Status In World Politics Research Articles

Status Orders: Toward a Local Understanding of Status Dynamics in World Politics

Abstract This analytical essay highlights the importance of status orders in the study of status and prestige in world politics. Drawing on recent research in the field, I argue that understanding the particular social structures that regulate the status dynamics within social collectives is crucial to understanding how actors seek and receive status in world politics. I review the literature on status in IR and introduce the concept of status orders as context-specific and local social structures that determine what is considered prestigious within a particular group, community, or club. Using examples from war-making, nuclear weapons, and diplomatic practice, I argue that the fact that status dynamics is often produced locally and not globally forces us to focus less on “universal” aspirations for status, and more on where that actor sought status from and eventually according to which yardstick that actor experienced a change in status.

The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics, written by Joslyn Barnhart

The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics, written by Joslyn Barnhart

The Operational Codes of Pacific Island Countries’ Leaders: Beliefs about the World amidst Climate Change

Abstract Small island states such as Tuvalu face major risks due to anthropogenic climate change and rise in sea levels. Whereas these microstates face an existential crisis, there is scant interest in understanding how their leaders view the world. This paper takes a political leadership approach and explores the belief systems of Pacific Island countries (PICs). Drawing from the United Nations plenary addresses of the PICs’ leaders, it uses the operational code construct to assess their general and climate change-specific beliefs. Given their small state status in world politics and imminent threats to the viability of their communities, how do the PICs view the world and specifically the global politics of climate change? The findings suggest the PICs leaders have a more hostile view concerning climate change, with few exceptions they believe the PICs have less control over climate change matters, and again, with few exceptions, the PICs have less cooperative strategies in the global politics of climate change. This paper captures a preliminary account of beliefs about climate change, presents an empirical foundation to trace these in the Pacific Island states, and suggests venues for future research.

Status competition or Conflict of interest: Understanding China-India Asymmetrical rivalry in the Indian Ocean region

Status competition in world politics always played a greater role, especially the developing powers who strive for greater status in world politics, and so do both India and China. This article tries to examine the nature of the conflict between India and China through the framework of Status competition while at the same time comparatively examining it with other conflict models such as Conflict of interest, Zero-sum game, and Status Dilemma. The article demonstrates that India-China relations in general and in the IOR (Indian Ocean region) should not always be scrutinized through the zero-sum game concept. The status competition model differs from other conflict models in many ways. The status competition model can accommodate the asymmetrical power gap between India and China in IOR. Also, the model provides policymakers in Beijing and New Delhi to avoid conflict-ridden zero-sum game thinking.

The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics

The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics

The Status Dilemma in World Politics: An Anatomy of the China–India Asymmetrical Rivalry

Abstract The role of status in world politics has become an important research topic. This article examines China–India relations through a new framework for status dilemmas. This article, through a careful comparison of the status dilemma with other models of conflict, clarifies the logic and mechanism of status dilemmas in world politics. In particular, it differentiates between the status competition model and the status dilemma model. The status dilemma entails overestimation of the competitive nature of the status relationship and underestimation of the potential compatibility of the status goal. The article demonstrates that the China–India relationship is not always a zero-sum game, even though its competitive nature is real. Asymmetrical power and motivated reasoning contribute to misunderstanding and misperception. The power asymmetry makes India oversensitive to Chinese actions, and it makes China less sensitive to India’s concerns. Motivated reasoning, based on historical memory and domestic politics, moreover, makes India’s perception of China more negative and competitive than China’s apprehension of India. The status dilemma has broad implications for power politics in the new era which suggest that policymakers should realistically evaluate the challenges of status competition while avoiding deterministic zero-sum thinking.

