Stoic View Research Articles

Why Frege Did Not Plagiarize the Stoics: More on the Relationship Between Fregean and Stoic Logic

In this paper we give a detailed comparison of the key elements of Frege’s formal language of thought and apparently similar views in Stoic formal logic. That is, we compare their views on the following topics: connectives, negation, simple sentences, propositional content, predicates and their incompleteness, and quantifications. We show that in most of these cases the similarities between Frege’s views and the Stoic views are only superficial. Frege’s views are far more systematic, better developed and can in no case directly or fully be traced back to Stoic ideas. Furthermore, we show that Prantl, pace Bobzien 2021, is in most of these cases not a reliable source with respect to Stoic logic and that it is very unlikely that Frege’s views on logic were influenced by Prantl’s interpretation of Stoic formal logic.

Stoic Consolations

In this paper I explore the Stoic view on attachment to external goods, or what the Stoics call “indifferents.” Attachment is problematic, on the Stoic view, because it exposes us to loss and exacerbates the fragility that comes with needing others and things. The Stoics argue that we can build resilience through a robust reeducation of ordinary emotions and routine practice in psychological risk management techniques. Through a focus on selected writings of Seneca as well as Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, I nonetheless ask whether Stoicism leaves any room for grief and distress. I argue that it does, and that consolation comes not from a retreat to some inner citadel, but from the support and sustenance of social connections.

HORMĒ: WHAT IS IT AND WHERE IS IT? A CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF THE STOIC THEORY OF ACTION

The location of hormē (impulse) is a long-standing problem in Stoic action theory, as it is unclear whether it comes before or after the assent. In this paper, we aim to define hormē and locate it in the chain of mental states that, for the Stoics, bring us to action. Following both ancient and modern sources, we argue that hormē is best understood as an intention since it comprises a cluster of mental states that cause intentional action. We also argue that the impulse coincides with the assent because they are both activated in an agent’s mind almost simultaneously after an external presentation. We, then, reject the notion of double impulse and an understanding of hormē as a desire. The paper highlights interesting points of connection between the ancient and contemporary action theory by showing that the Stoic view of rational, intentional action bears strong similarities to contemporary accounts of intention.

Relevansi Pendidikan Dengan Ajaran Upanisad (Pandangan Stoikisme)

Upanisad is one of the sections of the Holy Book of the Weda which belongs to the Sruti section, where the Upanishad is considered to be the oldest part of Weda. Stoicism is one of the current Western philosophies that teaches the importance of self-control and emotional calm. Specifically, this article deals with education in the past, present and future times and Stoicism as its bridge. As for the methodology used in this writing is the study of intertexts where the study in this research through the writing that has circulated. There is no sloka Upanisad that directly connects the teachings of Upanishad with Stoic philosophy. There are several concepts in the teachings of Upanisad that have similarities with the principles adopted by the Stoics. In the teachings of Upanisad there is a concept of the importance of self-control and the development of deep consciousness. This is similar to the Stoic view that emphasized self-control and strong character development. The Upanisad is one of the sacred texts in Hinduism and is part of the Weda sacred book. Education in the Upanisad era was based on the close relationship between teacher and student. Education in the Upanisad era was not limited to pure academic learning, but emphasized more on spiritual, existential understanding, and the achievement of spiritual liberation. Meditation and contemplation are used as tools to deeper understanding.

Pliny’s Roman Economy: Natural History, Innovation, and Growth by Richard P. Saller

This book does not start out well. Saller writes, “Most recent efforts do not hold up to close scrutiny and so do not demonstrate sustained growth up to the Antonine Plague” (9). Saller cites Harper in this regard, but he fails to note Harper’s 2016 article that showed real wages increasing in Roman Egypt during those years.1Although wages are not strictly a proxy for the national product, rising wages are a good index of national income in an agricultural economy in which a plague did not reduce the quantity of labor. The rest of Chapter 1, which summarizes other publications about growth, seems pointless given its omission of an important source of ancient Roman economic data.Saller arrives at his main topic in Chapter 2, describing Pliny’s life and work habits, as well as a detailed description of Pliny’s Natural History and its probable readers. The chapters that follow discuss various topics in Pliny’s book. Pliny had a Stoic view of nature; he decried the damaging exploitation of the natural world. He condemned iron mining on the grounds that it could contribute to killing people. He also presented a list of power and agricultural innovations, about which Saller gives his opinions.When Saller turns to Pliny’s economics, he prefaces his analysis with the caveat, “The point is not to blame him for a lack of rationality but to show his thought was framed by different values and a bounded rationality.” Pliny’s discussion focuses on agriculture and trade. He cites my book about The Roman Market Economy, but he fails to discuss the rate of interest.2 Pliny the Younger—the ward and nephew of the Pliny the Elder, the subject of this book—explained to Emperor Trajan, well after his uncle’s time, that “no one wanted to borrow at 9 percent” (174). The Greeks, however, had already advanced sophisticated ideas about interest rates and risk before Pliny the Elder lived. Saller could have included them in his discussion of Roman economics since the use of interest was common in Rome as well.Saller closes his book with a dubious recommendation of Pliny’s Natural History as a good source of information for ancient historians. Yet, only potential readers with a particular interest in Pliny the Elder or in contemporary Roman agriculture and trade will find Pliny’s book to have much relevance for them.

