Stoic Theory Research Articles

Aristotle and the Stoics on the Notion of ἐνέργεια

Abstract The Stoic theory of movement has never been the object of a deep investigation despite the considerable number of sources in Neoplatonist commentators. This paper explores for the first time the Stoic notion of ἐνέργεια, which plays a fundamental role in the Stoic conception of movement and generally in the characterization of interaction between bodies. I will show that the Stoics identified movement and activity, so that everything that is active is necessarily moved. This implies that the Stoics merely characterized ἐνέργεια in a dynamic or kinetic sense, namely by connecting it with movement. In order to prove the coherence of this philosophical position to the Stoic doctrine, I will display the compatibility of Neoplatonists’ reports with other sources. Accordingly, I will claim that the Stoics conceived this peculiar sense of ἐνέργεια in reaction to Aristotle, who clearly distinguished between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις in his physical theory.

¿Cómo delibera y decide un estoico? How Does a Stoic Deliberate and Decide?

Abstract This article explores, from an epistemic perspective, the scope of some key notions of the Stoic theory of action at the moment of a rational agent’s deliberation. It is argued that deliberation consists primarily in a critical examination of impulsive presentations (φαντασίαι ὁρμητικαί) and that indifferent objects (ἀδιάφορα), as carriers of a kind of selective value (ἀξία ἐκλεκτική), rather than a reason to act constitute a reason to believe (Klein, 2015). Finally, it is concluded that virtue, contrary to what has sometimes been interpreted, is not part of the deliberative process as one among other considerations about the indifferent because the moral value of virtue is incommensurable with the natural value of the indifferent. However, virtue enters decisively into deliberation insofar as the practical end of the rational agent is to reason perfectly (εὐλογιστεῖν) in full consonance with the demands of destiny.

분노의 이해와 비극적 치유의 서사시

This study delves into the intricate exploration of amorphous anger within the first-person narrator of Jason Reynolds’s Long Way Down, employing Seneca’s Stoic theories on anger and clemency. Triggered by the tragic death of his brother, William Holloman, the narrator seeks to understand his anger by crafting narrative poetry. Imagined dialogues with six ghosts, each meeting a dismal demise, unveil the fallacy of poetic justice in the local community William once trusted by William. The ritualistic adherence to a deceptive convention known as the Rules merely functions as an emotional release valve, providing temporary relief under the guise of righteous revenge. By distancing himself from the flawed poetic justice, William conveys heartfelt condolences for the violent deaths of those he once considered acquaintances. Finally, exposing the hollowness of the established norms, he embraces an ethical stance, aspiring to reconstruct a new and flexible way of defining justice grounded in empathy, coexistence, and respect for others.

A Chrysippean Modality

Abstract In this paper, I attempt to explain one of the most controversial views attributed to the Stoic Chrysippus: that the impossible can follow from the possible. My solution finds in Chrysippus a distinction later made by the medieval logician John Buridan: that between being possible (there being a state of affairs that may occur) and being possibly-true (there being some proposition whose truth-conditions are that state of affairs). Buridan and Chrysippus have radically opposing views on the nature of propositions. What their conceptions share is the conclusion that at least some propositions must be contingent beings. They argue for this while maintaining a rigorous commitment to the view that propositions are strictly bivalent. In 2. I explain the Chrysippean passage in terms of a distinction Buridan makes explicitly. In 3. I show how the distinction follows implicitly from the Stoic theory of quantification. In 4. I compare the modality with other aspects of Stoic logic. In 5. I discuss how the distinction behaves in the future tense.

