Soviet Nuclear Power Research Articles

Breeding Soviet Progress

This article investigates an ambitious attempt to materialise the imaginary of atomic‑powered communism on the Southern periphery of the post‑Stalinist USSR: the nuclear complex of Shevchenko on Kazakhstan’s Caspian shore, which combined uranium mining, a fast breeder reactor and large‑scale nuclear‑powered water desalination in a modernist showcase city, to domestic and international acclaim. The analysis focuses on how political and technoscientific developments set each other’s pace in Soviet nuclear modernity, and points to a number of ways in which their diverging operational rationales were out of step, resulting in an uneasy combination of late‑Soviet technocratic visions with brute‑force modernisation carried over from Stalinist industrialization. It is argued that these contradictions aligned in large part with two competing ways in which key actors framed the Soviet nuclear power programme: first, in terms of a nuclear exceptionalism which aimed to synergise the mobilizational clout of the Soviet system with the transformative power of the atom to achieve revolutionary progress, prioritising quantity over quality, and second, in terms of a nuclear internationalism which saw the USSR at the forefront of universal technoscientific advancement, competing and cooperating across the bloc divide with countries such as France and the US to improve the efficiency and safety of nuclear power generation, with an emphasis on quality. The history of Shevchenko provides insights into both of these tendencies, which, it is claimed, already prefigured the idiosyncrasies of Russia’s present nuclear technopolitics.

When safe enough is not good enough: Organizing safety at Chernobyl

The threat of global climate change has pushed governments around the world to consider alternative energy sources, including nuclear energy. As the interest in nuclear power increases, serious discussions on safety must resume before moving forward. There is no better time than now, the twenty-fifth anniversary of Chernobyl, to revisit the causes of the worst civilian nuclear disaster in history in an attempt to prevent future accidents. The author reviews initial reports that accused operators of violating instructions, but also looks at evidence that surfaced in the early 1990s, which suggested that the reactor design, combined with a lack of information sharing, were to blame for the explosion. While it is imperative to address human error, design flaws, and communication failures, the author argues that organizational characteristics of the Soviet nuclear power sector deserve more attention by scholars and policy makers. Chernobyl was not a disaster waiting to happen, the author writes, but occurred despite ongoing efforts to improve technical design, operator training, and inter-organizational communication. Chernobyl, in this interpretation, illuminates that what the nuclear industry considers “safe enough” is always linked to specific historical periods, cultural settings, and institutional arrangements, and that even the best efforts to ensure nuclear safety may not be good enough.

Organizational Culture and Professional Identities in the Soviet Nuclear Power Industry

Abstract This essay describes the evolution and interaction of powerful constituencies within the Soviet nuclear energy community since the late 1950s. It elucidates the historical origins of the alleged distinction between nuclear specialists (atomshchiki) and power engineers (energetiki) and explores why there was not more disagreement with and resistance to state authorities. The emerging civilian nuclear industry faced the dual legacy of the atomic bomb project and the state electrification program, a legacy that informed attempts to regulate a complex, dual‐use technology, as well as the values and routines of specialists involved with the design and operation of nuclear power reactors. The essay argues that rather than cynicism, a deep commitment to scientific rationality and an often personal conviction of the necessity of nuclear energy permeated this heterogeneous community of experts. The secrecy imposed on their work only reinforced these experts’ loyalty to a state that embodied their own tech...

Technological utopianism in the twenty‐first century: russia's nuclear future

The Soviet nuclear power establishment, the second largest in the world, has embarked on an ambitious program to build dozens of reactors between 2003 and 2020. The rejuvenation of that Soviet establishment through Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) is based on the technological utopianism of Russian political and scientific leaders. They see nuclear energy as a way to maintain Russia's great power status. They have adopted approaches to reactor development prominent in the Soviet era. These include building dozens of new reactors in construction time faster than seen before in world history, upgrading several Chernobyl‐type reactors, accepting spent fuel from abroad for storage in exchange for cash, and floating—literally—nuclear power stations on barges for use in Russia's far north and for export. There are few controls on MinAtom within the government, and public involvement in the technology assessment process is limited.

Nuclear power in the Soviet Union and in Russia

This paper contains a brief description of nuclear power reactor designs, which gives a base planning of its development and provides the scientific and research basis of its further realization. The paper states the successive stages of these plans, their modifications and fulfilment. The article dwells upon the peculiarities of the technical solutions for three main types of reactors and NPPs in more detail, which constitute the base for commercial nuclear power in the Soviet Union and Russia: pressurized water vessel-type (VVER), channel graphite type with boiling water cooling (RBMK) and fast neutron type with sodium coolant (BN). Also stated is the development of safety principles in Soviet nuclear power and the transformation of corresponding technical solutions in the plants' designs. The article describes specific traits of NPP equipment construction, which are different from Western analogues, and whch resulted from the independent development of corresponding technologies and constructions. The article also discusses the main solutions in connection with the new generation of nuclear power plants, demonstrating the necessarily increased safety level, which are being constructed at present, as well as the scientific and technical base which enables the realization of these solutions. The conclusion contains a discussion relating the place of nuclear power in the Russian power industry, updated prognoses of its possible development, its long-term supply of nuclear fuel, and the economic competitiveness of nuclear energy sources compared with fossil fuel ones.