A PLATONIC ARGUMENT FOR THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IN CICERO (TVSCVLANAE DISPVTATIONES 1.39–49)

AbstractAn argument in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations (Tusc. 1.39–49) defends psychic immortality by reference to the physical constitution of the soul. This article argues that this ‘Physical Argument’ should be interpreted as a reception of Plato's doctrine of the soul within the philosophical paradigm of the Hellenistic era. After analysing the argument, it is shown that Cicero's proof recasts elements of Plato's Phaedo, in particular the kinship between the soul and the heavens and the soul's essentially contemplative nature, within a corporealist cosmology. The article also argues that Cicero formulates his argument to oppose the Stoic view that the soul's survival after death is only temporary. The Physical Argument emerges as a modernization of Platonic thought, putting Plato into dialogue with contemporary Hellenistic philosophy. Cicero, too, emerges as a more adept philosophical author than is often supposed.

Física e Metafísica no Estoicismo Antigo

The Stoic School takes up the tripartite division of philosophy of the post-Platonic Academy, in which physics occupies, alongside dialectics and ethics, a prominent place. In this tripartition, there is no metaphysics, nor in the two subdivisions of Stoic physics. For the thinkers of the Stoa, there is nothing beyond physics. In spite of this statement, we try to discover, in this article, the presence of a study devoted to first philosophy among the various topics investigated by the Stoics in their physics. It is with this aim that we first examine what precisely Aristotle deals with in the Metaphysics. This preliminary investigation will serve as a point of reference for determining what can be considered as metaphysics, at least in ancient Greece. Afterwards, we are interested in the Stoic view of nature itself since nothing superior exists. This examination leads us to scrutinize the Stoic conception of the Good, a notion closely linked to the subject of physics. We then take a good look at each one of the topics found in the two Stoic divisions of physics, highlighting the matters approaching Aristotelian metaphysics. On that occasion, a specific analysis is devoted to the two Stoic principles, due notably to the relevance of the subject in relation to first philosophy. From the diversity of the elements found in the course of our study, we come to the final part, in which we establish the position of the Stoic School on metaphysics.

Max J. Lee. Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries

Max J. Lee. <i>Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries</i>

Stoic Theory of Action and Sceptical Objections Against It

The article considers the Stoic theory of action and its critique by Sceptics. The Stoics believed that the agent is autonomous due to his ability to give the assent to a representation. The theory of action is interwoven with the theory of knowledge in the assent-giving since the assent can be given to both value-neutral and value-loaded statements. It is thus appropriate to ask whether an adequate theoretical comprehension is required for performing a morally correct action, or is a correct practical comprehension sufficient? Sceptics actively criticized all parts of Stoic philosophy and often turned to the concept of “comprehensible representation”, dialectically arguing that such a thing does not exist. Revealing the deficiencies of Stoic views (which can be applied to other dogmatic theories), sceptics pointed out epistemic and moral flaws of the seemingly immaculate Stoic sage. A possible answer of the Stoics would be to distinguish between the practical and theoretical aspects of the comprehensible representation. Using the example of the assent given to a false representation, it is suggested that an error in the theoretical assent does not necessarily imply an error in the practical assent. In reaction to the Stoics' critique, Sceptics developed not only a non-dogmatic way of argumentation but also their model of action. Moreover, Sceptics should defend themselves from the apraxia charge. The charge, in general, argues that the Sceptic cannot be active because s/he would not give the assent to any representation. However, it is argued that having the ataraxia state does not imply a plant or animal-like life or the total quietism since it leaves room open for an undogmatic action, the action which avoids truth-valued statements or the assent to a representation. The discussion had the consequence that the Stoics loosened the connection between epistemology and ethics. In contrast, Sceptics had to develop a model of sceptical action, according to which one can act and live without adherence to beliefs.

