Stimulus-response Contingencies Research Articles

The dual-feature approach-avoidance task: validity, training efficacy, and the role of contingency awareness in changing food preference

ABSTRACT The approach-avoidance task (AAT) probes tendencies contributing to unwanted behaviours, like excessive snacking, by measuring RT differences between approach and avoidance responses to different stimuli. It retrains such tendencies using repeated avoidance of appetitive stimuli and approach of healthy alternatives. The most common paradigm, the irrelevant-feature AAT, conceals these stimulus-response contingencies by requiring approach or avoidance based on features irrelevant to the tendencies (e.g. frame colour). Unfortunately, it is an unreliable measure and not always successful as a training, likely because the stimuli can be ignored. In the novel dual-feature AAT, the combination of stimulus and irrelevant feature determines responses: participants approach foods and avoid objects surrounded by frame A, and vice versa given frame B. We trained 219 online participants to approach fruit and avoid chocolate using active (7:1 stimulus-to-frame contingency) and sham (1:1 stimulus-to-frame contingency) versions of these two trainings. Compared to sham, active irrelevant-feature training was associated with more selection and desire to eat fruit, and active dual-feature training increased approach bias for fruit. Participants’ perceived rate of approaching fruit versus chocolate correlated with many outcome measures, suggesting contingency awareness plays a major role in AAT training effectiveness, challenging implicit accounts. While the dual-feature paradigm shows potential, its high error rates, RTs, and difficulty mandate improvement.

Resting network architecture of theta oscillations reflects hyper-learning of sensorimotor information in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome.

Gilles de la Tourette syndrome is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by motor and vocal tics. It is associated with enhanced processing of stimulus-response associations, including a higher propensity to learn probabilistic stimulus-response contingencies (i.e. statistical learning), the nature of which is still elusive. In this study, we investigated the hypothesis that resting-state theta network organization is a key for the understanding of superior statistical learning in these patients. We investigated the graph-theoretical network architecture of theta oscillations in adult patients with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome and healthy controls during a statistical learning task and in resting states both before and after learning. We found that patients with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome showed a higher statistical learning score than healthy controls, as well as a more optimal (small-world-like) theta network before the task. Thus, patients with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome had a superior facility to integrate and evaluate novel information as a trait-like characteristic. Additionally, the theta network architecture in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome adapted more to the statistical information during the task than in HC. We suggest that hyper-learning in patients with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome is likely a consequence of increased sensitivity to perceive and integrate sensorimotor information leveraged through theta oscillation-based resting-state dynamics. The study delineates the neural basis of a higher propensity in patients with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome to pick up statistical contingencies in their environment. Moreover, the study emphasizes pathophysiologically endowed abilities in patients with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome, which are often not taken into account in the perception of this common disorder but could play an important role in destigmatization.

One Link to Link Them All.

A conditioned response to a stimulus can be transferred to an associated stimulus, as seen in sensory preconditioning. In this research paper, we aimed to explore this phenomenon using a stimulus-response contingency learning paradigm using voluntary actions as responses. We conducted two preregistered experiments that explored whether a learned response can be indirectly activated by a stimulus (S1) that was never directly paired with the response itself. Importantly, S1 was previously associated with another stimulus (S2) that was then directly and contingently paired with a response (S2-R contingency). In Experiment 1a, an indirect activation of acquired stimulus-response contingencies was present for audiovisual stimulus pairs wherein the stimulus association resembled a vocabulary learning setup. This result was replicated in Experiment 1b. Additionally, we found that the effect is moderated by having conscious awareness of the S1-S2 association and the S2-R contingency. By demonstrating indirect activation effects for voluntary actions, our findings show that principles of Pavlovian conditioning like sensory preconditioning also apply to contingency learning of stimulus-response relations for operant behavior.

