Stock Option Expense Research Articles

Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Bank Earnings Management: Evidence from FAS 123R

We study the effect of CEOs’ risk-taking incentives (vega), derived from their stock options, on earnings management (EMGT) by banks. Prior research finds an inconsistent relationship between vega and EMGT in non-financial firms. In the banking industry, the effect of vega on EMGT is further complicated by the strict regulatory environment. To establish causality, we exploit the exogenous reduction in vega resulting from Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R in 2005 that mandates a fair-value-based method to expense stock options and increases costs of granting option compensation. Using the difference-in-differences approach, we find that banks with a larger drop in CEO vega due to FAS 123R significantly reduce EMGT. The findings suggest that CEO vega has a positive and causal effect on bank EMGT. Our results are robust enough to employ in different research designs and specifications. Furthermore, we find that the negative effect of FAS 123R on EMGT is weaker in banks subject to a higher possibility of regulatory intervention.

Why Did Politicians Intervene in the Fair Value Debate? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private-sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician’s ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician’s stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top-management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the most dominant force.

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

ABSTRACTPoliticians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.

Executive Pay and Labor’s Shares: Unions and Corporate Governance from Enron to Dodd-Frank

AbstractThis article is an historical analysis of the U.S. labor movement’s shareholder activism during the 2000s, which was based on their pension-plan assets. During the previous decade, corporate governance had tilted to give shareholders greater voice in corporate decisions. The protagonists were public pension plans such as CalPERS. Come the 2000s, they were replaced by unions and union-influenced pension plans. Their agendas overlapped but union investors were distinctive in their use of shareholder activism to make companies more public-minded, raise labor’s organizing power, and challenge executive power by reliance not only on shareholder activism but also political activities. Labor’s signature issue was executive pay, which was a topic that that shareholder activists during the 1990s had avoided other than to push for stock-based pay. But three waves of corporate scandals during the following decade caused other shareholders to become skeptical of executive pay-setting methods. Union investors zeroed in on expensing and backdating of stock options, and fought for say on pay, the issue where they had the greatest impact. An interaction between private orderings and regulation now developed, whereby shareholder pay reforms found their way into law. With inequality a major social concern, unions repeatedly contrasted lofty executive pay to stagnant wages. Yet little was said about lofty payouts to shareholders, which may have been a more important driver of inequality than executive pay. The article ties corporate governance to larger social and political developments in the U.S., and to the labor movement, embedding corporate governance in historical context.

The effects of SFAS-123R on corporate investment

ABSTRACTThis study examines the effects of mandatory expensing of stock options on corporate investment after the passage of SFAS-123R. First, we find an increase in corporate investment such as R&D investment and capital expenditure in the post-SFAS-123R period. Second, we find that stock-based compensation such as stock option compensation and restricted stock in the post-SFAS-123R period is positively related to investment. Our findings suggest that SFAS-123R discourages the opportunistic use of stock option compensation. The use of option compensation in the post-SFAS-123R era appears to encourage managers to pursue more long-term investment, which suggests that the SFAS-123R has had positive consequences.

Managerial compensation incentives and corporate debt maturity: Evidence from FAS 123R

This paper studies the effect of risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation on corporate debt maturity choices. The Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R is used as a quasi-natural experiment to establish causality. FAS 123R requires firms to expense stock options at fair value, which has resulted in a dramatic reduction in option compensation and managerial risk-taking incentives. We find that treated firms significantly increased debt maturity relative to control firms. Further tests identify that the alleviation of creditor-shareholder agency conflicts due to the adoption of FAS 123R is the underlying mechanism driving the result.

Does Option-Based Compensation Affect Payout Policy? Evidence from FAS 123R

Does option-based compensation affect payout policy? To address this question, we examine the adoption of mandatory expensing of stock options. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that the reduction in option-based compensation after the accounting change varies with the firm-specific expected accounting impact. Across a battery of tests, we do not find that (accounting-driven) reductions in option-based pay cause dividends to increase or repurchases to decrease. Our results contrast with the widely held belief that option-based pay has a significant causal influence on payout policy and cast doubts on its role in the shift from dividends to repurchases.

