States Intervene Research Articles

Why Do States Intervene in the Elections of Others? The Role of Incumbent–Opposition Divisions

AbstractWhy do states intervene in elections abroad? This article argues that outsiders intervene when the main domestic contenders for office adopt policy positions that differ from the point of view of the outside power. It refers to the split between the government's and opposition's positions as policy polarization. Polarization between domestic political forces, rather than the degree of unfriendliness of the government in office, attracts two types of interventions: process (for or against democracy) and candidate (for or against the government) interventions. The study uses a novel, original data set to track local contenders’ policy positions. It shows that the new policy polarization measurement outperforms a number of available alternatives when it comes to explaining process and candidate interventions. The authors use this measurement to explain the behavior of the United States as an intervener in elections from 1945 to 2012. The United States is more likely to support the opposition, and the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US opposition is facing an anti-US government. It is more likely to support the government, and undermine the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US government is facing an anti-US opposition. The article also presents the results for all interveners, confirming the results from the US case.

Inmigración, Derechos Humanos y Modelos Europeo de fronteras Propuestas conceptuales sobre "extraterritorialidad", "desterritorialidad" y "externalización" de controles y flujos migratorios

The migratory flows and the refugee crisis in Europe since 2015 have motivated a growing concern about the respect of human rights and European values ​​in the actions of the EU and the Member States when confronting controls of access to European territory in the external borders. This work analyzes how borders are problematic places for the defense, application and protection of human rights of foreigners, causing what we call the ‘fragility’ of human rights in the EU's external air, land and maritime borders. We are witnessing a change in the very concept of border in this post-globalization era, in which certain functions are offshored and systematically placed outside a state’s territory and checkpoints. However, territorial and extraterritorial actions must be differentiated from those occurring as part of external actions in or with third states for the purposes of migration policy and the control of migration flows. The reality is that a new border space south and east of the Mediterranean has been configured for migratory flows, which needs a new policy of external borders for these areas. Therefore, we must reflect on new frontier spaces, with new concepts and approaches to the border that provide other parameters of action towards migratory flows and external controls. On the other hand, the protection of human rights by European States beyond the external borders is treated to determine to what extent the control functions that are deployed outside the territory affect the human rights of migrants. For this, we differentiate between situations of Outsourcing or Externalisation, where those that act are third States; and situations with Extraterritorial action of migration controls where agents of European States intervene. Both pose problems of protection of human rights in migration controls outside the terrestrial or the maritime territory of the Member States of the EU; we conceive them as deterritorialized functions of border control. And both situations must have in our opinion differentiated mechanisms for monitoring, control and supervision of respect for human rights in the functions of migration control. Respect of human rights of foreigners in border controls is a vital issue of the identity, values ​​and even the survival of the European integration.

Foreign Military Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars Revisited

Studies of the impact of foreign military intervention on the duration of civil wars most often fail to distinguish conflicts in which a single external state intervenes from those in which several outside states intervene. One influential quantitative analysis that does explore this distinction (Cunningham, Journal of Peace Research 47(2), 115–127, 2010) focuses primarily on whether or not the interests and preferences of the intervening state(s) coincide with those of prominent local actors. By revising this study’s dataset to clarify the distinction between single-state interventions and multiple-state interventions, it can be demonstrated that the latter are associated with lengthier wars than the former. Both types of foreign military interventions are correlated with civil wars that last longer than average.

Why Do States Intervene in the Elections of Others?

Why do states intervene in elections abroad? We argue that outsiders intervene when the main domestic contenders for office adopt policy positions that differ from the point of view of the outside power. We refer to the split between the government’s and opposition’s positions as policy polarization. Polarization between domestic political forces, rather than the degree of unfriendliness of the government in office, is what attracts interventions of two types: process (for or against democracy) and candidate (for or against the government) interventions. We provide a novel, original data set to track the policy positions of local contenders. We show that the new policy polarization measurement outperforms a number of available alternatives when it comes to explaining process and candidate interventions. We use it to explain the behavior of the United States as an intervener in elections over the period 1945 to 2012. The United States is more likely to support the opposition, and the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US opposition is facing an anti-US government. It is is more likely to support the government, and undermine the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US government is facing an anti-US opposition. We also present results for all interveners, confirming the results from the US case.