Reinforcement Learning Under Uncertainty: Expected Versus Unexpected Uncertainty and State Versus Reward Uncertainty

Two prominent types of uncertainty that have been studied extensively are expected and unexpected uncertainty. Studies suggest that humans are capable of learning from reward under both expected and unexpected uncertainty when the source of variability is the reward. How do people learn when the source of uncertainty is the environment’s state and the rewards themselves are deterministic? How does their learning compare with the case of reward uncertainty? The present study addressed these questions using behavioural experimentation and computational modelling. Experiment 1 showed that human subjects were generally able to use reward feedback to successfully learn the task rules under state uncertainty, and were able to detect a non-signalled reversal of stimulus-response contingencies. Experiment 2, which combined all four types of uncertainties—expected versus unexpected uncertainty, and state versus reward uncertainty—highlighted key similarities and differences in learning between state and reward uncertainties. We found that subjects performed significantly better in the state uncertainty condition, primarily because they explored less and improved their state disambiguation. We also show that a simple reinforcement learning mechanism that ignores state uncertainty and updates the state-action value of only the identified state accounted for the behavioural data better than both a Bayesian reinforcement learning model that keeps track of belief states and a model that acts based on sampling from past experiences. Our findings suggest a common mechanism supports reward-based learning under state and reward uncertainty.

Neural Index of Reinforcement Learning Predicts Improved Stimulus-Response Retention under High Working Memory Load.

Human learning and decision-making are supported by multiple systems operating in parallel. Recent studies isolating the contributions of reinforcement learning (RL) and working memory (WM) have revealed a trade-off between the two. An interactive WM/RL computational model predicts that although high WM load slows behavioral acquisition, it also induces larger prediction errors in the RL system that enhance robustness and retention of learned behaviors. Here, we tested this account by parametrically manipulating WM load during RL in conjunction with EEG in both male and female participants and administered two surprise memory tests. We further leveraged single-trial decoding of EEG signatures of RL and WM to determine whether their interaction predicted robust retention. Consistent with the model, behavioral learning was slower for associations acquired under higher load but showed parametrically improved future retention. This paradoxical result was mirrored by EEG indices of RL, which were strengthened under higher WM loads and predictive of more robust future behavioral retention of learned stimulus-response contingencies. We further tested whether stress alters the ability to shift between the two systems strategically to maximize immediate learning versus retention of information and found that induced stress had only a limited effect on this trade-off. The present results offer a deeper understanding of the cooperative interaction between WM and RL and show that relying on WM can benefit the rapid acquisition of choice behavior during learning but impairs retention.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Successful learning is achieved by the joint contribution of the dopaminergic RL system and WM. The cooperative WM/RL model was productive in improving our understanding of the interplay between the two systems during learning, demonstrating that reliance on RL computations is modulated by WM load. However, the role of WM/RL systems in the retention of learned stimulus-response associations remained unestablished. Our results show that increased neural signatures of learning, indicative of greater RL computation, under high WM load also predicted better stimulus-response retention. This result supports a trade-off between the two systems, where degraded WM increases RL processing, which improves retention. Notably, we show that this cooperative interplay remains largely unaffected by acute stress.

How preference change induced by mere action versus inaction persists over time

AbstractUnderstanding how sustainable preference change can be achieved is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work shows that merely responding or not responding to objects during go/no-go training can influence preferences for these objects right after the training, when people choose with a time limit. Here we examined whether and how such immediate preference change in fast choices can affect choices without time limit one week later. In two preregistered experiments, participants responded to go food items and withheld responses toward no-go food items during a go/no-go training. Immediately after the training, they made consumption choices for half of the items (with a time limit in Experiment 1; without time limit in Experiment 2). One week later, participants chose again (without time limit in both experiments). Half of the choices had been presented immediately after the training (repeated choices), while the other half had not (new choices). Participants preferred go over no-go items both immediately after the training and one week later. Furthermore, the effect was observed for both repeated and new choices after one week, revealing a direct effect of mere (non)responses on preferences one week later. Exploratory analyses revealed that the effect after one week is related to the memory of stimulus-response contingencies immediately after the training, and this memory is impaired by making choices. These findings show mere action versus inaction can directly induce preference change that lasts for at least one week, and memory of stimulus-response contingencies may play a crucial role in this effect.

