State Peace And Development Council Research Articles

Appraisal of Burma/Myanmar’s Roundabout Roadmaps

The peace process Burma/Myanmar has got a momentum since 2011, and both government and non-State actors including Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), political parties, and civil society groups put endeavor to make the process move on. This article is a comparative study of the seven-step Roadmap of National League for Democracy (NLD) and the seven-step Roadmap of previous military junta State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). While the military junta tactfully reached six out of its seven-step Roadmap and strictly holds on to the 2008 Constitution. It guaranteed the Tatmadaw (Army) a fixed position both in politics and defense. In contrast, the civilian government and ethnic groups are struggling to sign a union agreement— the 21st century Panglong Conference Agreement. This article argues that amending the constitution in accordance with the union agreement and the subsequent approval of the amended constitution may cause tension and pressure to be dealt with by the government, the Tatmadaw and ethnic groups. If the stakeholders are capable to get the union agreement to amend the constitution, there will be a wider chance to build a democratic federal union as planned in the NLD’s seven-step road map.

Understanding Recent Political Changes in Myanmar

On 30 March 2011, Myanmar's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), handed power to a new government led by President Thein Sein that had come into being in the wake of elections held in November 2010. Because all administrative and legislative bodies--both at the central and local levels--were controlled by members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), political activists and Myanmar watchers did not expect more than superficial changes under the new government. Although President Thein Sein mentioned his plan to introduce administrative and economic reforms and to launch an anti-corruption campaign in his inaugural speech doubts remained that the president would actually be able to deliver on his promises. However, on 19 August 2011, to the surprise of many people, President Thein Sein met Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at his official residence. Two days earlier, the President had invited exiled activists to return to the country. Aung San Suu Kyi publicly stated that she was very encouraged by her meeting with Thein Sein and that she had trust in his determination to bring about positive political change to the country. (1) The United States and some members of the European Union (EU) welcomed the meeting. On the other hand, several exiled activists had reservations about the sincerity of the President, with some going so far as to say that what Thein Sein had done was little more than a publicity stunt and that there was little difference between the new government and its predecessor. This article, drawing on interviews with serving and retired government officials, and political activists including leading NLD members, argues that since the new government has taken office a new era of political openness has begun in Myanmar. It goes on to illustrate that in order to understand recent political changes, one should pay attention to shifts in the internal power structure of the government. However, it is not a given that Myanmar will become a full-fledged democracy any time soon. Indeed this article suggests that the country is at a critical juncture, and that the expansion of political openness in the country will depend on whether liberals within the government and those from the pro-democracy movement can work together to further political changes without prompting the country's armed forces, the tatmadaw, to stage a coup. The Power Structure and Political Change in the SLORC/SPDC Government The military government that ruled Myanmar between late 1988 and early 2011 was formed in response to the nation-wide pro-democracy movement against the military-dominated socialist government led by General Ne Win. Although the junta, which was initially known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and later renamed the SPDC, held multi-party elections in 1990, it refused to transfer power to the NLD even after the latter had won a landslide victory. Instead, the junta convened a decade long National Convention (NC) to adopt guidelines for a new constitution. Although opposition groups and the international community called for the transfer of power to the NLD, the SLORC ignored these calls. In fact, after the 1990 elections Myanmar's military leaders decided to defer political change for as long as possible. Political activists, on the other hand, continued to campaign for swift political change. As Huntington and many others have pointed out, democratization under an authoritarian regime might take place under the following conditions: when the regime is toppled by a social movement or seriously weakened by a crisis; when reformers from within the regime and liberals from the movement find a way to work together; or when the regime feels that it cannot survive without initiating political reform. (2) Some activists had hoped for a split in the government and tried to identify liberal officials they could work with. …