Is poor mental health an unrecognised occupational health and safety hazard for conservation biologists and ecologists? Reported incidences, likely causes and possible solutions

Workers in many professions suffer from poor mental health as a result of their employment. Although a bibliographic search generated little published evidence for poor mental health among conservation biologists and ecologists, the phenomenon has been reported among researchers working on coral reefs, climate change, wildfires and threatened species. Factors responsible for poor mental health include (1) epistemic attributes associated with conservation biologists’ and ecologists’ deep knowledge base; (2) non-epistemic values associated with their view of the natural world; and (3) a complex suite of factors relating to the wider social, political and economic milieu in which they practise their trade. Because it relates directly to employment, poor mental health among conservation biologists and ecologists must be differentiated from the phenomena of ‘environmental grief’ and ‘solastalgia’ reported in the wider community. A number of solutions to the problem have been suggested, including appreciating the conservation successes that have been achieved, recognising the importance of collegiality and comradeship, acknowledging the role of grieving rituals, active intervention via therapeutic counselling, reducing the incidence of censorship and repression of scientists’ research, and the adoption of a Stoic view of the world. I propose a different approach: conservation biologists and ecologists should reposition their personal experiences within an historical perspective that sees them as part of a long tradition of struggle to protect the natural environment. An apt rallying cry to help conservation biologists and ecologists manage their mental health is Pablo Casals’ ‘The situation is hopeless. We must take the next step’.

К интерпретации понятия «среднего надлежащего» в ранней стоической этике

This paper examines two alternative ways to interpret the early Stoic concept of “inter­mediate appropriate” action (μέσον καθῆκον). According to the first interpretation, which the author calls “dichotomous”, appropriate actions can be “intermediate” or morally neutral only when viewed in abstracto, i.e. without reference to the virtuous or vicious disposition of those who commit them, whereas in practice they always become either morally right or morally wrong depending on this disposition. According to the second interpretation, which the author calls “trichotomous”, “intermediate appropriate” actions constitute a separate class of morally neutral actions along with morally right and morally wrong ones. The author believes that the dichotomous interpretation is preferable. On the whole, it fits much better with the early Stoic view that all moral agents are divided into virtuous sages who only per­form morally right actions (κατορθώματα) and vicious fools who only commit morally wrong transgressions (ἁμαρτήματα). Nevertheless, some Stoic fragments contain statements that might seem to support the trichotomous reading. The author offers a detailed analysis of these fragments, demonstrating that they do not in fact contradict the dichotomous interpre­tation – either because on closer examination these texts prove to be quite compatible with it and even to some extent confirm it or because they do not provide evidence for authentically Stoic teaching at all.

The Limits of Grief in Augustine of Hippo’s Sermones 172-173 and Sermo 396

This contribution explores select sermons of Augustine relating to the pastoral and existential phenomena of grief and human mortality (ss. 172-173 and s. 396). In particular, it evaluates these themes in conversation with philosophical reflections on human nature in the City of God, Books 13-14. Drawing upon Platonic and Stoic views in the latter, St. Augustine prefers a more compassionate and permissive understanding of human emotion in the former. Nevertheless, the author argues that while Augustine makes extensive textual appeal to Pauline and Johannine sources, which is likewise evident in his philosophical work, he remains implicitly committed to a cognitivist theory of emotion also in his preaching. In order to support this claim, I first present the philosophical traditions at work within the biblical horizon of the City of God, through a careful reading of pertinent texts, including work of Sarah Byers. Second, I attend to shifts of tone and emphasis detected in three public sermons, two of which have been successfully dated to 418 and 419, where evident differences of genre and audience help to account for Augustine’s heightened pastoral sensitivity. This comparative approach illuminates, finally, how the bishop of Hippo maintains philosophical continuity and navigates his pastoral responsibilities.

