Coalition Of States Research Articles

The Strength of School Wellness Policies: One State’s Experience

This study examines the results of federal legislation on the content and quality of policies written in 2005-2006 by Utah school districts (n = 30). Policies were gathered by phone call requests to school districts or obtained on district Web pages. Content was compared to requirements outlined in the Child Nutrition Reauthorization Act (CNRA) of 2004 and recommendations made by a state coalition of health and education agencies. The strength of the language was assessed (mandate vs recommendation), and characteristics of school districts that adopted strong policies were identified. The majority of Utah school districts (78%) complied with the federal guidelines, and a variety of state recommended nutrition and physical activity policy statements were included. The strength of the language used in the policies revealed that districts were more likely to mandate items already required by other entities or well established in the district. School districts with high participation in free- and reduced-price programs had significantly more mandatory policies (mean = 9.2) versus low (mean = 7.1) and medium enrollment (mean = 4.7). Urban school districts were more likely to indicate mandatory competitive food policies than rural and suburban (mean = 2.3 vs 0.93, 0.83). There were no differences in policy language between school districts based on race or size. Compliance with the CNRA may be a positive step toward improving the school nutrition and physical activity environment, but it does not ensure a comprehensive or powerful policy. Schools and community partners must continue to work together to strengthen wellness policies and programs.

Independence Under Fire: Extra-legal Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement

This study uses detailed quantitative analyses of the complete history of rulings made by the Panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism during its first ten years of operation, to assess the robustness of theories regarding the decision-making of these institutions. Regression analyses are used to test for correlation between the success of Complainants in dispute settlement and a variety of factors, representing the hypothesized capacity of states to influence Panels and the Appellate Body through dimensions of political and economic power, the impact of the relative practical capacities of states in dispute settlement proceedings, and the formation of coalitions of states in support of a particular Complainant or Respondent. The results of the regression analyses - that few significant correlations exist between the independent variables and the dispute outcomes - provide evidence that the judicial institutions of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism are independent from Member State influence. The one reliable correlation found in these analyses demonstrates that a Complainant state does have substantial advantage in Panel proceedings if it has previously participated in more disputes than the Respondent.

NATO and the anticipatory use of force

Only since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since September 2001, have questions of anticipatory action arisen in alliance deliberations concerning the use of force. In initiating their Balkan operations, it should be recalled, the allies did not face direct threats, but intervened toterminate conflicts and human rights abuses and to shape their security environment. It has been difficult for the alliance to get to grips with the new security challenges presented by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction because of its history, its intrinsic character, and the nature of the new security challenges. Its history includes a strictly reactive posture during the Cold War and its interventions from a position of overwhelming superiority in the Balkan conflicts. The new security challenges place under stress the alliance's intrinsic character as a permanent coalition of sovereign independent states committed to collective defence because these challenges may endanger specific allies to differing degrees (in contrast with the overarching Soviet threat during the Cold War) and revealdiff erences in interests, capabilities and strategic cultures among the allies. The allies have not yet resolved questions concerning the legality and legitimacy of the antici patory use of force, nor have they fully explored the implications of concepts such as ‘constructive abstention’ and ‘NATO in support’ with regard to preemptive or preventive operations undertaken by a group of allies.

Airbus and Boeing: Strengths and Limitations of Strong States

Over the past three decades, Airbus has emerged as the world's leading manufacturer of large commercial aircraft. The success of Europe's Airbus is dramatic, given that three decades ago, American domination of the large commercial aircraft market outside the Soviet bloc was uncontested. Airbus is now one of the world's remaining two large commercial aircraft manufacturers. Airbus was created by a coalition of European states and firms committed to regaining a European presence in the international large com mercial aviation market. By most measures, the rise of Airbus is a striking example of a successful industrial policy that required a sustained multi-state collaboration over a number of decades.