Language, Definition and Being in Antisthenes

Abstract In this paper I focus on the relationships between language, definition and being in Antisthenes. I start from Plato’s Sophist 251b–c, in which the reference to the ὀψιμαθεῖς stands out, and I conclude that it is not possible to identify these characters with Antisthenes. The conception of ὀψιμαθεῖς provides for the exclusive legitimacy of identical judgments, exploiting in an eristic sense an evident Eleatic legacy. But this position, rather than concordances, reveals serious opposition to what is surely known to us of the logical and linguistic doctrines of Antisthenes. The most explicit testimony about the relationship between language and being in Antisthenes is handed down by Porphyry, who attributes to Antisthenes the equation λέγειν = λέγειν τι = λέγειν τὸ ὄν. My analysis intends to show that this equation is assumed by Antisthenes through a Socratic mediation and has a double objective: to ensure an objective reference of language, as opposed to Gorgias’ self-referential conception of language, and to nullify the antilogy, which is typical of sophistic argumentation. To it Antisthenes contrasts the ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων, which is a development of Socratic ἐξετάζειν, and whose aim is to reach, at the end of the examination, no longer just a ὁμολογία, but a definition valid once and for all. Antisthenes is aware that there is a distinction between essence and quality, and with this, he moves a first important step beyond the univocal conception of being proper to Parmenides. The doxography will sum up Antisthenes’ position by describing him as the first philosopher to advance a definition of logos, i. e., definition. He bases his theory of definition on the identification of that attribute which is ἴδιον καὶ οἰκεῖον of the proposed object. Antisthenes coined the phrase τὸ τί ἦν to designate what the predicate is meant to say in a definition, i. e., the proper quality. This expression does not seem to identify the general notion of a predicate as such, but rather to indicate the determination or qualification necessary to actually define the object in question. In the final part of my article, I examine some testimonies that show how, with his theory of definition, Antisthenes is, and was considered already in antiquity, the precursor of the Stoic theory of definition, whose objective is, according to Chrysippus’ formula, to provide the explanation of what is proper (ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις).

Loanwords in the Fiery Furnace

Abstract This article is a discussion of two Greek loanwords found in the Rabbinic text Song of Songs Rabbah. It shows that these words are best identified and explained through a comparison with a Stoic theory of fire, described and refuted by Philo of Alexandria. That these words, both hapax legomena in Rabbinic literature, are used in the Midrash show that at least some rabbis were conversant in Greek scientific terminology—and perhaps specifically with a version of this Stoic dispute. The uses to which these terms were put show that the rabbis deployed their vast, specialized knowledge where it was most important to them: interpreting the scriptures.

Percepción Moral y Conocimiento Práctico en el Estoicismo

In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.

Συνɛίδησις in Paul's Texts and Stoic Self-Perception

AbstractΣυνɛίδησις is a relatively rare word, but a favourite for Paul, whose undisputed texts contain nearly half of its New Testament occurrences. In the 19th and 20th centuries, scholars debated the origin of the substantive and the possibility of Stoic influence, which led to a consensus that the term was not a technical philosophical one and Paul's use was not affected by Stoic thought. There is evidence, though, that the presence of συνɛίδησις in a few Stoic texts is due to its semantic relationship in Stoic discourse with συναίσθησις, the Stoic term for self-perception, which was a key component in their epistemological and ethical theory. This article argues that a reading of Paul's use of συνɛίδησις as Stoic self-perception explains the distinctive features of his use to which scholars have recently drawn attention, namely, the permanent and continuous operation of the συνɛίδησις, its ability to be passively impacted by the actions of others and the neutral or positive content of its reflexive knowledge. After a review of recent scholarship, I discuss the role of συναίσθησις in Stoic theory and the evidence for its semantic relationship to συνɛίδησις, then offer a reading of 1 Cor 8–10 demonstrating Paul's use of συνɛίδησις as self-perception.

Passion as Judgment

Ancient sources present mainly two Stoic definitions of passion: as an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul, and as an excessive impulse. These definitions hold for the Stoics in general, and undoubtedly for Zeno. However, in other sources, passion is seen as a judgment or as what supervenes on judgment. In this case, some sources refer to Zeno, others to Chrysippus, and still others do not refer to any particular Stoic philosopher, so it is unclear whether the idea of judgment was already present in Zeno or is an innovation of his successor. Starting from this problem, I attempt to reconstruct the meaning of Stoic passion, with a particular interest in the definition of passion as judgment. In this way I will try to show that the apparently different positions of Zeno and Chrysippus are in fact the same when viewed within the framework of the Stoic theory of action.

Colocation and the Stoic Definition of Blending

Abstract This paper considers what function—if any—colocation of bodies may have in the Stoic theory of blending (κρᾶσις), by examining (1) whether colocation is part of the definition of what blending is; and (2) whether colocation is posited by the Stoics as a requirement necessary for the definition to be satisfied. I reconstruct the standard, Chrysippean definition of blending, and I show that the answer to (1) is ‘no’; further, I argue that the evidence gives no reason to affirm (2). Thus, it appears that colocation does not have a central function in the Stoic theory of blending.