Why Does the United States Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human Rights Violations, and Terrorism

Democracy, human rights, and terrorism are major foreign policy issues. However, among these issues, what do the US leaders care about the most? This study assesses the degree to which Washington responds militarily to threats to democratic institutions, human rights abuses, and terrorist activity in other countries. Based on a cross-national, time-series data analysis of 164 countries for the years 1981 to 2005, this study presents empirical models that evaluate the relative importance of these issues for contemporary American foreign and security policy. It turns out that, all other things being equal, the United States is likely to engage in military campaigns for humanitarian reasons that focus on human rights protection rather than for its own security interests such as democracy promotion or terrorism reduction. This finding is extremely robust and reinforced by case illustrations that support a causal explanation for US intervention with a basic and sustained place for human rights protection.

Covert Actions and the Responsibility to Protect

Fifteen years on, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is still facing questions over its content, scope and attendant obligations. Recent conflicts in Syria, Ukraine and Iraq show, how, when and if states intervene is a matter of political will and calculation. Yet the question of political will remains largely unaddressed, and many ignore the conceptual and practical distance between stating that the international community should encourage and assist states to fulfill R2P obligations and requiring third parties to use diplomatic, humanitarian or ‘other’ means to protect populations when states fail to do so. I propose we acknowledge this distance and minimize it through covert action. Embracing the reality that some states cannot intervene due to political constraints entails that we can theorize about other ways to uphold R2P. Moreover, covert action involves a range of means and types of targets and is a flexible option for R2P.

When Does the United States Intervene Militarily for Humanitarian Reasons?

Although the end of the Cold War meant fewer constraints on humanitarian intervention, U.S. leaders continue to shy away from protecting innocents outside of the United States from harm. This is despite the fact that presidential candidates often campaign on restoring America's moral lead in the world and, in particular, on U.S. responsibilities to avert mass atrocities. Hagan's Logic of Political Explanation aids in understanding why, once in office, a president's initial response is to avoid the controversy of a risky involvement. When this strategy fails, he shifts to a strategy of legitimating a policy of intervention and/or to a strategy that insulates his foreign policy choice from domestic political pressures. Hagan's model facilitates in understanding the role of the domestic environment, especially regarding political opposition and the public's attitude toward a crisis, in shaping presidential decision making on humanitarian intervention.Related Articles Dolan, Chris J. 2008. “.” Politics & Policy 36 (): 542–585. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2007.00121.x/abstract Harris, Paul G. 2008. “.” Politics & Policy 36 (): 914–943. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00145.x/abstract Anda, Michael O. 1993. “.” Southeastern Political Review 21 (): 593–611. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.1993.tb00379.x/abstract Related Media Obama, Barak. 2007. “.” November 26. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEd583‐fA8M

Nothing but medals? Attitudes towards the importance of Olympic success

States intervene increasingly in financing and organization of Olympic elite sport in order to maximize national success in the medal table. In Germany and many other countries too that includes practices that have been criticized as unacceptable in democratic societies: funding of medal-promising sports only, early selection and specialization of young athletes, authoritarian tendencies in sport policy, etc. Are those efforts reflected by a strong desire for medals within the population? Is national success regarded as so important that even critical measures are accepted? And would that indicate more general tendencies to nationalistic or authoritarian attitudes? These and other questions were addressed in a survey carried out in Germany in 2012 ( N = 899). Results show that medals are indeed perceived as important, especially in lower educational levels, but by far not as important as sticking to sporting values and the rules of fair play. Multivariate analyses reveal that the desire for medal success is highly dependent on the belief in and perception of the Olympic competition. For most of the respondents that does not legitimize unfair practices or exploiting athletes, but partly the struggle for medals is also linked with a limited understanding of fair play and nationalistic or authoritarian attitudes.

Should the United States Intervene in International Conflicts: Why, When, and How?

Should the United States Intervene in International Conflicts: Why, When, and How?

Dealing with Biased Meditation: Lessons from the Malaysian and Libyan Mediation in the Philippines

States intervene as mediators in pursuit of national or foreign policy interests. The prospective state mediator may be too closely aligned to one party or too directly involved in the conflict to be capable of meeting the minimum conditions of a sustainable agreement. The literature on mediation argues that neutrality serves as a necessary condition if a sustainable outcome is to be reached. Conflict of interests of mediators may further contribute to the intractability of the conflict. For instance, the unresolved conflict in Mindanao is increasingly seen as beneficial for Malaysia to detract the Philippine government in pursuing its claims over Sabah. Nevertheless, as the case of the Libyan and Malaysian mediation efforts in Southern Philippines shows, biased states as mediators can still manifest impartiality when they have stakes in being impartial. The condition of bias may actually promote the negotiation process by providing necessary political leverage towards the conflicting parties to recognize the “ripeness” for an agreement. A comparison of the Libyan and Malaysian mediation efforts in the Philippines shows two different directions: while Libya has remained biased to the benefit of the Muslim rebel groups, Malaysia has increasingly evolved from a biased to a genuinely neutral mediator.