Effects of State Coalitions to Reduce Underage Drinking: A National Evaluation

<h3>Introduction</h3> Drinking by youth remains prevalent. The Reducing Underage Drinking through coalitions (RUD) project funded ten states for 8 years to form coalitions designed to change the policy and normative environment regarding youth access to alcohol. An independent national outcome evaluation of this $21-million effort was conducted. <h3>Methods</h3> Using a longitudinal quasi-experimental design, the ten intervention states were compared with the other 40 states, with repeated annual measures of outcomes from 1995 to 2004. Measures included print news media coverage, legislative bills enacted, youth drinking behavior, and youth alcohol-related driving behaviors and traffic crash mortality. Analyses using latent growth curve modeling methods were conducted in 2005. <h3>Results</h3> Significant differences in slopes between treatment and comparison states were found for several outcome measures, particularly in the more-proximal outcome domains. Across all outcome domains, the pattern of effects was in the direction of positive effects of the RUD coalitions, although for most individual measures the differences were not statistically significant. The magnitude of observed differences associated with the RUD coalitions were sizable, with an estimated effect size of 1.10 on media coverage, 0.46 on state policies enacted, −0.44 on youth drinking behaviors, and −0.16 on alcohol-related driving and fatal car-crash mortality. <h3>Conclusions</h3> The pattern of results and the magnitude of estimated effects provides evidence of effect of the RUD coalitions. The lack of statistically significant differences for most individual outcome measures indicates the difficulty of unambiguously demonstrating the full effects of an effort designed to change behaviors and health outcomes of the entire youth population of multiple states.

Location management based on distance and direction for PCS networks

This paper proposes a distance-and-direction-based location management scheme with a nonisotropic mobility model to capture the directional movement of an MT, which remarkably reduces the total cost at the cost of a slight increase in the location update cost. In this scheme, whenever a distance threshold or a direction threshold is exceeded, a location update is performed. When a call arrives, the network pages the called MT within the paging area defined by the distance threshold and direction threshold. In addition, an online distance-and-direction calculation method, and an interactive distance-and-direction optimization algorithm are developed to dynamically adjust the paging area. We analyze this scheme using a Markov chain for both one-dimensional (1-D) case and two-dimensional (2-D) case. Specifically, a good state coalition method is proposed to reduce sharply the computational complexity of the 2-D cost evaluation. Numerical results suggest that substantial cost saving can be obtained by fully utilizing the mobility direction information. Therefore, the proposed scheme outperforms the distance-based scheme.

The Group of Seven

It is entirely appropriate to question whether the Group of Seven (G7) should even feature in this Global Monitor series. The series has provided updates, commentary and analysis of institutions in...

The Move from Institutions? Examining the Phenomenon in Africa

INTRODUCTION The recently issued National Security Strategy of the United States (March 2006), reaffirms the preference for informally created institutions or networks with selective membership increasingly favored in U.S. policy. It describes them as partnerships that emphasize international cooperation, not international bureaucracy; rely on voluntary adherence rather than binding treaties; and are oriented towards action and results rather than legislation and rulemaking. (1) Some commentators have concluded that these networks manifest a move away from institutions. One of my copanelists, Prof. Eyal Benvenisti, has described this trend in his presentation and in a forthcoming publication as thus: This new attitude toward international obligations reflects both the availability of novel ways for governments to interact across political borders, as well as new concerns about international legal tools, especially the formal international institutions. This preference for informal lawmaking suggests that international cooperation can be achieved without recourse to international legal tools and that the informality offers significant benefits to some governments. (2) The phenomenon of of the willing as an informal mechanism for circumventing the bureaucratic strictures and international rule-making or legislative processes of formal international institutions has become more pronounced lately with the proliferation of various coalitions of like-minded states led or inspired by the United States. Yet, the history of this phenomenon has a far longer and more complex life. (3) Most of these coalitions involve countries from the global North, but they are by no means limited to these states. Similar developments--albeit of a limited nature and scope, and of more recent pedigree--can be identified among states of the global South as well. My presentation focuses on the emergence of this phenomenon in the global South and is aimed at demonstrating that the move away from institutions may be occurring not only with respect to the universal or global institutions but also at the level of regional institutions, such as the African Union (AU). In my view, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) presents the closest example of this phenomenon in Africa. NEPAD: A MOVE FROM THE AU? NEPAD is nowadays commonly described as an integral program of the AU, the regional organization that superseded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 2002. Yet, NEPAD originally was conceived as a separate framework for interaction and cooperation among a self-selected group of African states, operating as a parallel structure to the OAU. Although African political leaders subsequently decided to adopt it as a program of the OAU, I would argue that NEPAD was intended to be, and remains, an exclusive, voluntary coalition of like-minded states. From a structural and operational point of view, it remains a separate entity from the AU, notwithstanding the political rhetoric suggesting otherwise. The establishment of a separate small, core secretariat for NEPAD in Midrand, South Africa, away from the headquarters and international bureaucracy of the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is itself a manifestation of this position. In addition, the different approaches taken by the AU and NEPAD leaders in presenting the two initiatives to African governments, civil society groups and Africa's external development partners, in particular the G8 countries, reinforces this view. Time constraints do not permit me to discuss in any meaningful detail the history, process and content of NEPAD or its relevance for solving Africa's developmental problems, etc. In any case, not all these issues are pertinent or relevant to the examination of the phenomenon of the move from institutions. …

New Stakeholders in the Common Agricultural Policy: A Real Burden to Reform Processes in the Enlarged European Union?

