Soviet Export Research Articles

Thermodynamic Modeling and Process Simulation of Kumkol Crude Oil Refining

The Crude Distillation Unit (CDU) mechanism is commonly regarded as the first stage in petroleum refining. In this study, Aspen Plus® is used to simulate the basic process of a CDU, which consists of an Atmospheric Distillation Column (ATC) and a Vacuum Distillation Column (VC). These columns are fed with two types of crude oil: KUMKOL from Kazakhstan and Soviet Export Blend, in the proportions of 0.75:0.25, 0.50:0.50, and 0.25:0.75, respectively. The goal was to do a parametric analysis and analyze the resultant streams of naphtha, kerosene, Atmospheric Gas Oil (AGO), Light Vacuum Gas Oil (LVGO), and Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil (HVGO). The simulation used the CHAO-SEA thermodynamic model, which included the Chao-Seader correlation, the Scatchard-Hildebrand model, the Redlich-Kwong equation of state, the Lee-Kesler equation of state, and the API gravity technique. Temperature, pressure, mass flow, enthalpy, vapor percentage, and average molecular weights of the streams at various phases within the CDU system were estimated. For both the ATC and VC columns, curves indicating Temperature- Pressure vs the number of stages, as well as ASTM D86 (temperature) versus stream volume % distillation, were developed. The results show that when compared to feed streams containing 0.25 and 0.50 StdVol of Kumkol Kazakhstan Oil, the feed stream with 0.75 StdVol produces more Heavy, Medium, and Light Vacuum Gas Oil (H-VGO, M-VGO, and L-VGO), as well as more Vacuum Gas (VG). These findings indicate that Kumkol Kazakhstan Oil is of high quality and has fewer contaminants, such as sulfur when compared to other accessible mixes throughout the world.

SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF I.M. YEREMEIEV – A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL PLANT BREEDING

The article deals with the contribution of Professor I.M. Yeremeiev to the development of domestic science and practice, based on the references and publications. The urgency of the research is determined by the fact that the driving force of the social and economic level of the country is the development of science and technology. Achievements of domestic scientists are one of the determining factors of technical progress and economic development of the state. The general scientific principles and methods are the methodological basis of the research. In the process of the research, the scientific activity of I.M. Yeremeiev, the outstanding scientist and breeder, on the creation of plastic, durable, high-protein and high-yield varieties, development of theoretical bases and methods of the breeding process was analyzed. It is emphasized that he went down in the history of breeding as a leading co-author of the winter wheat «Ukrainka 0246», which is the pride of domestic breeding and a calling card of Ukraine. It is noted that the variety received its name in 1920, was regionalized in 1929 and in 1956 was approved by the UN as an international standard for strong wheat, thanks to its high yield and good baking qualities, it became an important article of Soviet export and recognized worldwide bread quality standard. It is pointed out that «Ukrainka 0246» was used in crossbreeding directly and through varieties bred with its participation. Its descendants are more than 300 varieties. It was found out that the Leninhrad Breeding Station under the leadership of I.M. Yeremeiev bred and handed over to the state commission for testing the varieties of wheat, oats, barley and peas. The winter wheat DС 2444, the spring wheat varieties – Tulun 3А/32 and Tulun 70В/8 and Alhausen buckwheat were regionalized. However, the main achievement of I. M. Yeremeiev's life is the creation and distribution of «Ukrainka 0246» variety.

Руссотурк: Советские Зарубежные Инвестиции и Социальная История Ранней Турецкой Республики

The purpose of this article is to introduce and examine the story of Russotürk, which was established as a venture capital company that was established in 1924 with the collaboration of the Soviet Union and Turkey in Istanbul. Russotürk helped the Soviet Union during the 1920s to overcome the obstacles that were put on export goods in the foreign trade of the Russians as it was a joint-stock company. One of the most important tasks undertaken by the company is to promote and increase the export of Soviet goods in the Middle East and Balkan countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and Greece, in which the Soviet Trade Representatives were not allowed to operate. Russotürk, which was trying to attract the attention of the Turkish bourgeoisie, could not prevent the company, with which they were dealing joint business Karadeniz firm, to become partners with White Russians. Thus, the White Russians were effective in the foreign trade of the Soviets until Russotürk was liquidated. Selling Soviet export goods below the average world prices and issuing import licenses in return are among the most criticized issues that the company encountered. Russotürk constantly competed with Arcos and other Soviet economic institutions. The most obvious indication of this competitive situation was the sales of the Soviet agricultural tools in the Turkish market. The founding officials of Russotürk, which had eventful and nontrivial establishment and closure, were tried in the Soviet courts. Russotürk completed its duty and ended its existence when 1927 trade agreement was signed among the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Soviet Export of Forest in the late 1920s — early 1930s and Competition on European Market

Soviet Export of Forest in the late 1920s — early 1930s and Competition on European Market

Lubbers Plan: Soviet Energy as a Standpoint for Improving Economic Reforms in the USSR

The programme has a compensational character which would guarantee not only sufficient rates of profit on capital invested in the Soviet economy, but also the practical possibility to transfer this profit abroad. In addition, the Soviet side would receive some guaranteed flow of hard currency or of convertible goods and services as a result of production activity. The overall scale of cooperation depends directly upon the potential capacity of the Soviet export base to be opened up or expanded for realisation of the programme.

