Introduction This article analyzes the financial incentives of employees and policyholders versus financiers of insurance firms within a stochastic dominance framework. It examines the risk-taking incentives of the insurer with respect to asset portfolio choice, and how the payoffs to each of the firm's claimants depend on the final value of the portfolio. Mayers and Smith (1981), Doherty and Garven (1986), and Cummins (1988) have examined these incentives using an option pricing model paradigm. In this article, we adopt the discrete time, risk-neutral valuation approach previously used by Doherty and Garven (1986). The development of a generalized option valuation model in the discrete time framework, under costly contracting,(1) requires the adoption of one of two sets of assumptions. The first set requires that the return on the insurer's asset portfolio and the claims made on its policies are normally distributed and that individuals have constant absolute risk aversion (Rubinstein, 1976). The second set requires that the return on assets and the cost of claims are lognormally distributed and that either there is no friction to continuous trading or that investors have constant relative risk aversion (Brennan, 1979; Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1984). The advantage of stochastic dominance in analyzing the effects of these conflicts is that it avoids the necessity of imposing restrictions on individual preferences (Levy and Sarnat, 1972; Bawa, 1975). In many cases, conclusions are obtainable without any extensive knowledge about return distributions and/or utility functions. Moreover, this framework has pedagogical value in that many of the incentive conflicts can be demonstrated simply. This article begins by developing the notion of risky investment portfolios in a stochastic dominance context, followed by an analysis of the incentives of insurer stakeholders. Incentive conflicts between owners and employees and between owners and customers are shown to vary with organizational form. Two Risky Investment Portfolios Assume that the insurer has two mutually exclusive investment portfolios from which to choose. One portfolio is riskier than the other in that it is a simple mean-preserving spread of the less risky one. The expected returns from both portfolios are the same, although the actual returns vary by state of nature. (The figure portrays total end-of-period returns and not rates of return.) In states with returns below the expected return, the riskier portfolio provides lower returns, whereas in states where returns exceed the expected return, the riskier portfolio outperforms the less risky one. Because the two asset return lines intersect at the point that equates their expected returns, we can be sure that, by way of second-degree stochastic dominance, any risk-averse individual faced with only these two mutually exclusive choices will prefer the less risky portfolio. This is true by construction, regardless of the precise shape of his or her utility function and irrespective of the exact probability distribution of states. Conflict Between Employees, Policyholders, and Owners The incentive conflicts among the claimants to a stock insurance firm can be explored using the stochastic dominance paradigm. The simplest case--a single period model--is presented, and employees, policyholders, and financiers are considered.(2) Labor costs (and other fixed costs) are assumed to be set at levels that reflect the conflicting incentives of owners versus employees. In other words, employees are able to ascertain the firm's incentives to choose an asset portfolio that would be adverse to their interests, and they negotiate for compensating wage levels accordingly. Similarly, policyholders are aware of the incentives for the insurer to choose an asset portfolio that would be adverse to their interests, and they demonstrate this awareness by lowering the premiums that they are willing to pay for insurance policies. …