Enlargement to the east has significantly changed the agricultural panorama of the European Union (EU). Since 1 May 2004 the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has had eight new stakeholders from Central and Eastern Europe, that yet more than a decade ago were part of the Communist Bloc with its own model of agriculture. Agricultural sectors of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) are therefore characterised by structural deficiencies left as a legacy of the Communist period. Moreover, agriculture in the CEECs proved a relatively recalcitrant economic sector. The adjustments to the new conditions of a market economy have generally been proceeding far more slowly than in other economic sectors. How, then, will the integration between eastern and western European countries, which have quite different agricultural structures and different agricultural problems shape the EU’s CAP in the next few decades? Will the eastern enlargement complicate the CAP and make the reform processes in this area an arduous task? What will be the role and position of the new Member States in future EU internal negotiations on reforms in this policy area? Given the economic and political importance of agriculture in the CEECs, future negotiations between new and old Member States regarding the CAP reforms in the enlarged EU are commonly expected to be one of the most difficult areas of negotiation. According to researchers, the new Member States, as major beneficiaries of the CAP, will opt for greater support for their agricultural sectors after accession. Instead, the political economy analyses of the developments in the EU agricultural policy show that preference of the old Member States to cut agricultural expenditure will be greater once enlargement to the east has taken place. This has made researchers suggest that after enlargement to the east, reforms of the CAP would be much more difficult, because the coalition of the new Member States may use their common veto power to European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 5, September 2005, pp. 566–585. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

Canada's Addiction to American Security: The Illusion of Choice in the War on Terrorism

1. America's Addiction to Security and Public Safety Despite the absence of another terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, American officials are becoming increasingly addicted to achieving perfect security and absolute safety in the midst of an unwinnable war on terrorism. Success will remain elusive because, over time, more groups and individuals with expanding lists of grievances will acquire the power to inflict levels of damage considered by political leaders to be unacceptable. In essence war is becoming privatized (Nye 2004) (3) through the democratization of technology and knowledge (Friedman, 2001), (4) miniaturization of weaponry and lethality, increasing accessibility and transferability of weapons of mass destruction, and a rising number of competing terrorist groups with religious, political and financial motivations to terrorize. Even more disturbing are trends towards the privatization of political power. The Madrid train bombings in March 2004 revealed that a relatively straightforward attack by a small group of terrorists could have a significant impact on the outcome of a democratic election and play a major role in the immediate withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. The Philippine government withdrew their troops in July 2004 in response to the kidnapping of a single truck driver in Baghdad. These successes reveal that terrorists have acquired a measure of political power that far exceeds the influence of hundreds of thousands of anti-war protesters in Spain and the Philippines who were demanding the same outcome (an early withdrawal from Iraq), but failed. Mass protests in Katmandu after the murder of twelve Nepalese workers in Baghdad provoked both an apology from the government in Nepal for failing to secure their release, and an explanation from officials that they received no offer from the kidnappers--the implication being that had such an offer been made the government would almost certainly have negotiated with the terrorists. The Kuwaiti government paid a $500,000 ransom for the release of seven Indian and Kenyan employees of a Kuwaiti company involved in post-war reconstruction in Iraq. (5) Several Egyptian, Jordanian, and Turkish companies agreed to cut short their constructions operations in Iraq in exchange for the release of kidnapped employees. (6) In August 2004, terrorists threatened to kill two French journalists as a protest against legislation in France banning the wearing of Muslim headscarves in public schools. The kidnappings provoked a flurry of French diplomatic activity resulting in the release of the hostages in December, 2004. (7) Apparently even the strongest critics of the U.S.-UK led war in Iraq are not immune from kidnapping and extortion. More recently, the Italian government was forced to address accusations that $1 million was paid for the release of two aid workers in October 2004, and significantly more to obtain the release of Italian reporter, Giuliana Sgrena, after a controversial rescue operation in March 2005. (8) Negotiating with terrorists is standard operating procedure for governments eager to avoid a public backlash against policies that are too closely associated with an unpopular war, and an even less popular American president. But these concessions (and others to follow) will guarantee that more kidnappings, bombings and killings will occur as coalitions of insurgents and terrorists cooperate to build on political victories and financial windfalls. (9) Consider the following illustration of the privatization of political power in Iraq today--the overwhelming consensus across the international community is that success in Iraq requires an end to the insurgency and a credible and sustained effort by a broad-based, coalition of states supporting an unwavering commitment to post-conflict reconstruction, counter-insurgency, liberalization, and democratization. Yet despite this multilateral consensus, supported by unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, unilateral self-interests motivated by domestic political imperatives to protect their own citizens and troops remain the most powerful determinants of whether states join (or remain in) the U. …

Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council

This article discusses the dynamics between informal groups of states and the UN Security Council. First, I argue that informal groups have proliferated in response to systemic change. Second, these groups serve as a mechanism that allows for exit from structural constraints of the Security Council and voice for stakeholders in a conflict. In effect, they may narrow the operational and participatory gap growing out of the multiple incapacities that prevents the Council from formulating an effective response to crisis situations. Third, the processes of diplomatic problem solving and its collective legitimation have become increasingly decoupled. The former tends to be delegated to informal groups or coalition of states, while the Council provides the latter. I illustrate how these findings affect one's understanding of power, legitimacy, and change in the theory of international relations.This article is the extensively revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System in 2003. The project received financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council, United Kingdom (Grant No. R42200024335), and the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford. The UN Studies Program at Yale University was a frequent host and home over recent years. I would like to express my gratitude for the long-term support and advice of Karl Kaiser, Bruce Russett, James Sutterlin, and especially Neil MacFarlane. I also wish to thank Mats Berdal, Richard Caplan, Sam Daws, Kurt Gaubatz, Marrack Goulding, Jean Krasno, Edward Luck, David Malone, Lisa Martin, James Mayall, Joseph Nye, Adam Roberts, Avi Shlaim, Ngaire Woods, and two anonymous referees for comments and criticism.

Safety-net dental clinics: A viable model for access to dental care

Federal policy supports and funds community-based clinics to provide health care to low-income and underserved groups. This study examines the role of community dental safety-net clinics in providing dental care for these populations. The authors administered a cross-sectional survey of all identified safety-net dental clinics in Illinois. Seventy-one of 94 clinics responded (response rate, 76 percent), describing their history, operations, patients, staffing and dentist relationships. An in-depth analysis of 57 clinics presents comparisons of three categories of clinics, sponsored by community health centers (23), local health departments (21) and private services agencies (13). Clinics were distributed across the state; 80 percent were located in facilities with other health care providers, and all provided dental care to low-income and other underserved groups. Clinics provided more than 3100 annual dental visits, operated with limited staffing and budgets, and had referral relationships with local dentists. Clinics with full-time dentists or any dental hygienists had higher annual numbers of dental visits. These clinics provide dental care to groups with traditional access barriers. Although they represent a small portion of all dental care, their mission and role make them a key component of strategies to address the dental access problem. Local and state dental practitioners and coalitions seeking to expand dental access should consider their community dental safety-net clinics as partners. Efforts to expand theese clinics should include considering optimizing staffing for better dental productivity.

