Soviet Military Presence Research Articles

«День Афганистана» в 1980-е гг. как пропагандистское мероприятие администрации США

On the basis of American official documents (primarily US State Department documents), the author examines such a propaganda event of the US administration as “Afghanistan Day”, held from 1982 to 1988 inclusive in connection with the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and should demonstrate support for Afghan anti-government groups. This issue has not yet become the subject of a separate study, which is the scientific novelty of the article. The main method used in this article is the method of comparative analysis. The author examines the proclamations announcing the “Afghanistan Day” of US State Department and of US President and briefly examines the activities carried out in connection with this action. The author also compares “Afghanistan Day” and “Baltic Freedom Day” as similar events carried out by the US administration in the 1980s. The author also touches on such a topic as the attitude of the Soviet and Afghan governments to this event and analyzes their some official statements on this issue. It seems possible to conclude that “Afghanistan Day” was part of the complex propaganda activities carried out by the United States in connection with the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. On its own, “Afghanistan Day” could hardly have had a significant effect, but in combination with other propaganda events, it undoubtedly had an impact, helping to strengthen the position of the United States in the Soviet-American “propaganda war”.

Guest Editor’s Introduction

Guest Editor’s Introduction

Improvised Liberation, October 1944: The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation and the Red Army in Norway. Part 2

ABSTRACT This is the second of a two-part article exploring the background of the Red Army’s move into Norway on 18 October 1944. Did it reflect ambitions to prepare the ground for a long-term Soviet military presence in Norway or to create leverage for political influence? It was not: crossing the border became unavoidable once the strategic aim of the offensive, to surround and then destroy the main forces of the Germans’ 19th Mountain Corps on Soviet territory, failed. The rational for the Soviet move was tactical, not strategic or political. This part follows general Meretskov’s planning for and the execution of the successive steps of the operation starting from the elaboration of the final plans in late September. The military events are related to events in Moscow, including the interaction between the Norwegians and their Soviet ally and an illuminating exchange between Stalin and Churchill on the evening of 14 October. It concludes by briefly discussing the Soviet withdrawal in September 1945.

Improvised Liberation, October 1944: The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation and the Red Army in Norway. Part I

ABSTRACT This is the first of a double article on the Red Army’s offensive against the German 20th Mountain Army in the Murmansk sector, October–November 1944, soon to be known as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive Operation, Petsamo-Kirkenesskaya nastupatel’naya operatsiya, or simply the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. Based on Soviet military archival sources, the article focuses on the background of the Karelian Front’s 14th Army’s move into Norway on 18 October 1944. Was this reflecting a larger scheme to prepare the ground for a Soviet military presence in Norway or to create leverage for political influence? My conclusion is that it was not. Pursuing retreating German troops across the border into Norway was not part of the plans for the 14th Army’s offensive; the move into Norway became unavoidable once the strategic aim of the offensive — to surround and then destroy the German forces on Soviet territory — failed. Contrary to Soviet expectations — and leaving behind much of their heavy weapons and equipment and suffering heavy losses — the 20th Mountain Army successfully withdrew its main units from Finnish and Soviet territory across the border to Norway. This operational rationale for the Soviet military presence in Norway also explains why the last Soviet troops left as early as September 1945. This first article follows the evolution of the Karelian Front’s planning against the German units in the Murmansk sector from its beginning in February 1944 until late September, when Stavka finally instructed the Front commander Kirill A. Meretskov to finalize the planning for the 14th Army’s offensive. As crucial background to the operational planning and developments, and based on mostly Soviet and British sources, the article also analyzes Norway’s place in Stalin’s and his entourage’s ambitions for the post-war order in Europe.

Афганский вооруженный конфликт в 1980-е годы и позиция некоторых государств Латинской Америки

The article reviews the policy of some Latin American states regarding the Afghan armed conflict of 1979–1989 with the participation of Soviet troops. The objective of the study is to find out the degree of support by Latin American states for both Soviet policy in Afghanistan and the Afghan government itself of that period. To achieve the objective of the study, the author resorts to studying documents, including collections of foreign policy documents of the Soviet Union and UN documentation. The author separately considered the Cuban policy in this matter, separately – the policy of the Latin American socialist-oriented states (Nicaragua and Grenada), the author also refers to the policy regarding the Afghan conflict of states that took an intermediate position of support for conflict (for example, Argentina and Mexico). The author pays the main attention to the diplomatic position of the above-mentioned states. The author comes to the following conclusions: on the Latin American continent, fewer states supported the Soviet policy in Afghanistan compared with the number of states condemning it or holding a neutral position – but nonetheless, the number of these supporters throughout the 1980s remained stable. A key supporter of the «Afghan» policy of the USSR in Latin America in the 1980s was Cuba, while Cuba supported not so much the policy of the USSR in Afghanistan, expressed in maintaining the Soviet military presence there, but the line aimed at a political settlement of the Afghan conflict; Nicaragua and Grenada’s position was more restrained than Cuban’s, and after the October events of 1983, the USSR lost the Grenadian support for its «Afghan» policy; and some states of the continent took an intermediate position – they did not provide the USSR with direct diplo-matic support, but carried it out indirectly.

