SWAT Team Research Articles

Examining Collected qEEGs of SWAT Team Operators: A Pilot Study

Examining Collected qEEGs of SWAT Team Operators: A Pilot Study

Using the five-factor model of personality to identify an optimal SWAT team member

This study, based on the five-factor model (FFM) of personality, aimed to identify personality traits associated with the most optimal special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team member. SWAT teams are tasked with pre-empting and responding to terrorist threats, conducting hostage rescue operations, and managing situations that exceed the capabilities of conventional law enforcement agencies. The study sought to provide a deeper understanding of how personality traits function within the high-stakes context of these teams. It involved 159 male SWAT officers in active service within the Swedish Police Authority. A work analysis instrument, the Personality Job Profiler (PJP), was administered to these officers, who served as subject matter experts (SMEs) in a comprehensive personality work analysis. Specifically, the study addressed two research questions: How can an optimal SWAT police officer personality profile be operationalized when translated to the FFM of personality? What is the association between this optimal SWAT profile and the ratings of ten Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders personality disorder profiles, based on the FFM of personality? The findings suggest that successful SWAT officers should exhibit low neuroticism and high conscientiousness, specifically featuring low vulnerability and high levels of competence, dutifulness, and self-discipline. Notably, the SWAT profile differs significantly from personality disorders, such as borderline, schizotypal, dependent, and avoidant, when operationalized with the FFM of personality. These results have significant implications for developing predictors for the selection process and can enhance the selection procedures for future SWAT members. This may also prompt further studies on criteria-related validity using various personality assessment methods.

The importance of context: re-examining the ‘deployments’ of SWAT teams in Canada

ABSTRACT Based on an analysis of data released through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, Canadian researchers have suggested that Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams are no longer exclusively deployed to resolve high-risk incidents but now frequently respond to routine calls that do not necessitate their involvement. Given concerns about these conclusions, we submitted the same FOI requests to the 14 police agencies examined by Roziere and Walby [2020. Special weapons and tactics teams in Canadian policing: legal, institutional, and economic dimensions. Policing and society, 30 (6), 704–719] and worked with the FOI analyst from each agency to ensure that the data were being interpreted correctly. Based on our re-analysis of the FOI-released data, we report on two problems with the conclusions reached by Roziere and Walby: the conflation of incidents where any SWAT officer responds to calls with full SWAT team deployments and the masking of potential risk factors in calls when relying on call type categories. Our findings illustrate the value of police agencies disclosing relevant contextual information to researchers when possible and they reinforce the necessity of collaborating with FOI analysts to better understand the data being released.

Always Be Prepared

Always Be Prepared

Crisis decision making: Lessons from a SWAT team

Operating in environments with catastrophic downside risk requires the application of decision-making processes that differ from those applied in situations with more symmetrical risk-to-reward ratios. Using a case study of a SWAT team deployed for a manhunt of an armed gunman who had shot numerous people including a police officer, this paper explores how to avoid excessive information gathering by applying a bias for action and limiting variables. The paper also discusses the danger in attenuating the aggressiveness of action as a means to mitigate risk. Instead, the author argues that decision makers should distinguish between the questions of if they should do something rather than how they should do something. By defining decision gates to separate these questions, decision makers will be better equipped to differentiate uncertainty from indecision. Finally, the paper looks at the difference between strategies that prioritise efficiency over effectiveness and recommends assessments of decision-making processes rather than just outcomes when reviewing critical incident response.

POLICE REFORM IN DIVIDED TIMES

POLICE REFORM IN DIVIDED TIMES

The Carceral Universal and the Prison Particular

The Carceral Universal and the Prison Particular

Helen of troy on the indiscretion

Helen of troy on the indiscretion Maria Zoccola (bio) ihe said have you ever been north before and i hadn't.ii winter sewed me into her lungs. i felt each gust,each gasp. iiimy husband, he'll bomb squad. he'll sniffer dog.he'll fly in the army. he'll call up the fuzz.he'll swat team, he'll fire truck, he'll ambulance.i'll wake up one morning to green berets. but he doesn't. ivi'll tell you what it was. it was a blank space. it was the shape of that blank space. its ridges and valleys. [End Page 59] Maria Zoccola Maria Zoccola is a queer Southern writer with deep roots in the Mississippi Delta. She has writing degrees from Emory University and Falmouth University. Her work has previously appeared or is forthcoming in Ploughshares, The Iowa Review, The Cincinnati Review, The Massachusetts Review, and elsewhere. Learn more about her work at mariazoccola.com. Copyright © 2022 University of Wisconsin Board of Regents