Safety in the former Soviet nuclear power industry

Despite significant growth within the Soviet nuclear industry in the 1970s, the underlying ethos legislated against an effective safety culture. In retrospect, it seems to have been almost inevitable that some incident would occur-events at Chernobyl in 1986 merely served to confirm this. This incident alerted Western nuclear experts, as well as the public worldwide, to the risks taken in the Soviet industry. While, in practical terms, Soviet and East European nuclear development slowed considerably, it was not until the collapse of communism that the official standpoint on nuclear power changed and Western operators gained the opportunity to co-operate in safety work. However, the associated political upheaval and economic depression introduce new concerns. This article examines the changes which have occurred in the civil nuclear industry in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Trapped Soviet nuclear power reactor finally to go home

Trapped Soviet nuclear power reactor finally to go home

CHERNOBYL': FIVE YEARS LATER

One of the most knowledgeable Western experts on the Chernobyl' disaster assesses widely varying interpretations of its impact based on new information available upon the fifth anniversary of the accident. After a brief account of alternative interpretations of the causes of the accident, the article focuses on radioactive contamination and public health hazards, national and republic-level programs designed to ameliorate its aftereffects, impacts on the Soviet nuclear power industry and the Soviet energy supply in general, and the situation at the Chernobyl' plant itself.

American strategy after the cold war: The price of disengagement

Abstract Basic foreign policy options for the United States in the post‐cold war period are such that withdrawal and nonentanglement are neither feasible nor desirable, and full U.S. engagement is necessary to maintain international stability. No other power or combination can substitute, especially in residual deterrence of Soviet nuclear power, but also in containing outlaw states like Iraq. U.S. vital interests are tied to the world future, involving 12 key goals for the “Millennium”: framing a stable order; accommodating change; protecting diversity; preventing genocide; suppressing terrorism; curbing arms proliferation; building consensus on environmental change; sustaining economic growth; improving LDC share of planetary product; better coordinating of G‐7 macroeconomic policies; redressing American economic imbalances; and rationalizing international organizations. The cold war shaped the present organizational disorders, so streamlining of structure and remodeling of the United Nations is now fea...

Something in the wind: politics after Chernobyl

The accident at Chernobyl drew attention to the whole question of nuclear technology. The broad political context in which nuclear power has developed is discussed. Chapter One gives an account of the Soviet nuclear power programme. The connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons are established in the second chapter and in chapter 3 the role of special interest groups and of secrecy in nuclear power decision-making is considered. The following two chapters look at the dialogues between social movements in East-West and North-South splits. Alternative ways in which the world could reduce its reliance on nuclear energy are proposed in the final section. This includes a chapter on alternative ways of thinking about economics, social and political development in the Third World and the final chapter on the philosophy of moving away from the technocratic assumptions of the Cold War towards international democratic politics. The nine chapters are all indexed separately. The nuclear facilities in the world are listed at the end country by country. There is also a glossary. (U.K.).

Soviet nuclear power plant programme marks time

Soviet nuclear power plant programme marks time

Nuclear power safety and the role of international organization

Sovereign states determine the health and safety regulation of nuclear power facilities almost exclusively. Yet the Soviet nuclear power accident at Chernobyl (April 1986) demonstrated that nuclear power can have significant health and political effects transcending state boundaries. Several meetings have been held at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the Chernobyl accident, with delegates seeking to find the proper balance between autonomous state decision-making and international or transboundary interests. This article examines the nuclear safety role of IAEA in the past, and comes to conclusions regarding its likely role in the future. I claim that IAEA is unlikely to become a powerful regulatory “watchdog,” but that incremental changes in the agency could, over time, create a significant international presence.

Soviet nuclear power: Teething trouble persists

Soviet nuclear power: Teething trouble persists

Soviet nuclear power: Signs of caution

Soviet nuclear power: Signs of caution

Nuclear Energy: Achievements and Problems

Nuclear power plant construction is so common, so ordinary, that it frequently overshadows the significance of various events in the development of this new and important branch of domestic energy production. But comparisons make everything clear. The Soviet nuclear power industry has now reached a point at which it annually activates capacities capable of producing approximately 2 million kilowatts a year. Is this a lot or little? It is unquestionably a great deal if we consider that only 1.5 million kilowatts of atomic power-generating capacities were put into operation in the USSR from the time of activation of the world's first atomic power plants (APPs) in 1954 to 1970 (i.e., in a 16-year period).

Nuclear Energy: Achievements and Problems

Nuclear power plant construction is so common, so "ordinary," that it frequently overshadows the significance of various events in the development of this new and important branch of domestic energy production. But comparisons make everything clear. The Soviet nuclear power industry has now reached a point at which it annually activates capacities capable of producing approximately 2 million kilowatts a year. Is this a lot or little? It is unquestionably a great deal if we consider that only 1.5 million kilowatts of atomic power-generating capacities were put into operation in the USSR from the time of activation of the world's first atomic power plants (APPs) in 1954 to 1970 (i.e., in a 16-year period).

Soviet Nuclear Power Station Construction

Soviet Nuclear Power Station Construction

Soviet Nuclear Power: A different approach to nuclear safety

Soviet Nuclear Power: A different approach to nuclear safety

Soviet nuclear power specialists' tour of the Netherlands and Belgium

Soviet nuclear power specialists' tour of the Netherlands and Belgium

Handling of radioactive waste at Soviet nuclear power stations

Handling of radioactive waste at Soviet nuclear power stations