Static Welfare Losses Research Articles

The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface

There is a tension between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property (IP) laws. Both aim to promote social welfare, but their focus differs. By and large, antitrust law aims to promote competition and static welfare. In contrast, IP law permits static welfare losses in exchange for dynamic welfare gains. Thus, there is a tradeoff between static and dynamic welfare considerations. This tradeoff leads to a natural tension between IP law and antitrust policy. Implicitly, we believe that the benefits of long-term progress outweigh the short-run welfare losses that are due to the misallocation of resources. This can be seen in our Special Issue.

Family Welfare and the Great Recession

The analysis in this paper provides estimates of family welfare losses generated by wage and nonlabor income declines experienced across the Great Recession and by labor market constraints existing postrecession. Welfare losses are greater as families (both married and single) move up the income distribution. Total static welfare losses are estimated to amount to roughly $190 billion, comparing family welfare between 2007 and 2011.

Are Markups Too High? Competition, Strategic Innovation, and Industry Dynamics

Since the 1970s, there have been significant changes in firm dynamics within and across industries in the US. Industries are increasingly dominated by a small number of large firms (superstars). Markups, market concentration, profits, and R&D spending are increasing, whereas business dynamism, productivity growth, and the labor share are in decline. We develop a unified framework to explore the underlying economic mechanisms driving these changes, and the implications for economic growth and social welfare. Our theoretical framework combines a detailed oligopolistic competition structure featuring endogenous entry and exit with a new Schumpeterian growth model. Within each industry, there are an endogenously determined number of superstars that compete a la Cournot and a continuum of small firms which collectively constitute a competitive fringe. Firms dynamically choose their innovation strategies, cognizant of other firms' choices. The model is consistent with the changes in the macroeconomic aggregates, and it replicates the empirical relationship between innovation and competition within and across industries. We estimate the model to disentangle the effects of separate mechanisms on the structural transition, which yields striking results: (1) While the increase in the average markup causes a significant static welfare loss, this loss is overshadowed by the dynamic welfare gains from increased innovation in response to higher profit opportunities. (2) The decline in productivity growth is largely driven by the increasing costs of innovation, i.e., ideas are getting harder to find.

Collusion, profitability and welfare: Theory and evidence

In a differentiated oligopoly model with free entry, the static welfare loss from collusion is larger the lower the entry cost, the larger the market size and the higher the degree of product differentiation. The cartel overcharge is larger the lower the entry cost and the larger the market size, and is independent of the degree of product differentiation. These theoretical results are consistent with evidence from a natural experiment of policy reform, the introduction of cartel law in the UK in the late 1950s. Price-cost margins declined after the breakdown of cartels in low-capital and larger-sized industries relative to capital-intensive and smaller-sized ones. There is weaker evidence of a fall in price-cost margins in consumer good and advertising-intensive relative to producer good and low-advertising industries. Crucially, these effects are not observed for industries that were not affected by the cartel law. A comparison of these findings with evidence on the incidence of collusion suggests that the welfare loss from collusive pricing may often be smaller in industries where cartels tend to form than in those where collusion is more difficult to sustain.

Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency

We develop a model of learning-by-doing in human capital formation in the presence of allocative inefficiencies. The inefficiencies are a result of lobbying by firms to establish, or prevent, barriers to the perfectly competitive allocation of factors of production (labor). It is shown that lobbying may lead to a static welfare loss depending upon the elasticity of substitution between goods, and the relative lobbying power of firms. Further, productivity growth, via learning by doing, changes the relative lobbying power over time. This may magnify or diminish the static welfare loss in the long-run depending on the level of initial misallocation. Therefore, differences in initial lobbying power and rate of productivity growth between sectors determine the long-run effects of lobbying.

Copyright indicators and the costs of symbolic production: The cultural dimension of telecommunications policy

The paper discusses the current situation of the economic case of copyright through the available theoretical and empirical literature, and from a cultural economics perspective. For its classic case, copyright can only increase welfare in a dynamic setting, when the static welfare losses are offset by dynamic welfare gains: monopolistic rents give producers an incentive to produce more, offering consumers more innovation in return. In the digital age, many economists have remained skeptical about the welfare benefits of strong copyright policies, notwithstanding the lack of indicators of the actual effects of such policies, especially in terms of the production of new cultural goods. While accepting this conclusion, the paper argues that, in order to construct a more realistic landscape of indicators to inform copyright policy makers, the economic case of copyright needs to be broadened to include not only the direct producers of the work in its material form, but also the producers of the meaning and value of the work (the overall perception of its “quality”). Once both symbolic and material production are theoretically and empirically incorporated in the economic case of copyright policy, a new set of hypothesis and indicators can be constructed and tested in relation to changes in the telecommunication system.