A Matter of Timing: Rudy Tanzi on Alzheimer's Disease

A Matter of Timing: Rudy Tanzi on Alzheimer's Disease

Tucson Shares Blueprint for Crisis System Success

Tucson Shares Blueprint for Crisis System Success

Point-of-Care Ultrasound by Nonexpert Operators Demonstrates High Sensitivity and Specificity in Detecting Gallstones: Data from the Samoa Typhoid Fever Control Program.

ABSTRACT.Approximately 90% of chronic typhoid carriers with persistent Salmonella enterica serovar Typhi (S. Typhi) gallbladder infection have gallstones. In Samoa, where typhoid fever has been endemic for many decades, risk factors predisposing to the development of gallstones are increasing among adults. The Samoa Typhoid Fever Control Program dispatches a “Typhoid Epidemiologic SWAT Team” to perform a household investigation of every blood culture-confirmed case of acute typhoid fever. Investigations include screening household contacts to detect chronic carriers. Following limited training, two nonexpert ultrasound operators performed point-of-care ultrasound (POCUS) on 120 Samoan adults from August to September 2019 to explore the feasibility of POCUS to detect individuals with gallstones during household investigations and community screenings. POCUS scans from 120 Samoan adults in three cohorts (28 food handlers, two typhoid cases and their 18 household contacts, and 72 attendees at an ambulatory clinic) were reviewed by a board-certified radiologist who deemed 96/120 scans (80%) to be interpretable. Compared with the radiologist (gold standard), the nonexpert operators successfully detected 6/7 Samoans with gallstones (85.7% sensitivity) and correctly identified 85/89 without gallstones (95.5% specificity). The proportion (24/120) of uninterpretable scans from this pilot that used minimally trained clinicians (who are neither radiologists nor ultrasound technicians) indicates the need for additional training of POCUS operators. Nevertheless, this pilot feasibility study engenders optimism that in the Samoan setting nonexperts can be trained to use POCUS to diagnose cholelithiasis, thereby helping (along with stool cultures and Vi serology) to identify possible chronic S. Typhi carriers.

UAS for Public Safety: Active Threat Recognition

The Center for Homeland Defense and Security identified an increase of active threat events, such as mass shootings, annually since 1999. Literature suggests that 90% of shootings were over before law enforcement arrived at the scene and the first responder response was limited to “surround and contain” until Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT) arrived on the scene. Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to detect which individual was the threat and type of weapon used can provide useful information to increase the speed of the response for first-on-scene rather than waiting for SWAT if the type of weapon was known. A UAS equipped with a full spectrum sensor compared traditional red-green-blue (RGB) images to near-infrared (NIR) images in a simulated active threat scenario. A true positive rate (TPR) metric was used to measure the percentage of correctly-detected weapons consisting of either a knife, pistol, rifle, shotgun, or shovel at slant range distances of 25-, 50-, 75-, and 100-feet respectively. A convenience sample of 102 survey participants, recruited from constituents of the Airborne Public Safety Association (APSA) and DRONERESPONDERS was conducted to observe 48 randomly-presented images to determine which type of weapon was detected. The results suggest that survey participants could correctly detect weapons at a 12% greater rate with the NIR sensor than the RGB sensor; however, the pistol had the largest difference in TPR between NIR and RGB sensors. The pistol had an increased probability of detection by 33% when using the NIR sensor compared to an RGB sensor. Additionally, differences were also observed between slant range distances. The closest distance of 25 feet showed a 42% increase in participants’ ability to correctly determine the weapon type compared to the 100-foot slant range distance. Therefore, using a NIR sensor-equipped UAS at flying a maximum slant range distance of 50 feet may help a first-responder determine the type of weapon before SWAT arrives on the scene.

SWAT Team: A Student Leadership Club to Support Student School Connectedness and Teacher Technology Use

Research suggests that many school technology programs have a new, unanticipated need for ongoing training and job-embedded support for teachers and students (Sheninger & Murray, 2017; Warschauer, 2012). Additionally, the seemingly unrelated problem of low student attachment to school is widespread (Klem & Connell, 2004). Student technology leadership clubs, when trained and led properly, are one possible solution to both problems (Ertmer & Hruskocy, 1999; Harper, 2008). This mixed-methods study took place at a middle grades school and blended student interviews with quantitative student achievement and attendance data, as well as teacher technology-use survey data. The study has determined that student technology leadership clubs that train students in relevant technology and empower students as leaders can enhance students’ attachment to school while also improving teacher technology use.