CEO incentive pay around performance declines

PurposeThe authors study stock and option grants around abrupt performance declines for continuing CEOs and find that firms facing abrupt financial declines grant more options than stock, while firms facing operational decline grant more stock than options. Firms making these adjustments just prior to performance declines outperform those that do not for three years following the decline and are less likely to engage in asset restructuring. To establish causality, the authors exploit compensation changes instigated by FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing. The result is robust to numerous tests, including rebalancing of incentives and CEO turnover. The paper aims to discuss these issues.Design/methodology/approachTo establish causality, the authors exploit compensation changes instigated by FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing.FindingsFirms making these adjustments just prior to performance declines outperform those that do not for three years following the decline and are less likely to engage in asset restructuring. The result is robust to numerous tests, including rebalancing of incentives and CEO turnover.Originality/valueSeveral studies examine the relationship between poor performance and compensation of newly appointed CEOs. But firms regularly employ retention or incentive plans when experiencing distress to prevent critical employees from leaving when they are most needed (Goyal and Wang, 2017). Employee turnover results in a loss of continuity coupled with high search and training costs for replacement personnel. Beneish et al. (2017) find that 57 percent of CEOs associated with intentional misreporting retain their jobs, implying the costs of removing CEOs is high, especially if the incumbent CEO has a strong track record relative to industry peers prior to the period before the misreporting begins. The board fires the CEO if future firm value under the CEO is expected to be lower than under the best alternative CEO less adjustment costs (e.g. search costs, severance pay).

Option-Based Compensation and Corporate Debt Maturity: Evidence from FAS 123R

This paper studies the effect of risk-taking incentives provided in managerial compensation on corporate debt maturity choices. The Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R is used as a quasi-natural experiment to establish causality. FAS 123R requires firms to expense stock options at fair value, which has resulted in a dramatic reduction in both option compensation and managerial risk-taking incentives. We find that treated firms significantly increased debt maturity relative to control firms. Further tests identify that the alleviation of creditor-shareholder agency conflicts due to the adoption of FAS 123R is the underlying mechanism driving the result.

Cash Holding in U.S. Firms: Evidence from FAS 123R

Using exogenous variation in CEO stock option grants generated by FAS 123R which mandated expensing of employee stock options, we investigate the causal effects of CEO risk incentives (vega) on cash policies of U.S. firms. Employing a difference-in-difference framework, in which we identify firms most affected by the regulatory change, we find no evidence that changes in CEO portfolio vega lead to significant changes in corporate cash holdings and the marginal value of cash. Our evidence challenges the view that option-based compensation is a first-order driver of corporate cash policy and instead implies that previously documented associations perhaps reflect endogeneity rather than a causal influence.

The Effect of Option-Based Compensation on Payout Policy: Evidence from FAS123R

Does option-based compensation have a causal influence on payout policy? To address this question we examine the adoption of mandatory expensing of stock options (via accounting standard FAS123R), a plausible exogenous shock to the use of option-based compensation. As FAS123R applies to all firms, our identification strategy exploits the fact that the reduction in option-based compensation in response to the accounting standard varies with the firm-specific expected accounting impact, as measured by the option expense disclosed in the footnotes prior to FAS123R. Using a difference-in-difference research design we do not find that (accounting-driven) reductions in option-based pay cause dividends to increase, repurchases to decrease or the payout composition to change, except for some increase in dividends among dividend-paying small firms. Our results contrast with the widely held belief that option-based pay has a significant causal influence on payout policy and cast doubts on its role in the shift from dividends to repurchases in recent decades.

Managing Employee Stock Option Expense: A Fair Value Approach

Owing to special characteristics, classic option pricing models are not well suited to the valuation of employee stock options (ESOs). This paper attempts to conduct a more general fair value estimation based on attaching performance targets to option vesting. Considering a setting that includes factors such as options that may be exercised early at employee discretion, employee exit rates and firm default risk, this paper presents a sensitivity analysis and empirical tests of option value. The results highlight the importance of considering the characteristics of ESOs in the design of performance‐vested option plans so as to provide the most attractive incentives for employees.