Learning-by-Doing in a Model of Allocative Inefficiency

We develop a model of learning by doing in human capital formation in the presence of allocative inefficiencies. The inefficiencies are a result of lobbying by firms to establish, or prevent, barriers to the perfectly competitive allocation of factors of production (labor). It is shown that lobbying may lead to a static welfare loss depending upon the relative lobbying power of firms seeking to establish barriers to the competitive allocation of labor. We further show that productivity growth via learning by doing may make firms more effective at lobbying by increasing their lobbying power, leading to greater misallocation over time. This magnifies the static welfare loss over time depending on the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the economy.

Family Welfare and the Great Recession

The analysis in this paper provides estimates of family welfare losses generated by wage and nonlabor income declines experienced across the Great Recession and by labor market constraints existing postrecession. Welfare losses are greater as families (both married and single) move up the income distribution. Total static welfare losses are estimated to amount to roughly $190 billion, comparing family welfare between 2007 and 2011.

The EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)

Purpose – The entry into force of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) marks the beginning of a new era of trade relations, from preferential treatment to reciprocity, between the member states of the European Union (EU) and the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. In light of the controversy regarding the impact of the agreement, an assessment is made on the static welfare impact it is likely to generate on consumers in Guyana. Design/methodology/approach – The assessment is done through the application of a partial equilibrium model to the 2008 import and tariff data of Guyana. The model captures the static welfare effect that will be occasioned by a change in tariff on imports. Findings – The study finds that there will be a static net welfare loss to the tune of US$31.01 million or 2.2 percent of Guyana's GDP obtained for 2008. The loss is due to a large trade diversion effect which is the product of the fact that over the years Guyana imported l...

Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets.

Standard normative analysis of intellectual property focuses on the balance between incentives for research and the static welfare costs of reduced price-competition from monopoly. However, static welfare loss from patents is not universal. While patents restrict price competition, they may also provide static welfare benefits by improving incentives for marketing, which is a form of non-price competition. We show theoretically how stronger marketing incentives mitigate, and can even offset, the static costs of monopoly pricing. Empirical analysis in the pharmaceutical industry context suggests that, in the short-run, patent expirations reduce consumer welfare as a result of decreased marketing effort. In the long-run, patent expirations do benefit consumers, but by 30% less than would be implied by the reduction in price alone. The social value of monopoly marketing to consumers alone is roughly on par with its costs to firms.

On the growth and welfare effects of monopolistic distortions

The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap” may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term.

An empirical analysis of productivity growth and industrial concentration in us manufacturing

This manuscript focuses on the productivity-industrial concentration relationship in the US manufacturing industries, while accounting for external and internal sources of knowledge. It is found that there is a critical level of industrial concentration beyond which its relationship with productivity growth becomes negative. Results suggest that static welfare losses of increasing concentration in manufacturing industries can be offset by welfare gains from productivity growth.

Price Variability and Industrial Concentration in U.S. Food Industries

This paper focuses on the sources of intra‐industry price variability in US food industries during a period of increasing concentration, while accounting for the impact of variations in prices of primary agricultural products. Results suggest that intra‐industry price variability in food industries increases with their respective mean rate of inflation and product heterogeneity. However, industrial concentration lowers the sensitivity of relative prices to changes in the mean rate of inflation. Hence, static welfare losses to consumers from increasing concentration in food industries, a subject of recent and intensive investigation, can partly be offset by gains such as reduced price variability.

The Core–Periphery Model and Endogenous Growth: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Integration

We present a model where long‐run growth and industrial location are jointlyendogenous by introducing Romerian product innovation growth into Krugman'score–periphery model. We focus on stability, showing that growth is apowerful centripetal force, but that knowledge spillovers are a powerfulcentrifugal force. Integration policies that lower the cost of tradingideas are shown to encourage dispersion of economic activity while thosethat lower the cost of trading goods encourage agglomeration. Agglomerationis shown to be favourable to growth in both regions. The pro‐growth effectsmitigate the periphery's static welfare loss from agglomeration.