Myanmar in 2010: The Elections Year and Beyond

One need not have been a soothsayer and, according to Dante Alighieri in The Divine Comedy, go to a very low circle of hell to predict that 2010 would be the year of elections, that all attention internally in Myanmar would be directed towards that end, and this concentration would also affect foreign relations. At the same time, no fortune teller would have been required, beyond picking the date of the elections themselves, to determine that minority issues would profoundly influence the future, as they have done since independence in 1948, and that 2010 would not witness resolution of these to-date intractable problems.1 The 7 November 2010 elections may have determined the composition of the new government, but they did not change, and specifically were not intended to change, the distribution of effective power, which still rests with the Tatmadaw (armed forces), and is likely to do so into the indefinite future. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) efforts ineffectual at best to assuage the minorities are unlikely to succeed for several reasons. The minorities have wanted some form of federal system, and many groups have formulated draft constitutions (illegally under Myanmar law and thus they were forced to do so outside the country) for their seven constituent states that incorporated elements of some such preferred system. To the military, however, federalism has been anathema since Ne Win declared it so in 1962. He considered it the first step toward secession, against which the military has always fought since independence. The government's Border Guard Force concept (see below) has exacerbated tensions; it would result in the effective castration of the ceasefire military of key ethnic groups, and thus has been resisted. It is a subject with which the new government in 2011 will have to deal, and there are fears it may try to do so through military force. The

Democracy Activism and Assistance in Burma

The assistance community supporting democratic transition in Burma tends to contrast the relative importance of the political opposition Burma against the political opposition based of the country. In shorthand, this is called inside and outside work, and it carries normative and funding implications. Instead of that dichotomy, this article recommends of as an analytical approach better suited to understanding democracy activities and assistance in Burma. Pro-democracy activities supporting self-determination in Burma radiate from three primary sites of resistance: opposition from Burma, opposition in countries bordering Burma, and the international opposition. Democracy assistance supports democrats and their activities at all three resistance sites. The article describes each of them and concludes with a broad picture of what democracy assistance can and cannot do in the case of Burma.BACKGROUNDBurma has been ruled by a military dictatorship since 1962 and democracy assistance is based upon supporting transition to a democratic system. After nearly 20 years of democracy assistance there is no evidence of evolution towards democracy, although, as will be discussed below, gains have been made within the political movement and civil society. The evidence is that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's ruling military junta, has entrenched itself throughout its time in power, and that it has enriched its leaders and consolidated their hold on power/ The saffron protests of September 2007 highlighted the potential for a revolutionary means of democratic transition. Despite the brutal outcome, these protests reminded the world of widespread internal disapproval of the military regime and the latent ability of the population to rise up in protest. Despite the parliamentary election planned for 2010, there is nothing to suggest the military in Burma intends to hand to a democratically elected civilian government. Unlike other post-Cold War regimes, the state is not dissolving in Burma, but rather continues to consolidate and expand.2State expansion is contested in several ways. While the largest prodemocracy protests thus far occurred in 1988 and 2007, protests also occurred in 1962, 1974, and 1996. Each protest ended in a violent reassertion of control by the military government. In addition to the demonstrations led by civilians, armed groups have fought the government since 1948. Most of the armed resistance groups, which were founded initially in the struggle for independence, continue to fight for state autonomy in a federal, democratic Burma.3When the 1988 protests in Burma erupted, the country was isolated from the world and little information about the protests was available to of a small group of Burma watchers and scholars. Other international events - the fall of the Berlin wall, the Tiananmen Square protests, and the ending of apartheid in South Africa - captured international attention at the end of the decade. Approximately 8000 to 10,000 students fled to the borders of Burma after 1988.4 Many took up arms by joining existing ethnic revolutionary forces and the newly created All Burma Students Defense Force.Democracy assistance began in 1991, with American nonviolent struggle strategists from the Albert Einstein Institute and Nonviolence International coming to border areas. During these visits, they worked with the exiled opposition to develop a unified strategy of Burmese people power using nonviolent tactics. They also helped develop an international community component to press for diplomatic and economic strategies to weaken support for the regime.5 Over the past 20 years, democracy assistance programs have been implemented by numerous nonprofit organizations receiving funds from Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the United States, as weU as from private foundations. …

Motherhood and social network: Response strategies of internally displaced Karen women in Taungoo district

This paper investigates the response strategies of displaced women, based on the oral testimonies of displaced Karen women. Contrary to conventional refugee literature, which treats displaced people as passive victims, we found that instead of feeling helpless when the men fled the relocation sites to escape the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military's abuse, women actively decided to stay back with their children and other women to maintain their social linkages, and survive in the underbelly of the SPDC by leveraging their femininity and their identity as mothers. We found that the women used the concept of motherhood as a negotiation tool to reduce the damage from their experiences of conflict and displacement. At the same time, ironically, the success of this strategy led the insurgents to include the women in their military strategies, putting them in a precarious situation between the fighting parties.