How Preference Change Induced by Mere Action Versus Inaction Persists Over Time

Understanding how sustainable preference change can be achieved is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work shows that merely responding or not responding to objects during go/no-go training can influence preferences for these objects right after the training, when people choose with a time limit. Here we examined whether and how such immediate preference change in fast choices can affect choices without time limit one week later. In two preregistered experiments, participants responded to go food items and withheld responses toward no-go food items during a go/no-go training. Immediately after the training, they made consumption choices for half of the items (with a time limit in Experiment 1; without time limit in Experiment 2). One week later, participants chose again (without time limit in both experiments). Half of the choices had been presented immediately after the training (repeated choices), while the other half had not (new choices). Participants preferred go over no-go items both immediately after the training and one week later. Furthermore, the effect was observed for both repeated and new choices after one week, revealing a direct effect of mere (non)responses on preferences one week later. Exploratory analyses revealed that the effect after one week is related to the memory of stimulus-response contingencies immediately after the training, and this memory is impaired by making choices. These findings show mere action versus inaction can directly induce preference change that lasts for at least one week, and memory of stimulus-response contingencies may play a crucial role in this effect.

Learning something new versus changing your ways: Distinct effects on midfrontal oscillations and cardiac activity for learning and flexible adjustments

We need to be able to learn new behaviour, but also be capable of changing existing routines, when they start conflicting with our long-term goals. Little is known about to what extent blank-slate learning of new and adjustment of existing behavioural routines rely on different neural and bodily mechanisms. In the current study, participants first acquired novel stimulus–response contingencies, which were subsequently randomly changed to create the need for flexible adjustments. We measured midfrontal theta oscillations via EEG as an indicator of neural conflict processing, as well as heart rate as a proxy of autonomic activity. Participants’ trial-wise learning progress was estimated via computation modelling. Theta power and heart rate significantly differed between correct and incorrect trials. Differences between correct and incorrect trials in both neural and cardiac feedback processing were more pronounced for adjustments compared to blank-slate learning. This indicates that both midfrontal and cardiac processing are sensitive to changes in stimulus–response contingencies. Increases in individual learning rates predicted lower impact of performance feedback on midfrontal theta power, but higher impact on heart rate. This suggests that cardiac and midfrontal reactivity are partially reflective of different mechanisms related to feedback learning. Our results shed new light on the role of neural and autonomic mechanisms for learning and behavioural adjustments.

Working memory load dissociates contingency learning and item-specific proportion-congruent effects.

A consistent finding in the Stroop literature is that congruency effects (i.e., the color-naming latency difference between words presented in incongruent vs. congruent colors) are larger for mostly-congruent items (e.g., the word RED presented most often in red) than for mostly-incongruent items (e.g., the word GREEN presented most often in yellow). This "item-specific proportion-congruent effect" might be produced by a conflict-adaptation process (e.g., fully focus attention to the color when the word GREEN appears) and/or by a more general learning mechanism of stimulus-response contingencies (e.g., respond "yellow" when the word GREEN appears). Under the assumption that limited-capacity resources are necessary for learning stimulus-response contingencies, we examined the contingency-learning account using both Stroop and nonconflict (i.e., noncolor words written in colors) versions of a color identification task while participants maintained a working memory (WM) load. Consistent with the contingency-learning account, WM load modulated people's ability to learn contingencies in the nonconflict task. In contrast, across 3 experiments, WM load did not affect the item-specific proportion-congruent effect in the Stroop task even though we employed a design (the "2-item set" design) in which contingency learning should be the dominant process. These results imply that the item-specific proportion-congruent effect is not merely a byproduct of contingency learning but a manifestation of reactive control, a mode of control engagement that may be especially useful when WM resources are scarce. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Item-specific control of attention in the Stroop task: Contingency learning is not the whole story in the item-specific proportion-congruent effect.

