This publication is a Russian translation of F. Gironi’s paper devoted to a panoramic survey of attempts to relativize Kantian ideas about a priori knowledge. Gironi reconstructs various approaches and interpretations, focusing on the ideas of C. I. Lewis, H. Reichenbach, W. Sellars, and M. Friedman within the context of scientific realism, and relates such forms of dynamic Kantianism to recent speculative projects based on a critique or rejection of Kant’s legacy. In doing so, the author argues that Kant’s ideas on a priori conceptual structures form the core of debates about the role of philosophy vis-a-vis science, as opposed to variants of metaphysics and philosophy of science, which replace the so-called correlationist paradigm of transcendental critique with unconstrained speculation that falls out of step with the realities of modern science. The naturalized Kantianism of W. Sellars appears to be the most promising starting point for subsequent speculative – and transcendental – endeavours in the field of conceptualizing meta-conceptual frameworks that would meet the need to regulate and systematize the reality of scientific discourse. This is precisely what speculative realism, consistent with what we owe to Kant’s philosophy, is supposed to be.
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