Stockpiling Of Chemical Weapons Research Articles

History of the use of chemical weapons for military purposes and the possibility of their current use

Throughout the history of mankind there have been many wars of both local character and large-scale wars. At the heart of military actions necessarily lies the use of weapons, one type of which is chemical. Chemical weapons, the basis of which are diverse in their effect on the body and chemical composition of poisonous substances, began to be used for military purposes during World War I, namely, the first use occurred on April 22, 1915 in Belgium near the city of Ypres. Germany used gas cylinders filled with chlorine in this attack. The man who created this weapon was German chemist Fritz Haber, who became known as the "father of chemical weapons". Since that time, scientists from different countries began to actively study the effect of poisonous substances on the human body, synthesize their new types, as well as search for reliable means of protection against its effects. Throughout history, attempts have been made to ban the use of chemical weapons. In particular, after the end of the First World War, the Geneva Protocol was adopted in 1925, prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other similar gases in war. However, this agreement failed to limit the use of poisonous substances, which led to their further use, mainly in localized wars. Much work on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons belongs to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, established in 1997 after the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 1993. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the history of chemical weapons for military purposes, as well as to study the activities for their prohibition. Literary data of recent years on the history of creation, use of chemical weapons and international legal agreements on their prohibition and destruction, the main types of toxic substances, means of protection against their effects are analyzed. Conclusions are made about the possibilities of chemical weapons use at present.

Investigation of Features of Mass-Fragmentation of Some N-(N,N-diethylacetamidino)-O-alkylfluorophosphates and Related Alkylfluorophosphonates and their Detection by Liquid Chromatography-High Resolution Mass Spectrometry

The timely detection of violations of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) requires reliable methods for detecting toxic chemicals that can be used for chemical attacks. The purpose of this investigation is to estimate chromatographic and mass-spectral characteristics of some toxic chemicals recently included into Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals of the CWC, in particular N-(N,N-diethylacetamidino)-methylfluorophosphonate (DEAMP), N-(N,N-diethylacetamidino)-O-methylfluorophosphate (DEAOMP) and N-(N,N-diethylacetamidino)-O-ethylfluorophosphate (DEAOEP) and the improvement of the qualification of the Chemical Analytical Control Laboratory experts taking part in the OPCW Proficiency Tests. Materials and methods. The technique of high efficient liquid chromatography coupled with tandem high resolution mass spectrometry (LC-MS/HRMS) was used during the investigation. The results. The results of optimization of conditions of mass-spectrometric detection, selection of optimal pairs of ion reactions and program of gradient elution during separation of chemicals in reversed-phase liquid chromatography were presented. Presented approach was tested in analysis of model aqueous samples; metrological parameters of detection of compounds were estimated. Conclusion. It was shown during investigation that electrospray ionization mass-spectra of DEAMP, DEAOMP and DEAOEP contain intensive peaks of protonated molecular ions, which after further fragmentation produce characteristic product-ions used for identification and high sensitive detection of parent compounds by LC-MS/HRMS. Limits of detection of DEAMP, DEAOMP and DEAOEP were 1.0 ng/mL, 0.5 ng/mL and 0.5 ng/mL, respectively