Lidé z obsazeného města. Sonda do vzpomínek pamětníků přítomnosti sovětské posádky v Olomouci

Sovětská posádka byla v Olomouci dislokována v říjnu 1968 a ovlivňovala tvář města téměř třiadvacet let, až do ukončení odchodu sovětských vojsk z Československa v roce 1991. Vedle samotných vojáků k ní patřili také rodinní příslušníci důstojníků a civilní zaměstnanci útvarů se svými rodinami. Sověti tak ve městě utvořili svébytnou komunitu, která se dostávala při různých příležitostech do kontaktu s místním obyvatelstvem. Dílčí částí výzkumu věnovaného olomoucké sovětské posádce je práce s výpověďmi pamětníků. Důraz je kladen na individuální zkušenost pamětníka, na stopy, jaké v jeho vzpomínkách zanechal postoj k olomouckým Sovětům a jednání s nimi. Jde přitom převážně o pamětníky, kteří se s nimi nejčastěji potkávali v ulicích města nebo na "družebních" akcích, a jejichž zkušenosti tedy vycházejí z pohledu "zvenčí". Získané poznatky se vztahují k oficiálním setkáním s olomouckými Sověty v rámci "družby", k jednáním a postojům vůči nim mimo tento prostor (od přátelského vztahu a korektního vystupování přes míjení až po konfliktní situace) a ukazují také určité opakující se motivy ve výpovědích, zachycující obrazy sovětské přítomnosti ve městě (sovětská samoobsluha s prodavačkami používajícími počitadla, tzv. sčoty, důstojník s osobním sluhou vlekoucím zavazadla, zanedbané a zastaralé uniformy vojáků základní služby).

Sovětská základna uprostřed Čech. Milovice v době sovětské vojenské přítomnosti na území Československa (1968-1991)

Studie se pokouší v ucelené podobě zachytit různé stránky spjaté s přítomností sovětské vojenské posádky ve středočeské obci Milovice v letech 1968 až 1991. Opírá se přitom do značné míry o lokální archivní a jiné prameny. Autor nejprve stručně představuje historii Milovic. Tato lokalita i s okolím byla od počátku dvacátého století významně modelována pod vlivem unikátního vojenského výcvikového prostoru v místní části Mladá, který sloužil postupně rakousko-uherské, československé, německé, znovu československé a nakonec sovětské armádě. Milovice tak tvoří ojedinělé prostředí, které v současnosti prochází přeměnou z oblasti zatížené chátrajícími vojenskými objekty a ekologickými škodami v dynamicky se rozvíjející menší město. Zvláště zajímavá kapitola tohoto místa se začala psát po 21. srpnu 1968, kdy intervenční Sovětská armáda převzala zdejší vojenský prostor a zřídila zde nejen početnou posádku, ale také sídlo Střední skupiny sovětských vojsk. Milovice se tak staly nejen prominentní a přísně střeženou zónou, ale i politickým symbolem sovětské vojenské přítomnosti v Československu.Autor se zaměřuje především na vývoj vztahů mezi místními obyvateli a příslušníky sovětské posádky (patřili k ní nejen vojáci, ale i rodiny důstojníků a civilní zaměstnanci), ale také na změny zdejšího prostředí i každodenního života a na důsledky sovětského pobytu v daném období. Sleduje protesty místních občanů proti sovětské invazi, jejich odmítavé reakce na usídlení sovětské posádky a poté postup takzvané normalizace na Milovicku a v nymburském okrese, vyznačující se změnou postojů místních politických orgánů a stranickými prověrkami, navazováním styků se Sovětskou armádou i manifestačními návštěvami oficiálních státních a stranických činitelů. Zevrubně popisuje problematickou bezpečnostní situaci v Milovicích s množstvím drobnějších kriminálních incidentů i zostřenou policejní kontrolou, vážné ekologické škody, zejména znečištění vodních zdrojů a půdy ropnými produkty, problémy obyvatel se zásobováním pitnou vodou, potravinami a průmyslovým zbožím (ale i oblíbené nákupy místních v nadstandardně zásobených sovětských prodejnách), dopravní komplikace, devastaci obytných a veřejných prostor, spojenou s častým nerespektováním předpisů a pravidel soužití ze strany sovětských občanů. Líčí ale také neformální kontakty domácích obyvatel se sovětskou posádkou, často za účelem nelegálního výměnného obchodu nedostatkového zboží, a vedle toho oficiální projevy československo-sovětské "družby". Trvalým průvodním rysem sovětské přítomnosti byly stížnosti místních obyvatel na rozmanité problémy, které byly na příslušných místech řešeny většinou jen formálně nebo vůbec, a marná snaha o zjednání nápravy.