Community-based assessment of human rights in a complex humanitarian emergency: the Emergency Assistance Teams-Burma and Cyclone Nargis

IntroductionCyclone Nargis hit Burma on May 2, 2008, killing over 138,000 and affecting at least 2.4 million people. The Burmese military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), initially blocked international aid to storm victims, forcing community-based organizations such as the Emergency Assistance Teams-Burma (EAT) to fill the void, helping with cyclone relief and long-term reconstruction. Recognizing the need for independent monitoring of the human rights situation in cyclone-affected areas, particularly given censorship over storm relief coverage, EAT initiated such documentation efforts.MethodsA human rights investigation was conducted to document selected human rights abuses that had initially been reported to volunteers providing relief services in cyclone affected areas. Using participatory research methods and qualitative, semi-structured interviews, EAT volunteers collected 103 testimonies from August 2008 to June 2009; 42 from relief workers and 61 from storm survivors.ResultsOne year after the storm, basic necessities such as food, potable water, and shelter remained insufficient for many, a situation exacerbated by lack of support to help rebuild livelihoods and worsening household debt. This precluded many survivors from being able to access healthcare services, which were inadequate even before Cyclone Nargis. Aid efforts continued to be met with government restrictions and harassment, and relief workers continued to face threats and fear of arrest. Abuses, including land confiscation and misappropriation of aid, were reported during reconstruction, and tight government control over communication and information exchange continued.ConclusionsBasic needs of many cyclone survivors in the Irrawaddy Delta remained unmet over a year following Cyclone Nargis. Official impediments to delivery of aid to storm survivors continued, including human rights abrogations experienced by civilians during reconstruction efforts. Such issues remain unaddressed in official assessments conducted in partnership with the SPDC. Private, community-based relief organizations like EAT are well positioned and able to independently assess human rights conditions in response to complex humanitarian emergencies such as Cyclone Nargis; efforts of this nature must be encouraged, particularly in settings where human rights abuses have been documented and censorship is widespread.

China's role in the pursuit of security by Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council: boon and bane?

This article focuses on both the opportunities and challenges that the People's Republic of China (PRC) presents for Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in its quest for security. It does so in the context of significant external pressures on the military regime and its ongoing struggle to consolidate the state. The article argues that though Myanmar's military has successfully relied on Beijing for economic development as well as diplomatic protection against efforts to take the junta to task for its political intransigence in the face of Western demands for a more inclusive political process towards national reconciliation, Beijing's political support is actually more ambiguous than first meets the eye. It also suggests that China's links to the areas in which ethnic armed ceasefire groups formerly making up the Communist Party of Burma exercise significant if not complete authority have complicated efforts by Naypyidaw to impose its perspective on state and nation building along at least part of the Sino-Myanmar border. Rising frustration with perceived Chinese involvement and influence as well as strategic calculations about how to exploit potential opportunities have led the SPDC – in the run-up to the 2010 elections – to explore the possibility of improved relations with Washington and to use force in Kokang despite the risks such a move entails.

ETHNIC POLITICS IN MYANMAR: A Year of Tension and Anticipation

The year 2009 was marked by rising tension in ethnic politics as different parties and stakeholder groups began to position themselves in advance of the 2010 general election, pledged by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).1 The first general election in Myanmar in twenty years (and only third in fifty), the 2010 polls are an integral element in what could become the most defining year in a generation, setting the landscape for the introduction of a new constitution and system of government. No quantum leap of change is expected. Under the new constitution, the leading role of the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) in national politics will be maintained through reserved positions for military personnel in both parliament and government. Nevertheless, as 2009 progressed, leaders on all sides of Myanmar's political and ethnic divisions recognized that the 2010 election is an eventuality that they cannot ignore. For while the success or failure of the 2010 polls is likely to prove historic judgment on the political road map of the military government, events during 2009 signalled that they also represent a landmark challenge for the country's different ethnic groups. Whether by contesting, boycotting, or confronting the polls, the fate of individual nationality movements could be decided for many years to come. Adding pressure on the political actors in Myanmar were the activities of Asian neighbours. In a fast developing region, political and ethnic events in Myanmar were followed with ever greater interest. During 2009, economic engagement accelerated, with a host of major energy, trade, and infrastructure projects under way or in the early stages of planning that are likely to change the political economy forever. Many are located in the ethnic minority borderlands, meaning that stability in Myanmar and international progress are becoming closely