International Terrorism Using Toxic Chemicals as an Element of Hybrid Warfare

Modern terrorism is a complex system that consists of a complex of complementary processes – ideological, criminal, military, political, religious and nationalistic. Chemical terrorism is one of the elements of hybrid warfare – a new technology in the fight for the reorganization of the world at the present stage. The purpose of this article is to consider one of the elements of hybrid wars – chemical terrorism. Sources and informational basis of the research, methodology. In this work, the sources published by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) were used. The publications available through the databases PubMed, Google Scholar, eLibrary, etc. were also studied. Research method – system analysis. The probability of the use of chemical warfare agents and toxic chemicals by terrorists of various ideological orientations as part of a hybrid war strategy has been studied. The discussion of the results. Hybrid military conflicts of a non-classical nature involve the participation of international terrorist organizations in hostilities. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) does not explicitly prohibit non-state actors from obtaining and using chemical weapons. This situation is very convenient for the states that have signed the CWC and use terrorist organizations as part of the strategy of indirect action. In such cases the information and psychological operations are aimed at the collapse and fragmentation of countries, undermining their ability to resist, discrediting their leaders, and causing a split in the ranks of the allies. This was most clearly shown in the incidents with the use of toxic chemicals in Syria. Conclusion. Working groups under the auspices of the UN and the OPCW, sent to Syria to investigate incidents with the use of sarin, proved unable to conduct objective investigations. They usually ended up on the side of the sponsors of chemical terrorist attacks, despite the evidence of falsification. This, in turn, can lead to serious military conflicts, for which the role of casus belli will be played by false news from the global media. The only mechanism that made it possible to stop such provocations in Syria was a public warning from the Russian side about the place and time of the planned false flag attack. At the same time, such a selective position of the UN and the OPCW can at any moment lead to the loss of the control over chemical weapons in certain regions of the world.

Goodbye to chemical weapons stockpiles

Goodbye to chemical weapons stockpiles

Goodbye to chemical weapon stockpiles

Goodbye to chemical weapon stockpiles

A never-ending fight

In 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention —a first-of-its-kind global disarmament agreement—came into force. The treaty was championed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with the aim of ridding the world of that class of weapons of mass destruction. In World War I alone, chemical weapons injured more than 1.3 million people, and over 100,000 of those died shortly after exposure, according to the OPCW . Now the OPCW is approaching a new milestone: the destruction of all declared stockpiles of chemical weapons by its 193 member states. (Only four countries—Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan—aren’t members.) In a few weeks, the destruction of the remaining stockpiles by the US will be completed, according to the OPCW. In Pueblo, Colorado , the US is destroying between 600 and 700 4.2 in (107 mm) mortars containing sulfur mustard, also called mustard gas, a chemical warfare agent that

Chemical Weapons Violations in Syria's Civil War: an International Law Perspective

The use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war is a grave violation of international law, as it violates the prohibition on using chemical weapons under customary international law. The war has erupted since Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad responded violently to the peaceful opposition toward the regime. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has confirmed two occasions of using chemical weapons in Syria in 2015 and 2016. However, until recently, there were no necessary measures to protect civilians in Syria from using chemical weapons and prevent any future use of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons. The study aims to analyze the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war, the violation of the CWC in the Syrian civil war, and the legal protection of Syrian civilians. The study used a normative legal research methodology. The data sources in the study were secondary data obtained from the statutory, analytical, legal, conceptual, and fact approaches. The study's result showed that the Syrian government violated the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 (CWC) and should respond with the action, categorized as an infringement of the international legal norm.

Social conditioning and grounds for criminalization of violations of the procedure for carrying out the international transfer of goods which are the subject to state export control

The paper emphasizes that violation of the procedure for international transfers of goods subject to state export control directly threatens the national security of the state itself. The criteria that serve as a measure of the social conditioning of the criminalization of violation of the order of international transfers of goods subject to state export control have been determined. Groups of factors influencing criminalization are identified. A literature review of the grounds of the criminal law prohibition, which serve as objective prerequisites for its establishment, was carried out. The position regarding the impracticality of considering a criminal offense provided for by Art. 333 of the Criminal Code, as an international convention. It was determined that the social conditioning of the criminalization of violations of the order of international transfers of goods subject to state export control is based on society's assessment of the act as criminal, that is, one characterized by such a degree of social danger that only criminal liability is the appropriate legal consequence public danger of this act. The public danger of violating the order of international transfers of goods subject to state export control is not only in weakening the national security and defense capability of a certain state, but also has an international character. It cannot be claimed that the criminalization of the violation of the order of international transfers of goods subject to state export control is a consequence of Ukraine's obligations under the international treaties it has ratified, since this conclusion will be justified only in the case when we are talking about the Convention on the prohibition of development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, Art. VII of which clearly provides for the establishment of criminal liability for acts prohibited by this convention. Criminal violation provided for in Art. 333 of the Criminal Code, cannot be considered as an international convention, since the criminalization of violation of the order of international transfers of goods subject to state export control is not a consequence of Ukraine's obligations under international treaties ratified by it, with the exception of certain acts defined by the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, accumulation and use of chemical weapons and their destruction.