Hegemony and multilateralism

I INTRODUCTIONDoes US strategy as a hegemon, epitomized in the eyes of many by its war versus Iraq, represent a significant and lasting change in the structure of global politics? Are analysts like Robert Kagan right that contemporary US strategy is more the inevitable product of hegemony and less the choice of a particular administration? Getting this question right is of paramount importance for foreign ministries around the world in ascertaining how to avoid, on the one hand, over-reacting to the transient aberrations of an extreme administration, or failing to face up to longer-term changes, on the other. Do recent events demonstrate that strategies for security as pursued by many countries other than the US are in peril, such that decisions to go ahead with multilateral initiatives like the landmines convention and International Criminal Court (ICC) without the US are mistaken?Without claiming there is a perfectly clean revolutionary break from previous US foreign policy strategy, there has been a distinctive change in US strategy under the Bush administration. This change includes an explicit embrace of an agenda of hegemonic superiority as the end, a rejection of multilateralism as a presumptive approach to security in favour of unilateralism (and bilateralism), and an avowed embrace of preemptive (better termed preventive) military action as means. There are many implications of the Bush administration's strategy for world politics, though here I confine myself to an examination of two interrelated developments that are front and centre: 1) what are the implications of US strategy with regard to the control and prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and 2) what conclusions can we draw about the viability of multilateral international security institutions like the UN, ICC, or landmines convention? These concerns follow from what are arguably the most revolutionary planks of the Bush administration's strategy; namely 1) the contention that the Cold War strategy of deterrence is outmoded in an era of WMD and terrorism; and 2) the administration's frequent and blunt recourse to unilateralism, epitomized by Bush's challenge at the UN in September of 2003 that the UN would become an irrelevant talk-shop and go the way of the League of Nations if it did not enforce its own security council resolutions by approving war against Iraq.This article proceeds by first examining the extent to which key features of US strategy under the Bush administration are policy proclivities of a particular administration or structural features of a hegemon. I then examine the implications of US hegemony for design strategies for multilateral institutions. This sets up an examination of what the evidence so far suggests regarding the success of US strategy with regard to WMD, and the success of coalitions of states to proceed with initiatives like the landmines convention and ICC without the hegemon. I conclude by addressing the significance of US domestic politics and threat perceptions for these issues, since they provide a potential avenue for productive responses to the Bush administration's strategy that are often overlooked by analyses that are focused at the international level.II US STRATEGY: INEVITABLE UNILATERALISM?Which elements of contemporary US strategy are proclivities (or, for critics, pathologies) of the Bush administration, and which are more enduring features likely to outlast any one particular administration? Are these tendencies inevitable features of a hegemonic power? Robert Kagan, in his essay Power and weakness, has suggested just this, that US tendencies and differences with others are the inevitable product of power differences:Today's transatlantic problem, in short, is not a George Bush problem. It is a power problem. American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe's military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power. …

Danger Beyond Dyads: Third-Party Participants in Militarized Interstate Disputes

Stuart Bremer often reminded us that third parties—directly or indirectly—affect the initiation, evolution, and termination of conflict. He encouraged scholars to research the phenomenon of joining behavior further and personally investigated it. Questions about joining behavior are indeed deeply intertwined with a variety of theories of conflict. However, existing records on third-party interventions are limited to states' military involvement in conflict. The limitations imposed by the data can lead researchers to biased or incomplete conclusions about many international phenomena. We heed Bremer's encouragement and present here the results of an effort to collect new evidence on nonneutral (partisan) interventions in militarized interstate disputes for the 1946—2001 period. The data we present differ from existing records in that: (1) they provide information on both third parties' military and nonmilitary activities; (2) they broaden the notion of what constitutes a third party by including coalitions of states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); (3) they expand the investigation framework by recording interventions that occur before and after a militarized dispute. We test the usefulness of the data by exploring the issue of major powers' interventions in conflicts, as Yamamoto and Bremer did in their 1980 “Wider Wars and Restless Nights” article. We offer strong support for Yamamoto and Bremer's finding that major powers drag one another into ongoing conflicts and show how the data may help us raise and answer new and more complex hypotheses about third parties and the dynamics of joining behavior.

Assignment of Weights to the Member States of the European Union in Order to Model Their Relative Power Positions

Relative power of the member states of the European Union is expressed by weights assigned to the states on the basis of five criteria: population, gross domestic product, national area, political stability, and contributions to the European culture and civilization. The underlying idea is that ratios of these weights should approximate ratios of the five corresponding indicators. In addition, relative power can be moderated when the large member states save their power for issues about which they care more, and it can be amplified when the large states coordinate their efforts in order to dominate a coalition of smaller states. The results of the analysis are used to sketch a power distribution in the enlarged European Union.

