Soviet Price Research Articles

Socialism and Innovation

Socialism and InnovationDavid M. KotzDavid M. Kotz1. Department of Economics and Political Economy Research Institute, Thompson Hall, University of MassachusettsSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:June 2005https://doi.org/10.1521/siso.66.1.94.21007PDFPDF PLUS ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations AboutReferencesAlbert , Michael, and Robin Hahnel. 1991. The Political Economy of Participatory Economics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Google ScholarBerliner , Joseph S. 1981. “Technological Progress and the Evolution of Soviet Pricing Policy.” Pp. 105–125 in Steven Rosefielde, ed., Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Google ScholarBerliner , Joseph S. 1976. The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Google ScholarCockshott , W. Paul, and Allin Cottrell. 1993. Towards a New Socialism. Nottingham, England: Spokesman. Google ScholarDevine , Pat. Forthcoming. “The Institutional Context of Entrepreneurial Activity.” In Fikrit Adaman and Pat Devine, eds., Reciprocity, Distribution, and Exchange: Embedding the Economy in Society. Montreal, Quebec, Canada: Black Rose Books. Google ScholarDevine , Pat. 1988. Democracy and Economic Planning: The Political Economy of a Self-Governing Society. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Google ScholarJewkes , John, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman. 1969. The Sources of Invention. New York: Norton. Google ScholarKotz , David M., with Fred Weir. 1997. Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System. London and New York: Routledge. Google ScholarScherer , F. M. 1999. New Perspectives on Economic Growth and Technological Innovation. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Google ScholarScherer , F. M. 1980. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 2nd Edition. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally. Google Scholar Previous article Next article FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Cited byCited by1. Innovation and Skills Requirements in Post-transition EconomiesOnline publication date: 22 September 2022. Go to citation Crossref Google Scholar2. Inventor and Innovator. Small socialist business within the limits of normalization plansOnline publication date: Go to citation Crossref Google ScholarMaxi Nieto and Juan Pablo Mateo3. Dynamic Efficiency in a Planned Economy: Innovation and Entrepreneurship Without MarketsOnline publication date: 27 December 2019. Go to citation Crossref Google Scholar4. FOSTERING ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF INVENTION COMMERCIALIZATION IN VIETNAMOnline publication date: 15 February 2019. Go to citation Crossref Google Scholar5. One Hundred Years after the Russian Revolution: Looking Back and Looking ForwardOnline publication date: 10 October 2017. Go to citation Crossref Google Scholar6. Big Data, Platform Economy and Market Competition: A Preliminary Construction of Plan-Oriented Market Economy System in the Information EraOnline publication date: Go to citation Crossref Google Scholar7. On Theories of a Democratic Planned Economy and the Coevolution of “Pro-democratic Planning” PreferencesOnline publication date: 28 May 2014. Go to citation Crossref Google ScholarMark Jablonowski8. Markets on a (Computer) Chip? New Perspectives on Economic CalculationOnline publication date: 29 June 2011. Go to citation Crossref Google Scholar Volume 66Issue 1Mar 2002 Information© Guilford Publications Inc.PDF download

Structural change in the Russian far east: The implications for trade and factor markets

This study compares actual directions of structural adjustment in the Russian Far East since the collapse of the former Soviet Union with estimated directions of adjustment that would be predicted to follow an opening of the region to the world market. How would moving to world prices affect the competitiveness of individual sectors of the Russian Far East? This author estimates the impact of changing terms of trade by revaluing a 1987 input-output table for the Russian Far East by price relatives between internal Soviet prices and world prices estimated by David Tarr [1992]. These estimates measure apparent competitiveness of each sector at world prices and identify four sectors of the Russian Far East—food processing, forest products, light industry, and the chemical industry—as negative value added sectors at world prices. However, actual short-run directions of adjustment in 1992–94 are only partly consistent with the directions predicted in the model. Measured gains from trade are strong on the import side but not on the export side.

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS AMONG UNION REPUBLICS OF THE USSR: 1970-1988

This paper examines available Soviet data (and estimates from it) on the redistribution of national income among the republics through the state budget and interrepublic commodity trade relations, two contentious issues involved in the current shift to greater republic economic autonomy and authority. Although the available Soviet statistical measures are highly distorted, the study indicates considerable income transfers among the republics through the state budget. Major “donors” are the northern, more industrialized Slavic republics, whereas the principal “recipients” are less-developed republics in Central Asia. In interrepublic commodity trade, the trade balances and flows (measured in rubles) are highly distorted by established Soviet prices (particularly in accounting for foreign trade), as well as by other problems. In established domestic prices, only five republics export more to the other republics than they import from them. Soviet re-estimates of the republic trade balances to correct for the...

Price Reform in the USSR: Comment on Shmelev

An apparent shift and rethinking of earlier views on prices by one of perestroyka's most outspoken and visible architects prompts an analysis by a leading American specialist in the field. Problems of the three main components of the Soviet price system, namely industrial producer prices, agricultural producer prices, and state retail prices, are examined. Proposals and official plans for changes in the price system are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 027, 052, 124, 227.