Legal Regulation of Environmental Protection during Armed Conflicts on the Example of Ukraine

The article analyzes the impact of military operations on the state of ecosystems and individual natural resources in Ukraine. Based on the analysis of Ukrainian and foreign sources, it was made a conclusion about the catastrophic damage to the environment caused by the military aggression of the Russian Federation. In particular, the environmental damage as of September 2022 is estimated at almost 1 trillion hryvnias and continues to grow daily.
 Taking into account the fact that the impact on the environment during armed conflicts almost always has a transboundary nature, author analyzed the provisions of international acts that regulate this problem. These are the Stockholm Declaration (1972); the World Charter of Nature; the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992); the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It was established that all the mentioned documents call on the international community to take measures for preventing or minimizing the destructive impact on the environment during military operations.
 The author paid particular attention to Ukrainian legislation. The Instruction on the Procedure for Implementing the Norms of International Humanitarian Law in the Armed Forces of Ukraine requires following the provisions of international humanitarian law, including, in the context of environmental protection. In the Basic Principles (Strategy) of the State Environmental Policy of Ukraine for the Period Until 2030, it is noted that it is absolutely necessary to solve the issue of access to the objects of the military-defense industrial complex in order to carry out appropriate supervision and control over compliance with environmental legislation at these objects. A separate block of normative acts is devoted to the legal regulation of the procedure and methods of determining damage and losses caused to the environment of Ukraine as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation.
 Despite the fact that the war continues, the development of normative acts aimed at regulating the reconstruction of destroyed or damaged territories and objects is already being observed. The author analyzed some of them, identified shortcomings and proposed ways to eliminate them.

New Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies as the Key to Successful Completion of Chemical Weapons Disarmament Process

The fulfillment of international obligations of the Russian Federation under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction required the development and the creation of safe innovative industrial technologies and facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons. The purpose of this work is to give brief characteristics of the technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons developed and commercially implemented at various facilities. The destruction of chemical weapons was carried out at seven facilities specially designed and built for this purpose. These facilities were located in six regions of the country. The choice of technologies for the destruction (utilization) of chemical weapons was carried out on a competitive basis in the period from 1992 to 1995.The priority was given to the so-called two-stage technology. At the first stage, the toxic chemicals were extracted from the munitions or the containers and detoxified chemically in «soft» controlled conditions. Then the empty munitions were degassed. At the second stage, thermal neutralization or bituminization of the reaction masses was carried out with their subsequent burial. The two-stage technology for the destruction of mustard and mustard-lewisite mixtures was based on the interaction of toxic chemicals with an 80 ± 5% aqueous solution of monoethanolamine, which was supplied into the reactor at a temperature of 60–80 °C in the ratio toxic chemical: degassing formulation - 1:1.2 according to mass. The detoxification process was considered completed if the content of toxic chemicals in the reaction mass did not exceed 3,2×10 -3 %. To destroy lewisite, a «short scheme» in a jet-type reactor was implemented. The mixing of the initial reagents, lewisite and 20% alkali solution, was carried out using a nozzle of a special design, where lewisite was swirled with a special device (swirler) and supplied into the reactor. The first stage of the destruction of V-gases was carried out in munitions cases. The munitions were considered as chemical reactors. The process of detoxification of V-gases was considered completed when the residual content of toxic chemicals was at the level of 5×10 -4 %, and the reaction mass was delivered for thermal neutralization (second stage). In total, 39966,588 tons of toxic chemicals were destroyed. The whole number of destroyed containers with agents and chemical munitions amounted to 4,158,456 units. On September 27, 2017, the last chemical weapon was destroyed at the Kizner chemical weapons destruction facility, thus completing the process of complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles in the Russian Federation.