Jumping Ship

Following the revelations about what had been going on in Iraqi prisons, run by American and British troops, there has been universal and justified condemnation. Moral philosophers will hardly need in the future to invent arguments against the utilitarian justification of torture or to look for examples of inuria in bello.Amid all the furore, one small but possibly significant phenomenon has been a steady procession of erstwhile supporters of the war, now seeking to distance themselves from the whole operation. Some are now saying that they had been wrong to support it in the first place.This may indeed be the case. They might indeed have been wrong all along, for a whole variety of reasons, moral and practical. What, though, would be unfortunate would be if the misconduct of one operation meant that the whole question of wars of humanitarian intervention were to disappear from the philosophical and political agenda. Apart from anything else it would seem to blur any distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello.But more important, we still have to consider whether it might ever be morally imperative to invade another country to protect its people, and if so when. Such a consideration may never have been part of the traditional just war doctrine. But that doctrine was formulated in times very different from our own, times when neither communications nor state nor military power were anything like they are to-day.To put the matter bluntly: should we in the West be ashamed that we did little or nothing in Rwanda in the 1990s, say, even though Western interests were hardly affected by what was going on? We knew well what was going on, and we did nothing as hundreds of thousands were butchered. Would it be right or wrong for a coalition of states (any coalition) to intervene were such a situation to happen again? Or would the high probability that at least some of those the invaders thought they were liberating would come quickly to resent their ‘liberation’ be sufficient to rule out action of the part of those not directly affected?The sad truth is that we cannot rule out a situation like Rwanda arising again in various parts of the world. Sudan may be on the verge of such a catastrophe even at the time of writing. We need to be prepared philosophically as well as practically.

Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999

This article examines contrasting claims made by scholars of oil and politics that oil wealth either tends (1) to undermine regime durability or (2) to enhance it. Using cross-sectional time-series data from 107 developing states between 1960 and 1999, I test the effects of oil wealth on regime failure, political protests, and civil war. I find that oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime durability, even when controlling for repression, and with lower likelihoods of civil war and antistate protest. I also find that neither the boom nor bust periods exerted any significant effect on regime durability in the states most dependent on exports, even while those states saw more protests during the bust. In short, oil wealth has generally increased the durability of regimes, and repression does not account for this effect. Future research focused on the origins of robust coalitions in oil-rich states is most likely to provide fruitful explanations to this puzzle.

The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War

I shall often go wrong through defect of judgment. When right, I shall often be thought wrong by those whose positions will not command a view of the whole ground. I ask your indulgence for my own errors, which will never be intentional, and your support against the errors of others, who may condemn what they would not if seen in all its parts.—Thomas JeffersonOn August 2,1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait, beginning a seven-monthlong series of events that would come to be known as the Persian Gulf war. Perhaps the most thoroughly examined of these events was the thirty-eight-day air campaign, which began on January 17,1991, and marked the beginning of the offensive by the coalition of states arrayed against Iraq, which ended after the latter’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Much has been written about the air campaign and its objectives, its implications for the future use of military force, and the extent to which it conformed to international law. Although this article will focus on the last of these topics, a contextual understanding of the air campaign is essential to a serious consideration of the military necessity and proportionality issues that lie at the heart of the legal analysis.

Same War—Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism

AbstractGerman and Japanese counterterrorism policies differ from those adopted by the United States as well as from one another. Defeated in war, occupied, and partially remade during the Cold War, Germany and Japan became clients of the United States first, then close allies. Both countries offer easy tests to explore the extent to which the United States can hope to fight the war against terrorism, as it did the Cold War, supported by a broad coalition of like-minded states. On this central point the article's conclusion is not reassuring. In contrast to the Cold War, the relative importance of different self-conceptions and institutional practices appears to be larger and the systemic effects constraining national divergences smaller. Even among the closest allies of the United States, the very early stages of the war against terrorism point to substantial strains. Over a prolonged period such strains are likely to affect profoundly long-standing patterns of alliance.

FISH WARS ON THE HIGH SEAS: A STRADDLING STOCK COMPETITION MODEL

The post-World War II era saw the development of powerful self-contained fishing fleets, so-called distant-water fleets (DWFs), which roamed the world's oceans, seeking out rich harvesting targets and practicing pulse fishing. With the creation in the 1980s of coastal states' extended economic zones (EEZs), to manage fisheries out to 200 miles from the shore, it was hoped that the DWFs would close down. But the ranges of many important commercial fish stocks straddle the boundaries of several EEZs, and continue out into international waters. Thus, the consequence of creating the EEZs has been to encourage development of coastal countries' national fleets, while the DWFs continue to harvest in international waters. Here, we model the fish war between a DWF and a regionally-based coalition of coastal states, operating out of their EEZs. The outcome is again a pulse fishery, but one which may be even more destructive than was the former situation, when the DWF was unopposed. Finally we point out the relevance of the fish war model to the issue of creating effective multinational Regional Fisheries Management Organisations — a necessary step for achieving sustainable benefit from the harvest of the regional seas.