King in the North: evaluating the status recognition and performance of the Scandinavian countries

The Scandinavian states’ pursuit of status in world politics is well documented. However, little is known about whether these endeavors have resulted in higher status for these states. In this article, we suggest that the Scandinavian countries represent a useful case to explore whether similar foreign policy profiles and common club membership equalizes or exacerbates the unequal distribution of status recognition in world politics. To measure the status recognition of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, we use a network centrality measure of diplomatic representation and exchange from 1970 to 2010. We also measure how well the states have performed to increase their status recognition given their available status resources (measured by military capabilities and wealth) and their status-seeking effort (measured by relative diplomatic outreach). Our results show that Sweden has received significantly more recognition and performed much better than both Denmark and Norway in the measured period. We offer three explanations for these developments. First, the spoils of seeking status using the Scandinavian brand is akin to a regional zero-sum game in which Sweden, as the most visible state of the three, is the main beneficiary of the status recognition in the direction of the club. Second, status recognition often lags achievements or increases in status resources because the beliefs of foreign policy practitioners are only updated sporadically. This status lag is especially visible when states struggle to convert their resources into status (Norway), or when they succeed in maintaining their status despite experiencing a drop in status resources (Sweden). Third, an increase in status resources will only influence status recognition if it plays into a corresponding narrative. Sweden, in contrast to the nouveau riche Norwegians, has managed to rearticulate its foreign policy in a way that has attracted recognition in world politics.

The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics. By Joslyn Barnhart. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020. 270p. $47.95 cloth.

The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics. By Joslyn Barnhart. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020. 270p. $47.95 cloth.

Response to David Traven’s Review of The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics

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Role status and status-saving behaviour in world politics: the ASEAN case

Abstract Most research on status in international politics focuses on a state's ‘trait status’, defined by valued attributes that a state possesses, but ignores the importance of ‘role status’, which is constituted through state interactions and competent practices in world politics. By integrating prospect theory and role status scholarship, this article introduces a ‘status-saving’ argument to shed light on how states adopt risk-acceptant strategies to salvage the decline in their role status in world politics. We test the status-saving argument by examining the ASEAN states’ bold community-building efforts in the early 2000s, especially the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007. We argue that both the economic and political conditions of ASEAN were far from mature enough to pursue such an institutionalization and legalization endeavour. The perceived decline of international role status after the 1998 Asian financial crisis, however, encouraged the ASEAN states to take this ‘great leap forward’ behaviour towards regional integration, which has placed ASEAN's long-term status and internal unity in a more risky and vulnerable position. We conclude that pursuing role status is another way for states, especially rising powers, to seek status in a deference hierarchy. Dominant powers should consider accommodating the pursuit of role status by rising powers and encourage ‘do-goodism’ in world politics.

The "I" in BRICS: leadership traits of Indian prime ministers and India's role adaptation to rising status in world politics.

This paper inquires theoretically into how leaders act and react to the state role of rising power through the case study of India. It brings together role theory and leadership trait analysis, and contends that there is a puzzling interplay between rising status and leaders’ characteristics. We project that leaders’ traits and styles condition how they enact roles. India and its leaders offer a suitable case for investigating this issue. Since the economically unstable early 1990s, India has gone through a relatively successful era of global emergence. Thus, we examine the relationship between India’s roles and the leadership profiles of Prime Ministers Atal Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narenda Modi, specifically their belief in the ability to control events and the need for power. We find especially in Vajpayee and Singh that their traits can help explain India’s foreign policy roles and in Modi (first term only) a leader vulnerable to contextual winds. We argue that the interplay of leaders’ traits and roles, as expressions of both material and social dimensions, helps assess how they make sense of their country’s rising within both the regional and international systems.

India in the Post-Bipolar World: 30 Years of Searching the Place

The article analyzes the tools and mechanisms that Indian elites used to adapt the country’s foreign policy to the post-Cold War world order. We describe the internal political development of India over the past 30 years, noting that the general foreign and economic policies remained unchanged due to the political consensus. We analyze the desire of the Indian leadership to form a solid economic foundation, which is perceived in the framework of India’s strategic thought as a prerequisite for the country to claim the status of great power. Finally, we discuss the primary imperatives of the Indian external policy, i.e., building a sphere of influence necessary for the polycentric world. It is noted that India’s main external security challenges remain the same (China and Pakistan), although they have changed qualitatively: the PRC has become one of the superpowers, overtaking India in terms of economic development, and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons. We conclude that, on the whole, the Indian elites managed to relatively safely lead the country through the chaos of the post-Cold War world, turning it into one of the largest economies in the world and providing the necessary conditions for raising its status in world politics.