Problems of Biosafety in Current International Law

INTRODUCTION. The presented article is devoted to an extremely curious and, without exaggeration, urgent topic. The authors seek to understand the content and legal concept of biosafety in International Law. The researchers seek to list the biosafety issues in order to define concrete aspects related to responsibility of the States for using biological weapons. The authors analyze new legal trends on ensuring the international biosafety. The article is focused on legal issues by raising many questions about what should be considered a just war in the view of international humanitarian law, the issues of fundamental principles in current international law (the principle use of force, the right of States to self-defense in case of a bioattack, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, arms control, and responsibility). The writers give an overview of new types of sovereignty such as biosovereignty, cyber sovereignty, cyberbiosovereignty, and genomic sovereignty of States, the legal concept of international biocrimes (genomocide), the legal classification of bioterrorism, bioaggression, biopolitics, and bioeconomics. The authors consider the importance of facilitating the broad interpretation of the concept of biosafety.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research uses general scientific and special cognitive techniques wherein legal analysis and synthesis, systemic, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and dialectical methods are applied.RESEARCH RESULTS. The authors found out that despite the prohibition of biological weapon there are still other urgent issues such as an international control mechanism for monitoring the non-proliferation of biological weapons has not been established yet. The Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has not been adopted yet. The study concludes with an idea that the problem of banning certain types of biomedical research has not been solved in some States and at the international level. The authors note such important problems as the lack of an international control mechanism for monitoring the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, as well as the threat to the safety of genomic research and confidentiality of genetic data. In this paper, we interpret the concept of biosafety rather broadly, considering the issues typical of allied industries. Biosecurity and biosafety are directly related to ensuring environmental security, marine security, food security and outer space security. The researchers paid attention to the issue of legal regulation of ensuring environmental, biological, and food safety. Due to this fact, it is hard to do so with regard to the causal link between the acts (bioterrorism) of state agencies, the violation of the principles of international law, standards of human rights and the consequences that occurred. It is not clear from the text of the BTWC Convention which international organ/body can investigate such acts in international affairs and which norm of international law directly should be applied.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Following a review of the content, the authors raise possible problems, strategies, suggestions and guidelines for ensuring biosafety in international law. The authors conclude that near future new categories of weapons of mass destruction appear in the world, moreover, genetic weapons should be classified as weapons of mass destruction, along with chemical, biological, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons. Technological developments will trigger the issues of fundamental principles in current international law. The authors came to the conclusion about extension of the universal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in case biological and genetic weapons are used. The authors encourage the complement to the international legal regulation the necessity to adopt a Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), establishing an international control mechanism for verifying prohibitions on the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons is obvious. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction adopted in 1993, which contains a mechanism for verifying compliance with the prohibitions of the Convention, can be considered a precedent for the effective regulation of the circulation of hazardous substances all over the world.

Federal Directorate for Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons – 30th Anniversary

The Russian Federation has ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and thereby reaffirmed its international obligations assumed in the field of chemical disarmament. To solve the problem of the destruction of chemical weapons, given its complexity and versatility, the Presidential Federal Target Program «Destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation» was developed. This article is dedicated to the history of the formation of a unique structure – the Federal Office for the Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons and the formation of a team of its specialists who directly performed the difficult task of destroying chemical weapons. September 27, 2017 at the facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in the village Kizner of the Udmurt Republic, in a special ceremony, the last chemical munition was destroyed. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has recorded the fact of the complete destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation with the relevant certificates. The program for the destruction of chemical weapons was completed 3 years ahead of schedule, with savings of 9.6 billion rubles. The main results of the completed process of destruction of chemical weapons are that no human life has been lost and no damage has been done to the environment. Currently, the Federal Directorate is implementing measures within the framework of the departmental project «Liquidation of the consequences of the activities of storage facilities and facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation» of the state program of the Russian Federation «Development of industry and increasing its competitiveness»

New Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies as the Key to Successful Completion of Chemical Weapons Disarmament Process

