Specific Cognitive Capacities Research Articles

Psychological capacity profiles of different age groups and gender in a national representative sample.

Beyond the specific cognitive capacities like numerical or verbal intelligence and cognitive speed, the so-called soft skills, namely, psychological capacities, have become highly important in modern life. This is the first representative study on the distribution of work-relevant psychological capacities in the general population. We investigate capacities in different age groups, gender, and their relation with basic sociodemographics. A representative sample of 2531 people aged 14-95 years was investigated concerning work-relevant psychological capacities with the mini self-rating for psychological activities and participation (Mini-ICF-APP-S). The strongest capacities in young people were mobility, flexibility, proactivity, contact to thirds, and group interaction. Other capacities were stronger in midlife (30-59 years), such as adjustment to rules and routines, planning and structuring, decision making and judgement, application of competence and knowledge, assertiveness, dyadic relationships, endurance, and self-care. Women reported better dyadic relationship capacities, and men felt more assertive. The study provides, for the first time, representative data on a broad range of psychological capacities according to an internationally validated capacity concept. Good psychological capacities occur not primarily in youth, but especially in midlife and older age. Regarding demographic change, this implies older people are highly competent in the working world.

Acute effect of complexity in basketball on cognitive capacity.

Executive functions, notably inhibition, significantly influence decision-making and behavioral regulation in team sports. However, more research must be conducted on individual player characteristics such as experience and motor skills. This study assessed how accumulated practical experience moderates inhibition in response to varying task difficulty levels. Forty-four university students (age: 20.36 ± 3.13 years) participated in this study with two sessions: one followed standard 1 × 1 basketball rules ("Regular Practice"), while the other imposed motor, temporal, and spatial restrictions ("Restriction Practice"). Functional difficulty was controlled by grouping pairs with similar skill levels. Flanker and Go-Nogo tasks were used. Increasing complexity worsened cognitive performance (inhibition). "Restriction Practice" showed a significantly slower and less accurate performance in both tests than "Regular Practice" (p < 0.001). Experience positively impacted test speed and accuracy (p < 0.001). In sports, acute cognitive impacts are intrinsically linked to the task's complexity and the athlete's cognitive resources. In this sense, it is essential to adjust individually the cognitive demands of the tasks, considering each athlete's specific cognitive abilities and capacities.

Transitions in cognitive evolution.

The evolutionary history of animal cognition appears to involve a few major transitions: major changes that opened up new phylogenetic possibilities for cognition. Here, we review and contrast current transitional accounts of cognitive evolution. We discuss how an important feature of an evolutionary transition should be that it changes what is evolvable, so that the possible phenotypic spaces before and after a transition are different. We develop an account of cognitive evolution that focuses on how selection might act on the computational architecture of nervous systems. Selection for operational efficiency or robustness can drive changes in computational architecture that then make new types of cognition evolvable. We propose five major transitions in the evolution of animal nervous systems. Each of these gave rise to a different type of computational architecture that changed the evolvability of a lineage and allowed the evolution of new cognitive capacities. Transitional accounts have value in that they allow a big-picture perspective of macroevolution by focusing on changes that have had major consequences. For cognitive evolution, however, we argue it is most useful to focus on evolutionary changes to the nervous system that changed what is evolvable, rather than to focus on specific cognitive capacities.

Clinical and neurophysiological patterns of impairments to emotion attention and empathy in multiple sclerosis.

Patients suffering from multiple sclerosis experience various cognitive and affective impairments, resulting in a negative impact on social behavior and personal independence to differing degrees. According to these often clinically subtle but conflicting cognitive-affective impairments, recordings of these socially relevant issues are still of demand to stratifying clinical and social support in a sophisticated way. Therefore, we studied specific cognitive and affective capacities in eleven patients with a predominant relapsing-remitting type of multiple sclerosis by applying paradigms of event-related potentials and a well-selected neuropsychological test protocol. Thus far, distinct cognitive disturbances of executive and attentional domains and the Wechsler Memory Test's four memory indices were found in multiple sclerosis patients. Concerning affective domains, patients showed discrete impairments of affect discrimination and affected naming as proved by specific testing (Tuebinger Affect Battery). Neurophysiologically, event-related potentials recordings in multiple sclerosis patients, were associated with decreased implicit emotion processing to cues of different emotion arousal at the early processing stage depending on attentional capacities and alterations of implicit emotion modulation at late processing stages. These clinical neurophysiological and neuropsychological data were correlated in part to quantitative magnetic resonance imaging brain lesions. Summarizing our data, our data indicate certain neurocognitive and neuroaffective dysfunctions in patients with multiple sclerosis, thus highlighting the validity of sensitive recording of less apparent neurologic disturbances in multiple sclerosis for optimizing the individual care management in patients.

