Spatio-temporal World Research Articles

KANT, FREGE, HILBERT Y LAS FUENTES DEL CONOCIMIENTO GEOMÉTRICO

1. The scientific revolution of the 18th century was based in capability of predicting, using mathematical models, the structure of the spacio-temporal world. From there, aro se the notion of experimental science whose goals are determine wich of the theorical architectures correspond to spatio-temporal facts. 2. Producing the scientific revolution and destroying the psychologism inherent in the realism of Arostotle is the question "What are the mental structures that permit the creation and development ofthe scientific model achieved by mathematico-experimental physics? This is the problem conceming the sources of geometric knowledge proposed by Kant and later by Fregge and still later by David Hilbert. 3. These lead to a new concept of science seen as creativity of the human mind in order to systematize our experience in the spatio-temporal world inhabited by Horno sapiens.

Adhipati, Yogācāra Intersubjectivity, and Soteriology in Kuiji’s Commentaries

AbstractThis study sheds light on a key concept of Yogācāra intersubjectivity that played a significant role in medieval Chinese Yogācāra. Specifically, it analyzes how Kuiji 窺基 (632–682) reinterprets adhipati (activating and amplifying influence; Ch: zengshang 增上 or zengshang li 增上力 or zengshang yuan 增上緣) to account for intersubjective karmic interactions across different lifeworlds in the events of teaching and killing.As this line of investigation shows, Kuiji’s theory of adhipati attempts to sidestep the entanglement of the problems of intersubjectivity and incommensurable worlds in Yogācāra. Extant scholarship on intersubjectivity often presumes one spatio-temporal world populated by sentient beings and insentient objects, which is fundamentally at odds with the Yogācāra tenet that each mental stream generates its distinct lifeworld. To address the pragmatic question of how different mental continuums of consciousnesses can impinge into each other’s lifeworlds, Kuiji employed adhipati in a specific way to account for intersubjective interplay across different, potentially incommensurable worlds. In this framing of intersubjectivity, the problem of one world or many worlds is explained non-dualistically: these lifeworlds are neither the same nor different, neither one nor many, but karmically interconnected.Expanding on recent discussions of the puzzle of intersubjectivity in Yogācāra, this paper shows that Kuiji’s deployment of adhipati provides an account of genuine intersubjectivity in which different mental continuums are recognized as subjects and engage in causal interactions among different spatio-temporal worlds. In Kuiji’s framing, this genuine intersubjectivity gives rise to the sense of one shared world.

Correcton to “DiTNet: End-to-End 3D Object Detection and Track ID Assignment in Spatio-temporal World”

The corresponding author of this letter [1] is Lujia Wang, not Sukai Wang.

The Pessimistic Existentialism of Arthur Shopenhauer: An Expository and Evaluative Study

This work interrogates the seeming ambivalence between Arthur Schopenhauer's existentialist pessimism and his advocacy for artistic, moral and ascetic forms of awareness, as means of managing the absurdities and frustrations of life. The objective of this work is to discover whether or not his apparently orthogonal positions can be reconciled in any way at all, and what that might portend for the contemporary philosopher. Schopenhauer's metaphysics and philosophy of nature led him to the doctrine of pessimism: the view that sentient beings, with few exceptions, are bound to strive and suffer greatly, all without any ultimate purpose or justification and thus life is not really worth living. Arthur Schopenhauer was among the first 19th century philosophers to contend that at its core, the universe is not a rational place. Inspired by Plato and Kant, both of whom regarded the world as being more amenable to reason, Schopenhauer developed their philosophies into an instinct-recognizing and ultimately ascetic outlook, emphasizing that in the face of a world filled with endless strife, we ought to minimize our natural desires for the sake of achieving a more tranquil frame of mind and a disposition towards universal beneficence. Often considered to be a thoroughgoing pessimist, Schopenhauer in fact advocated ways to overcome a frustration-filled and fundamentally painful human condition. He believed that the "will-to-life" (the force driving man to survive and to reproduce) was the driving forces of the world, and that the pursuit of happiness, love and intellectual satisfaction was essentially futile and anyway secondary to the innate imperative of procreation. This essay argues that phenomenologically, Schopenhauer had an “existentialist” orientation towards the spatio-temporal world that informed his pessimism, but also engenders further questions regarding the actual sincerity of his mental commitment to such a position.