The fulfillment of international obligations of the Russian Federation under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction required the development and the creation of safe innovative industrial technologies and facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons. The purpose of this work is to give brief characteristics of the technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons developed and commercially implemented at various facilities. The destruction of chemical weapons was carried out at seven facilities specially designed and built for this purpose. These facilities were located in six regions of the country. The choice of technologies for the destruction (utilization) of chemical weapons was carried out on a competitive basis in the period from 1992 to 1995. The priority was given to the so-called two-stage technology. At the first stage, the toxic chemicals were extracted from the munitions or the containers and detoxified chemically in «soft» controlled conditions. Then the empty munitions were degassed. At the second stage, thermal neutralization or bituminization of the reaction masses was carried out with their subsequent burial. The two-stage technology for the destruction of mustard and mustard-lewisite mixtures was based on the interaction of toxic chemicals with an 80 ± 5% aqueous solution of monoethanolamine, which was supplied into the reactor at a temperature of 60–80 °C in the ratio toxic chemical: degassing formulation - 1:1.2 according to mass. The detoxification process was considered completed if the content of toxic chemicals in the reaction mass did not exceed 3,2×10-3%. To destroy lewisite, a «short scheme» in a jet-type reactor was implemented. The mixing of the initial reagents, lewisite and 20% alkali solution, was carried out using a nozzle of a special design, where lewisite was swirled with a special device (swirler) and supplied into the reactor. The first stage of the destruction of V-gases was carried out in munitions cases. The munitions were considered as chemical reactors. The process of detoxification of V-gases was considered completed when the residual content of toxic chemicals was at the level of 5×10-4%, and the reaction mass was delivered for thermal neutralization (second stage). In total, 39966,588 tons of toxic chemicals were destroyed. The whole number of destroyed containers with agents and chemical munitions amounted to 4,158,456 units. On September 27, 2017, the last chemical weapon was destroyed at the Kizner chemical weapons destruction facility, thus completing the process of complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles in the Russian Federation.

When the pigeons refuse to fly: Legal perpesctives on the deployment of chemical weapons in Syria

In recent times, several hostilities have taken place all over the world. However, these hostilities have been non-international in character and outlook, with the attendant gory effects more pronounced in the 20th and 21st Century warfare. The type of weaponry engaged in such hostilities have been in the spotlight in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The deployment of chemical weapons in the Syrian war and its adverse effect on the civilian population have become a global concern. The effectiveness of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, and other legal instruments relating to the protection of victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, have been questioned. Although, scholars had in times past advocated for the restriction and prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in armed conflicts, the Syrian situation has again exposed the need to devote urgent attention to providing more effective sanctions for perpetrators of this heinous crime. This paper seeks to explore the legal implications of the deployment of Chemical Weapons in Syria, by canvassing arguments for more concerted efforts to guard against the use of Chemical Weapons in armed conflicts and ensure more adequate protection for civilians. This will give effect to and promote the core values of IHL.

О целесообразности внедрения цикла специальной подготовки врачей-токсикологов по теме «Химикаты двойного назначения — потенциал для создания современного химического оружия»

Актуальность. Химикаты двойного назначения и их потенциальное воздействие являются постоянным объектом наблюдения со стороны многих международных организаций, однако данная информация до сих пор не нашла должного отражения в учебных программах подготовки военных токсикологов. Цель. Подтверждение актуальности расширения спектра знаний по токсикологии химикатов двойного назначения и разработки цикла тематического усовершенствования по этому вопросу. Материалы и методы. Проанализированы материалы Организации по запрещению химического оружия, Австралийской группы, Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе по вопросам международного регулирования химического и токсичного оружия. Результаты. Автором обобщены ключевые компоненты системы международного наблюдения за химическими веществами — компонентами химического оружия, дана характеристика химикатов двойного назначения. Представленные списки химикатов подразделяются в зависимости от степени потенциального риска и масштаба коммерческого применения. Подчеркивается, что в учебных программах последипломной подготовки военных врачей преимущественно уделяется внимание изучению оружия массового поражения на основе методологии, разработанной еще во времена Второй мировой войны. Учитывая вышеизложенное, существует необходимость пересмотра учебных программ последипломной подготовки военных врачей с целью создания возможности приобретения слушателями знаний по токсикологии химикатов двойного назначения и современных международных норм их наблюдения и регулирования. Выводы. В современных условиях существует необходимость совершенствования учебных программ последипломной подготовки военных врачей в аспекте изучения токсикологии химикатов двойного назначения и международных норм их контроля.

