Purpose Of Statute Research Articles

Scouring Dictionaries: Their Overuse and Misuse in the Courts

For the past two or three decades, under the influence of the interpretive method called textualism, courts have increasingly turned to general dictionaries when interpreting the meaning of contested terms. And the rate of increase has been striking. This resort to dictionaries is suspect for two main reasons: as practiced, it's arbitrary and unsystematic; and it's linguistically questionable for determining meaning in a legal context. This article looks primarily at the first point-the courts' arbitrariness when choosing which definition to apply. Using three cases from the Michigan Supreme Court, the article argues that the Court majority cherry-picked a definition that did not seem to fit with an English speaker's common understanding of the term in context and that ran counter to common sense, practical considerations, or the statute's purpose. While dictionaries may have modest value in judicial decision-making, courts too often give them a greater role-to the exclusion of reasonable nontextual arguments.

A Flaw in ERISA’s Remedial Scheme: How Do Benefit Plans Recoup Money from Overpaid Participants?

Consider the following scenario: an ERISA plan erroneously distributes greater retirement benefits to its members than the participants and beneficiaries are actually entitled to receive — either because the plan errs when calculating benefits, or a participant induces the plan to distribute non-vested funds through misrepresentation. This article investigates the remedies available to plaintiff-plans seeking recovery for overpayments to participants. Based on the Supreme Court's recent ERISA remedies rulings, the article discusses whether the statute contains a viable cause of action for fiduciaries to recover mistaken overpayments from participants. Following a brief history of ERISA, including the statute's purpose and foundation in trust law, this article examines the Supreme Court’s construction of Section 502(a) and its test for appropriate equitable relief. The article then analyzes and compares recent cases denying monetary recovery to plan fiduciaries to those cases allowing fiduciaries to recoup overpayments to participants. Ultimately, the article's analysis illustrates that the Supreme Court's overly-narrow interpretation of ERISA’s remedial provisions frustrates the purpose of the statute.

Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia's Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation

Justice Scalia is one of the only American judges to have formulated a complete methodology of statutory interpretation. He contends that the rule of law requires [s]tatutory construction to begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. This article presents the results of a study that examined how Justice Scalia's practice of interpreting statutes compares with his theory. Based on a random sample of Justice Scalia's statutory interpretation dissents, this study uncovered the following. First, Justice Scalia entirely suspends textualism in about a quarter of the cases in the study's sample, because he is interpreting a statute that he believes grants the courts common law authority. Second, when Justice Scalia engages in textual analysis, more often than not his presumption that the ordinary meaning of words governs statutory meaning is overcome. He also consults an eclectic set of extrinsic materials - the same broad set of materials that other justices use, with the singular exception of legislative history. Third, purpose analysis lies at the core of Justice Scalia's method, and he considers a statute's purpose about as often as the Court as a whole does. Because Justice Scalia refuses to consult legislative materials, however, his purpose analysis frequently stems from the least formal source of all - his own sense of a statute's purpose or of absurd or anomalous results. This article concludes by observing that compared to ipse dixit purposivism, the evils of legislative history are grossly overstated.

Internal Affairs Doctrine: California versus Delaware in a Fight for the Right to Regulate Foreign Corporations

In the United States, a prospective corporation is free to incorporate in any state, regardless of where the corporation plans to physically locate or transact business. Where the corporate organizers reside and whether or not the corporation has any actual ties to the chosen state of incorporation are factors of no consequence. The state that a corporation chooses is extremely important, however, because states generally have the exclusive right to regulate the internal affairs of corporations that have decided to incorporate under their laws. This sole right of regulation is known as the Internal Affairs Doctrine (IAD), which replaces the standard conflict-of-laws principles that apply in most other areas of law. Several states have recently decided to resist this seemingly absolute right of an incorporating state to regulate internal affairs. Most notably, in 1977, the California legislature enacted Corporations Code section 2115. This statute allows the state to regulate all corporations that conduct a majority of their business in California, even if they are incorporated out-of-state and are considered foreign corporations. The statute's purpose is not to eliminate or override the regulatory rights of the actual incorporating state, but only to add another layer of protection for California shareholders and stakeholders in those foreign corporations. Section 2115 has been approved and upheld by the courts in California. Delaware courts, on the other hand, have whole-heartedly disagreed with allowing non-incorporating states to regulate internal affairs. They refuse to permit any exception to the IAD and have criticized California's section 2115 in its entirety. The fact that these two specific states are diametrically opposed on this issue is extremely important because they are two major players in corporate law. More than sixty-percent of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware, and twenty-percent of all Fortune 500 companies are headquartered in California. Consequently, the unsettled nature of the law governing internal affairs affects a substantial number of the largest corporations in the country. This Note argues that California Corporations Code section 2115 should be accepted as a valid exception to the IAD, and that in certain situations, a non-incorporating state should have the right to regulate foreign corporations operating significantly within it. Part I examines the history of this type of regulation in California and traces the state's steps in creating section 2115. Part II discusses relevant case law from other jurisdictions that have adopted similar schemes of regulation. Part III examines the history of the treatment of the IAD as a categorical rule in Delaware. Part IV summarizes the problem of having competing state policies regarding the regulation of corporate internal affairs through a discussion of the Supreme Court of Delaware's decision in VantagePoint. Finally, Part V highlights this court's error through a critique of its VantagePoint opinion and questions the real motives driving Delaware's decision to reject section 2115 as an exception to the IAD.

Occupational Safety and Health Act … And the Hospital

The principles of occupational safety and health have long been applied to industry, but it is only in recent times that serious consideration has been given to their application in the hospital. This interest coincided with the passage, in 1970, of the Occupatinal Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the government's first venture into general occupational safety and health.The statute's purpose is “to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources.” In general, the Act permits the Secretary of Labor to promulgate occupational safety and health standards. The secretary or his authorized representative may, “with Out delay,” enter the premises of any employer who is covered by the Act, which includes virtually every private sector employer. The legislation applies to 5 million businesses and 57 million employees, who in a year suffer 14,000 deaths and 2 million disabling injuries or diseases related to their occupation.

In re Demangeat.

384Extradition — Procedure of — Matters required to be specified in warrant — Date of commission of offence for purpose of statute of limitations — Relevance of requirement of valid warrant by law of requested State — The law of Belgium.

In re Kraussman.

Extradition — Miscellaneous — Extradition to Occupied Territory — Effect of Termination of Occupation with Reservation of Certain Rights.War — Termination of — Termination of Occupation — Germany and Berlin — Effect on Jurisdiction of Occupation Courts — Reserved Powers of Former Occupant.Belligerent Occupation — Nature and Effects of — Termination of Occupation — Germany and Berlin — Effect on Jurisdiction of Occupation Courts — Reserved Powers of Former Occupant — Transition Period for Winding Up of Cases — Whether Constituting Occupation for Purpose of Statute Regarding Extradition to Occupied Territory — The Law of the United States of America.

Statutes. Construction. Omission of "Not" Defeating Purpose of Statute

Statutes. Construction. Omission of "Not" Defeating Purpose of Statute