United States-Myanmar Relations: On the Threshold of Rapprochement? A Response

Priscilla Clapp's article very clearly describes the pragmatic new US policy approach to Myanmar adopted by the Obama administration, and the very deep-seated obstacles in both countries that stand in the way of genuine rapprochement. The paper accurately concludes that there is realistically no chance of this happening in the near future, even after the elections scheduled for 7 November 2010. The deep-seated obstacles include the fact that, for the past twenty years, the focus of US policy has almost exclusively been on the personal leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi framed in terms of democracy and human rights. The objective of US policy was to remove the military dictatorship and replace it with the parliament elected in 1990 under the leadership of Suu Kyi. While this policy focus has shifted slightly under Obama, Suu Kyi is still central to US policy on Myanmar. As recently as 24 September 2010, the US government reiterated that the elections could not be seen as credible as long as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest. (1) For Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), this validates their claim that Suu Kyi is being used by colonial forces (British) and neocolonial forces (US) to subjugate Myanmar: Suu Kyi was not allowed to compete in the 1990 elections; she was under house arrest; political prisoners were not released; the election campaign was not free and fair by any standards; and the media were as restricted then as now. Yet the US and the international community hailed the 1990 elections as credible. From the military's point of view, what has changed to make the 2010 elections illegitimate? Was it because Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won in 1990 and has no chance of winning in 2010? The regime will certainly not release Suu Kyi before the elections, let alone allow her to compete. This means that Washington will not be able to improve relations with Myanmar as long as she remains the focus of US policy. Suu Kyi remains a crucial figure, and she may be the only person able to hold Myanmar together in any future transition to a democracy; but if the US is serious about improving relations with Myanmar, it needs to take into account other factors that may be equally important. As described in Ms Clapp's paper, the SPDC's primary goal is to maintain power. Improving ties with the United States, or any other country or organization including the United Nations, is secondary. Therefore, no matter what pressure Washington or other external actors bring to bear on Nyapyidaw, it will not release Suu Kyi because she is perceived as a threat to regime survival. Myanmar's military (the Tatmadaw) refuses to entertain the possibility of her assuming a leadership role. To the generals, it would be tantamount to surrendering the country's sovereignty to the colonialists and neocolonialists. The regime simply cannot, and will not, accept the premise that they are the villains and she is the saviour of Myanmar. Neither will the regime risk losing the elections by allowing them to be genuinely free and fair. Nor will it release political prisoners and allow unfettered media coverage. All these factors impinge on the security of the regime and nothing will be allowed to challenge its supremacy. The only hope the article holds out for a possible opening for better relations is if the new government is composed of different faces and the parliament produces a significant number of independent opposition figures including non-Burman ethnic leaders. And if the government adopts more open policies--such as the release of political prisoners and the introduction of economic reform--the process of rapprochement might inch forward. Yet as the author points out, this is extremely unlikely, given the SPDC's approach towards the elections. Does this then mean that the Obama administration's new Myanmar policy is destined to fail? …

The Myanmar imbroglio and ASEAN: heading towards the 2010 elections

Following the adoption of a new constitution by national referendum, Myanmar's military junta is set to organize multiparty elections in 2010. Not least to influence Myanmar's leadership, with regard to the conditions Washington believes necessary for credible elections, the United States announced in September 2009 that it would embark on a new approach towards Naypyidaw. This will focus on a high-level dialogue while keeping existing sanctions in place. The Obama administration has asked the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to support this new approach. Against the backdrop of the deep divide between the ruling generals and Aung San Suu Kyi, and the continued conflict between Naypyidaw and armed ethnic nationalities, this article asks: How strong is ASEAN's record when it comes to influencing the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in relation to matters of national reconciliation and political transition? What factors explain ASEAN's approach towards Myanmar? What prospect, if any, is there that ASEAN states can influence Myanmar's political developments before the 2010 elections? The article argues that ASEAN has not moved beyond a collective criticism which aims to induce Naypyidaw to respond positively to the demands of its international detractors. ASEAN's norms, different political identities and geopolitical interests coupled with the SPDC's prickliness have limited the consensus on Myanmar. Naypyidaw's calculations about relations with Washington, rather than ASEAN's ‘enhanced interactions’ with the military government, and domestic political dynamics are likely to be the crucial determinants of further developments in the context of the 2010 elections.