Irritants: a modern redefining of relevance to the armed forces and the prospect of creating medical means of protection

Absract. Arguments are presented in favor of the increasing relevance of irritants to ensure the fulfillment of tasks by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the need to reassess the risks to human health arising from their use. The results of an information-analytical data on methods and adverse effects of irritant application for purposes which are not prohibited by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction are presented. Modern ideas about molecular mechanisms of the effect of irritants on structures of the nervous system are considered, which are based on the fact that the provocative effect of irritants is realized by changing the permeability of cation channels of the transient receptor potential of type A1, expressed at the ends of sensitive neurons. The results of experimental and clinical studies of specific modulation of these channels using their natural and synthetic antagonists are analyzed. Structural formulas and basic pharmacological characteristics of the most active antagonists are given and the prospect of their use as a basis for the development of drugs for the treatment of irritant lesions is substantiated. The data on the use of solutions based on amphoteric and chelating agents for emergency treatment of skin areas infected with irritants is presented. A number of promising areas of research on the creation of effective medical means of protection against lesions by irritants has been identified.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction: History of Signing and Key Points

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on 30 November 1992. The treaty entered into force on 29 April 1997. The aim of this work was to study the history of signing of the CWC and its key points. First attempts to develop an international agreement restricting the use of poisons and various toxic substances in hostilities have been made in the 17th century, when the 1675 Strasbourg Agreement between France and the Holy Roman Empire banned the use of poisoned bullets. During the First and Second Peace Conferences in The Hague (1899 and 1907), its participants pledged to refrain from employing «poison or poisoned arms» and from employing «arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury». The First World War showed that this ban turned out to be ineffective, and chemical weapons appeared on the battlefield. After the war, the «Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare», known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, was developed. But this document did not ban the elaboration and the production of chemical weapons. The High Contracting Parties agreed not to use «asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices» against those States only, that acceded to the Protocol. Moreover, many States-Parties reserved their right to use chemical weapons in response to a first use by an enemy. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) showed the ineffectiveness of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Iraq’s massive use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops has accelerated the process of developing an international document – the CWC, the world`s first multilateral disarmament agreement, which provided for the verifiable elimination, within the prescribed time limit, of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction – chemical weapons. Nowadays 192 states have become parties to the CWC. The Russian Federation fully complied with the obligations undertaken by the CWC, the last Russian chemical munition was destroyed in September 2017

Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). 4. The Destruction of Iraqi Chemical Weapons

After the defeat of Iraqi army in Kuwait in February 1991, on April 3, the UN Security Council (UN Security Council) adopted Resolution 687, that «decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities». This UN operation was not the first forced disarmament of vanquished by victors, but it gave great impetus to the completion of the work on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, i.e. the destruction of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The aim of this article was to show the process of Iraqi`s chemical weapons destruction. The destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons included the formation of legal basis (United Nations Security Council Resolution 687); the establishment of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect and oversee the destruction or elimination of Iraq’s chemical weapons directly on Iraqi territory; certain measures of political, economic (UN sanctions) and military coercion (the US and the UK military operation «Desert Fox»). In summer 1991, UNSCOM formed a Destruction Advisory Panel to develop technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons, toxic substances and their precursors. Their destruction was carried out in the period October 1992 to May 1994 on the territory of the Muthanna State Establishment. Sarin, cyclosarin, tabun and their precursors were destroyed by hydrolysis in aqueous alkaline solution using a repurposed production facility. Thus 76 tons of sarin and sarin/cyclosarin mixture, as well as 40 tons of tabun were destroyed. For the sulfur mustard, the high-temperature direct burning method was used at the special factory, established under the project of the Destruction Advisory Panel. Thus were destroyed around 400 tons of liquid sulfur mustard. Chemical munitions and containers, after the extraction of poisonous agents, were destroyed using a specially developed technique of explosive ventilation and burning. 30 chemical warheads for Al-Hussein ballistic missiles, 12,8 thousand 155-mm mustard shells, 40,5 thousand 122 mm rockets for MLRS, filled with sarin/cyclosarin, were destroyed. In general, UNSCOM managed to solve the problem of chemical disarmament of Iraq. The article describes in details the Iraq’s chemical weapons destruction technologies

