Drysdale et al. (2017) provide a useful analysis of the major challenges posed by China's economic rise for the international financial architecture and suggest a new role for China in the future architecture. This is highly welcome given that China has taken a lead in the reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), made efforts to internationalize the renminbi (RMB), and launched new institutions and mechanisms, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, its Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and the Belt & Road Initiative. As a rising economic and financial power, China is naturally expected to play a major role in the international financial system: (i) maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability at home by adopting a flexible exchange rate regime; (ii) establishing an open, transparent, and rule-based financial market where foreign financial service providers can freely operate with equal footing with domestic competitors; (iii) providing steady flows of long-term capital to the rest of the world, particularly for infrastructure investment in other emerging and developing economies; and (iv) offering liquid and safe RMB financial assets to the global economy to promote global trade, investment and financial activity and help maintain global financial stability. An important issue is whether China can accomplish these in a way not to destabilize the domestic and global economies. Drysdale et al. (2017) take up three challenges for the international financial system; absorbing China's massive savings while avoiding global payments imbalances; incorporating China into a cohesive global financial safety net (GFSN); and organizing China's participation in infrastructure investment financing. They argue that China should: rebalance the economy to increase domestic consumption and reduce savings; develop a GFSN centered on a more representative IMF (i.e., a reformed IMF that better reflects the rising economic weights of emerging economies) that is well coordinated with regional and bilateral arrangements; and work with the established economic powers while seeking support for building new institutions that fill gaps in the existing architecture. Drysdale et al. also claim that the success or failure of China's domestic economic reforms will determine whether the future international financial architecture will be strong or fragile. I am in full agreement with Drysdale et al. in their assessments and conclusions on these three issues, except for some details which I will not discuss here. However, they do not take up several other, potentially more important issues. These include RMB internationalization, capital account liberalization, and RMB exchange rate flexibility. The issue of RMB internationalization poses the important questions of whether the currency will become the most dominant international currency in Asia and, if so, what implications this may have for the world monetary system. The use of the RMB for trade settlement (and invoicing) has been rising as a trend, and the RMB is increasingly held as official assets by foreign monetary authorities, although the pace of RMB internationalization has slowed or even reversed since late 2014 because of large capital outflow pressure (see below). Asia is not yet a RMB bloc (see Kawai & Pontines, 2016), but the weights of the RMB in Asian economies' implicit currency baskets have been steadily rising. The inclusion of the RMB in the special drawing rights (SDR) basket will certainly help raise the profile of the RMB as a major international currency. Hence, it would have been useful if Drysdale et al. (2017) had provided assessments of the future prospects for the RMB as a major international currency. While China had pursued gradual capital account liberalization for some time, its pace was accelerated after the launch of RMB internationalization following the Lehman shock. Indeed for further RMB internationalization, greater capital account liberalization would be needed, which would also require exchange rate flexibility to maintain monetary policy autonomy (see Eichengreen & Kawai, 2015). However, since mid-2014, China has encountered massive capital outflows, RMB depreciation and a loss of foreign exchange reserves (amounting to close to $1 trillion by the end of 2016). In response, the authorities have used greater controls on capital outflows and currency market interventions to avoid the rapid fall of the RMB value, reversing the trends toward capital account openness and exchange rate flexibility. A critical question is how China can return to the path of capital account opening, further RMB internationalization and greater exchange rate flexibility in a manner not to destabilize the economy. I take the view that as long as massive capital outflows continue China should maintain tight outflow controls and currency market interventions, but that as outflow pressure eases it should move to greater exchange rate flexibility, initially by retaining some outflow controls and over time by dismantling such controls. Of course to achieve capital account openness significant domestic financial reforms are needed—including the deleveraging of corporate debt, the improvement of local government finance, and major reforms of state-owned commercial banks and state-owned enterprises which are these banks' important loan clients—and China should focus on such reforms in this transition period. Drysdale et al. (2017) should have discussed these critical issues.