SWAT everywhere? A response to Jenkins, Semple, Bennell, and Huey

This paper is a response to an article on public police special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams written by Jenkins and colleagues (2020). Jenkins and colleagues are responding to a study showing that tactical units and members are being used more in Canadian policing. For Jenkins and colleagues, not only are SWAT teams being used properly, but drawing from interviews with tactical members they suggest SWAT teams should be used more in the future. This response focuses on conceptual, methodological, and empirical deficiencies in the work of Jenkins and colleagues. This response shows that Jenkins and colleagues ignore social theory, ignore relevant contrary data, are ignorant of the harms of policing, and are ignorant of the violence that Black and Indigenous peoples face from Canadian police. Relatedly, this response offers a criticism of what is called evidence-based policing scholarship. Using the work of Jenkins and colleagues as an example, the argument here is that evidence-based policing scholars are in a conflict of interest because of how closely they work with police and due to the funding they receive from police agencies and justice ministries. This conflict of interest decreases the credibility and trustworthiness of the claims of evidence-based policing scholars. Overall, this response draws attention not only to the harms of public policing and criminalization, but also to how evidence-based policing scholarship is supporting the expansion of violent, harmful, and regressive forms of social control.

Implementation and Evaluation of an IPAC SWAT Team Mobilized to Long-Term Care and Retirement Homes During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Pragmatic Health System Innovation

Long-term care facilities (LTCFs), retirement homes (RHs), and other congregate care settings in Canada and worldwide have experienced significant COVID-19 outbreaks. As a health system response, our acute care hospital in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, developed and mobilized an onsite Infection Prevention and Control (IPAC) SWAT team (IPAC-SWAT) to regional settings on outbreak and implemented a strategy of support through education, training, and engagement.Between April 28, 2020, and June 30, 2020, IPAC-SWAT assessed 7 LTCFs and 10 RHs for IPAC preparedness and actively managed 10 of 13 COVID-19 outbreaks (LTCF n=5; RH n=5). IPAC-SWAT strategies were multi-interventional and intended to mitigate further viral transmission or prevent outbreaks. Dedicated training of local “IPAC champions” was facilitated at 7 sites (LTCF = 5; RH = 2) using a “train-the-trainer” approach to promote local knowledge, autonomy, and site-led audits and feedback.

Psychophysiological Responses Of Swat Team Members During Active Shooter Training: A Pilot Study

Psychophysiological Responses Of Swat Team Members During Active Shooter Training: A Pilot Study

SWAB team instead of SWAT team: Medical students as a frontline force during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team is trained to deal with troubling situations. The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic confronted health care systems with different challenges. In Europe, the first coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) patients presented in late February 2020. Our region was amongst the most severely affected in central Europe. Therefore, frontline operations, such as emergency departments (ED), were highly stressed by immediate demand for diagnostic swab-testing, and additional personnel were urgently needed within a short time. In the meantime, clinical activities of medical students were on hold, and teaching had to be restructured to online formats. However, we expected that medical students would benefit tremendously from learning opportunities through active involvement in the COVID-19 pandemic. The Corona Task Force (CTF) established a trained team (ie, the SWAB team), ‘armed’ with swabs in a nearby Triage Test Centre (TTC) to evaluate hundreds of patients per day with appropriate structural and personal protective equipment (PPE). This TTC was set up in the church next to our ED, with the structure to ensure social distancing. The first SWAB team consisted of physicians from different specialties and nurses. As these professionals were urgently needed for other duties, we actively asked medical students from Years 2 to 6 via email for their volunteered support in the workforce and experienced great willingness to help. To cover medical students' needs, they received a working contract with appropriate insurance. Working in two shifts of 12 students each, a total of 936 shifts were staffed by medical students. The CTF developed a training curriculum on history taking, testing with nasal and oropharyngeal swabs, including knowledge of social distancing, disinfection, hygiene, self-protection and careful handling of PPE. Furthermore, teaching on the spot was provided daily by one clinician, who remained as a supervisory team member, focusing on COVID-19, triage processes, test strategies, clinical manifestations and therapeutic options. From 9 March to 15 April 2020, the SWAB team provided over 6700 swabs. Although we recognise restructuring of medical education to online formats as an inevitable approach in a pandemic, the active involvement of medical students as frontline support confirmed our expectations of a valuable learning experience. Reflecting on this intervention, we draw several conclusions. First, this intervention was feasible and safe. The number of tests the SWAB team provided was very high, but no incidence occurred. Particularly, we did not discover any medical student with symptoms of COVID-19. Second, similar to a SWAT team, a SWAB team can be continuously trained and adjusted to be able to respond quickly to changing situations. To meet these training challenges, we established a supervisory system, where more experienced team members took care of less experienced staff. Third, we judged the inclusion of medical students in these demanding situations as adequate, as we saw motivated learners in an unusual environment. Staying in daily contact, we were pleased by the optimism and the willingness to comply with regulations and difficult frontline scenarios. Although we cannot foresee how these encounters will influence medical students going forward, the impacts of this experience on the individuals’ emotional well-being and also clinical competence in their role as health advocates merit further investigation, which we plan as a next step.