Prospects for Rapprochement Between the United States and Myanmar

If rapprochement is defined as the establishment or resumption of harmonious relations, one must conclude that it is premature to apply this concept to the current state of relations between the United States and Myanmar. While the shift in US policy towards Myanmar's military junta--the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)--which seeks to balance sanctions with engagement, could, under the right circumstances, lead in this direction, we have not seen rapprochement yet and may not see it for some time to come. Therefore, it is probably more appropriate to describe the current state of US-Myanmar relations as suspended animation, with both sides waiting for the completion of Myanmar's transition process to decide whether it will create an environment conducive to engagement and possibly rapprochement as well. US relations with Myanmar have been stuck in neutral gear for at least two decades, with the engine running, but propelling the vehicle neither forwards nor backwards. During this period, major changes have occurred in Southeast Asia, leading to much broader and more cordial relations between the United States and all ASEAN members, except Myanmar. Yet, in the case of US-Myanmar relations, until recently the fundamentals of the relationship had been barely revisited by either side for decades. While a stubborn, entrenched regime concentrated single-mindedly on consolidating its grip on internal power, repressing and impoverishing its population in the process, a frustrated superpower piled on layers of punishing sanctions in the interest of supporting Myanmar's embattled political opposition. Is the time of reckoning now approaching? The Obama administration's seven-month review of US policy towards Myanmar in 2009 was Washington's first comprehensive reassessment of the bilateral relationship in decades. The review happened to coincide with the final stages of the SPDC's seven-step plan for replacing two decades of martial law with discipline-flourishing democracy. The aim of this paper is to explore whether genuine rapprochement between the United States and Myanmar can emerge from this convergence of events. Underlying Factors In the United States The Obama administration came to office with the stated intention of reorienting US foreign policy towards greater collaboration and cooperation with international partners and opening the door to engagement with previously shunned outposts of tyranny. The idea was that confrontation, particularly in a unilateral form, might not be the best or only means of achieving US policy objectives with unfriendly governments. (1) Immediately after President Obama's inauguration, the new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Asia, including Southeast Asia, where she expressed frustration with the failure of either sanctions or engagement strategies to exert a positive influence on the behaviour of Myanmar's military regime. (2) Secretary Clinton announced that the new administration would be reviewing America's Myanmar policy and, upon her return to Washington, initiated this review. During the long period of policy stasis in US-Myanmar relations, both sides did, of course, make small policy adjustments in response to events, which over time had the effect of modifying policy direction somewhat. In the case of the United States, these adjustments included additional sanctions when the regime cracked down on opposition groups (such as following the Depayin Incident in 2003), but there were also a series of more positive moves during the past decade to expand US humanitarian assistance to Myanmar. In fact, the United States became one of the largest donor governments in the international response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The policy review of 2009 allowed Washington to take full account of the various threads of past US policy and activities concerning Myanmar and to re-evaluate US interests in that country and the region in the context of current and prospective conditions and events. …

Burma/ Myanmar: Challenges of a Ceasefire Accord in Karen State

Burma (Myanmar) has seen some of the longest-running insurgencies in the world, which have had a devastating effect on local populations and the country as a whole. While the Karen National Union (KNU), which has fought successive Burmese governments since 1949, is in a critical phase of its life, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC) is experiencing life under a ceasefire accord with the Burmese government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Major challenges have occurred since the ceasefire and future developments are uncertain. Like all ceasefire groups in the country, the KPC has come under immense pressure to follow the government's “seven-step road map” to democracy, compete in the 2010 elections, and transform its troops into a border guard force under the control of the Burmese military or face disarmament. This article seeks to provide some insights into a ceasefire group, to analyse the failures and successes of the ceasefire accord, and to outline future challenges to the country.

