieu et du profit. » Le profit équitable selon Jan van Boendale

Historical research on what a just price should be has focused mainly on late medieval theological texts. However, in laic literature too, notions of the just price can be detected without the concept itself being mentioned. Instead of talking about “the just price”, Jan van Boendale asks questions about what a fair profit would be. Just like producing, the buying and selling of goods were a way of labouring that ought to be well rewarded, especially since it was in the common interest of the city. The pursuit of profit and the gathering of richness formed no ethical problem for this fourteenth-century Antwerp city clerk. Problems only arose when the greedy desire to gain more and more started to dominate consciousness and stimulated merchants or guild masters to start cheating. In response, Boendale stressed the stoic virtue of moderation as a remedy against greed. Still, this was not only a matter of achieving an honest profit. One also had to be moderate when giving alms, which was a reaction against popular preachers who overemphasised the state of sinfulness in which people lived.

How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics

Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism about wisdom, and show that many of the elements of the Stoic picture can be preserved in a more plausible fallibilist approach. Specifically, I propose to develop a Stoic fallibilist virtue epistemology that is based on the Stoic model of the moral virtues. This model of the intellectual virtues will show that (in keeping with a folk distinction) the wise person is never befooled, though that person might be fooled.

Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (and Some More General Studies)

Susanna Braund s edition of Senecas De dementia} is both the first full philological edition of the work in English and a full-scale literary and philosophical study of Senecas essay. There is a new text and brief apparatus criticus; this is (explicitly) indebted to a more intensive recent edition (by E. Malaspina, 2001, 2nd edn. 2004). The translation on facing pages aims to combine clear and readable English with consistency in the rendering of key terms. It seems to me highly effective; like Brad Inwood, in his recent translations of the letters, Braund brings out the sinewy force of Seneca's prose, while also allowing full visibility to the philosophical underpinnings. A special feature of this book is a very ample introduction (91 pages), covering the full range of historical, literary, political, and philosophical topics relevant to this fascinating text. I found especially illuminating her treatment of the concept of dementia, which underlines the close linkage between this virtue and autocracy, and of the delicate manner in which Seneca pitches the work (addressed to Nero) between flattery and didacticism. Also of special interest is her analysis of the way Seneca handles in a broadly Stoic way a positive treatment of what is, in theoretical terms, not a Stoic virtue. The commentary is on a large, even massive, scale (269 pages, compared with 29 pages of text). Braund combines detailed

Cato the Younger in the Enlightenment

“If I had only been born a Roman!” sighed Jean-Jacques Rousseau after touring the Pont du Gard. 1 This was a typically emotional reaction on Rousseau’s part, but for once he was perfectly in tune with his times. Roman history was familiar to every educated person in the eighteenth century and supplied a vocabulary of terms and examples used for discussions of practically any concept, not least politics and statesmanship. 2 Prominent among the historical personages who figured in this discourse was Marcus Porcius Cato (95–46 BCE), also called Cato Uticensis or Cato the Younger. 3 In his time, Cato was famous as the quintessential republican, exhibiting stoic virtue in private and public and leading the increasingly desperate struggle to save the republic from Julius Caesar. On occasion he behaved quite oddly: for example, when he divorced his wife Marcia so that his ally Hortensius could marry her (after the latter’s death, Cato remarried her). Following a not particularly successful political and military career, he decided to retire but found himself unable to abstain from joining his former opponent Pompey in the civil war against Caesar, which broke out shortly thereafter. In the wake of Pompey’s defeat at Pharsalus (48 BCE),