State Policy Orientation Research Articles

Association Between Partisan Affiliation of State Governments and State Mortality Rates Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Increasing polarization of states reached a high point during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the party affiliation of elected officials often predicted their policy response. The health consequences of these divisions are unclear. Prior studies compared mortality rates based on presidential voting patterns, but few considered the partisan orientation of state officials. This study examined whether the partisan orientation of governors or legislatures was associated with mortality outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic. Data on deaths and the partisan orientation of governors and legislators were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Conference of State Legislatures, respectively. Linear regression was used to measure the association between Republican representation (percentage of seats held) in legislatures and (1) age-adjusted, all-cause mortality rates (AAMRs) in 2015-2021 and (2) excess death rates during three phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, controlling for median household income, the prevalence of four risk factors (obesity, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, heart attack, stroke), and state policy orientation. Associations between excess death rates and the governor's party were also examined. States with Republican governors or greater Republican representation in legislatures experienced higher AAMRs during 2015-2021, lower excess death rates during Phase 1 of the COVID-19 pandemic (weeks ending March 28, 2020, through June 13, 2020), and higher excess death rates in Phases 2 and 3 (weeks ending June 20, 2020, through April 30, 2022; p < 0.05). Most associations lost statistical significance after adjustment for control variables. Mortality was higher in states with Republican governors and greater Republican legislative representation before and during much of the pandemic. Observed associations could be explained by the adverse effects of policy choices, reverse causality (e.g., popularity of Republican candidates in states with lower socioeconomic and health status), or unmeasured factors that predominate in states with Republican leaders.

Association of US state policy orientation with adverse birth outcomes: a longitudinal analysis

BackgroundThe current US context is marked by extreme right–left partisanship, which means that state policies tend to bundle together and are not experienced in isolation. While prior work has leveraged...

Japan’s Heisei municipal mergers and the contradictions of neo-liberal administrative planning

This article addresses Japan’s Heisei period municipal mergers, which occurred from 2000 to 2010, considering the emerging outcomes and long-term implications. The mergers, which aimed to upscale on a national level to larger-sized municipalities while also rationalising administrative costs and streamlining services, reduced the number of municipalities in Japan from over 3000 to under 1800. Reports from prefectural and municipal bureaus and research institutions, together with coverage through the media, indicate that these aims have largely been met in the short term. However, these sources also indicate that resident reaction is less than favourable, particularly in terms of service rationalisation and loss of local identity. In terms of the long-term implications of the mergers as reflecting within Japan a transition from a developmental state policy orientation toward nation state liberalism, questions are emerging for rural areas regarding the long-term sustainability of the post-merger national municipal structures, as well as resident acceptance of the neo-liberal governing philosophy.

The Development of International Student Recruitment Policies in Taiwan

In recent decades many East Asian countries have initiated ambitious policies to increase their global prominence as education hubs. This article examines the development of Taiwan’s international student recruitment policies from 1950 to 2011, exemplifying the case in a non-Western, non-English speaking context. While Taiwan’s case is distinctive with the dominance of noneconomic factors in shaping the state policy orientation and agendas, the strong role of the state and the Confucian model of higher education constitute a valid example of developments in the internationalization of higher education in East Asia. The analysis further shows that the intertwining forces of localization, nationalization, and globalization influenced the policy development throughout three stages of the trajectory. These findings demonstrate the transformationalist viewpoint of globalization and support the “glonacal agency approach” proposed by Rhoades and Marginson claiming that local, national, and global domains are simultaneously significant in understanding globalization and higher education.