Identifying Points of Engagement Versus Disengagement When Consulting During Crisis Negotiations: A Flexible Model for Applying the Ethics Code

Application of the American Psychological Association (APA) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American Psychological Association 2018) to consultation during crisis negotiations by psychological consultants is an emerging area. Common and emerging ethical dilemmas not addressed in previous works are discussed including use of third-party intermediaries, bounds of psychological principles that are applied to negotiation strategies, and tactical disengagement by law enforcement and SWAT teams. A flexible model along a continuum of the psychological consultant’s participation based upon ethical considerations is suggested. Concerns about the psychological consultant’s proximity to decision-making regarding “going tactical” is moot when experienced teams have a shared understanding of the various roles of team members and consulting mental health professionals are mindful of the “ceiling” of ethical decision-making based upon the General Principles of the Code of Conduct.

Militarization of police: a comparison of police paramilitary units in Canadian and the United States

In comparison with Canada, the more pronounced ability to acquire special weapons and tactics (SWAT) equipment in the United States suggests the resulting proliferation of SWAT teams with adequate material resources is likely to continue. This proliferation has stimulated media and public discourses against the “militarization” of police. In Canada, however, the amalgamation of SWAT teams has led to increased standardization in SWAT training, member specialization and protocols of applied practice. We argue that, in comparison with the United States, the proliferation of paramilitary activity is limited in the Canadian policing landscape by public safety governance structures, acquisition processes, and judicial scrutiny. In consequence, Canadian police services are better positioned than their counterparts in the United States to withstand the public scrutiny tied to police tactical responses.

Surveillance, Ubiquity, Granularity

In the wake of the mass shootings in Dayton, Ohio, and El Paso, Texas, the Trump Administration floated the creation of a new governmental agency named HARPA, the Health Advanced Research Projects Agency, modeled after DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, that could explore novel ways of curtailing gun violence. For an administration unwilling to entertain serious legislation to address the problem of gun violence in the United States, HARPA offered a way to appear to be doing something about gun violence. HARPA, advocates maintained, could house a project called SAFEHOME, an acronym for “Stopping Aberrant Events by Helping Overcome Mental Extremes.” SAFEHOME would use “breakthrough technologies with high specificity and sensitivity for early diagnosis of neuropsychiatric violence”; the proposal would draw on data from Apple Watches, Fitbits, Amazon Echo, and Google Home to predict when someone might be on the cusp of mass violence (Alemany 2019). The guiding assumption of SAFEHOME is that surveillance of this biophysical data, combined with extant surveillance of textual messaging, search patterns, social networking sites, and discussion boards would alert law enforcement officials to a prospective shooter. Think Minority Report (2002, Steven Spielberg) with digital surveillance technology playing the role of psychic precogs. SAFEHOME is probably (hopefully) a nonstarter in serious conversations about gun violence, given the tenuous link between mental health, physical disposition, and violence; the inevitability of data-profiling being articulated to minoritized subjects and false positives (imagine the first time SAFEHOME flags a SWAT team on someone having sex) and obvious concerns about such an invasive surveillance regime. But the very fact that a program like SAFEHOME is posed as a potentially credible solution points to a dimension of surveillance that complements this forum’s discussion of ubiquity: granularity.