Soviet Weapons Research Articles

British surveillance of postwar Soviet radio jamming: US–UK intelligence relations and interference detection at BBC Tatsfield, 1948-1949

ABSTRACT Following World War II, the BBC, better known for radio programme broadcasts, continued its long-standing work of radio spectrum surveillance at the specialized receiving and measurement facility located at Tatsfield. Both before and after Soviet jamming of US and British Russian-language broadcasts escalated in April 1949, Tatsfield catalogued the technical characteristics of jamming signals. BBC engineers, experienced in interpreting types and sources of radio interference, issued fortnightly summaries with interpretations of these technical observations. US intelligence agencies knew of Tatsfield’s findings, but differing perspectives in Washington and London resulted in divergent responses to the technical intelligence data. With rising tensions in wider Anglo-American intelligence relations, fueled by the Soviet weapons program and security breaches, such differences presaged separate approaches to Soviet communications threats. US agencies received greatly increased funding, while the BBC’s budget struggles persisted. Even so, interference detection was a high-water mark in Britain’s early Cold War intelligence work.

Prospects for the supply of weapons from the US, the eu and the United Kingdom to Ukraine

This study examines the prospects of arms supplies from the United States, the EU and the United Kingdom to Ukraine in the context of the ongoing military conflict. The paper analyzes the issue of expanding the nomenclature, up to the provision of American-made jet aircraft complexes, the supplied equipment and the process of transition from stocks of military equipment both produced by NATO and the Soviet model to newly produced samples. The problem of the impact of a special military operation on the defense industry of London, Washington and Brussels is considered separately. There is a tendency to increase the value of shares of defense companies and their profits. The paper concludes that the increase in military production with the further course of the conflict and the supply of weapons will grow both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition, the existing problems of the defense industry of the United States, Great Britain and the European Union in the current period are revealed - the high cost of products, issues of standardization with Soviet weapons, its complexity in using and training personnel. The main conclusion of the work can be called the statement of a significant time required for the deployment of mass industrial production.

USSR Military Assistance to the Federal Government During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970)

Drawing on newly available documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) the author closely examines Soviet-Nigerian military and technical cooperation during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). He focuses on the following issues: the extent of Soviet assistance to the war efforts by the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria, how Soviet weapons were used in combat operations, what effect military aid had on Soviet-Nigerian relations. On 30th May 1967, the southeastern provinces of Nigeria attempted to secede as the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra. This caused the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). The head of the FMG general Yakubu Gowon had to apply the USSR for military assistance. The USSR did not recognize the break-away region. The author argues that there were three Soviet-Nigerian arms deals in 1967–1969. The quantity of military hardware and small arms supplied to the FMG remains a guarded secret, and the author had to rely on the declassified CIA intelligence and other published sources. Soviet military personnel in Nigeria, mostly pilots and aviation specialists, strictly adhered to the rule: do not commit acts that might have involved the Soviet Union in the Nigerian conflict. During the war, Soviet-Nigerian relations rose from virtually zero to a fairly high level. However, military assistance did not turn Nigeria into a Soviet ally. Nigerian foreign policy did not change fundamentally, it was still dominated by the Western vector.

Contribution of the scientific and technical intelligentsia of the North Caucasus to the victory over fascism (1941–1945)

The history of the Great Patriotic War is multifaceted, and the disclosure of the role of the scientific and technical intelligentsia of the North Caucasus during the war years allows us to give an objective picture of the processes taking place in the country at the regional level. The intelligentsia, that consists of various socio-professional groups, made a feasible contribution to the defeat of the enemy. The scientific and technical intelligentsia played a big role in ensuring the country's defense capability, helped supply the army with high-quality military equipment, weapons and ammunition, their developments increased labor productivity. The efforts of scientists and constructors ensured progress in the creation of military equipment, the continuous growth of the combat performance of Soviet weapons, which became the most important condition for the victory of the Soviet people in the war. An important condition that ensures a quick and comprehensive approach to solving actual problems in the implementation of scientific developments to meet the needs of the front was the creation of new management structures, the broad involvement of the country's leading scientists to work in the departments and committees of the State Defense Committee, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in key People's commissariats. This made it possible to optimally direct scientific activity to solving the tasks that the war set for Soviet science. The creation and organization of serial production of advanced military equipment was carried out according to the «science-technology-production» system. The extreme difficulty and scale of the tasks that were solved by the state executive and administrative bodies during the Great Patriotic War was the timely training of scientific and technical personnel. On the instructions of the SDC and the CPC of the USSR, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1943–1945 did a lot of work on the main directions of their further development. At that time, the main directions in the development of a number of areas in science and technology were determined – chemistry, rocket technology, nuclear energy. The war made adjustments to the training of intelligentsia personnel. Universities and technical schools of the region had to solve the most difficult task of training technical intelligentsia.

Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States

Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States

Russia’s novel weapons systems: military innovation in the post-Soviet period

ABSTRACT This article identifies the principal drivers of Russian military innovation involving five novel nuclear, conventional, or dual-capable delivery systems—Avangard, Burevestnik, Poseidon, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon—and analyzes the interplay between these drivers over the course of the innovation process. It does so by means of a structured, focused comparison of the five systems and their progression to date, distinguishing “innovation” from concepts like “invention” and “diffusion,” and defining the stages of an innovation life cycle. The article also distills prior research on Soviet weapons innovation and investigates its continued validity. The analysis finds external factors to be central in driving innovation, specifically Russian threat perceptions around (1) US missile-defense development and (2) the development of Western conventional warfighting capabilities. It also discusses the roles of a range of internal factors, including industry and high-level political support for specific systems, the availability of Soviet-legacy research and engineering initiatives, and the appeal of anticipated industrial and ancillary benefits from the development of specific systems. Cooperation between design bureaus and other industry players is also examined, as is the role of status considerations in driving innovation. Finally, the relative importance of individual factors in explaining innovation is shown to differ across the systems. The structured comparison identifies the continued validity of certain aspects of past studies on Soviet military innovation, while also bringing to light new insights about contemporary Russian weapons innovation.

U.S. Main Policies in Central Asia

The article analyses the U.S. policy in Central Asia with the focus on the policy of the Trump administration. It highlights its main areas of interests and features, examines the U.S. bilateral relations with Central Asian countries. The American interest in the region was manifested immediately after the collapse of the USSR and was linked to its geostrategic position and energy resources. Initially, the efforts of the White House were focused on the elimination of Soviet weapons and the promotion of business contacts. The role of Central Asia in the U.S. foreign policy increased when the military operation in Afghanistan was launched. With the achievement of agreements on the use of military infrastructure in Central Asia states, the U.S. military presence in the region significantly expanded, and cooperation through defense agencies began to actively develop. Contacts in the economic area intensified, dozens of American companies rushed to Central Asian countries, and the volume of American investments increased significantly. In order to form pro-American societies and elites, the work to promote “democratic values” has been intensified. With the arrival of the Trump administration, the emphasis was shifted towards military cooperation. Military-technical cooperation, joint military maneuvers and educational programs, exchange of experience in the field of combating terrorism, illegal migration, human trafficking and drug trafficking have increased. Business contacts, trade, economic and energy cooperation have been intensified. Washington has somewhat reduced the degree of criticism of the Central Asian countries for “problems in the area of democratic governance”, nevertheless, the U.S. continues its attempts to democratize the region through NGOs sponsored by non-state funds close to the American Democratic Party. The Central Asian region will remain in the focus of the U.S. foreign policy for a long period of time, regardless of whether the Republican or Democratic administration is in power, taking into account its geostrategic position, natural resources, situation in Afghanistan, desire to weaken the positions of Russia and China in this area.

Die UdSSR und der Nahe Osten: Zionismus, ägyptischer Antikolonialismus und sowjetische Außenpolitik bis 1956. by Wiebke Bachmann, Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 2011. 223 pp. €24.80.