Rock opera and resistance

Stephen, the King (1983), the most popular Hungarian rock opera, succeeded in bringing alive the well-known foundational myth of the Hungarian nation state by means of a new genre and its political relevance as a covert protest against the Soviet military presence. The rock opera was also extremely popular among members of Hungarian communities beyond the borders. The article compares two, very different cases of trans-border Hungarian identities focused around Stephen, the King: the Transylvanian reception of the rock opera and, based on Réka Pigniczky’s documentary Incubator, its American-Hungarian readings. The latter qualifies as a hybrid identity in progress, while Transylvania, a site of permanent cultural and political friction between Hungary and Romania, displays a cultural identity that is inherently mixed, a borderland identity. Capitalizing on Stuart Hall’s understanding of cultural identities, we argue that the diasporic/minority reception of the rock opera enabled unique ways of imag(in)ing national belonging, which were, to a great extent, different from its reception in Hungary. Our case studies confirm that both diasporic and borderland identities have received a boost via the new popular genre, enabling both groups to forge bonds with the imagined community of Hungarians and what they perceived as Hungarian national culture.

Spooks, Tribes, and Holy Men: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The Central Intelligence Agency played a crucial role in US policy during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, scholars have overly focused on the idea that the CIA promoted a global ‘jihad’. This article instead looks at knowledge-formation within the agency to understand US approaches to the conflict, and to Afghan society more generally. Drawing on recently declassified analyses and reporting from intra-agency departments, this article reveals that agency officials focused largely on the idea of ‘tradition’ to understand the organization and motivations of the Afghan resistance. This trope emphasized Afghanistan's historically ‘tribal’ and ethnically divided nature and presented a static view of an unchangeable, backwards society incapable of coordinating to counter the Soviet military presence. In this reading, officials actually downplayed in the importance of Islam to Afghan society, dismissing it as a potential political force in the region. Ultimately, this article reflects on CIA officials’ limitations in envisioning a post-invasion Afghanistan, finding explanations in their rigid views of Afghan political and social organization which prevented them from recognizing the invasion's potential to catalyze longer-term changes.

DRIVING FORCES OF THE EMERGENCE AND MAINTENANCE OF ESTONIAN – RUSSIAN BILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION REGIME IN THE 1990S