A robust finding in the Stroop literature is that congruency effects (i.e., the color-naming latency difference between color words presented in incongruent vs. congruent colors) are larger for color words presented most often in their congruent color than for color words presented most often in incongruent colors. However, the cause of this item-specific proportion congruent (ISPC) effect is unclear, as it might be produced by either a conflict-adaptation strategy (e.g., prepare for conflict when the word RED appears) and/or a more general learning mechanism of stimulus-response contingencies (e.g., prepare to respond blue when the word RED appears). Thus far, attempts to directly dissociate the two processes appear to indicate no role for conflict adaptation, at least in situations in which contingency learning is also possible. We re-examined this conclusion in a Stroop task in which contingency learning and item-specific conflict frequency were manipulated partially independently. In addition to a contingency-learning effect emerging for stimuli matched on conflict frequency, a conflict-adaptation effect also emerged for stimuli matched on contingency. The two effects also had different time courses, with the contingency-learning effect emerging early and remaining stable throughout the experiment and the conflict-adaptation effect arising later in the experiment. These results challenge not only the contingency-learning account of the ISPC effect, an account that denies the existence of a conflict-adaptation process, but also control accounts that assume that, although conflict-adaptation processes do exist, they are not used when contingency learning is also possible.

Dissociable cognitive strategies for sensorimotor learning

Computations underlying cognitive strategies in human motor learning are poorly understood. Here we investigate such strategies in a common sensorimotor transformation task. We show that strategies assume two forms, likely reflecting distinct working memory representations: discrete caching of stimulus-response contingencies, and time-consuming parametric computations. Reaction times and errors suggest that both strategies are employed during learning, and trade off based on task complexity. Experiments using pressured preparation time further support dissociable strategies: In response caching, time pressure elicits multi-modal distributions of movements; during parametric computations, time pressure elicits a shifting distribution of movements between visual targets and distal goals, consistent with analog re-computing of a movement plan. A generalization experiment reveals that discrete and parametric strategies produce, respectively, more localized or more global transfer effects. These results describe how qualitatively distinct cognitive representations are leveraged for motor learning and produce downstream consequences for behavioral flexibility.

No effect of hippocampal lesions on stimulus-response bindings.

The hippocampus is believed to be important for rapid learning of arbitrary stimulus-response contingencies, or S-R bindings. In support of this, Schnyer et al. (2006) (Experiment 2) measured priming of reaction times (RTs) to categorise visual objects, and found that patients with medial temporal lobe damage, unlike healthy controls, failed to show evidence of reduced priming when response contingencies were reversed between initial and repeated categorisation of objects (a signature of S-R bindings). We ran a similar though extended object classification task on 6 patients who appear to have selective hippocampal lesions, together with 24 age-matched controls. Unlike Schnyer et al. (2006), we found that reversing response contingencies abolished priming in both controls and patients. Bayes Factors provided no reason to believe that response reversal had less effect on patients than controls. We therefore conclude that it is unlikely that the hippocampus is needed for S-R bindings.

Prior Cocaine Self-Administration Increases Response-Outcome Encoding That Is Divorced from Actions Selected in Dorsal Lateral Striatum.

Dorsal lateral striatum (DLS) is a highly associative structure that encodes relationships among environmental stimuli, behavioral responses, and predicted outcomes. DLS is known to be disrupted after chronic drug abuse; however, it remains unclear what neural signals in DLS are altered. Current theory suggests that drug use enhances stimulus-response processing at the expense of response-outcome encoding, but this has mostly been tested in simple behavioral tasks. Here, we investigated what neural correlates in DLS are affected by previous cocaine exposure as rats performed a complex reward-guided decision-making task in which predicted reward value was independently manipulated by changing the delay to or size of reward associated with a response direction across a series of trial blocks. After cocaine self-administration, rats exhibited stronger biases toward higher-value reward and firing in DLS more strongly represented action-outcome contingencies independent from actions subsequently taken rather than outcomes predicted by selected actions (chosen-outcome contingencies) and associations between stimuli and actions (stimulus-response contingencies). These results suggest that cocaine self-administration strengthens action-outcome encoding in rats (as opposed to chosen-outcome or stimulus-response encoding), which abnormally biases behavior toward valued reward when there is a choice between two options during reward-guided decision-making.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Current theories suggest that the impaired decision-making observed in individuals who chronically abuse drugs reflects a decrease in goal-directed behaviors and an increase in habitual behaviors governed by neural representations of response-outcome (R-O) and stimulus-response associations, respectively. We examined the impact that prior cocaine self-administration had on firing in dorsal lateral striatum (DLS), a brain area known to be involved in habit formation and affected by drugs of abuse, during performance of a complex reward-guided decision-making task. Surprisingly, we found that previous cocaine exposure enhanced R-O associations in DLS. This suggests that there may be more complex consequences of drug abuse than current theories have explored, especially when examining brain and behavior in the context of a complex two-choice decision-making task.