The War on Drugs

This article demonstrates the inadequate response of the international community to the suppression of drugs in Myanmar1 and the lost opportunity by the United States to reverse its policy toward interdiction since 2002. First, it provides a brief history of drug production in Myanmar and examines the reliability of surveys conducted by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United States, both together with Myanmar, on opium cultivation and of estimates of amphetamine type stimulants (ATS) production. Second, it sheds light on international and domestic efforts to halt the production and distribution of opium, heroin and ATS, and discusses the roots of the dramatic decline in opium cultivation and production over the twelve years preceding 2007. Third, it evaluates the alleged involvement of authorities under the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the governing body of Myanmar, in the drug trade. Fourth, it concludes that extensive assistance by the international community and local authorities is vital to avoid a humanitarian disaster in the opium cultivation areas and consequent reversal of the favourable progression.

Crisis in Burma

On September 24, 2007, the conflict in Burma, also known as Myanmar, between the public and the military junta, officially known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), reached a serious point. The military junta, which represented the Burmese government, had raised the price of oil through its monopoly, which subsequently elevated food prices. In response, the public, including 1000 monks, protested against the tyrannical rule of the junta. The junta reacted by killing thousands of people and arresting democratic leaders such as U Gambira, the leader of the protesting monks. Amidst this turmoil, many foreign countries intervened to try to find a solution. Keck and Sikkink suggest that these are voluntary and angel states coming to the aid of others. On the other hand, Kaufmann and Pape argue that these are states masking their acts as aid while looking for gains for themselves. They add that these political gains are made at the costly price of economic loss. By examining how the United States has been involved in the crisis in Burma, Kaufmann and Pape’s view on these states appears to be more correct than that of Keck and Sikkink, who believe in the existence of voluntary states.

Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate

As Myanmar entered its twentieth year of direct military rule, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) once more spurned its critics and opponents at home and abroad. Facing in September the largest organized anti-government demonstrations in nearly two decades, ensconced in their new capital, Naypyitaw, the generals appeared outwardly unperturbed by the huge pressure generated. Perhaps anticipating minor protests in August by political activists following draconian petrol and gas price increases, the regime appeared initially unprepared for the much larger protests by Buddhist monks who took to the streets of Yangon and other cities to protest at rising food prices and the general decrepitude of the urban life, as well as continued military rule. At the conclusion of the first step, the National Convention, in the regime's lengthy seven-step road map to a new power-sharing constitutional order, many inside and outside Myanmar thought an opportunity had arisen to weaken the army's grip and open political options anew. A role was sought for the National League for Democracy (NLD) General-Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the future political order, as well as consideration of federalist demands by some ethnic minority leaders, plus a reduction in the power of the army as foreseen in the principles agreed at the constitutional convention. However, at year's end, the closure implied by the completion of the National Convention remained unaltered and the power of the ruling generals appeared undiminished. From January onwards, Myanmar was increasingly in the world's news. Foreign politicians and civil servants who had largely ignored two decades of

BURMA'S DESPAIR

The Saffron Revolution is Burma's 9/11; much will never be the same. The regime's harsh crackdown and killing of monks in fall 2007 has aroused a new generation of dissidents. Economic grievances have morphed into antigovernment political protests, and the political situation has become even more polarized. Burma's 9/11 may also be sowing dissension within the military as ostracism from the sangha (Buddhist community) and popular revulsion affects institutional interests, ones that may no longer be identical to those of the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The government's seven-step roadmap to democracy appears to have lost all credibility, and no one believes that the military or its proxies will implement the proposed Constitution in good faith. There is concern that the SPDC is only going through the motions of the UN-sponsored dialogue and still hopes to impose a democracy in shackles. Indonesia has provided inspiration for the SPDC, especially the paramount political power exercised by the Indonesian military during the New Order era (1967-98), but the junta fails to see that this model has already been overtaken by events and popular aspirations. Meanwhile, the international community debates how to break through the current impasse, given that economic sanctions and constructive engagement have not produced any progress. Transforming unprecedented international attention to Burma's plight into sustained support for alleviating severe humanitarian conditions, promoting nation building, and nurturing a time-bound dialogue for national reconciliation and democratization remains a key challenge.