The Craftsman: Paul’s Law of Christ and the Stoic Law of Nature

Abstract Paul’s statements on law have recently been considered in the context of Hellenistic discourse, but these readings have not always included his “law of Christ.” Here I analyze this phrase in Gal 6:2 in comparison with the Stoic “law of nature,” arguing that both Paul’s negative and positive discourse on law and this particular phrase can be elucidated by comparison to Stoic ethics, which used similar discourse to, respectively, elevate a first-order good, endorse a second-order value, and reference a higher-order norm. I first discuss the Stoic theory of “natural law,” conventional laws, and their relationship to each other, then offer a reading of Gal 5:13–6:2 with reference to other statements in Galatians and 1 Cor 9:21. The metaphorical “law of Christ” in Gal 6:2 references a higher-order norm that could be placed in antithesis to conventional laws, including the Mosaic law, and could be used to challenge them. This metaphor portrayed the norm as functioning like a law in its ability to prohibit and command behavior, but more comprehensively than conventional laws. Paul posits a “law of Christ” as a shared standard of behavior for Jesus-believers that also grounds a qualified use of the Mosaic law.

The Stoic Theory of Sign and the Semantic Modulation of Models

AbstractThe theory of mental models is a current cognitive approach trying to describe the way people make inferences. According to this theory, people reason from possibilities or models linked to sentences. Sometimes, such possibilities or models are transformed by the action of a semantic modulation. The point this paper is intended to make is that Stoic logic also has the machinery to explain semantic processes such as that of modulation. This is shown by means of the criterion Chrysippus of Soli provided for conditional sentences and the theory of sign related to that criterion.

Vagueness and Kataleptic Impressions

AbstractThe Stoics’ theory of kataleptic impressions looks different once we attend to their analysis of the Sorites paradox. In defending this view, I reject the long-standing assumption that the Stoics develop their theory by focusing on sensory impressions. The Stoic approach to vagueness shows, for example, that non-sensory impressions can be seemingly indistinguishable by belonging to a series. It also draws attention to an understudied dimension of Stoic theory: in aiming to assent only to kataleptic impressions, one aims to avoid not only assent to false impressions but also assent to those that are neither true nor false.

A NOTE ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF CICERO, DE FATO 35

AbstractDe fato 35 is part of Cicero's argument against the Stoic theory of causation. He claims in general that the Stoic chain of causes consists of antecedent but not efficient causes. To the examples cited in the previous chapter he adds verses from the opening of Ennius’ Medea exul (lines 208–11 Jocelyn = FRL 2 and TRF 89.1–4) containing the Nurse's lamentation over the origins of the Argonautic expedition that led, ultimately, to Medea's current mental distress. Then follows the question quorsum haec praeterita? and the answer quia sequitur illud, ‘nam numquam era errans mea domo ecferret pedem | Medea, animo aegro, amore saeuo saucia’, non ut eae res causam adferrent amoris, citing Ennius, Medea exul 215–16 Jocelyn = FRL 2 and TRF 89.8–9. Editors and commentators have struggled to explain the relation of the answer to the question. Here it is argued that the relation becomes clear if one adopts non<ne> for non and punctuates with a query after amoris. The sense will be: ‘Why have these past events been cited? In view of the sequel … was it not so that they bring on the cause of love?’ In other words, the Nurse, like the Stoics in Cicero's view, cites antecedent events as if they were efficient causes.

Los Antecedentes Presocráticos de la Teoría Estoica de Conflagración

In this paper, I explore the Presocratic antecedents of the Stoic theory of conflagration and argue that, even though three central theses of this theory have solid antecedents in Presocratic physics, the logical connection between them is a Stoic innovation. I label the Presocratics who hold these theses ‘Anaximandreans’ and include in this group Anaximander himself , Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia, and reveal that Anaximenes, Democritus and Antiphon share with them central meteorological and cosmological assumptions.