The food situation in the ex‐Soviet Republics

AGRICULTURE ALWAYS PLAYED a key role in determining economic and political change in the former Soviet Union and this is even more the case in the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS1). One of the main aims of establishing that Commonwealth was to prevent further collapse in trade among the Republics, with the risk of mirroring the chaos which arose from the demise of the CMEA2 in 1991. Collapse of inter-Republican trade would lead to rapid deterioration of the already critical food supply situation in many areas, and particularly in the large Russian cities. According to official estimates, over half the population of the former Soviet Union was below the poverty line in late 1991, and food accounted for 50% of household expenditure on average. In January 1992 prices were liberalised in Russia and various other Republics, and a comparison of food prices and incomes illustrates that there is widespread hardship. Agricultural production is falling in the ex-Soviet Republics and there are doubts about how far even the higher prices will be able to induce the necessary supply response. Trade with third countries collapsed, both on the import and export side. This was partly due to payment difficulties, and recession in the smaller Central-East European countries, but also to falling output and deliveries in traditional Soviet export sectors such as energy, gold and raw materials. In this context Western food aid assumed a crucial importance, though the task of directing assistance into the right hands became ever more complex. The aim here is to provide a brief description of the present situation (though this is difficult with such a fast-moving target), illustrating how the factors leading to decline had been evident for some time. Then follows an attempt to assess the measures being taken to meet this crisis, both by the ex-Soviet Republics and by the West. Agricultural production According to Goskomstat (the State Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation), in 1991 agricultural production fell by 7% in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This figure excludes Georgia and the Baltic States, and is somewhat surprising given that official statistics indicated a fall in agricultural production of all the ex-Soviet Republics of 11% in the first six months of 1991

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE USSR's FOREIGN TRADE WITH BORDERING SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

The author examines post-War shifts in trade relations of the USSR with neighboring socialist states within the context of changing political alignments, distance and transport accessibility from major sites of Soviet export production, economic complementarity, changing world economic conditions, and restructuring of the Soviet economy. Topics of analysis include shares of the bordering states in Soviet foreign trade turnover, the commodity composition of trade (still weighted heavily toward raw materials exports from the USSR), and the problems the raw material orientation of Soviet exports poses for the transport sector (translated by Jay K. Mitchell, PlanEcon, Inc., Washington, DC 20005).

Attack on protectionism in the Soviet Union? A comment

Unlike the other countries in what we tend to call “the Soviet bloc,” the Soviet Union benefited financially from the oil crises of the 1970s, for it was a major petroleum and natural gas exporter. The oil crises also benefited the Soviet Union indirectly as a number of radical Third World oil producers acquired money to buy more Soviet arms. Moreover, the windfall increase in petroleum prices was supplemented by a similar windfall increase in the price of the other major Soviet export product, gold. The subsidies that the Soviet Union provided to Eastern Europe did not entail any sacrifice of resources that had been previously committed but required only that it forgo even greater gains. The politics underlying the Soviet decisions were the politics underlying the rapid expansion of export earnings.

Soviet Export Potential and Several Aspects of Soviet Foreign Trade

Since the mid-1970s the USSR has been exploiting the inherent advantages of the division of labor more fully than ever before in order to resolve the economic problems of raising the efficiency of its production. This has been demonstrated by the rise in the country's volume of foreign trade (from 50.7 billion rubles in 1975 to 109.7 billion in 1981) and by the number of countries that are on its list of trading partners (115 and 142 for those years respectively). In 1981 the value of Soviet exports (57.1 billion rubles) exceeded imports (52.6 billion rubles), thus producing a trade surplus.

The Soviet Gas Pipeline, American "Sanctions" and International Law

Abstract All manner of "sanctions" and restrictions introduced in international trade by the U.S. government in recent years, including those that were designed to impede the construction of the Soviet export gas pipeline, here evoked sharp protests not only in Western Europe but in the USA as well.

Carter readies tighter Soviet export controls

Carter readies tighter Soviet export controls

THE IMPACT OF THE TRANSPORT FACTOR ON THE LOCATION OF EXPORT INDUSTRIES IN THE COMECON COUNTRIES

While the lengths of haul of iron ore and coal from the Ukraine to the Comecon countries tend to be relatively short, very long hauls are involved in some iron and steel shipments (from Kazakhstan to East Germany) and wood-product hauls (from East Siberia to Hungary). The desirability of locating Soviet export industries in the European portion of the country, close to the western frontier, is, however, being canceled out by the general trend of the Soviet industrial pattern to expand eastward. Modernization of transport techniques (pipelines, containerization), joint Comecon investment in Soviet transport facilities and generally closer coordination and planning are recommended to help reduce the cost-raising impact of the transport factor on the Soviet Union's trade with its Comecon partners.