The Queer-Cyberspace of Jeanette Winterson’s’ The Powerbook: A Critique of St. Augustine’s Metaphysical Philosophy

ABSTRACT Jeanette Winterson’s The PowerBook is about the cyber and story-making experience of Ali/Alix, the main character and the narrator of many interwoven narratives who experiments with time and retells well-known historical literary texts in the novel. Toward the end of the novel, while he knots himself into time, Ali calls to mind St. Augustine and thinks that St. Augustine might be right when he said “the universe was not created in time but with time.” St. Augustine, one of the most important Fathers of Christianity whose writings had a great impact on shaping the Western prejudices about sex and the body, is also important for his ideas of time. In spite of the short reference to St. Augustine in The PowerBook, Ali/Alix’s story-telling experience can be read not only as a deconstruction and encarnalization of St Augustine’s metaphysical philosophy, but also as reconstructing his personal life and philosophy in the queer spatio-temporal cyber world of the novel.

Nature Is Healing

Nature Is Healing

DiTNet: End-to-End 3D Object Detection and Track ID Assignment in Spatio-Temporal World

End-to-end 3D object detection and tracking based on point clouds is receiving more and more attention in many robotics applications, such as autonomous driving. Compared with 2D images, 3D point clouds do not have enough texture information for data association. Thus, we propose an end-to-end point cloud-based network, DiTNet, to directly assign a track ID to each object across the whole sequence, without the data association step. DiTNet is made location-invariant by using relative location and embeddings to learn each object's spatial and temporal features in the Spatio-temporal world. The features from the detection module helps to improve the tracking performance, and the tracking module with final trajectories also helps to refine the detection results. We train and evaluate our network on the CARLA simulation environment and KITTI dataset. Our approach achieves competitive performance over the state-of-the-art methods on the KITTI benchmark.

The Long Crisis of Irish Realism: A Phenomenological Reading

In an essay titled “On the Theory of Image Consciousness and Figment Consciousness,” Edmund Husserl notes, “The space of the stage with its sets, and so on, analogizes actual space.” The desire to stage a world analogous to “actual space” dominated Irish theatrical practice from the founding of Dublin’s Abbey Theatre in 1904 up to the moment in the late twentieth century when it entered a period of crisis, as the social world it purported to stage became fractured and unstable. This article looks to develop the analysis of Irish theatrical space further by using Husserl’s concept of Lebenswelt, or “lifeworld,” which he defines in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy as “the spatiotemporal world of things as we experience them in our pre- and extrascientific life.” The article argues that the physical space of the stage gives concrete, experiential form to Husserl’s concept of the epochē, the “bracketing” by which theatrical space is transformed into place and the temporary lifeworld on the stage is generated. Drawing examples from Irish theatre that range from J.M. Synge’s Riders to the Sea (1904) to Enda Walsh’s Arlington (2016), the article explores the progression from stage worlds that correspond spatially to the extra-theatrical world to stage worlds that challenge the theatre’s ability to hold together a single image capable of functioning as a Lebenswelt.

Embodiment and Self-Awareness – Evans, Cassam and Husserl

AbstractIn recent years there has been a general attempt – inspired by P. F. Strawson – to naturalise Kant's notion of the transcendental self. The argument being that self-consciousness should refer to neither a kind of noumenal nor mental self but that the self-conscious subject must conceive of itself as an embodied entity, a person among persons that regards itself as an element of the objective order of the world. While Kant does not make room for the notion of an embodied transcendental self, this is where we need to go as our bodily awareness is central both for self-knowledge and the possibility of cognition and thus a transcendental condition for knowledge claims. In this paper I should like to single out Quassim Cassam's work Self and World to see whether such a position is tenable. Cassam's main claim is that we can only become aware of ourselves as subjects if we are at the very same time aware of ourselves as objects located in the spatio-temporal world. We could not be self-conscious and ascribe experiences to ourselves unless we are also aware of ourselves as a physical object among other physical objects in the world. The central claim is that when we self-refer we do not refer to two distinct entities, one possessing only mental, and the other possessing only physical features, rather we refer to a subject that is both mental and physical at the very same time. Awareness of ourselves qua subject is just awareness of ourselves qua object. This paper will focus on this claim alone and will ask whether it is tenable. The answer will be negative. Drawing on the work of Edmund Husserl, I shall argue that there is an inherent flaw in Cassam's position which he has inherited from Gareth Evans’ depiction of the self. The contention will be that our awareness of ourselves qua subject is not compatible with the awareness of ourselves qua object.

Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations

Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience - nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people - unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The ?transcendental? character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating.