Stoic Theory of Action and Sceptical Objections Against It

The article considers the Stoic theory of action and its critique by Sceptics. The Stoics believed that the agent is autonomous due to his ability to give the assent to a representation. The theory of action is interwoven with the theory of knowledge in the assent-giving since the assent can be given to both value-neutral and value-loaded statements. It is thus appropriate to ask whether an adequate theoretical comprehension is required for performing a morally correct action, or is a correct practical comprehension sufficient? Sceptics actively criticized all parts of Stoic philosophy and often turned to the concept of “comprehensible representation”, dialectically arguing that such a thing does not exist. Revealing the deficiencies of Stoic views (which can be applied to other dogmatic theories), sceptics pointed out epistemic and moral flaws of the seemingly immaculate Stoic sage. A possible answer of the Stoics would be to distinguish between the practical and theoretical aspects of the comprehensible representation. Using the example of the assent given to a false representation, it is suggested that an error in the theoretical assent does not necessarily imply an error in the practical assent. In reaction to the Stoics' critique, Sceptics developed not only a non-dogmatic way of argumentation but also their model of action. Moreover, Sceptics should defend themselves from the apraxia charge. The charge, in general, argues that the Sceptic cannot be active because s/he would not give the assent to any representation. However, it is argued that having the ataraxia state does not imply a plant or animal-like life or the total quietism since it leaves room open for an undogmatic action, the action which avoids truth-valued statements or the assent to a representation. The discussion had the consequence that the Stoics loosened the connection between epistemology and ethics. In contrast, Sceptics had to develop a model of sceptical action, according to which one can act and live without adherence to beliefs.

¿Por qué no hay variaciones en el eterno retorno? Notas sobre el pensamiento divino en la cosmología estoica

In this article, I offer an analysis of the Stoic theory of everlasting recurrence and especially of the thesis that the infinite recurrence of the cosmos admits no variation whatsoever, and focus on the hypothesis advanced by Francis Henry Sandbach and David Furley to explain it. As I intend to reveal, this hypothesis is not adequately supported by the evidence if we take into account Stoic axiology. I argue that, in order to solve this difficulty, we need to explore Stoic theology and, in particular, the nature of Stoic divine thinking.

The Stoic Sage Does not Err: An Error?

The Stoics held that the wise person does not err. This thesis was widely criticized in the ancient world and runs afoul of contemporary fallibilist views in epistemology. Was this view itself an error? On one line, the view can be modified to accommodate many of the critical lines against it. Some of these lines of modification are consistent with traditional Stoic value theory (for example, importing the notion of preferred indifferents into epistemic considerations). However, others require larger modifications to Stoic axiology (in particular, a revision of the equality of errors thesis). A version of the no errors thesis emerges as defensible against the criticisms of the view, but there is then the question as to whether it is an orthodox Stoicism.

Visualizing Pain

Although Seneca often expresses a disdain for the body, vividly detailed evocations of bodily experience feature frequently in his writing. In particular, he presents the repeated imagining of anticipated pain and suffering (praemeditatio futurorum malorum) as an important psychotherapeutic technique. This strategy should be seen in the context of Stoic theories of perception and the embodied nature of emotion (theories that resonate in significant respects with findings in cognitive neuroscience). Yet Seneca’s approach is also profoundly colored by a perception of the relationship between imagination and emotion which lies at the heart of ancient rhetorical theory. While anticipating future misfortunes is sometimes presented as a means to dull anxiety, a method of cultivating stereotypically Stoic impassivity by rooting out negative emotions, Seneca also highlights the power of the vividly imagined scene of suffering to stimulate an ardent love of virtue, a positive emotion which plays a crucial role in the moral progress of the Stoic student.

Kant and Stoic Affections

AbstractI examine the significance of the Stoic theory ofpathē(and related topics) for Kant’s moral psychology, arguing against the received view that systematic differences block the possibility of Kant’s drawing anything more than rhetoric from his Stoic sources. More particularly, I take on the chronically underexamined assumption that Kant is committed to a psychological dualism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, positing distinct rational and nonrational elements of human mentality. By contrast, Stoics take the mentality of an adult human being to be rational through and through, while recognising that this rationality is not normally in a state of health or excellence. I show how Kant’s account of affections—chiefly the “affects” and “passions” that he identifies as targets of a duty of apathy—draws substantive lessons from his Stoic sources, and how he accepts on his own terms the monistic principles of Stoic moral psychology.