In a now famous commentary on the state of sociological theory, Robert K. Merton asserts that ... one must admit that a large part of what is now called sociological theory consists of general orientations toward data, suggesting types of variables which need somehow to be taken into account, rather than clear, verifiable statements of relationships between specified variables. We have many concepts but few confirmed theories; many points of but few theorems; many 'approaches,' but few arrivals.' This assessment is of interest for at least two reasons. First, it entails an issue concerning one's methodological conscience, i.e., the methodological criteria taken to be appropriate in making such an appraisal,2 for surely any judgment of this sort is relative to the particular evaluative criteria employed-whether implicitly or explicitly. Secondly, a peculiar methodological problem is generated when the conclusion drawn is essentially negative, i.e., when it is maintained that little or no work in sociology meets the imposed criteria. The question may be raised whether the evaluative criteria are appropriate.3 This problem is especially acute when the designation of what is currently available is couched in such vague terms as orientation, point of view, frame of reference, or conceptual scheme. Apart from the vagueness of the language used, the major difficulty militating against the absorption of these approaches into the purview of science is the absence of explicit standards whereby the significance of the work to which they refer may be assessed. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the possibility of evaluative criteria suited to the present stage of development of sociological inquiry. A crucial aspect of one's methodological conscience, therefore, concerns how explicit to make the formal criteria on which the stage of theoretical development is predicated. One alternative is to introduce very rigorous criteria for carrying out formalizations by utilizing an artificial language for explicating the necessary criteria within the context of justification. However, one might also invoke May Brodbeck's distinction between context-bound and context-free language where the problem is seen as a matter of the degree of explicitness of the reconstructed language, e.g., the difference between communicating with a co-worker in a laboratory conversation and with professional colleagues through articles-to formal axiomatized presentation.4 In particular, this view allows for the employment of a set of methodological distinctions that are not systematized within an artificial language system, but which may encompass the notion of an artificial language.