An Ontological Sketch for Robust Non-Reductive Realists

The aim of this article is to draw a sketch of an ontology for Realist Non-Naturalist Cognitivists. A distinction is made between moral property-universals and moral property-particulars. It is argued, first, that moral property-universals have the same ontological status as non-moral property-universals; second, that moral property-universals have many instances in the spatio-temporal world; third that these moral property-instances or -particulars have the same ontological status as non-moral property-particulars.

The Place of Subjects in the Metaphysics of Material Objects

An under-explored intermediate position between traditional materialism and traditional idealism is the view that although the spatiotemporal world is purely material, minds nonetheless have a metaphysically special place in it. One way this can be is via a special role that subjects have in the metaphysics of material objects. Some metaphysical aspect of material objects might require the existence of subjects. This would support that minds must exist if material objects exist and thus that a mindless material world is impossible. This view, labeled the subjectivity thesis by Anton Friedrich Koch, was defended by him with an intriguing, purely metaphysical argument connected to the individuation of material objects in space and time. The present paper hopes to make progress on assessing the viability of such a position. It starts by critically examining Koch’s argument for the subjectivity thesis, as well as similar arguments that give minds a central place in the metaphysics of material objects via considerations about identity and difference. It then compares these ideas to similar ones in the philosophy of time, and concludes with an outlook on whether such a position is viable and what needs to be done to fill the gaps unearthed along the way.

Próba naturalistycznej interpretacji norm i ocen

Artykuł rozważa spór naturalizmu z antynaturalizmem w metaetyce oraz argumentuje za naturalizmem, aczkolwiek nie skrajnym. Procesy normowania i oceniania są uznane za pierwotne wobec ich werbalnej artykulacji w postaci norm i ocen, rozumianych jako wypowiedzi. Prowadzi to do nielingwistycznej koncepcji norm i ocen jako faktów (ocenianie i normowanie, przy czym normy są traktowane jako działania performatywne) istniejących gdzieś i kiedyś. Performatywy, ocenianie, wypowiedzi normatywne (performatywne i deontyczne), ocenianie i zdania bonitywne (o dobru) dostarczają narzędzi do ugruntowania naturalizmu w metaetyce. Przeprowadzona analiza logiczna pokazuje, że logika deontyczna i logika bonitywna są analogiczne. Rozważane są też uogólnione argumenty Hume’a i Moore’a, które, jak się okazuje, nie zagrażają naturalizmowi.

What's going on about geo-process modeling in virtual geographic environments (VGEs)

Geography investigates changes in physical structures and distributions of objects in spatiotemporal world, which are shaped by geographic process (geo-process). With extensive simulation models used to study geo-process, this paper examines the status of geo-process modeling (namely model-based simulation) for multidisciplinary geo-processes across scales in virtual geographic environments (VGEs). The conceptual framework of integrated modeling in VGEs is proposed with a review of specific issues, including model sharing and management, collaborative modeling and uncertainty analysis. The contribution of a model base in model reusability and modeling management, concerning input data, parameterization, and simulation output, is detailed. Finally, this paper concludes with a discussion of future research directions for holistic geo-process modeling.

Almost Nearly: The Languages of Approximation

Late eighteenth-century thought was profoundly influenced by the mathematics of infinity and infinitesimals in Isaac Newton, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Leonhard Euler. Immanuel Kant’s pronouncement in the Critique of Pure Reason that the spatio-temporal world is neither finite nor infinite, along with his doctrine of the mathematical sublime in the Critique of Judgment, set the stage for the accounts of singularity, totality, and the absolute that emerge in Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. One of the most familiar Romantic motifs presents the conceptualization of the unconditioned as a perpetual striving after an unattainable goal. Characterized as the asymptotic approach to a limit, this dynamic is often illustrated with a diagram from analytic geometry showing the distance between a curve and a line nearing zero as the two tend to infinity. This “endlose Annaherung,” as Friedrich Schlegel terms it, is first and foremost an emblem of tension or contradiction (Studien des klassischen Altertums 255). As boundlessly precise imprecision, such a process is constitutively imperfect and open-ended, its telos uncertain, yet it remains unsurpassed in the exactitude of its execution. The privilege accorded infinite approximation by Romantic authors highlights their investment in irreducibly provisional programs whose coherence and integrity are permanently under threat. But it is also a reminder of the substantial advances that had taken place in infinitesimal calculus, which by Schlegel’s time was generating algorithms of considerable accuracy, distinguishing itself as a discourse of continuity as much as discontinuity. The Romantic concern with the interplay of verbal and mathematical dynamics raises the question of whether sentences or words may relate asymptotically. On a larger scale, could one speak of the infinite approach of one poem to another? In this article, I will explore the concept of proximity in Romantic poetry and poetics by focusing on a small constellation of terms: nah, beinahe, and annahern. As the invocation of an asymptotic function implies, what is at issue is less a static set of fixed elements than a dynamic of forces of uncertain provenance. Even the exposition of the word near proves a challenging task. As much as it describes the arrangement of objects in space or metaphorically characterizes relations between abstract terms, nearness also seems to pre-exist and even enable relationships, thereby proving central to the Romantic account of