Do impulsive individuals benefit more from food go/no-go training? Testing the role of inhibition capacity in the no-go devaluation effect

Not responding to food items in a go/no-go task can lead to devaluation of these food items, which may help people regulate their eating behavior. The Behavior Stimulus Interaction (BSI) theory explains this devaluation effect by assuming that inhibiting impulses triggered by appetitive foods elicits negative affect, which in turn devalues the food items. BSI theory further predicts that the devaluation effect will be stronger when food items are more appetitive and when individuals have low inhibition capacity. To test these hypotheses, we manipulated the appetitiveness of food items and measured individual inhibition capacity with the stop-signal task. Food items were consistently paired with either go or no-go cues, so that participants responded to go items and not to no-go items. Evaluations of these items were measured before and after go/no-go training. Across two preregistered experiments, we consistently found no-go foods were liked less after the training compared to both go foods and foods not used in the training. Unexpectedly, this devaluation effect occurred for both appetitive and less appetitive food items. Exploratory signal detection analyses suggest this latter finding might be explained by increased learning of stimulus-response contingencies for the less appetitive items when they are presented among appetitive items. Furthermore, the strength of devaluation did not consistently correlate with individual inhibition capacity, and Bayesian analyses combining data from both experiments provided moderate support for the null hypothesis. The current project demonstrated the devaluation effect induced by the go/no-go training, but failed to obtain further evidence for BSI theory. Since the devaluation effect was reliably obtained across experiments, the results do reinforce the notion that the go/no-go training is a promising tool to help people regulate their eating behavior.

Conflict adaptation within but not across NoGo decision criteria: Event-related-potential evidence of specificity in the contextual modulation of cognitive control

From the standpoint of conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001), detecting an incident of information-processing conflict should attenuate the disruptive influence of information-processing conflicts encountered subsequently, by which time cognitive-control operations will have been engaged. To examine the generality of this conflict-adaptation process across task dimensions, the present research analyzed event-related potentials in a Go/NoGo task that randomly varied the NoGo decision criterion applied across trials. Sequential analyses revealed reduced-amplitude fronto-central N2 and NoGo P3 responses on the second of two consecutive NoGo trials. Importantly, both of these conflict-adaptation effects were present only when the same NoGo decision criterion was applied across trials n and n−1. These findings support the theory that encountering information-processing conflict focuses attention on specific stimulus–response contingencies (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009) rather than engages general cognitive-control mechanisms (Freitas & Clark, 2015). Further implications for the generality of cognitive control are discussed.

Adapting to stimulus-response contingencies without noticing them.

Episodic stimulus-response (S-R) bindings emerge whenever a response is executed in temporal proximity to a stimulus and they are retrieved from memory by repeating the stimulus on a later occasion. To examine whether retrieval of S-R bindings is sensitive to contextual influences, we manipulated contingencies between stimulus repetitions and response repetitions. In a sequential priming paradigm, stimulus repetitions were either predictive of response repetitions (positive contingency) or response changes (negative contingency) or were orthogonal to the response relation (no contingency). Results revealed that compared to the orthogonal condition, S-R binding and retrieval effects were larger under positive contingency but were reduced under negative contingency. The modulating effect of contingency on the strength of S-R binding and retrieval processes was not mediated by contingency awareness. These findings implicate that S-R binding and retrieval processes are implicitly tuned to adapt to contextual affordances that either promote or hinder the use of S-R bindings for efficient action regulation.

Talking About Counseling: A Plea to Return to Humanistic Language

Multiple linguistic systems have emerged to describe the counseling process. In contemporary mental health culture, humanistic lexicons have generally been displaced by technical, experience‐removed descriptors. The author argues that humanistic language should be adopted by counselors because it has far greater utility than technical linguistic systems for describing counseling processes.