Soviet Price Policies

Recent Soviet policies regarding industrial producer prices, agricultural purchase prices, and retail prices are analyzed. Effects on the level and structure of each price category, and on the relationships among the three categories, are evaluated. Some constructive steps in the reform of the price system have been taken, and others adopted although not yet implemented, but important deficiencies remain. Hence, further changes are proposed to make prices of all three types reflect cost and scarcity more accurately, in order to exert greater influence on resource allocation and income distribution. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 027, 052, 124, 227.

Methodological aspects in building soviet price indices

Methodological aspects in building soviet price indices

An Empirical Analysis of Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Countries

Soviet trade with the developing countries is analyzed using formal statistical techniques. Soviet imports of primary products are found to grow more rapidly but to be no more stable than imports of these products by market economies. Evidence is found of Soviet price discrimination in trade in favor of LDC members of the CMEA and against LDCs with which it has bilateral clearing agreements (BCAs). BCAs are correlated with greater trade volumes, relatively diverse export structures and more stable LDC exports to the Soviet Union. No evidence exists that Soviet aid deliveries are linked systematically with later Soviet imports. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 124, 421, 443

L'aide militaire soviétique au Tiers Monde

Soviet Military Aid to the Third World, by Moshe Efrat The price of Soviet arms is much higher than is generally believed in the West. Soviet pricing policy is different of the two main categories of military equipment. The price list quoted for the arms themselves is very favourable, whilst the prices for complementary Systems are usually much doser to international market prices. It follows therefore that foreign military expenditure is either much greater, or goods purchased by the Third World fewer, than has commonly been thought. The actual cost of conventional armaments supplied by the Soviet Union could be more than double the amount normally estima-ted by Western observers.

Soviet market power and pricing behaviour in Western export markets

INCREASED involvement of the Soviet Union in world markets over the past two decades has led to a continuing debate in the West over the distribution of trade benefits between the USSR and its Western trade partners. I Part of the concern with this distribution derives from the common perception that the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade enables the USSR to earn monopoly (or monopsony, as the case may be) profits in East-West trade at the expense of Western firms. Some observers have been making the point for some time, however, that the existence of this internal, institutional monopoly over Soviet foreign trade does not necessarily translate into Soviet 'market power' on Western markets.2 (By 'market power' we mean the ability to affect the prices paid for imports and received for exports.) Indeed, with the USSR in recent years accounting for less than 2% of the foreign trade turnover of OECD countries, many observers, including this one, have tended to suggest that the Soviet Union enjoys little market power on Western markets. Heretofore, however, there has been no systematic attempt to investigate the degree of Soviet market power and Soviet pricing behaviour on Western markets. This study examines, for the first time in an intensive and disaggregated way, the degree of Soviet market power in Western export markets. Although market power is easy to define (as above), it is very difficult to measure. Obviously market share in general has a bearing on the degree of market power, but there is no magical market-share criterion which we may use in distinguishing between a 'price taker' and a potential 'price maker' in a given market. Furthermore, it is not always clear how the relevant market for market-share calculations should be defined. Moreover, as 'price leadership' and some other oligopolistic models suggest, having a sizeable market share does not necessarily mean that a given exporter will actively use its market power. For the purposes of this paper we will consider a share of 10% or more in a relevant market as an indicator of potential market power. How Soviet organizations choose to use their market power, when they have it, is another question. Whether Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTOs)

A Note on Soviet Pricing, Profits and Technological Choice

Journal Article A Note on Soviet Pricing, Profits and Technological Choice Get access Morgan Åberg, Morgan Åberg University of Gothenburg Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Håkan Persson Håkan Persson University of Gothenburg Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 47, Issue 3, April 1980, Pages 629–635, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297313 Published: 01 April 1980 Article history Received: 01 July 1978 Accepted: 01 May 1979 Published: 01 April 1980

Inflation in the Planned Economies: Some Estimates for Eastern Europe

The desirability of constructing independent measures of economic activity within centrally-planned economies has been urged by all scholars familiar with the incomplete and often ambiguous nature of officially released statistics. In particular, price indices of the Soviet Union and Eastern European (Soviet-type) economies are viewed with considerable suspicion. Warren Nutter [6], for example, has argued that Soviet .. statistics are grist for the propaganda mill, . and consequently, officially reported indices suffer from lack of reliability because of selectivity, ambiguity, and misrepresentation. More recently, a comprehensive evaluation of Soviet price statistics led Morris Bornstein [2] to conclude that these statistics .. are of little help in measuring inflationary pressure. These statements suggest two possible sources of unreliability in the reported indexes. One is outright misrepresentation, for whatever reasons, by the authorities. Second, and of perhaps even more importance, is the widespread use of non-price rationing-both formal and informal-as practiced within the planned economies. Such non-pecuniary rationing, as evidenced by perennial shortages, lengthening queues, bulging savings accounts, and the ever present tolkach (expediter), strongly suggests that prices are being held below market-clearing levels. Consequently, even if faithfully reported, list-prices would not capture the degree of inflation which is being repressed through price control. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a method for measuring the extent of domestic inflation within countries for which the officially reported

The administration of the Soviet price system

The administration of the Soviet price system

Effects of the Soviet price reform of 1967 on energy consumption

(1978). Effects of the Soviet price reform of 1967 on energy consumption. Soviet Studies: Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 394-402.