Monopoly Welfare Losses in the Long Run

Irrespective of the merit of any previous approaches to assess the deadweight loss due to monopoly they are all static in character and disregard the long term effects of monopoly power. Taking into account the long run consequences of monopoly power within the framework of the new growth theory yields startling new insights. In contrast to the Schumpeterian view that there is a tradeoff between static inefficiency and dynamic progressiveness monopoly power is shown to entail not only static welfare losses but also to exert an adverse influence on economic growth. Once this is granted the long run welfare loss due to monopoly can be shown to dwarf the static losses so far treated in the economics literature.

Was Italy a protectionist country?

This paper aims at measuring as precisely as possible the changes in the level of protection in Italy from the 1870s to the 1920s – i.e. during the first phase of the country's industrialisation. It shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, protection was quite low – with the possible exception of a short spell of time in the late 1880s–90s. Therefore the static welfare losses were small, but also the alleged dynamic role of protection in fostering industrialisation seems small as well. In the last section of the paper we speculate on the implications of these findings for other countries. This evidence is not conclusive, but it does cast some doubts on the relevance of protection in 19th century Europe.

Resource misallocation and mark-up ratios: an alternative estimation technique for Harberger triangles

Roeger's method (Roeger, 1995), which analyses the relationship between primal and dual productivity measures, can also be used to directly estimate from readily available data the static welfare loss due to a suboptimal allocation of the factors of production.

Consumer Welfare Loss Estimates for Differentiated Food Product Markets

The magnitude of static welfare losses associated with oligopoly market power in the U.S. food manufacturing industries is controversial. Having accurate estimates of these losses is important for the allocation of antitrust enforcement efforts. Parker and Connor, using two structure-conduct-performance (SCP) crosssectional models,' were among the first to estimate the magnitude of welfare losses for the U.S. food manufacturing industries. They estimated the deadweight consumer welfare loss (DWL) to be between 0.16 and 0.45 percent of the value of 1975 food industry shipments, and total consumer overcharge (the sum of the deadweight loss triangle plus the income transfer) to range between 7.9 percent and 11.5 percent of food shipments. While the SCP models have provided useful insights, a criticism of these models is that they are not derived from explicit theoretical models (Schmalensee). This criticism led researchers to develop new welfare loss formulas based on oligopoly models that incorporate explicit firm pricing rules (Dickson and Yu; Willner; Willner and Stahl). Until the late 1980s, mathematical tractability confined these models to considering only homogeneous goods. Connor and Peterson (1994) showed that the average deadweight loss estimate for U.S. food manufacturing using various oligopoly models ranged

Bandwagon mergers, international competitiveness, and government policy

This paper suggests that while the static welfare losses of merger predilections among Western firms may not be dramatic, they may lead to substantial dynamic losses when merger-prone firms need to compete with firms which instead focus on equipment investment and investments in R&D. It is suggested that such diverging investment priorities have been the real cause of the deteriorating competitiveness of many of the largest Western enterprises vis-a-vis their Japanese rivals. While mergers are generally taken to be determined by either efficiency or monopoly considerations, this paper argues that Western merger predilections are likely to be generated by a combination of imitative and defensive routines as well. That would make it difficult for firms to unilaterally break away from these competitiveness-threatening investments. If correct, this would imply that competition policies would need to be refocused. However, it is also suggested that the implications for international competitiveness should make merger questions a subject of industrial policies too. In that respect, the paper suggests some basic attitudinal changes.

DOES THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKE1 BENEFIT ITS MEMBERS?

This paper estimates the welfare consequences for members of the Central American Common Market if they abolish their union by imposing tariffs against each other. An imperfect substitutes trade model is used and direct estimates are provided for the effects of the union. These are important advances over previous studies, which relied on perfect substitutes models and merely imputed the effects of the union by assuming that it left either market shares or income elasticities of demand constant in member countries. The union is shown to impose static welfare losses on the members, which contradicts the results of previous studies.