On 10 April 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin sent a note to Prime Minister Clement Attlee in which he gave his view of what the Soviet Union was up to: “The Russians have decided upon an aggressive policy based upon militant Communism and Russian chauvinism and seem determined to stick at nothing short of war, to obtain their objectives. At the present time Russia's aggressive policy is clearly directed to challenging this country everywhere” (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 800/501/SU/46/15).One of those places was the Near East, especially Palestine, where since April 1922 Great Britain had ruled through a Mandate of the League of Nations. The Mandate obligated Britain to encourage the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people; that is, a Jewish state.In 1939, with war imminent, the British abandoned this policy, fearing that the Arab world might turn against them otherwise. Over the next five years Jewish immigration to Palestine was limited to 75,000; after that it depended on the permission of the Arabs. The Zionist dream of a Jewish state seemed to be over. The Zionist leader, David Ben-Gurion, called the British volte-face the worst betrayal the civilized world had ever seen.In the following years, the Zionists turned to the United States for help—which U.S. leaders agreed to provide. This willingness stemmed partly from domestic politics. In supporting the establishment of the state of Israel, U.S. politicians hoped to win the votes of Jewish Americans.Jewish lobbying in Washington was successful and well known. Not so well known is the Jewish lobbying that took place in Moscow, which was also very successful, as Wiebke Bachmann shows. Without Moscow's support, there would have been no Israel.What did the Soviet Union want in Palestine? The main objective, as Bevin had rightly discerned, was to weaken British influence in the Near East (p. 122). Soviet leaders hoped that the new Jewish state would lean toward socialism and become a partner of the Soviet Union. That is why the Soviet dictator Iosif Stalin let some 200,000 Jews move from Eastern Europe to Palestine in one of the most dramatic illegal operations against the British.In early 1947 Britain relinquished its role and handed back the Palestine Mandate to the United Nations (UN). In subsequent months, the Soviet Union surprised many by backing the Zionist cause in favor of the partition of Palestine. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly approved partition.Although U.S. President Harry S. Truman recognized de facto the provisional government of Israel just eleven minutes after Israel's independence took effect at midnight local time on 14 May 1948, the Soviet Union was the first to recognize Israel de jure: on 17 May 1948. Moscow also provided the new state with infusions of weapons to fight the Arabs in the so-called war of independence.Drawing mostly on Soviet archival material, Bachmann shows how things changed later in the year after Israel demanded the release of Jews in the Soviet Union (p. 138). By mid-1950, after Israel took out a loan in the United States (p. 139) and supported the West in the Korean War, Israel had definitely become a lost cause for Stalin.After Stalin turned forcefully against Israel, Egypt steadily gained favor in the Soviet Union. In 1955, Egypt received large quantities of armaments from Moscow, the first Arab country to receive Soviet weapons. The book ends with the 1956 Soviet Communist Party Congress. So we learn nothing about the crucial months leading up to the Suez Crisis, to say nothing about Moscow's role before and during the Six-Day War in 1967.

BAĞIMSIZLIK SONRASI JEOPOLİTİK VE GÜVENLİK EKSENİNDE KAZAKİSTAN’IN NÜKLEER SİLAHSIZLANMA SÜRECİ

Özet Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasından sonra bağımsızlığını kazanmış bir ülke olarak Kazakistan açısından nükleer silahların yayılmasını önleme rejimi, güvenlik politikasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bağımsızlığı takip eden ilk yıllarda, Kazakistan önceliklerini ve bunun yanında ulusal çıkarlarını tanımlamaya başlamış; güvenlik politikası kendi topraklarındaki yıkıcı Sovyet silahlarına ilişkin meseleler doğrultusunda yön bulmuştur. Kazakistan’ın uluslararası arenada ilk defa boy göstermesi, bu silahların kaldırılmasına ilişkin uluslararası anlaşmalara katılımıyla gerçekleşmiştir. Nükleer silahlar modern jeopolitik bakış açısının vazgeçilmez unsurlarındandır. Abstract As a country that gained its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regime for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan played an important role in security policy. In the first years following independence, Kazakhstan began to define its priorities, as well as its national interests; The security policy has taken its course in the direction of the issues related to destructive Soviet weapons in its territory. The first appearance of Kazakhstan in the international arena has occurred with the participation of international agreements on the abolition of these weapons. Nuclear weapons are indispensable elements of modern geopolitical view.