MEDEA AND THE JOY OF KILLING

It may be agreed that the character of Medea, one of the most intertextual heroines of the Graeco-Roman literary tradition, is a veritable crucible of the most disparate emotions, as the articles gathered in this issue aim to show. In Seneca's Medea, readers encounter a murderous mother who kills her own children, giving in to destructive anger or, rather, fury. This emotion has been widely and extensively studied both in relation to its Greek model, Euripides’ Medea, and in the light of the Stoic view on passions, so that it can be acknowledged as one of the most salient features of the Roman character's emotional profile from a literary and philosophical standpoint. Although both Medeas, while struggling within themselves in their famous monologues, debate whether they should or should not kill their children, Euripides’ heroine does not seem to murder them out of anger: she repeatedly claims that a pressing necessity urges her to do so; by contrast, the Senecan Medea lets her anger literally lead the way (ira, qua ducis, sequor; 953). They both describe the filicide they are about to commit as a sacrificial act (compare Eur. Med. 1053‒4: ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ / θέμις παρεῖναι τοῖς ἐμοῖσι θύμασιν, ‘whoever is not permitted to attend my sacrifice’ and Sen. Med. 970‒1: uictima manes tuos / placamus ista, ‘with this victim we placate / your spirit’), but Seneca's character is pushed towards it by the dreadful hallucinations of the Furies and the shadow of her brother approaching (958‒66), which certainly contributes to heightening the disquieting atmosphere of the play: his Medea ultimately appears as a much ‘darker’ and bleaker version of the Euripidean counterpart, also emerging as a full-blown villain, by whom readers are both repelled and fascinated. In addition to this, the vocabulary of extreme passions recurring throughout the play and the heights of anger that the Senecan Medea reaches represent some of the most noticeable variations on the Greek model, not to mention a famous portrait of the heroine by the Nurse (382‒96), which strikingly resembles that of the angry man depicted by Seneca in De ira 1.1.3‒5. In these pages, however, instead of focusing on the notorious ira and furor of Seneca's Medea, I intend to concentrate on another and yet quite strongly related emotion: joy. In general, it may be noted that the bodily felt responses brought about by both anger and joy have in common the category of expansion, unlike fear and sadness (or grief), in which there is a tendency towards contraction. To my knowledge, the emotion of joy in Seneca's play has not received much attention thus far, owing perhaps to the fact that, as mentioned, anger literally steals the limelight. Therefore, I will here attempt to delve into this emotion, which appears to characterize Medea's criminal deeds, especially towards the end of the play, with a view to bringing to the fore its nuances and function. Although joy, at first glance, may seem to be extraneous to a tragic plot staging a filicide, since it is usually associated with good or positive events, it will be argued that this emotion (also verging on pleasure) is particularly fitting for the Senecan character, in that it takes a ‘perverted’ and monstrous form in the play, even coming to distort some concepts central to the Stoic doctrine.

Hopeless Fools and Impossible Ideals

In this article, I vindicate the longstanding intuition that the Stoics are transitional figures in the history of ethics. I argue that the Stoics are committed to thinking that the ideal of human happiness as a life of virtue is impossible for some people, whom I dub ‘hopeless fools.’ In conjunction with the Stoic view that everyone is subject to the same rational requirements to perform ‘appropriate actions’ or ‘duties’ (kath¯ekonta/officia), and the plausible eudaimonist assumption that happiness is a source of normative reasons only if it is in principle attainable, the existence of hopeless fools demonstrates that the Stoics were pluralists about the ultimate justificatory basis of rational action. Hopeless fools are required to behave just like their non-hopeless counterparts, not because doing so is conducive to their happiness, but because doing so conforms with the dictates of Right Reason.

Why Children, Parrots, and Actors Cannot Speak: The Stoics on Genuine and Superficial Speech

AbstractAt Varro LL VI.56 and SE M 8.275-276, we find reports of the Stoic view that children and articulate non-rational animals such as parrots cannot genuinely speak. Absent from these testimonia is the peculiar case of the superficiality of the actor’s speech, which appears in one edition of the unstable text of PHerc 307.9 containing fragments of Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations. Commentators who include this edition of the text in their discussions of the Stoic theory of speech do not offer a univocal account of the superficiality of the parrot’s, the child’s, and the actor’s speech. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of the Stoic account of genuine and superficial speech and show that not only is there an account of superficial speech that univocally explains the superficiality of the speech of parrots, children, and actors, but that this account challenges traditional assumptions about the entities at the heart of the Stoic theory of language—lekta. It will turn out that genuine speech is the expression of alektonby way of performing a speech act, and that this account of superficial speech can be used to explain other linguistic phenomena that are of interest to the Stoics, such as sentences in insoluble sophisms and sentences containing demonstratives that do not refer to anything in the subject term. Importantly, my reconstruction shows, against the near consensus view oflekta, thatlektado not primarily explain what makes an utterance meaningful. Rather, they primarily explain what makes an utterance an instance of genuine speech.