Are CEOs Held Accountable for Unrecognized Expenses? The Case of Implied Employee Option Expense

An extensive body of research has investigated whether CEOs are held accountable for various earnings components by testing the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to these earnings components. No study, however, has examined whether CEOs are held accountable for expenses unrecognized in earnings. This study investigates whether CEOs were held accountable for fair value employee stock option (ESO) expense in the period 1996-2005, during which the expense was not recognized, but rather implied by pro forma earnings disclosed in the footnotes under SFAS No. 123. Controlling for CEO stock option grants and other variables, I find that CEO cash compensation decreased with implied fair value ESO expense in the second half of the period 1996-2005 but not in the first half. The result represents the first evidence that CEOs can be held accountable for unrecognized expenses and how boards of directors view an unrecognized expense may be influenced by public opinions (accounting for fair value ESO expense was hotly debated in late 1990s and early 2000s). In high-tech industries, however, the result is very different. In these industries, CEO cash compensation was related to fair value ESO expense in neither the first half nor the second half of the period 1996-2005. The result is unsurprising given the strong position taken publicly by high-tech industry leaders that fair value ESO expense is not an expense to the firm and cannot be measured accurately.

The accuracy of disclosures for complex estimates: Evidence from reported stock option fair values

In this study, we exploit the unique reporting requirements for employee stock options to provide large sample evidence on the accuracy of footnote disclosures related to a specific complex estimate, the fair value of options granted. We first document the frequency and magnitude of differences between (1) the reported weighted-average fair value of options granted and (2) the calculated option fair value using the disclosed weighted-average valuation model inputs and the Black-Scholes option pricing model. In a sample of 23,358 firm-year observations between 2004 and 2011, we find that 23.9 percent have reported and calculated option fair values that differ by more than ten percent, and that these differences are sticky and are frequently significant as a percentage of net income. We also find that fair value differences are larger for firms that (1) exhibit anomalous stock option footnote disclosures that likely result from disclosure errors, (2) have more complex and hence error-prone stock option programs, and (3) have lower quality financial reporting. Taken together this evidence is consistent with large fair value differences that are primarily due to unintentional errors in the stock option footnote disclosures. To document the consequences of these fair value differences, we provide evidence that errors in the reported fair values prevent financial statement users from using the reported values to reliably estimate future stock option expense for many firms. Consistent with this result, we also find that analyst forecasts are less accurate and more disperse for firms with larger fair value differences.

Determinants and Valuation Implications of Compulsory Stock Option Disclosures in a Weak Regulatory Setting—The Case of France

AbstractUsing a sample of listed French firms in 2005, the year of mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union (EU), we investigate the determinants of disclosure compliance of stock option expenses under IFRS 2, Share‐based Payment. Stock options are a popular means of executive compensation in France relative to other EU countries. Prior to 2005, French accounting standards and corporate governance regulations did not require recognition of option expense amounts and required minimal supplementary disclosures. There was also a perception that enforcement was imperfect, in particular with respect to IFRS 2. Given this setting, we explore what factors influence the willingness of firms to follow compulsory IFRS requirements in a weak regulatory setting. We find that overall compliance with IFRS 2 disclosure requirements increases with U.S. and U.K. institutional ownership, U.S. cross‐listing, provision of English language statements, and decreases with CEO and family ownership of the firm. We also investigate how stock market prices are affected by the recognition and disclosure of stock option expenses according to IFRS 2 in this regulatory setting and find that investors value option expenses positively, particularly when accompanied by high‐disclosure compliance. Our findings have implications for other jurisdictions in the process of adopting or converging to IFRS.

The Accuracy of Disclosures for Complex Estimates: Evidence from Reported Stock Option Fair Values

In this study, we exploit the unique reporting requirements for employee stock options to provide large sample evidence on the accuracy of footnote disclosures related to a specific complex estimate, the fair value of options granted. We first document the frequency and magnitude of differences between (1) the reported weighted-average fair value of options granted and (2) the calculated option fair value using the disclosed weighted-average valuation model inputs and the Black-Scholes option pricing model. In a sample of 23,358 firm-year observations between 2004 and 2011, we find that 23.9 percent have reported and calculated option fair values that differ by more than ten percent, and that these differences are sticky and are frequently significant as a percentage of net income. We also find that fair value differences are larger for firms that (1) exhibit anomalous stock option footnote disclosures that likely result from disclosure errors, (2) have more complex and hence error-prone stock option programs, and (3) have lower quality financial reporting. Taken together this evidence is consistent with large fair value differences that are primarily due to unintentional errors in the stock option footnote disclosures. To document the consequences of these fair value differences, we provide evidence that errors in the reported fair values prevent financial statement users from using the reported values to reliably estimate future stock option expense for many firms. Consistent with this result, we also find that analyst forecasts are less accurate and more disperse for firms with larger fair value differences.