Physics is a casualty of Ukrainian turmoil

Help is needed for physicists and students who were uprooted from rebel-controlled eastern Ukraine. But the particulars are just being fleshed out.

Handel głównymi rodzajami uzbrojenia konwencjonalnego pomiędzy ZSRR i Rosją a Iranem – ujęcie ilościowe (na podstawie danych SIPRI)

Despite the short period of arms transfers to Iran before 1979, due to the quality and the quantity of arms, the Soviet Union even before the Islamic revolution in Iran grew to the position, in terms of transfers value of the third exporter of arms to Iran after the United States and the United Kingdom, ahead of Italy, France and other western countries. The biggest deals were implemented in the late 70s. of the XX century. The Islamic Revolution led to a break in the transfers of weapons from the Soviet Union, and only in 1986 did the Soviet Union re-join the group of suppliers of weapons to Iran, becoming, second only to China (PRC), the largest exporter of arms to Iran until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Soviet weapons strengthened the Iranian air force and air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles systems S-200 Angara/SA-5 Gammon). After the collapse of the USSR Iran continued purchasing arms in Russia, which had become the successor to the Soviet Union. Iran continued purchases of aircrafts and short range air-to-air missiles and bought helicopters, including for the purposes of search and rescue, and the version with anti-tank missiles. Iran also continued strengthening their defense missile systems by purchasing surface-to-air missile systems 2K12 Kwadrat/SA-6A, mobile surface-to-air missile systems, Tor-M1/SA-15 with missiles and air search radars 1L119 and air search systems 1L222 Avtobaza. Moreover, Russia has sold Iran three submarines of the Project 877E/Kilo, diesel engines for the modernization of tanks, mobile surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon systems 96K9 Pantsir-S1/SA-22 Greyhound (via Syria). Russia has also granted several licenses, including the production of antitank missiles 9M111/AT-4 Spigot, 9M14M/AT-3 Sagger, 9M113/AT-5 Spandrel, infantry fighting vehicles BMP-2, T-72M1 tanks, towed guns D-30-caliber 122mm. In the years 1992–2012 Russia has climbed to first place in the arms trade with Iran, ahead of China, which is in second place. Arms sales to Iran led to the saturation of the Iranian air defense and aviation with Soviet/Russian aircrafts and air defense systems, strengthening also the army and navy (with Russian submarines).

DNA Damage after Continuous Irradiation: Findings in Mice Compared with Human Epidemiologic Data

Olipitz et al. (2012) suggested that their study of biomarkers in several hundred mice exposed to 10.5 cGy of ionizing radiation for 5 weeks casts into doubt radiation standards and concerns about protracted exposure after accidental releases of radioactivity. Yet, the authors failed to discuss the many human studies that have appeared in recent years showing excess cancers after protracted exposure (e.g., Cardis et al. 2005; Krestinina et al. 2007; Muirhead et al. 2009). The most likely explanation for the contradiction is that the biomarkers they examined are not predictive of cancer incidence 10–50 years after exposure, a possibility they did not mention. Before a cellular biomarker can be trusted to predict cancer risk, it first must be linked to epidemiologic data, something that Olipitz et al. have not done. If Olipitz et al. (2012) interpreted their biomarker results correctly, then recent studies on humans must have been wrong. For example, in a study of 400,000 nuclear workers, Cardis et al. (2005) reported excess cancer from protracted exposure at a rate per Gray higher than that found in studies of one-time exposures in atomic bomb (A-bomb) survivors. In a study of 175,000 radiation workers receiving protracted exposures in the United Kingdom, Muirhead et al. (2009) observed excess cancer at the same rate as found in A-bomb survivors. Krestinina et al. (2007) found excess cancer in 17,000 members of the civilian population who received protracted exposure from emissions from the Soviet weapons complex—also at a higher rate than found in the A-bomb cohort. In addition, Chernobyl thyroid exposures meet the protracted test because > 90% of the dose came from iodine-131, which has an 8-day half-life (Gavrilin et al. 2004). It would have been helpful if Olipitz et al. (2012) had explicitly mentioned these epidemiologic contradictions to their data interpretation, thus allowing the reader to judge whether or not their mouse data should influence worker and public radiation standards for protracted exposures. In the past, cellular radiation studies have conflicted with human epidemiologic data. Thus, the study by Olipitz et al. (2012) is not a test of the linear nonthreshold theory (LNT). The authors started with a dose almost universally accepted to cause a (small) risk of cancer if given all at once. Perhaps Olipitz et al. (2012) would argue that the dose categories covered in the epidemiology studies cited above do not really include protracted exposures to 10.5-cGy doses, but only to doses no lower than 20 or 30 cGy. However, Olipitz et al. claimed to see “nothing” after 5 weeks, so the implication is that they would also see nothing after 10–15 weeks. If they thought otherwise, it would have been appropriate to say so. In addition, epidemiologic studies in regions with high natural background are not definitive. In one such study, Nair et al. (2009) concluded that their study in India, together with cancer mortality studies in China, could only set limits, suggesting that “it is unlikely that estimates of risk at low doses are substantially greater than currently believed.” One of the biggest paradoxes in the debate on low-level radiation—whether about immediate or protracted exposure—is that an individual risk can be a minor concern, while the societal risk (the total delayed cancers in an exposed population) can be of major concern. Attempts to calm public overreaction should not ignore the human epidemiologic data. Further discussion of these controversies and their policy implications have been published previously (Beyea 2012).