Understanding sex differences in cognitive insight across first-and-multiple episode psychosis

ObjectiveCognitive insight represents the capacity to self-reflect and consider external feedback when re-evaluating faulty beliefs. It is associated with specific cognitive capacities such as verbal memory, of which there is substantial evidence for sex differences in psychotic disorders. Like more general cognitive capacities, cognitive insight might too be modulated by sex differences. MethodOne hundred and seventy-one first episode psychosis (FEP; 123 males, 48 females), and 203 multiple episode psychosis (MEP; 147 males, 56 females) participants completed the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS). A two-way MANOVA was conducted on the three BCIS measures (self-reflectiveness, self-certainty, composite index) with sex (male, female) and illness stage (FEP, MEP) as factors, followed by two-way ANOVAs and a post hoc test of simple effects. ResultsThe only significant interaction to emerge was between sex and illness stage in self-certainty (F(1, 373) = 5.88, p = .016). A test of simple effects revealed that self-certainty group means were significantly different for males and females in FEP, where females had lower self-certainty than males (p = .053) but not during MEP (p = .119). ConclusionSex differences do not modulate cognitive insight in MEP, which may be attributable to females having greater positive symptom severity than males. In FEP however, results revealed that females were significantly less self-certain than males. Lower self-certainty relative to self-reflectiveness predicts treatment response in psychological interventions, and as such future FEP studies should explore sex differences in psychological interventions.

Cognitive insight, neurocognition and life skills in patients with schizophrenia.

The concept of cognitive insight refers to the capacity for self-reflectiveness as a mechanism for evaluating one's symptoms and self-certainty, understood as the ability to correct inappropriate interpretations and conclusions. There are no conclusive results regardingabout the clinical and neuropsychological variables involved and there are hardly any studies of their impact on functional outcomes. The objectives were to analyze the neuropsychological and clinical cognitive insight in a sample of 22 stable patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, to assess its impact on life skills and to analyze whether it can be a mediating variable between cognitive deficits and daily functioning. A neuropsychological battery composed of tests of memory (TAVEC and WAIS-Digits), executive functioning (WCST and Stroop) and vocabulary, the BCIS, a measure of everyday functions (LSP) and the PANSS. We found significant negative correlations between the WAIS vocabulary test, self-assurance, and life skills; although this is influenced to a greater extent by the negative symptomatology and the premorbid general cognitive level. A greater openness to corrective feedback of distorted thoughts, without specific cognitive capacities, improves the ability of patients with schizophrenia to adapt to the environment.

Here and now or a previously planned strategy? Rethinking the concept of ramification for micro-production in expedient contexts: Implications for Neanderthal socio-economic behaviour

Ramification is the term used to classify branched productive sequences in which a functional item (the flake) was exploited as a productive item (the core). This technological behaviour was present in Europe and the Levant beginning in the Lower and Early Middle Palaeolithic, but ramified productions were intensely developed in the Late Middle Palaeolithic. Traditionally, ramification has been interpreted as a well-structured behaviour, implying its integration into the provisioning strategies of past humans. This viewpoint has significant implications for the understanding of technological evolution in Neanderthals, suggesting specific cognitive and socio-economic capacities. Ramified procedures were characterised by high flexibility due to the versatile patterns of the core-on-flake and are described in the literature as corresponding to several different knapping concepts and technical procedures. This research aimed to describe the role of ramification in the Late Middle Palaeolithic. We analysed two assemblages from the Abric Romaní site (located in the north-east part of the Iberian Peninsula) characterised by informal, expedient technologies. The focus was on the spatial and temporal fragmentation of the ramified sequences based on the identification of single technical events. The reduction of the scale of analysis and the resulting implementation of temporal resolution of the stone tool assemblages in such expedient contexts allowed us to understand ramification from an innovative perspective, setting aside our bias toward well-defined productive methods associated with preconceived economic and mobility patterns. The results showed that ramification reflected a range of behaviours, implying a variety of planning proficiency, economic strategies and social interactions. This means that ‘ramified production’ is not meaningful unless is linked with a detailed description of human choices and an understanding of temporal and spatial relationships between knapping events. Furthermore, the results showed that, to approach behavioural issues, we as researchers must change our unitary vision of assemblages and enlarge the scope of categories to which we apply that vision.