De lakrasisprésocratique à lakrasisstoïcienne : l’émergence d’un modèle organique de l’individualité

AbstractThis paper focuses on the materialistic account of the blending and the way it shapes an original organism model. I aim to shed light on the threads of connections we can gather between the Presocratic and the Stoic views on the physicalkrasisof the body. The Stoics share with Parmenides and Empedocles the idea of a single material cosmiccontinuumin which thought and perception depend on the various blendings of the physical constituents of the body. Both of these naturalistic traditions are committed to the view that substance is continuous and undergoes constant and qualitative change. My point is to underline how this view of a sympathetic cosmos presupposes a model of the individuality that is radically open. Thus, by taking off the notion of thekrasis, the Stoics take off a problem – namely, that of the organism – that is first fleshed out by the Presocratics – Parmenides and Empedocles in particular – philosophers. In this respect, the Stoic view of relational identity indebts to the Presocratic account, beyond and against the Aristotelian one.

Les stoïciens et Platon – monistes ou dualistes ?

AbstractThe Stoics’ way of presenting principles – the active and the passive – is ambiguous because they say that principles are two while also suggesting that they are inseparable and thus interdependent. This ambiguity cannot be resolved in favour of one or the other side of the dilemma, as is shown by analysis of two possible models of the relations among principles – a causal and a categories-based model. This ambiguity is rather a necessary consequence of the Stoic view of principles and should be compared to the ambiguity of Plato’s concept of “principles” in theTimaeus. Plato’s Receptacle is in a similar relation to other constitutive elements of his cosmogonical account as are the two Stoic principles, each to the other. In particular, the relation between the Receptacle and qualities in it is to be seen as a systematic parallel to the relation of the Stoic principles (and probably also its historical model). The concluding claim is that Plato and the Stoics advance a similar kind of dualism which should be called such, despite its ambiguity. The ambiguity in both systems is due to the need to see the principles in such a relation as would reveal their dependence, and thus secure the basic unity of the cosmos.

Alienation in Commercial Society: The Republican Critique of Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson

AbstractThis article explores the republican critiques of commercial society of Jean‐Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, focusing on their kindred analyses of social alienation. The joint study of these thinkers reveals a Rousseauean strand of eighteenth‐century republicanism that effectively combined a traditional (yet idiosyncratic) Stoic view of human flourishing with an innovative, proto‐sociological analysis and critique of quintessentially modern social phenomena. Rousseau and Ferguson regard alienation as a loss of wholeness, both in humans individually and in their relations to their (social) surroundings. The article addresses two specific aspects of alienation in commercial society as the two thinkers see it. The first aspect concerns the insincerity underpinning the new moral vocabulary of polite sociability; the second aspect concerns the division of labor. According to Rousseau and Ferguson, this division threatens true human flourishing as well as political liberty. Finally, the conservative dimension of their republican solutions for overcoming alienation and bolstering liberty is considered.

Nietzsche and the Stoic Concept of Recentes Opiniones

ABSTRACTIn the context of the well-established importance of Nietzsche’s engagement with Stoic thought for his work as a whole, this article seeks to make two claims. First, that the Mausoleum reference in Lecture 4 of “On the Future of Our Educational Institutions” constitutes a substantial engagement with the Stoic doctrine of recentes opiniones as presented in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations; and second, that this reference taken in its textual and intertextual context, constitutes a critique of the Stoic views of time and of the relationship of nature and culture. In so doing, the article seeks to contribute to the wider issues of Nietzsche’s views on naturalism, fatalism, desirability, and culture.

Apocalypses and the Sage. Different Endings of the World in SenecaApocalypses and the Sage. Different Endings of the World in Seneca

This paper deals with apocalypse, intended as a revelation or prediction related to the end of the world, in Seneca’s prose work. The descriptions and readings of this event appear to be quite different from each other. My analysis will follow two main directions. Firstly, I will show the human side of the question, focussing on the condition of the sage facing the universal ruin in the context of the macroscopic narrative structure of most passages, and on the differences between the Epicurean and the Stoic view on this point. Secondly, I will turn to the descriptions of the end of the world which we can find in the Naturales Quaestiones. I will argue that Seneca’s choice of flood or conflagration as representations for the apocalypse are not haphazard, but may be motivated by a subtle political narrative, and thus linked to the Stoic struggle for taking part in the governing of the state. In particular, the end of book three represents a flood which probably alludes to Tiber’s floods.