Curtain falls on collaborative work

End of the line for international f unding agency that brought former Soviet weapons scientists in from the cold.

THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

Since its beginning in 1991, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) has grown to include a host of programs aimed at securing former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, weapons-relevant materials, and expertise. Multiple U.S. and Russian agencies are involved, and some programs have expanded beyond the former Soviet Union. CTR has demonstrated considerable success, but much work remains. Moreover, it is likely that the CTR agenda will be re-evaluated and refocused owing to reviews by the Obama administration, increasingly strained relations with Russia, and the global economic crisis. Any such analysis, however, should proceed from a clear understanding of both CTR's performance to date as well as lessons learned from this experience. This article provides a start by summarizing progress toward CTR's main goals, outlining the scope of remaining tasks, and looking at persistent problems in both the United States and Russia. In particular, CTR's future progress depends upon forging a new U.S. domestic consensus on the national security benefits of CTR, encouraging Russia to become a true partner in CTR activities, and improving interagency leadership and coordination. In turn, these improvements can help resolve emerging questions about the cooperative nonproliferation agenda as it expands beyond the former Soviet Union.

Through the Eye of the Needle: Five Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: Volumes 1–3, The Great Crises. Edited by Phillip D. Zelikow, Timothy Naftali, and Ernest R. May. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001; pp xxiv + 691 (vol. 1), pp xxiv + 642 (vol. 2), pp xxiv + 549 (vol. 3). $165.00 cloth. Averting 'The Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings. By Sheldon M. Stern. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003; pp xxx + 459. $35.00 cloth. Awaiting Armageddon: How America Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. By Alice L. George. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003; pp xxiii + 238. $29.95 cloth. October Fury. By Peter A. Huchthausen. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2002; pp v + 281. $17.47 cloth. Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis. By James G. Blight and Philip Brenner. Lanham, Md.: Bowman and Littlefield, 2002; pp xxvii + 324. $29.95 cloth. The fortieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis has produced a wealth of thought-provoking works that examine "the event that might have triggered WWIII." In October 1962, an American U-2 reconnaissance plane recorded photographs of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Ongoing tension between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev concerning both Berlin and the placement of Soviet weapons in Cuba motivated the president to act. He selected a group of seasoned advisors, referred to as the Executive [End Page 133] Committee (ExComm). ExComm, with the participation and leadership of President Kennedy, created the strategies and tactics of diplomacy that averted potential nuclear catastrophe. This review essay offers a collection of variegated viewpoints. First, The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: Volumes 1–3, The Great Crises, edited by Philip D. Zelikow, Timothy Naftali, and Ernest R. May, noted scholars and professors of public affairs and history, includes declassified presidential transcripts from July 30 through October 28, 1962. A CD with audio recordings of meetings accompanies the publication. Volume 3 covers transcripts of President Kennedy and the ExComm. The transcripts capture decision makers navigating their way through the quicksands of international diplomacy, escalating tension, and the management of public information. Examples of problem definition, reframing, and consensus building provide rich resources for rhetoricians, public policy analysts, and graduate students. This three-volume collection provides a captivating and comprehensive sense of the presidency as an institution. Civil rights, South American regime changes, currency fluctuations, along with lesser ceremonial responsibilities, convey the multifaceted tasks the chief executive faces daily. Next, Sheldon M. Stern's Averting 'The Final Failure,': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings provides a narrative approach to the ExComm transcripts. Stern, as an historian, chief librarian of the Kennedy Library for over two decades, and a compelling storyteller, captures personality and contextual nuances, adding rich dimensions to the collective wisdom on this topic. The author, having studied the Kennedy tapes for decades, conscientiously retranscribes and reinterprets a number of the transactions presented in The Presidential Recordings. In Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis, historian Alice L. George details a social history of Middle America's world during the Cold War. As a unique contribution to the available literature, she provides a diorama of children's lives as they experience the attempts of government, schools, and the media to manage and communicate the threat of nuclear war. Then, retired navy captain Peter A. Huchthausen's October Fury breaks new ground by dramatically recounting moment-by-moment decision making and lifestyles of both the Russian and American naval crews aboard submarines and ships participating in maneuvers during the crisis. The author effectively builds the case that a combination of exceptional political and naval leadership, plus superior American naval power, determined the outcome of events. Finally, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis, authored by international...