To Balance or Not to Balance: Alignment Theory and the Commonwealth of Independent States by Eric A. Miller (review)

reviews 581 Lampe thus presents a plausible and coherent argument, rich indetail and supported with well-chosen and well-presented economic data, in support of the view that the Balkans, in their development and ultimate destination ? the EU ? do not significantly differ from the rest of Europe. But the evidence he provides also suggests that the Balkans stillare the borderland of Europe. The emergence, in the last century, of nine nation-states in the region did not improve theirposition in relation to the rest of Europe: the Balkans was Europe's borderland in the past too. In view of the lack of natural and human resources, this is perhaps not so surprising. But if so, the efforts of the Balkan political and intellectual elites to create their own nation-states on the European model, however understandable, appear to have been deeply misguided. Having a nation-state, however liberal democratic and market oriented it is, may not be enough to extricate one's nation from the margins ofEurope; themembership of theEU, ifand when it isgranted, will probably not be enough either. Nonetheless, true to his commitment to liberal democratic values, Lampe openly condemns any significant departure from the liberal democratic standards by the inter-war royal and by recent post-Communist regimes in the Balkans. Yet the handing over, in 1945, of the four Balkan countries to Soviet control and the support, in the 1990s, of illiberal and corrupt regimes in formerYugoslav republics by theUSA and itsEuropean allies draws no comment from him. Perhaps theGreat Powers, in pursuit of their strategic aims, have never been constrained by liberal democratic values (which some of them stillprofess). If so,why should a historian evaluate, in terms of these lofty ideals, how small and fragmented countries pursue theirmuch more modest political goals? In any case, the history of the Balkans may pose another question of relevance to social science (and perhaps, not only to social science) which Lampe does not address. The question is: does the European model of a nation-state provide the best model for political and social development of ethnically fragmented regions lacking adequate resources for large-scale industrialization? Department ofPolitics Aleksandar Pavkovic Macquarie University, Sydney Miller, Eric A. To Balance or Not to Balance: Alignment Theoryand the Commonwealth ofIndependent States.Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2006. ix + 195pp. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?50.00. According to the 'realist' paradigm, the foreign policy orientation of states is shaped by their structural location in the international system.They will seek tomaximize their security or power either by aligning against local hege mons (balancing) or by aligning with them (bandwagoning). Eric A. Miller of theNational Institute forPublic Policy and George Washington University's Institute forEuropean, Russian and Eurasian Studies effectivelychallenges the relevance of thisparadigm to the post-Soviet region by means of a detailed examination of the evolution of foreign policy in two major states ? Ukraine 582 SEER, 86, 3, JULY 2008 and Uzbekistan. He concludes that themain concern of political leaders is to guard against domestic threats to their own regimes, rather than against external threats to the state as such. A leader will align with whichever for eign power seems to offer themost reliable protection against such domestic threats. For post-Soviet leaders that power tends to be Russia. Another im portant though secondary factor is the degree towhich a state is economically dependent on Russia. Thus, in the framework suggested byMiller, whether a state's foreign policy will be stronglypro-Russian, moderately pro-Russian, or independent of Russia depends on the combination of these two factors ? perceived strength of internal political threats and degree of economic dependence on Russia. It is a plausible theory.Leaders are naturally inclined to identifytheir own survivalwith state security, especially in the absence of stable, legitimate and autonomous state institutions. If there are no really serious external threats, the interestsof regime survivalwill dominate foreign as well as domestic pol icy.As the author points out, this situation is not peculiar to the post-Soviet realm. Regime security was a common determinant of alignment decisions made by Third World leaders during theCold War. Nevertheless, the problem remains of specifying the precise scope and conditions of the...

Foreign Policy Orientation, Strategic Interaction, and the Initiation of International Crises

In recent years, scholars studying U.S. foreign policy and the diversionary use of force have begun to focus more attention on when foreign regimes time crises with the U.S. Many argue that U.S. domestic conditions play a role in this. I argue that these models should take into consideration the foreign policy relationship between foreign governments and the U.S. I develop a theory of crisis initiation that considers the foreign policy orientation of states that may initiate a crisis with the U.S., and second, when the crisis may occur. I argue that by virtue of their foreign policy orientation, some regime leaders will be more likely than others to initiate a crisis with the U.S. Those regimes that are either closely aligned with the U.S. or closely identified with anti-U.S. interests will be much more likely to initiate crises with the U.S. than those whose foreign policy interests do not lead to such intimate ties of friendship or enmity. I develop and test hypotheses predicting what regime characteristics will be predictive of crisis initiation and when such crises are likely to occur. The results demonstrate that regime type matters more than U.S. domestic conditions in predicting where and when crises involving the U.S. will take place.