The Territorial Structure of Soviet Export Industries

AbstractThe geography of Soviet export industries was a lively topic of investigation in the nineteen twenties and thirties. It has lately become of renewed interest as a separate area of study in economic geography. Several factors determining the location of Soviet export industries are discussed. They are purely economic factors such as the greater labor intensity and higher wage levels characteristic of export industries in the Soviet Union; factors of the organization of production such as concentration and specialization; transport-geography factors, accounting for the location of industries near sources of raw materials, near markets, or somewhere in between. Soviet export industries are generally distinguished by a lower capital intensity than the industries that would be required to produce goods now being imported in exchange for exports. This suggests that foreign trade tends to reduce the Soviet Union's capital investment requirements. A rough areal distribution of export industries is discussed.

The Recent Trend of Demand-Supply Relations of Petroleum in the Eastern Europe and the Significance of the Construction of the, “DRUZHBA” Pipeline

The most remarkable characteristic in the East Europe's energy economy is that they are highly dependent upon coal production. This is in marked contrast with ‘mixed fuel’ economy in the Western Europe, which is under the same natural conditions as the Eastern Europe. In 1960, the petroleum rate in the structure of energy consumption was about 4% in almost all the countries except Romania (28.4%) and Bulgaria (13.9%), but in the former countries too, the rate shows a gradual increase as compared with the rate in 1957. The output of crude oil rose from 5.92 million tons (in 1950) to 14.12 million tons (in 1961), but the increase tempo became slower from the year 1955 and this is chiefly due to the stagnation of production in Romania (Fig 1). Romania is the largest supplying country in the Eastern Europe (the net export was 5.71 million tons in 1960), and 60% was exported to the SEV countries, but the main market is the Soviet Union (2.82 million tons).The ratio of dependence upon petroleum in the oil importing countries is very high. For example (in 1960), the rate was 99.9% in East Germany, 94.4% in Czechoslovakia, 77.1% in Poland and 53.8% in Hungary, and import in these countries is mostly from the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland occupied about 80% of the above Soviet export (Fig. 2). Due to the lack of official data cocerning the product consumption, I can not say for certain, but it can be assumed that more than two-thirds of it is for the fuel of automobiles and other engines and that its use in petrochemical industry is very rare.By 1965, crude oil output is planned to increase to about 16.82 million tons (Bulgaria excluded), in which is included 12.20 million tons (in Romania) and 1.0 million tons (supposed volume in East Germany). And in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, too, the petroleum import is planned to increase to about 18.0 million tons. This increase in import is solely due to the supply by means of the pipeline “Druzhba” and it is planned that by 1965, crude oil (15.00 million tons) will be exported through the pipeline from the 2nd Baku oil field.The construction of this pipeline has resulted from the combined efforts of several countries. And this has brought about an immediate effect upon the reduction of the cost of oil transport (about 72% cheaper than that of railway transportation), the release from the chains of railway transportation, and the development of the new oil refinery plants and petrochemical industry based on the plants. The capacity of crude oil refining in the Eastern Europe will increase from 17.81 million tons (1961) to 37.40 million tons (in 1964∼5, Fig. 3), and the new refinery plants will occupy about half of the whole capacity. Particularly, the locations of Schwedt and Slovnaft are worth noticing. The former is located on the border between Poland and East Germany, as is the case with Eisenhüttestadt, showing a political character of East Germany's dependence upon the Eastern world. The latter is along the Donau river and it will become all the more significant in exporting Soviet petroleum to the Western Europe, as it is situated in a strategically important place.But each country is under the different economic influence of the pipeline. In Poland, the export of coal occupies about 17% of the total export amount, and it is important for her to check the constant excess of import as much as possible. It is presumed that, because of the increase of energy consumption in her own country, the export of coal will stop and that Poland will change into an oil importing country. Therefore, what must be exported to replace it has become one of her important subjects. Romania has a problem to compete with the Soviet Union for oil market, as a similar oil exporting country. As it is presumed that, in near future, the export of oil will be reduced inside and outside the ‘block’

The Terms of Soviet-Satellite Trade: A Broadened Analysis

Abstract : The study led to the following findings about Soviet export prices: (1) Individual Satellite countries experienced different average degrees of price discrimination on Soviet exports. The discrimination effect tended to be stronger for the Balkan countries than for Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Poland was the only Satellite that enjoyed a continual decline in the degree of Soviet export price discrimination over the period as a whole. (2) In comparison to West Germany, East Germany's terms on Soviet exports were, on the average, consistently unfavorable during the period. (3) Finland and Egypt, two non-Bloc countries with especially close trade ties to the Soviet Union, tended to pay more for Soviet exports than did Free Europe as a whole, but less than the Satellites. (4) Soviet export prices to the Satellites showed sizable year-to-year fluctuations, for individual commodities. But the uneven timing of these fluctuations from commodity to commodity, which was caused by the noted lag effects, tended to smooth out the movements of a general index of Soviet export prices to the Satellites, relative to an index of such prices to Free Europe.

Soviet Export

Soviet Export