Once upon a time, on the lovely and wonderful planet called Earth, two brothers were conceived as a means of addressing the devastating consequences which arose in the aftermath of the 2007 Financial Crisis. These brothers, both originally princes, highly admired upon their conception, are known as the framework and the Frank Act (hereinafter referred to as Basel III and Dodd Frank). Amongst other legislative intent, had been conceived – partly owing to the need to address capital, liquidity requirements, as well as leverage issues, risk management and macro financial stability. On the other hand Frank, it was hoped, would rectify amongst other issues, those issues attributed to lack of coverage of regulatory legislation – a flaw which was revealed following the demise of investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which had been equipped, so it was thought, to address the possible consequences of the funding of bubbles, did not embrace the domain of investment banks.Whilst the legislative intents, character and nature of and Frank, to an extent, are capable of being discerned, and whilst both legislations are not exactly identical as is the case with the actual and Pauper, the uncertainty surrounding the impact which both legislations will generate over the years, as well as the revelation of the true nature, character and identity of both legislations is partly contributory to the derivation of the title of this paper/presentation. Furthermore, this paper aims to highlight the importance of the increased quest for the most suitable Goldilocks Zone.Dedicated to my real prince. Paper is partly based on actual story of The Prince and the Pauper as well as several papers by the author on and the Frank Act – particularly, the paper Preparing for IV (Whilst Commending III): Why Liquidity Risks Still Present a Challenge to Regulators in Prudential Supervision (Part II) - see particularly concluding section). For information on the origins of the Goldilocks Zone, please see F. Raghallaigh and M. Kennedy, Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes,“ February 2011, Mazars Publications.