On computational explanations

Computational explanations focus on information processing required in specific cognitive capacities, such as perception, reasoning or decision-making. These explanations specify the nature of the information processing task, what information needs to be represented, and why it should be operated on in a particular manner. In this article, the focus is on three questions concerning the nature of computational explanations: (1) What type of explanations they are, (2) in what sense computational explanations are explanatory and (3) to what extent they involve a special, “independent” or “autonomous” level of explanation. In this paper, we defend the view computational explanations are genuine explanations, which track non-causal/formal dependencies. Specifically, we argue that they do not provide mere sketches for explanation, in contrast to what for example Piccinini and Craver (Synthese 183(3):283–311, 2011) suggest. This view of computational explanations implies some degree of “autonomy” for the computational level. However, as we will demonstrate that does not make this view “computationally chauvinistic” in a way that Piccinini (Synthese 153:343–353, 2006b) or Kaplan (Synthese 183(3):339–373, 2011) have charged it to be.

Rethinking Conventional Wisdom: Ecological Effects on Potential Danger Preoccupation Salience

Despite frequent reliance on conventional wisdom (CW) about potential threats in political, policy, intelligence, and other domains, until now there have been few empirical studies addressing the spread, common features, or differences of precautionary preoccupations across ecologies. We describe some of our initial investigations of any significant variation or subordination of dominant potential danger themes within and between populations and ecologies. We hypothesized that ecological triggers and specific cognitive capacities constrain the dominance of particular precautionary themes generally, as well as their variability between distinct populations. Our initial results support these claims by indicating that females, cross-culturally, worried more about predation/assault threats than males (a universal tendency) and that South Africans were more worried about predation/assault and depletion of resources than their counterparts in the United Kingdom (a variation). Furthermore, non-white South Africans were more worried in all domains when compared to white South Africans.

Differences in the early cognitive development of children and great apes

There is very little research comparing great ape and human cognition developmentally. In the current studies we compared a cross-sectional sample of 2- to 4-year-old human children (n=48) with a large sample of chimpanzees and bonobos in the same age range (n=42, hereafter: apes) on a broad array of cognitive tasks. We then followed a group of juvenile apes (n=44) longitudinally over 3 years to track their cognitive development in greater detail. In skills of physical cognition (space, causality, quantities), children and apes performed comparably at 2 years of age, but by 4 years of age children were more advanced (whereas apes stayed at their 2-year-old performance levels). In skills of social cognition (communication, social learning, theory of mind), children out-performed apes already at 2 years, and increased this difference even more by 4 years. Patterns of development differed more between children and apes in the social domain than the physical domain, with support for these patterns present in both the cross-sectional and longitudinal ape data sets. These results indicate key differences in the pattern and pace of cognitive development between humans and other apes, particularly in the early emergence of specific social cognitive capacities in humans.

Complexity at large

Complexity at large

Kawashima vs “Super Mario”! Should a game be serious in order to stimulate cognitive aptitudes?