A habituation account of change detection in same/different judgments

We investigated the basis of change detection in a short-term priming task. In two experiments, participants were asked to indicate whether or not a target word was the same as a previously presented cue. Data from an experiment measuring magnetoencephalography failed to find different patterns for "same" and "different" responses, consistent with the claim that both arise from a common neural source, with response magnitude defining the difference between immediate novelty versus familiarity. In a behavioral experiment, we tested and confirmed the predictions of a habituation account of these judgments by comparing conditions in which the target, the cue, or neither was primed by its presentation in the previous trial. As predicted, cue-primed trials had faster response times, and target-primed trials had slower response times relative to the neither-primed baseline. These results were obtained irrespective of response repetition and stimulus-response contingencies. The behavioral and brain activity data support the view that detection of change drives performance in these tasks and that the underlying mechanism is neuronal habituation.

Variability of scores in the 2008 Olympic dressage competition and implications for horse training and welfare

Abstract Olympic dressage involves an intimate unity between a human and a non-human and is scored by a subjective judging process, under the auspices of the Federation Equestre Internationale whose Code of Conduct declares the welfare of the horse as paramount. Dressage is of particular interest to equitation scientists and equine ethologists because it embodies the full range of the stimulus-response contingencies that operate in all of the Olympic disciplines. In Federation Equestre Internationale dressage competition, collective marks are awarded across four domains immediately after each performance. Collective marks are designed to summarize the performance of horse and rider and must reflect the qualities of the entire performance. They are derived from the observation of the judges of the separate test movements. The 4 collective marks include: (1) paces; (2) impulsion; (3) submission; and (4) the rider's position and seat; correctness and effect of the aids (rider signals). The definition of submission in this context makes reference to lightness and other qualities that align with optimal ridden horse welfare. We assessed the characteristics of these marks in horses competing in the 2008 Olympic Games Grand Prix (GP; n =46) and Grand Prix Special (GPS; n =25) dressage competitions. We also examined the effect of judge location and used Pearson correlation coefficients to explore relationships between collective marks and test-movement scores. All 4 collective marks correlated with each other significantly ( P r =0.22) and the strongest between impulsion and rider position scores (RPS) ( r =0.59). In the GP, paces and submission scores were less correlated with test movement scores than the impulsion and RPS scores. In the GPS, submission scores were less correlated with individual movements than the other collective marks. Indeed, they failed to significantly correlate with 19 of 32 movement scores ( P F =31.27) made the least significant contribution (paces, F =61.3; impulsion, F =69.77; RPS F =53.01; P

Initiating the Development of Multisensory Integration by Manipulating Sensory Experience

The multisensory integration capabilities of superior colliculus neurons emerge gradually during early postnatal life as a consequence of experience with cross-modal stimuli. Without such experience neurons become responsive to multiple sensory modalities but are unable to integrate their inputs. The present study demonstrates that neurons retain sensitivity to cross-modal experience well past the normal developmental period for acquiring multisensory integration capabilities. Experience surprisingly late in life was found to rapidly initiate the development of multisensory integration, even more rapidly than expected based on its normal developmental time course. Furthermore, the requisite experience was acquired by the anesthetized brain and in the absence of any of the stimulus-response contingencies generally associated with learning. The key experiential factor was repeated exposure to the relevant stimuli, and this required that the multiple receptive fields of a multisensory neuron encompassed the cross-modal exposure site. Simple exposure to the individual components of a cross-modal stimulus was ineffective in this regard. Furthermore, once a neuron acquired multisensory integration capabilities at the exposure site, it generalized this experience to other locations, albeit with lowered effectiveness. These observations suggest that the prolonged period during which multisensory integration normally appears is due to developmental factors in neural circuitry in addition to those required for incorporating the statistics of cross-modal events; that neurons learn a multisensory principle based on the specifics of experience and can then apply it to other stimulus conditions; and that the incorporation of this multisensory information does not depend on an alert brain.