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction: History of Signing and Key Points

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on 30 November 1992. The treaty entered into force on 29 April 1997. The aim of this work was to study the history of signing of the CWC and its key points. First attempts to develop an international agreement restricting the use of poisons and various toxic substances in hostilities have been made in the 17th century, when the 1675 Strasbourg Agreement between France and the Holy Roman Empire banned the use of poisoned bullets. During the First and Second Peace Conferences in The Hague (1899 and 1907), its participants pledged to refrain from employing «poison or poisoned arms» and from employing «arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury». The First World War showed that this ban turned out to be ineffective, and chemical weapons appeared on the battlefield. After the war, the «Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare», known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, was developed. But this document did not ban the elaboration and the production of chemical weapons. The High Contracting Parties agreed not to use «asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices» against those States only, that acceded to the Protocol. Moreover, many States-Parties reserved their right to use chemical weapons in response to a first use by an enemy. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) showed the ineffectiveness of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Iraq’s massive use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops has accelerated the process of developing an international document – the CWC, the world`s first multilateral disarmament agreement, which provided for the verifiable elimination, within the prescribed time limit, of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction – chemical weapons. Nowadays 192 states have become parties to the CWC. The Russian Federation fully complied with the obligations undertaken by the CWC, the last Russian chemical munition was destroyed in September 2017.

Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). 4. The Destruction of Iraqi Chemical Weapons

After the defeat of Iraqi army in Kuwait in February 1991, on April 3, the UN Security Council (UN Security Council) adopted Resolution 687, that «decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities». This UN operation was not the first forced disarmament of vanquished by victors, but it gave great impetus to the completion of the work on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, i.e. the destruction of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The aim of this article was to show the process of Iraqi`s chemical weapons destruction. The destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons included the formation of legal basis (United Nations Security Council Resolution 687); the establishment of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect and oversee the destruction or elimination of Iraq’s chemical weapons directly on Iraqi territory; certain measures of political, economic (UN sanctions) and military coercion (the US and the UK military operation «Desert Fox»). In summer 1991, UNSCOM formed a Destruction Advisory Panel to develop technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons, toxic substances and their precursors. Their destruction was carried out in the period October 1992 to May 1994 on the territory of the Muthanna State Establishment. Sarin, cyclosarin, tabun and their precursors were destroyed by hydrolysis in aqueous alkaline solution using a repurposed production facility. Thus 76 tons of sarin and sarin/cyclosarin mixture, as well as 40 tons of tabun were destroyed. For the sulfur mustard, the high-temperature direct burning method was used at the special factory, established under the project of the Destruction Advisory Panel. Thus were destroyed around 400 tons of liquid sulfur mustard. Chemical munitions and containers, after the extraction of poisonous agents, were destroyed using a specially developed technique of explosive ventilation and burning. 30 chemical warheads for Al-Hussein ballistic missiles, 12,8 thousand 155-mm mustard shells, 40,5 thousand 122 mm rockets for MLRS, filled with sarin/cyclosarin, were destroyed. In general, UNSCOM managed to solve the problem of chemical disarmament of Iraq. The article describes in details the Iraq’s chemical weapons destruction technologies.