Introduction According to Samuel P. Huntington great historical line that has existed for centuries separating Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples runs along what are now borders between the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Russia [...] (Huntington 1998: 158). Estonia's geopolitical location on the border of two civilizations and its recent history, i.e. its turning from a small brother in the Soviet family into a sovereign subject of international law, or in other words, into an equal neighbour of the Russian Federation, make it an interesting subject for studying the driving forces and mechanisms of the emergence and maintenance of cooperation between the two countries differing substantially by size, importance on the international arena and cultural background. 10 years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and peaceful restoration of Estonia's independence in 1991, between the two neighbours--Russian Federation with its population of approximately 150 million and Estonia with its population of only 1.4 million--still have considerable room for improvement. It has often been pointed out that cooperation between the two states has not been developing so well and quickly as desirable. In spite of declarations that dynamic and friendly with Russia are among Estonia's security policy priorities (Klaar 1997:18), the list of unresolved political, economic and social issues, hampering normal development of two neighbours, has not significantly shortened over the last decade. Despite long-lasting negotiations and assurances from both sides that technical questions have been solved, the two countries still have not succeeded in signing an official agreement on borders. Economic between the two states are often overshadowed by political considerations, e.g. the unfavourable taxation regime, imposed by Russian authorities on many of Estonian products. The legacy left by the Soviet military presence can also be considered as a source of tension--there were 1565 military objects of the former Soviet Union in Estonia with the total area in their possession of about 87.000 hectares, i.e. 1.9% of Estonia's territory. Damage to the environment was estimated at about 4 billion USD (Raukas 1999:119). Although not directly threatened by its eastern neighbour today, Russia is still often implicitly considered as one of the main outside threats to Estonian security (Vares 1999, Kivi 1999, Luha 1999). Hostility and threats from the Russian side have also several times been openly demonstrated (Kadak 1999:70). The Russian Federation, on the other hand, has been continuously expressing its discontent with several political priorities and developments in Estonia during the 1990s. A difficult and interrelated set of bilateral issues, and especially the inter-ethnic between Russian minority and Estonian majority has been the most outstanding bilateral problem from the Russian point of view (Russia and... 1998). One of Estonian political priorities--accession to NATO, has continuously been causing mistrust and misunderstanding between two neighbours (Loshchinin 1997: 13-14, Shustov 1998:18, Suslov 1999). In the frame of these unfavourable conditions, however, regular environmental cooperation between Estonia and the Russian Federation has emerged and is still being successfully maintained. Several intergovernmental agreements on fisheries and environmental protection have been negotiated and signed, regular meetings of intergovernmental bodies held, and in the field of environmental protection, both on governmental and on non-governmental levels, built and strengthened. International regimes--defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations (Krasner 1983:2)--have been in the centre of scientific efforts to explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behaviour of state actors in the field of environmental protection (Zurn 1998). …

Sino-Indian Rapproachement and the Sino-Pakistan Entente

The several years preceeding Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's December 1988 visit to China saw significant improvements in Indian-Chinese relations. Following his visit, Sino-Indian relations became more cordial than at any time since the mid-1950s. China's close relation with Pakistan has been very important to Beijing. It is a long standing friendship that has been, as the Chinese and Pakistanis like to say, tested by adversity, which has come in the form of regime change and upheavals in both countries, fundamental realignments in the international system, and war. Pakistan played a major role in China's strategy for coping with India and, following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union. I By the time of the Deng Xiaoping-Mikhail Gorbachev summit meeting of May 1989, however, Sino-Soviet relations were increasingly cordial. Gorbachev acceded to Beijing's three demands-withdrawal from Afghanistan, ceasing support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and drawing down the Soviet military presence on China's northern borders. This redefined Sino-Soviet relations, reducing the utility of Pakistan to Beijing in the countering of Soviet encirclement. Moscow's withdrawal from Afghanistan was of special relevance here. Then following the Western sanctions in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, Beijing sought to renew its lapsed membership in the Third World, beginning with China's large southern neighbor, India. Since its formation in 1964 the Sino-Pakistan entente has been a significant source of contention in

The Soviet military presence in Egypt 1967–1972: A new perspective

(1995). The Soviet military presence in Egypt 1967–1972: A new perspective. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 547-565.

Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944-1958

In 1958, after fourteen years of military occupation, Khrushchev-in an unprecedented act-withdrew the Soviet Union's troops from Romania as part of a political move intended to encourage the withdrawal of Western military forces from Europe. In analyzing this crucial historic episode, Sergiu Verona's comprehensive study illustrates the dynamics of Soviet military presence in Romania and provides a framework for understanding Soviet security policy, then and now, as well as the interaction between Soviet military objectives and diplomacy. Drawing on declassified archival material in the United States and the United Kingdom, the author considers Khrushchev's reversal of Stalinist expansionism by examining the motivation, function, and operation of the initial occupation of Romania; the complex involvement of Soviet diplomacy and its perception by the United States and other Western powers; the process by which Khrushchev decided to withdraw Soviet troops from that country; and the impact of this decision on Soviet policy. Verona extends his analysis, providing comparisons between Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's approaches to Eastern Europe, noting that similarities exist not only in domestic policies but in the realm of foreign policy as well.

Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship

Until the Soviet military intervention in December 1979, Afghanistan had appeared largely as a political irritant for Pakistan, a petulant and resentful neighbor. The Afghan irredentism represented by the call for a Pushtunistan (an independent state for cross-border Pushtuns), although potentially a challenge to Pakistan's national integrity, was deemed manageable mainly because, economically and militarily, Afghanistan was no match for Pakistan. Pakistan's adversarial relations with India and domestic regional instability posed more serious problems for its national security. However, the deployment of Soviet troops, together with the arming of a government of Moscow's own making in Kabul, altered this picture by presenting what was perceived to be a geostrategic threat. Conceivably, the Soviets might hope to use Afghanistan as a stepping-stone to the Indian Ocean in fulfillment of the legendary Russian dream of a warmwater port. If, indeed, these were the intentions of the Soviet Union, then the presumed route taken would have been through Pakistan's port of Gwadar in Baluchistan and hence, perhaps, to control of the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf. In their worst moments, Pakistani planners could imagine having to fight a two-front war in which its army would face a pincer movement as the Soviets and their Afghan allies were joined by Pakistan's traditional adversary, India. Even if the Soviets had no intention of making a direct move against Pakistan, the danger existed that a war that dragged on could spill over, drawing in Pakistan as a combatant. A victory by the communists would leave a permanent border threat, especially since it was likely to include an indefinite Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Once the Soviet military became bogged down in fighting the Afghan resistance, the possibility of a frontal attack on Pakistan diminished. More

The influence of increasing Soviet military power in the far east on the security of the Korean Peninsula

The increasing Soviet military presence at a close distance poses a more practical and serious threat to the security of Korea than any other country in the region. The Soviet transfer to North Korea of such sophisticated weapons as surface-to-surface missiles, the flight of Soviet aircraft over the airspace of North Korea, and Port calls by Soviet vessels are some manifestations of its intention to deploy forces in case of emergency. Particularly in the face of two important events in Korea in 1988-a peaceful transfer of government and the Seoul Olympic Games-the joint military maneuvers in the East Sea and the reiteration of the Soviet support of North Korea in case of emergency made recently clearly indicate it. This paper suggests that Korea's security policy be planned and implemented on the following premises: (1) strengthening of the self-defense posture; (2) further consolidation of ROK-US combined defense capabilities; (3) emphasis on the fixation of peace in the Northeast Asian region. This Paper also directs attention to the need for the establishment of crisis management system and the continued pursuit of the inter Korean dialogue as a deterrent of armed hostility from the North.

The Soviet Union and Korea: Perceptions, scholarship, propaganda

Of the four countries divided after World War II (three since 1975), only Germany and Korea became divided as a result of military occupation by the Red Army, with the occupied part eventually being saddled with a Leninist regime and a centrally planned economy. But while East Germany is still forced to tolerate a sizable Soviet military presence, North Korea has been free of Soviet troops for almost 40 years (and free of Chinese troops, which entered the Korean conflict in late 1950 to save the North Korean regime, for almost 30 years). This fact goes a long way toward explaining the difference between East Germany and North Korea in terms of the degree of their dependence on the Soviet Union and hence the degree of their independence in the international arena. There is one other important difference: the presence of Communist China on the North Korean border, creating problems as well as opportunities for North Korea that are absent in the East German case. There are also important asymmetries in the cases of noncommunist South Korea and West Germany. To be sure, both countries are important U.S. allies that permit sizable contingents of American troops armed with nuclear weapons on their territory and that have generally anticommunist populations. In West Germany, the legal Communist party is irrelevant to the political process; and in South Korea, where communist activity is illegal, the memories of the war of 1950-53 have inoculated the populace against the attractions of communist ideology. But the similarities end here. West Germany is one of the world's most important middle powers and one of the most influential members of the European Communi ty one whose economic, industrial, technological, financial, and potential military power is truly first class. South Korea, by comparison, was for the first 30 years after liberation from Japanese colonial control a very minor

The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security

The growing nuclearization of the Soviet military presence in the Far East has been of increasing concern to the United States and its Asian-Pacific allies. This volume brings together the diverse perspectives of multinational groups of defense and foreign policy experts associated with the Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific.

Changing Power Alignments in Northeast Asia

At the beginning of the 1980s, most analysts of East Asian international relations thought that the regional configuration of power which had emerged at the end of the 1970s would endure throughout this decade and beyond. This new configuration was a response to the growing Soviet military presence in the region and Vietnam's expansionist ambitions and was characterized by a quasi-alliance among the United States, Japan, and China in Northeast Asia supported by growing links with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (asean), a group of non-communist states of Southeast Asia. Recently, developments in East Asian international relations have suggested, however, that current power alignments may be less durable than predicted. Growing strains among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing have raised doubts about the stability of their quasi-alliance. Since the accession of the Reagan administration in January 1981, the United States and China have clashed repeatedly over the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. Tensions have also been created

Nepal's Reactions to the Soviet Military Presence in Afghanistan

Nepal's Reactions to the Soviet Military Presence in Afghanistan