When Should the US Intervene?

When should the United States intervene militarily in weak countries? This is a topic of pressing international concern because the United States keeps intervening in weak countries. We are currently involved indirectly in Libya and very deeply in Afghanistan, as well as still being involved to some extent in Iraq. We have a propensity to engage in this kind of activity, but it hasn’t always worked out well for us. We need to reconsider the issue, and I want to discuss what the criteria should be for the United States when intervening militarily.

Bystanders and Interventionists: Where and When Do States Intervene to Stop Genocide?

This paper examines the psychology of intervention to stop genocides, using the Kosovo crisis, Rwanda and other historical examples to try to generate a very preliminary framework for understanding where, why and when states intervene to prevent mass killing and genocidal slaughter. From the realist perspective, it is a mystery why states intervene at all to stop genocides, at least where they lack a compelling national interest for doing so. And yet states sometimes do intervene without a self-interested justification. The United States arguably lacks any compelling interest in intervention to forestall a mass slaughter in Libya today, for instance, and yet it has done so. In an initial effort to explain where and when states intervene or stand by, this paper examines the role of a situational force which dissuades states from intervening (the well-known ‘bystander effect’) and a dispositional factor which may pull decision-makers in either direction (the personal experiences of decision-makers and the historical analogies they draw upon). In Rwanda, for instance, President Clinton’s then recent experience of Somalia and the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident persuaded him not to intervene, while compelling analogies with Bosnia and Munich prodded Madeleine Albright and other decision-makers to resolve the Kosovo crisis quickly in 1999. Similarly, the Rwandan analogy seems to have influenced the reasoning of UN Ambassador Susan Rice, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other Obama officials during the current Libyan crisis, even as analogies with the arming of Afghan revels by the CIA in the 1980s push the administration in the opposite direction.

Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I

Why did the United States intervene in World War I, breaking with its long tradition of noninvolvement in European political and military conflicts? During the 1920s and 1930s, many “revisionist” historians argued that American efforts to protect its trade with the Allies ultimately led to intervention. The logic of the revisionist position closely parallels the contemporary liberal case that interdependence promotes peace but arrives at different conclusions about the relationship between trade and conflict. Historians have largely abandoned this economic interpretation of American intervention, but data on the impact of the wartime export boom on the United States suggest that it should be reconsidered. The export boom was so large that it would have been difficult to ignore, and its progress corresponds to the timing of important decisions leading to American belligerency. An analysis of congressional voting on war-related measures also suggests that export income helped shape politicians' views of the war.I would like to thank Katherine Barbieri, John Coogan, David Clark, Jeffry Frieden, Jack Levy, Brian Lai, Timothy McKeown, David Painter, Strom Thacker, and participants in the world politics workshop at Binghamton University, the political economy workshop at Harvard University, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for their many comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. Lisa Martin and several anonymous reviewers at International Organization also made many valuable suggestions. I am especially grateful to Thomas Walker, whose good-natured skepticism prompted me to write this paper. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Any remaining errors and misinterpretations are my responsibility.

United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy

All through history, when United States presidents have sought to explain or defend US military interventions in foreign lands, no goal, with the exception of the national security of the United States, has been advanced with such regularity and frequency as the promotion of democracy. Interestingly, however, this readiness to use force in the name of democracy does not appear to square with some of the emerging findings on the pacific relations among democratic nations. If states do not war on each other because they are democratic, does it make sense that they wage war or use force to compel others to become democratic? In this article the author attempts to answer two central questions related to the use of force by the United States in the ostensible quest to promote democracy. First, why would the United States intervene in the affairs of other nations to promote democracy? And second, is the use of force an effective tool in the promotion of democracy? The article finds that in the majority of cases, regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured, US military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of democracy. Most nations retain their current level of democracy. However, when a comparison is made between nations which have experienced intervention, with those that have not, it is shown that the former group is more likely to experience democratic growth. Probit analyses of the effects of military intervention on democratization generally support the notion that the use of US ground forces does lead to increased democratization. A probit model is also developed to predict which military interventions are most likely to promote democracy. The predictive success of the models is quite high. The author finds that when the president declares democracy is a goal of the intervention, and if the US government is opposed to the targeted regime, democracy is more likely to be promoted.