Guest editorial "Our supplies of...oil and natural gas are being rapidly depleted, and many of the great fields are already exhausted." Not a warning from last year, when oil prices set a record of USD 147/bbl, but the words of pioneering conservationist Gifford Pinchot in 1910. Fears of "peak oil" are nothing new. The economist William Jevons forecast in 1865 that falling coal resources threatened the British Empire. Predictions of imminent decline came from petroleum geologists in 1885, 1919, and 1956; from US President Jimmy Carter in 1977; and from the US government in 1980. A prominent "peak oiler," Colin Campbell, claimed in 1989 that oil output had peaked; another, Kenneth Deffeyes, put the peak date, rather precisely, at 16 December 2005. The high prices of 2008 seemed to give credibility to the idea that we had reached the physical limits of production. But now that prices have fallen, peak oil advocates raise a new alarm—that decline will be hastened by a lack of investment. The opening years of the 21st century have been marked by milestones in the world of oil: the war in Iraq, the Shell reserves downgrade, hurricane Katrina, and the breaking of the once unthinkable USD 100/bbl barrier. Many have seized on these events as evidence that we are crossing the threshold of peak oil. Behind us, a century-and-a-half of abundant, cheap oil that fuelled industrial civilization and brought unprecedented prosperity to a fortunate global minority. Ahead of us, permanent declines in oil production, scarce and unaffordable energy, wars over dwindling resources, disastrous climate change, perhaps the collapse of modern society. But these ideas are based on misconceptions, flawed reasoning, and excessive pessimism. The world has abundant oil and gas for decades to come, geopolitical conflicts can be avoided by adroit policies, and we can learn to use hydrocarbons without unacceptable environmental damage. Cheap Oil and Underinvestment Recent high prices certainly seem to give some credibility to the idea that we are approaching some fundamental limit of oil resources. But we should remember how we arrived at this situation, because the culprit is not constraints on oil in the ground: it is the long 1986–98 period of cheap oil and underinvestment. Low prices decimated the oil industry, while the rise of energy-hungry new powers in Asia, combined with robust demand in the developed world and geopolitical upsets in major producers, stealthily ate up spare production capacity. As oil prices rose, investment increased, but much was consumed by cost inflation, while the most promising areas were mostly off-limits for political reasons. Supply growth was therefore disappointing. The inevitable result, perhaps amplified by speculation and market nervousness, was a sharp rise in the oil price.
Read full abstract