The vogue of massive commercialization of video games has prompted the development of methods for brain training on game consoles. Dr. Kawashima's Brain Training™ even benefited from an intense media campaign with celebrities. However, a previous study ( Lorant-Royer et al., 2008) proves that, in six tests (school-related or inspired by the WISC-IV), the effect of training from the Kawashima program or recreational brain training ( Brain Academy), is lacking or weak (+20%) and does not exceed paper-pencil games (Mickey games) or control group (without training). However, other studies show a cognitive effect particularly on attention, suggesting that the practice of video games could improve specific cognitive capacities used in video games such as attention, manual dexterity, visual and spatial memory, etc. In this sense, any recreational game could have the same effects as the so-called Brain Training program. This study adopts the general methodology of Lorant-Royer et al., comparing this time Dr Kawashima's Brain Training ™ to a recreational game ( New Super Mario Bros™), paper-pencil games (Mickey games) as “placebo” and a control group (without training) in 10 tests focused on visual attention, manual dexterity and visuospatial memory. Eighty-eight pupils aged 10 years and 2 months on average were divided into four groups and were evaluated twice (pretests and post-tests) before and after 11 training sessions in the games. The results were very disappointing. Of the 10 tests, only the “brain training” had a weak positive effect (+18.15%) in the right hand dexterity test. Conversely, the group playing the “ Super Mario” game registered a positive effect (+23.91%) on the visual span test. In conclusion, recreational training will neither be sufficiently specific nor sufficiently long (in terms of training years) in order to obviously develop cognitive abilities.

Recognizing group cognition

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition ( Clark , 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” ( Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis ( Adams & Aizawa, 2008).

Cognition in healthy aging is related to regional white matter integrity, but not cortical thickness.

It is well established that healthy aging is accompanied by structural changes in many brain regions and functional decline in a number of cognitive domains. The goal of this study was to determine (1) whether the regional distribution of age-related brain changes is similar in gray matter (GM) and white matter (WM) regions, or whether these two tissue types are affected differently by aging, and (2) whether measures of cognitive performance are more closely linked to alterations in the cerebral cortex or in the underlying WM in older adults (OA). To address these questions, we collected high-resolution magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data from a large sample of healthy young adults (YA; aged 18-28) and OA (aged 61-86 years). In addition, the OA completed a series of tasks selected to assess cognition in three domains: cognitive control, episodic memory, and semantic memory. Using advanced techniques for measuring cortical thickness and WM integrity, we found that healthy aging was accompanied by deterioration of both GM and WM, but with distinct patterns of change: Cortical thinning occurred primarily in primary sensory and motor cortices, whereas WM changes were localized to regions underlying association cortices. Further, in OA, we found a striking pattern of region-specific correlations between measures of cognitive performance and WM integrity, but not cortical thickness. Specifically, cognitive control correlated with integrity of frontal lobe WM, whereas episodic memory was related to integrity of temporal and parietal lobe WM. Thus, age-related impairments in specific cognitive capacities may arise from degenerative processes that affect the underlying connections of their respective neural networks.

The effect of adverse intrauterine and newborn environments on cognitive development: the experiences of premature delivery and diabetes during pregnancy.

The prenatal and early postnatal periods constitute a time of rapid development when the brain is in a state of both heightened plasticity and vulnerability. Premature infants and infants of diabetic mothers represent two experiments of nature that allow researchers to observe how the developing brain responds to early biological challenge of either a global or regionally specific nature. We outline a set of organizing principles for conceptualizing the mechanisms by which early adverse experience may be encoded in the brain and subsequently expressed in behavior. We then review the available literature on developmental outcomes for infants born premature and infants of diabetic mothers. Research examining the relative influence of experience and maturation in the development of preterm infants indicates that advance experience does not accelerate the advent of specific cognitive capacities, but may enhance performance once the particular ability has emerged. Long-term follow-up of preterm infants also reveals evidence for plasticity and cognitive improvement into early adolescence for later maturing executive functions. Finally we offer an integrated model for investigating cognitive outcomes in infants of diabetic mothers that incorporates data from animal, electrophysiological, and behavioral measures.

Cognitive evolutionary psychology without representational nativism

A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that specific cognitive capacities be (a) heritable and (b) ‘quasi-independent’ from other heritable traits. They must be heritable because there can be no selection for traits that are not. They must be quasi-independent from other heritable traits, since adaptive variations in a specific cognitive capacity could have no distinctive consequences for fitness if effecting those variations required widespread changes in other unrelated traits and capacities as well. These requirements would be satisfied by innate cognitive modules, as the dominant paradigm in evolutionary cognitive psychology assumes. However, those requirements would also be satisfied by heritable learning biases, perhaps in the form of architectural or chronotopic constraints, that operated to increase the canalization of specific cognitive capacities in the ancestral environment (Cummins and Cummins 1999). As an organism develops, cognitive capacities that are highly canalized as the result of heritable learning biases might result in an organism that is behaviourally quite similar to an organism whose innate modules come on line as the result of various environmental triggers. Taking this possibility seriously is increasingly important as the case against innate cognitive modules becomes increasingly strong.