Burma in the Balance: The Geopolitics of Gas*

A new great game is under way in Myanmar. The huge offshore gas findings stretching from the borders of Bangladesh down to Thailand have resulted in a flurry of diplomatic manoeuvring with China, Thailand and other ASEAN countries as well as United States, India, the European Union, Australia and Russia all playing key roles. The equations are bound to change and many countries, for fear of losing influence with Yangon, are seeking a more ‘pragmatic’ approach. As a result, the ruling regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SDPC), saturated with natural gas, finds itself at the centre of unexpected attention and unaccustomed wooing. Whether it be the Sino-Indian economic contests and resource competition in the Burmese gas sector or Thailand's increasing interest and growing influence in Myanmar, together this presents important leverage points for the SPDC, which has no doubt made it easier for the regime to withstand pressure for political reforms.

Myanmar: The Future Takes Form — But Little Change in Sight

The military regime, headed by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), in 2006 further consolidated its ranks, relocated to a new capital, and at year's end looked poised to wrap up the long-running constitutional assembly and retire control to a loyal successor regime, possibly by 2008. The National League for Democracy (NLD) made a last-ditch effort to gain a role in the transition by offering to recognize the SPDC as the lawful government in return for convening of the elected parliament, while democracy activists abroad celebrated another campaign victory as the UN Security Council adopted Myanmar on its formal agenda. But neither conciliatory gestures nor threats had any apparent effect on the military leaders who seemingly remain supremely confident in their own judgement. With competition for Myanmar 's rich energy resources intensifying, any notion that economic failure could force the military to accommodate demands for reform also appears increasingly implausible. While the regime may change, the prospects for substantive changes in power or policy in the near term look slim.

Myanmar´ s Human and Economic Crisis and Its Regional Implications

Myanmar is a leading example of what represents, at least by some definitions, a failed state: tyrannically governed by a military junta whose sullen leaders are seldom seen in public, with a downtrodden, impoverished, and dispirited citizenry ? most of whom struggle to survive, at best with the most basic standard of living.1 Except for the swollen hierarchy of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), upper elements of the armed forces (SitTat or Tatmadaw) and crony businessmen (including an increasingly self-evident resident Chinese population), the people of Myanmar experience few of the comforts and advances of the modern world. The unloved governing military junta, in absolute power under one name or another since 1962, prevails only because of the authority of the gun, and obliging neighbours on all sides eager to partake of Myanmar's still abundant natural resources at fire-sale prices. But Myanmar's internal situation has deep geopolitical ramifications. Emanating from this wounded nation are huge and problematic challenges for the region. There is evidence to suggest that despite periodic state efforts to eliminate the production of opium poppies, Myanmar remains one of the world's largest producers of heroin and amphetamines ? most of which is consigned for

Japan and the Myanmar Stalemate: Regional Power and Resolution of a Regional Problem

For years Myanmar has been caught in a political stalemate generated both by deadlock between the military government and the democratic opposition, and by polar differences between China and the United States. In searching for ways forward, analysts might therefore want to look beyond these dominant actors. This article considers the contribution that a regional power, Japan, could make to political change. It examines first political stalemate in Myanmar, second Japan as a regional power, third Japanese engagement with Myanmar, fourth Japan and resolution of the Myanmar problem, and fifth future possibilities. The argument is that strong historical ties and good relations inside and outside Myanmar put Japan in a pivotal position. As part of its reassurance diplomacy in East Asia, Japan should take the lead in tackling this regional problem.Since a May 1990 general election that saw the National League for Democracy (NLD) secure a landslide victory and the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) respond by reinforcing its dictatorship, Myanmar has been in political stasis. Although progress has been made on some fronts, notably in relations between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the military junta is now known, and the insurgent rebel armies with which it long fought civil wars, the uneasy political deadlock that settled on the country some 15 years ago has not been broken. Furthermore, within a complex internal context, the standoff between the two major protagonists from 1990 remains critical. Now, as then, the NLD, brandishing democratic legitimacy, charismatic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and latent popular support, confronts the military junta, wielding guns, power, and fear.