The Effect of Using a Lattice Model to Estimate Reported Option Values

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R suggests that lattice valuation models may improve the estimates of reported employee stock option values relative to the more commonly used Black–Scholes (BS) model. However, lattice model critics have expressed concerns that managers may use lattice models' flexibility to opportunistically understate option values. In this study, we investigate a sample of firms that recently adopted a lattice model to value employee stock options to provide evidence on this issue by identifying the determinants of lattice model adoption and examining the effect of lattice model use on reported option values. We report three main results. First, we find that firms are more likely to adopt a lattice model when it is more likely to produce lower values than the BS model and when managers have incentives to lower stock option expense. Second, we find that firms adopting a lattice model increase understatement of reported option values more than firms that continue to use the BS model and that the incremental understatement is due to use of the lattice model. Third, we conduct several tests to examine whether the valuation effect of lattice model use is consistent with efforts to correct for documented shortcomings in the BS model and find no evidence that this is the case. Taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that firms adopt and implement lattice models primarily to lower reported option values.

Stock option expense management after SFAS 123R

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms manage the total value of stock option grants downward after the implementation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123R to reduce their reported option expenses. Design/methodology/approach – All Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms with available stock option data in 2004 and 2006 are included in the analysis. The authors analyze if the total value of options granted, the per share fair value of options granted, the number of options granted as well as each individual input assumption have changed from the pre-SFAS 123R (i.e. 2004) to the post-SFAS 123R (i.e. 2006) period. We compare post-SFAS123R option pricing assumptions and per share fair value of options granted with their respective expected values to verify the results. We also analyze whether SFAS 123R has differential effects on firms which chose to disclose option expense only in footnotes (“disclosing firms”) versus firms which voluntarily recognized option expense (“recognizing firms”) prior to SFAS 123R. Findings – The results show that after SFAS 123R, the total fair value of stock options granted for disclosing firms declined significantly. The decrease appears to result from managerial discretion over volatility and dividend yield assumptions as well as the reduction in the number of options granted. The evidence suggests that firms engage in not only assumption-based manipulations but also real activities to lower reported stock option expenses. It was also found that disclosing firms lower the total fair value of stock options granted to a greater extent than recognizing firms. Originality/value – This study adds to prior literature that examines the opportunistic incentives for managers to use discretion in reporting stock option expenses. This study contributes to the earnings management literature by providing another example of manipulating earnings through real activities. Finally, our study should be of interest to regulators and investors.

The Differential Value Relevance of S&P's Core Earnings Versus GAAP Earnings: The Role of Stock Option Expense

AbstractIn 2002, Standard & Poor's (S&P) introduced Core Earnings as a proprietary, uniform earnings metric, with the goal of improving financial reporting. The distinguishing feature of Core Earnings is its consistent treatment of seven adjustments to GAAP earnings for which there is no consensus adjustment by managers and analysts. We use stock price and return data to assess whether investors perceive Core Earnings to be more value relevant than GAAP earnings. The implementation of FASB 123R changed the calculation of GAAP and Core Earnings. This change allows us to assess the role of stock option expense in the valuation of earnings numbers by partitioning the sample into pre‐ and post‐FASB 123R periods and creating consistent measures of GAAP and Core Earnings. Our price results indicate that Core Earnings is more value relevant than GAAP earnings in the pre‐period after controlling for stock option expense, and in the post‐FASB 123R periods. The price results provide empirical evidence consistent with S&P's expectation that a uniformly calculated earnings measure is a more consistent and useful indicator of current performance and future earnings.

Does Expensing Stock Options Trigger Under- Investment?

Does Expensing Stock Options Trigger Under- Investment?