La revolución peruana: Ideología y práctica política de un gobierno militar, 1968–1975

La revolución peruana: Ideología y práctica política de un gobierno militar, 1968–1975

US Research Grants Are Critical to Former Soviet Weapons Scientists, but Not a Long-Term Solution

Russia and other former Soviet republics inherited a massive nuclear weapons program they could no longer afford. Thousands of former weapons scientists have been subsidized by US grants, but finding them permanent, civilian jobs has proven to be extremely difficult.

Cooperative science and non-proliferation

US President George W. Bush's 'axis of evil' speech in January 2002, his administration's conflation of the terrorism and WMD threats, and speculation about an imminent US attack on Iraq designed to neutralise that country's putative WMD capabilities, have all placed proliferation issues at the centre of foreign policy debate. Discussions have focused primarily on US policy towards the Middle East and East Asia, options for the use of military force, and the evolving doctrine of pre-emption in dealing with WMD threats. Perhaps unavoidably, this has tended to obscure successful initiatives that may operate at a lower level. One such initiative involves the Moscow-based International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the Kiev-based Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), which aim to prevent former Soviet weapons scientists transferring their expertise to countries suspected of engaging in weapons proliferation and development by offering them research grants and the prospect of sustained employment in a civilian area of science. The ISTC and STCU are ongoing experiments adapting to changing strategic priorities.

Pickings are slim for former Soviet weapons scientists

International programs to support former Soviet weapons scientists have favored nuclear and missile scientists at the expense of chemists and biologists. In a just-released report, Amy E. Smithson of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C.-based national security research group, quantifies the bias. The collapse of the U.S.S.R has left tens of thousands of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons scientists in over 60 research institutes destitute. Russia has been unable to pay their salaries or support their research. So leading Western nations, fearing a brain drain and the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorists, have set up grant assistance programs. In the study 'Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical & Biological Weapons Complexes, Smithson finds that from 1994 to 1998 four research grant programs have contributed $310.3 million to support 1,733 collaborative projects. Only $26 million went to 178 biotechnology research pr...

MOSCOW SCIENCE CENTER LAUDED

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, a prime concern of the U.S. and other nations has been preventing former Soviet Union scientists and engineers from selling their expertise in weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological, as well as missile delivery systems—to outlaw nations or terrorist groups. To facilitate these antiproliferation efforts, the U.S., Russia, the European Union (EU), and Japan established an International Science & Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow to give the former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful activities. ISTC officially started up in March 1994. center has been successful and effective in meeting its primary objective during its first two years, finds a report by a National Research Council (NRC) panel, which assessed ISTC's programs at the request of the Department of Defense (DOD). The opportunities provided to [former Soviet] scientists and engineers do indeed offer meaningful n...