David Fontana as Transpersonal Psychologist

An overview of David Fontana’s status as an influential transpersonal psychologist is presented. In assessing the factors that contributed to his standing as a transpersonal psychologist I stress not only his skills as a scholar and writer but also his profound human qualities. David exemplified many of the key features that I would emphasise as characterising this branch of psychology, including commitment to scientific corroboration of insights deriving from spiritual traditions, and willingness to engage in a disciplined manner with the practices that the traditions promote. In addition, David brought exceptional communication skills, both orally and in writing to his work, and promoted the discipline with considerable passion. His fascination with a realm somehow ‘beyond’ the spatiotemporal world of immediate experience, together with his commitment to subjecting it to scientific scrutiny, will undoubtedly endure as his lasting legacy.

String formalism in superspace-time

It is shown that the mathematical apparatus of string theory can be formulated in 2D superspace-time without the concept of multidimensionality of spatio-temporal world, which automatically eliminates the necessity of compactification of excess space dimensions.

I Will Tell You about Axel Hägerström: His Ontology and Theory of Judgment

In this paper I set out to read Hagerstrom through his own eyes, adhering to the terminology he uses in his own original work and attempting to make sense of the variance and uniformity alike that one finds in his linguistic usage. The translations we have of Hagerstrom's works are quite liberal, using the same word in English where the original uses different ones, and, vice versa, using different words in English where the original uses a single one in different contexts. These misleading translations of Hagerstrom have contributed in some measure to Hagerstrom's reputation for obscurity. Further, and most importantly, I will take seriously what Hagerstrom says about his own thought, namely, that it is dependent on that of Kant and independent of the currents of thought contemporary with Hagerstrom. In Section 1, I will briefly take up the problem of consciousness that Hagerstrom proceeds from, and will recall something that Bertrand Russell once said, in 1928, in regard to the revolt staged in the early 20th century in Europe against German idealism. In Sections 2 and 4.1, I will instead take up Kant for the purpose of clarifying Hagerstrom's theory of judgment as treated in Section 3. In Section 4.2, I will illustrate the difference between the notions of nothing, R-reality, and W-reality in Hagerstrom. In Sections 5 and 6, I will examine the analysis that Hagerstrom offers of the principle of contradiction, and will summarize the three types of judgment he singled out, including the type he called impossible judgment (or, in my own words, pseudojudgment). In Section 7, I will consider Hagerstrom views as grounding, in a transcendental way, the presupposition of the primacy of the external spatio-temporal world, a world independent of our representations: I will consider in particular the W-real complexes that are merely represented, as well as the spatio-temporal world as the only W-real complex that is not merely represented. Finally, in Section 8, I will briefly consider some of those who have commented and translated Hagerstrom, this to conclude that R-reality and W-reality are coextensive but not synonymous.

Determinables as Universals

According to immanent realism, there are universals in the spatio-temporal world quite independently of language and the mind. The existence of these universals, furthermore, is not dependent upon there being platonic universals existing outside the spatiotemporal world. In this paper, I will try to show that immanent realism holds not only for many determinate universals, but for some determinable universals as well. In other words, there are ontological determinables as well as conceptual determinables.

Historical Linguistics and Language Change

Language change happens in the spatio-temporal world. Historical linguistics is the craft linguists exercise upon its results, in order to tell coherent stories about it. In a series of linked essays Roger Lass offers a critical survey of the foundations of the art of historical linguistics, and its interaction with its subject matter, language change. He takes as his background some of the major philosophical issues which arise from these considerations, such as ontology, realism and conventionalism, and explanation. Along the way he poses such questions as: where does our data come from; how trustworthy is it; what is the empirical basis for the reconstructive techniques we standardly take as yielding facts; and how much does the historian create data rather than receiving it? The paradoxical conclusion is that our historiographical methods are often better than the data they have to work with.