Les capacités numériques préverbales et leur évolution

Preverbal numerical abilities and their evolution. Many experiments have suggested that infants show preverbal numerical capacities. These data have led researchers to a debate about the nature of these capacities : is the numerical sensibility found with infants based on specific cognitive capacities or is it based on a global representation of objects ? According to the second approach, the representation of numerosity should only be of conceptual nature after the occurrence of language. However, experimental data have revealed that infants’ numerical capacities are independent of perceptive characteristics of objects (as physical identity or spatial localisation of objects). Moreover, they are not specific to visual objects and can also be applied to auditive entities or physical events. Thus, if preverbal numerical abilities are not based on the object itself, the language cannot represent a developmental drop between a previous stage of implicit representation of number, based on the object, and the final stage of conceptual representation of number. Infants and older children’s failures that can be stated in the literature could then reflect something else than a lack of numerical competence. As another alternative, we propose here to analyse these failures in terms of inhibition inefficiency, default which could hide the existence of true numerical capacities with young children.

The Sensational Hand: Clinical Assessment after Nerve Repair

Following the transection and repair of major nerve trunks in the forearm, the functional outcome is influenced by mechanisms in the peripheral, as well as in the central nervous system. In the present thesis the interest is focused on assessment of the outcome after nerve repair, central nervous factors influencing the outcome, and sense substitution to compensate for sensory loss. A new model instrument for routine documentation of the outcome after repair of a peripheral nerve is identified. The model includes assessments reflecting sensory, motor and pain/discomfort domains. Investigations of frequently used assessment instruments led to the construction and evaluation of a new test instrument for assessment of discriminative sensibility (tactile gnosis) to fit in the model. The summarised outcome, calculated from the model instrument and with a numerical scoring system, conforms well with the patient's opinion on the influence on activities of daily living resulting from the nerve injury, and demonstrates good reliability and validity. A reference interval for the outcome is presented, with the estimated 95% predicted values for the outcome up to five years after the nerve repair. Brain plasticity is a factor sensibility - tactile gnosis - in the adaptive process after a nerve injury, when the mind has to interpret new signal patterns, when objects are touched. For better understanding of the sensory outcome after nerve repair, central nervous factors were examined. Specific cognitive capacities, such as verbal learning and visuo-spatial logic capacity could be identified as being of importance for recovery of tactile gnosis. For patients with temporary or permanent sensory loss, a new principle for artificial sensibility based on sense substitution is presented. The hearing sense substitutes the sense of touch. The resemblance in perceptual experience between sound and touch is bridged by the stereophonic friction sound generated by touching objects, which is then amplified and transmitted to earphones. The delicate capacity of the sense of hearing to discriminate between the complex pattern of frequencies makes it reasonable to assume that hearing is able to take over functions normally devoted to touch. This is demonstrated in the thesis.

Nerve repair: Correlation of restitution of functional sensibility with specific cognitive capacities

To test the hypothesis that cognitive capacity is correlated with the outcome of functional sensibility after nerve repair, 19 patients were evaluated 2 to 5 years after median or ulnar nerve repair at the distal forearm level. The sensory evaluation included tests for functional sensibility as well as assessments addressing perception thresholds for touch/pressure and vibration. Psychometric tests for cognitive capacity were also carried out. Multiple regression analysis, correcting for the effect of age and the ability to perceive touch/vibration, was used to investigate the relationship between functional sensibility and cognitive capacity, and to determine which of the tested central nervous factors had the greatest influence on the outcome of recovery of functional sensibility. On a ranking list of such factors verbal learning and visuo-spatial logic capacity were the most important ones, indicating significant correlations with functional sensibility. It is concluded that cognitive capacity factors may play an important role for the functional outcome following nerve repair and that variations in such factors may help to explain the variability in the outcome of nerve repair.