The ratchet, price sensitivity, and assortment plan

The performance of the USSR economy is seriously damaged by the proclivity of enterprises to restrict output and to violate their assortment plan. This note shows that when managers of multiproduct enterprises successfully restrict output, they thereby also increase the influence of output prices on their selection of the relative levels of production of the various goods. If Soviet prices are irrational in that they do not reflect relative scarcities, the increased influence of output prices on this set of managerial decisions induces socially dysfunctional decisions. Moreover, the restriction of output may cause enterprises to violate their assortment plan. The analysis focuses on the two features of the incentive system that induce managers to restrict output and abstracts away from other considerations.

The Impact of Adjusted Factor Cost Valuation on the CES Interpretation of Postwar Soviet Economic Growth

Assessing the determinants of Soviet postwar economic growth has proven to be an enticing but elusive pursuit. Various aggregate production function studies carried out with both official Soviet and Western data have yielded results that raise as many questions as they clarify (principally Weitzman, 1970, subsequent comments on his study, and the studies of Desai, 1976, and Gomulka, 1974). In addition to sundry interpretive difficulties of a purely technical sort, deep problems of valuation continue to obscure the analytic significance of any parametric estimation of postwar Soviet economic growth. This paper seeks to illuminate these issues by testing the CES specification of Soviet growth in adjusted factor cost prices, which more closely approximate the neoclassical opportunity cost norm than do valuation schema employed in previous studies. A two-step estimation technique is utilized for estimation purposes, the results of which reveal that the rate of neutral technical change has been greater, and the degree of capital utilization less, than formerly supposed, while the elasticity of substitution remains essentially unchanged from the already low estimates reported by others for this important parameter. Moreover, in the broader perspective of Soviet economic development, our analysis suggests that the Soviets may be more firmly shackled to their traditional growth model than recent scholarly speculation indicates. Before proceeding to a detailed consideration of postwar Soviet growth valued in adjusted factor cost prices, however, fundamental problems of aggregation raised by the peculiar nature of Soviet price formation must be addressed.

Soviet Pricing, Profits and Technological Choice

It is an article of faith in Western economic thought that the only useful prices are scarcity prices, that is, marginal-cost prices which equate supply and demand. This idea receives its most vigorous support when the pricing of inputs is to be used as a means of bringing about productive efficiency. Even some socialists accepted this view. In his essay, On the Economic Theory of Socialism , Oskar Lange [2, p. 94] wrote that the rule to produce at the minimum average cost has no significance unless prices represent the relative scarcity of the factors of production . Official Soviet policy requires that prices of producers' goods be set so as to ensure a profit for each normally functioning enterprise . Prices obtained under these circumstances reflect production costs associated with the entire range of production techniques in use, rather than those associated with only the marginal technique. These prices do not in general equal marginal costs (and they do not equate supply and demand) so it is hardly surprising that Western economists are sceptical about their efficacy. In particular, because prices of intermediate goods do not reflect their relative economic scarcity, one would expect the Soviet pricing policy to have an adverse impact on technological choice. Nevertheless, I believe that Soviet pricing policy does not inherently result in inefficient production. With the aid of a mathematical model designed to resemble certain aspects of the Soviet economic framework, I shall argue that the Soviet pricing policy will, under certain conditions, tend to promote the adoption of optimal production techniques.

A NOTE ON PRICING MECHANISM IN THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE U.S.S.R.

When we consider the price policy of the Soviet Union, which was enforced to facilitate the creation and establishment of heavy industries, in relation to the price mechanism as it actually functions in the economic process, it may be said that its function should be found within, and not without, the price mechanism. This not only indicates the transitional character of the Soviet price policy but presents suggestions for a genuine socialist price mechanism.

The Soviet Price Reform Discussion

I. Background of the discussion, 16. — II. Criticisms of present industrial wholesale prices, 18; relationship of price to “value,” 20; relative prices and choice, 21; control and evaluation of enterprise performance, 22; measurement of macroeconomic relationships, 23. — III. Reform proposals, 23; the traditionalist school, 24; the surplus product markup schools, 28; the opportunity cost school, 36. — IV. Conclusion, 45.

The changing role of Soviet prices

The changing role of Soviet prices

The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era. The Soviet Price System. Soviet Proces of Producers Goods. Three volumes by Naum Jasny. (Stanford University Food Research-Institute, Misc. Publications IIA, IIB, IIC.) Stanford: University Press, 1951, 1951, 1952. Pp. ix, 116; ix, 179; vii, 180. Paper, $2.00 each.

The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era. The Soviet Price System. Soviet Proces of Producers Goods. Three volumes by Naum Jasny. (Stanford University Food Research-Institute, Misc. Publications IIA, IIB, IIC.) Stanford: University Press, 1951, 1951, 1952. Pp. ix, 116; ix, 179; vii, 180. Paper, $2.00 each.