The Status of Status in World Politics

ABSTRACTWhat is status? How does it work? What effects does it tend to have? A new wave of scholarship on status in international relations has converged on a central definition of status, several causal pathways, and the claim that the pursuit of status tends to produce conflict. The authors take stock of the status literature and argue that this convergence is not only a sign of progress, but also an obstacle to it. They find that the consensus definition conceals critical contradictions between standing and membership, that its causal pathways are promising but often in tension with each other, and that the literature may be overlooking the ways in which status can help states avoid conflict and promote cooperation under certain conditions.

Doing more for less? Status insecurity and the UK’s contribution to European security after Brexit

Advancing the literature on status in world politics, this article argues that Brexit generated status insecurity for the UK. In order to deal with the consequences of the shock represented by Brexit, the UK sought to address status insecurity in two ways. Firstly, it pursued more modes of engagement with European security simultaneously. It continued to play a leadership role in NATO, and it deepened bilateral cooperation with individual European countries. Secondly, it also articulated its willingness to be treated differently to any other third party by advancing ‘Global Britain’ as a framework for post-Brexit foreign policy, opening up space for involvement in EU defence initiatives. Nevertheless, this article argues that the UK faces the challenge of having to work more for less in the short term, without recognition by the EU of a status beyond third party for the UK. The implications of this are discussed.

Ideological and Political Origins of the J. S. Nye’s Concept of Soft Power

The popular theory of soft power was created in the United States in the early 1990s by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. An American researcher with extensive practical experience in public administration described soft power as the ability to achieve what is desired in the international arena by attracting sympathy, rather than using pressure or bribery. The integration of the term «soft power» into scientific life for the first time turned the use of elements of cultural and ideological influence in the international relations into an effective tool for achieving geopolitical goals. Today any state that claims a certain status in world politics is simply obliged to have the soft power tools in its foreign policy strategy. At the same time the idea of strengthening its position in world politics through attractiveness is certainly not new. Long before the Nye’s concept appeared, different actors used mechanisms described by him. Over the centuries theoretical thought has also developed and evolved in this direction.

Status Matters in World Politics

AbstractThis article explores the burgeoning literature on status in world politics. Toward that end, it reviews three recently published books. The three books are representative of the different theoretical perspectives that have come to dominate status research in international relations. Renshon's Fighting for Status offers a rationalist–instrumental approach; Larson and Shevchenko's Quest for Status draws on insights from social identity theory; and Murray's The Struggle for Recognition is informed by constructivist theory. The article contrasts and compares the three works. Moreover, it identifies shortcomings and limitations in each book and, based on this discussion, suggests areas for further research. In particular, it is argued that scholars should devote more attention to competitive theory testing through process tracing; incorporate domestic politics more systematically into approaches of status seeking; develop case-specific explanations that fuse insights from the various perspectives; and examine how the interplay of material and ideational factors shapes states’ status aspirations.

India's Military Procurement Programs & Economic Capacity: Compatibility & Pragmatism

In a world of Realpolitik, each state in the world always looks for increasing its power; some for the purpose of their survival and some seek to fulfill their hegemonic ambitions. Having a huge population, territory, economy, and military, the states like India usually desire to establish their hegemony; therefore, it is not surprising that India wants to achieve a Great Power status in world politics. Although India has great numbers in each area of strategic significance it lacks qualitative capacity in terms of military strength where the advanced weapon systems are the backbone of a country’s military power. In order to fill this gap, the Indian government has announced very ambitious military modernization programs and is concluding various military procurement programs around the world bearing huge costs while the big arms-exporting countries are getting involved in such ambitious military modernization programs of India. Over the past few years, it has been observed that the Indian economy has not been able to fulfill the costs of military modernization programs and the gap between the estimated costs of military procurements and the budget allocation is continuously increasing. Therefore, this study hypothesized that Indian military procurement programs and Indian economic capacity are not compatible with each other, which shall have perilous effects for the countries involved in such projects. This study provides an analysis of Indian economic growth and its comparison with the costs of India’s military procurements and finds that the stated hypothesis is correct to the extent of compatibility difference between the Indian economic capacity and military procurement cost.

Россия: общество “позднего старта” в водовороте мировой политики

Russia is regarded as a “late take-off” society (other participants in this “cohort” – Germany, Japan, Italy), the modernization of which was guided from above, by the state and its agencies, indirectly reflecting the lack of alternative, spontaneous modernization option. The author, while exploring the phenomenon of modern Russian society in the unity of historical, economic, sociocultural and political forms of existence, tries to identify the similarities as well as differences between the domestic society, on the one hand, and the “classical” West, that is Northwest Europe, on the other. The comparison demonstrates: Russia is the most complex organism among the “late take-off” societies, in the modernization of which the state has played and continues to play a pivotal role in its various historical and political forms and manifestations. The paper outlines the main stages of the “guided” transformation of Russian society. Fundamental to the modernization of Russia were: Peter and Catherine’s societal transformations, the first industrial revolution in the country (1850–1890s), emergence of the “organized capitalism” system in Germany, Japan, and later in the USA, the October Revolution, World War II, Soviet-American bipolarity. The accelerated transition of Russia from rural to industrial society was accompanied by deformations (deviations from the West European “standard”), return movements (“counter-reforms”), and impediments to reception of representative institutions and practices by the masses. External pressure reinforced the tendency of state domination over society, which subsequently transformed into paternalistic behavior patterns. Migration flows were not accompanied by social and professional diversification of Russian society. From now on, the logic of the accelerated development of Russia was shaped by competition with the West that was undergoing the industrial revolution. This competition endangered the homeostatic equilibrium of traditional society. The World War I revealed the peripheral, subordinate position of Russia in the international system. The most radical approach to regaining a major power status in world politics was proposed by the Bolshevik Party, who led the October Revolution of 1917. The Communist model has become instrumental of advancing transformation of traditional/rural society into a modern, urban one. Subsequently, the exhaustion of the communist model’s internal resources gave rise to a painful search for a new modernization and development paradigm. Currently, Russia’s existential task is to accelerate the pace of economic growth, help society enter the trajectory of sustainable development and, consequentially, participate in the world system on the basis of “strategic autonomy” that is unconditional sovereignty.

On the Social Status of the European Union

AbstractIn this article I analyse the EU's social status in world politics. I argue that recognition grants the EU both club and positional status. Drawing on existing literature on status in international relations, I conceptualize the diplomatic corps of various polities as the embodied recognition of their positional status in world politics. To indicate and measure the positional status of the EU, I applied social network analysis to data on the exchange of embassies from 1960 to 2010. This methodology allows for consistent longitudinal comparisons of standing between heterogeneous polities in world politics. The results indicate that the EU's rise in the status hierarchy has been meteoric since 1960. However, fear of status congestion and status dilution among countries has thwarted the EU's full inclusion into the various status clubs of nation‐states. I show that due to its lack of full club status the EU struggles to convert its high positional status into influence.

Logics of stratified identity management in world politics

AbstractThe importance of concerns about status in world politics has rarely been as evident as it is today. Yet our understanding of how status dynamics influence politics and foreign policy remains limited. Dominant approaches draw on insights from social psychology about individual attitudes and behavior, but scale these up to build accounts of states as unitary or anthropomorphic actors. This results in serious theoretical problems and analytical blind spots. In this article, I offer a new framework – still rooted in social psychological insights about intergroup status dynamics – that addresses these problems. I recast the fundamental question from one about how states react to status dissatisfaction to one about how individuals – with different psychological profiles, different interests, and different positions within the national community – react to anxiety about the status of the state with they identify. I develop four broad logics that inform responses to national status dissatisfaction: identification change, emulation, transformation, and rejection. These logics subsume familiar arguments about how states seek status, but they also accommodate additional variation and explanatory possibilities. They thus constitute a more flexible framework that is better suited than existing alternatives to understand the full variety of ways in which status dynamics may influence world politics.