Soviet Air Research Articles

South African Responses to New Soviet Air Defence Systems in Angola in the 1980s

Because of its air superiority during the counter-insurgency conflict against the South West Africa People’s Organisation, the South African Air Force had neglected to build up modern air and counter-air defences. When Soviet air defence systems were therefore deployed in Angola in the 1980s, they were forced to reconsider their tactics and responses to the war. The Soviet systems included early warning networks, surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns to cover troops advancing in the field, and fighter aircraft. While this build-up was also observed in the neighbouring Southern African countries and had the appearance of a purely defensive stance, given Soviet air defence doctrine, South Africa viewed this as the first steps to offensive actions in Angola and possibly Namibia (then South West Africa) and the start of a dangerous escalation in the military situation. In response, the SADF adopted a strong defensive stance and improved its own air defence capabilities to ensure that it was not outclassed. The South African Air Force also introduced new tactics. These included the introduction of toss-bombing, making greater use of precision-guided missiles and bombs, and investing more in research in terms of missiles and new technology for their aircraft.

Allied Aviation on the Eastern Front as Part of Operation Velvet: A View from the Soviet Side

Abstract The article delves into the efforts made by the Allies to deploy British and US air forces on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front during the Second World War. Its main focus is on internal Soviet military reports and diplomatic documents from the negotiations that took place in 1942, preceding Operation Velvet. The research presented examines the preparations made by the Allied aviation forces to carry out the combat missions assigned by the Soviet Air Force staff. In addition, the author analyses the simultaneous activities of the diplomatic bodies of the three countries involved in reaching an agreement on the Operation Velvet project. By drawing from various sources, the author uncovers the objectives of each side in the proposed operation and investigates the reasons behind the ultimate lack of results despite the extensive period of preparation for joint actions.

Soft Power in Northeast Asia, Using AI in Information Warfare

Purpose: Conflicts between Korea, the United States, Japan, North Korea, China, and Russia continue along with the competition for supremacy between the United States and China, and conflicts between South and North Korea and between China and Taiwan continue as the Korean Peninsula is an area with a high possibility of military conflict. However, even in North Korea, China, and Russia, which are closed countries, the influence of the soft power of cultural content such as dramas through the Internet is bringing about changes in collective sentiment even in closed countries. Due to these phenomena, Northeast Asia, which has been confronted with military power, is facing a new phase, and we wanted to discuss the use of AI technology in information warfare by the soft power of the Intelligence Agency.
 Method: For the expansion of AI use and research on information warfare, the historical cases of Northeast Asia were analyzed, and the evolution of literature and media was reviewed to understand the phenomenon of artificial intelligence (AI) after the 4th industrial revolution, and the themes were selected. In addition, related data were collected and reviewed, and an attempt was made to theoretically establish the research results academically.
 Results: 1. Northeast Asia is undergoing a transition from order based on hard power through military power to soft power based on cultural content. Just as the spread of culture has expanded faster and deeper the more it is controlled by the state, many researchers in Northeast Asia sympathize with the collapse of the system when asked how long such surveillance and control by dictatorships such as China and North Korea will be possible. According to this phenomenon, the influence of the power of culture on society was analyzed. 2. Artificial intelligence (AI) learning information will adversely affect sound soft power due to manipulated information and biased algorithm learning data. Due to this loophole, the Intelligence Agency will launch an information war using artificial intelligence (AI) technology that suits its own interests. In addition, the Internet will accelerate the propagation speed of distorted soft power and penetrate deeply into human life. Therefore, the Intelligence Agency is expected to analyze the influence of this distorted soft power on its country and start blocking and defending against attacks.
 Conclusion: 1. The legal system before the advent of AI is expected to be modified or supplemented by more than 50% after the advent of AI. In accordance with this paradigm shift, the authority of the Intelligence Agency in the information warfare of AI was divided into the right to investigate, the right to investigate, and the right to operate. 2. In response to the threat of using artificial intelligence (AI) in information warfare, the government of the country not only expanded the size of the Intelligence Agency but also proposed a hybrid structure of cooperation with the private sector, that is, a model of ‘hybrid defense’. Lastly, in 1983, when tensions between the US and the Soviet Union were in the Cold War, the state-of-the-art scientific equipment, a satellite for detecting nuclear missiles, recognized the US ICBM launch warning. In response, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, commander of the Watch Command of the Soviet Air Defense Force, determined through human intuition that this was a computer error. It reexamined the case of preventing World War III by judging computer errors through human intuition, not judgment of scientific equipment, and suggested ethical issues in information warfare.

Факторы боевого применения советской авиации в конфликте с Финляндией 1939–1940 годов

This article is devoted to the analysis of the factors which influenced the effectiveness of the combat use of the Soviet aviation during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The object of the study is the armed forces of the Red Army, the subject of the study is the air force of the Red Army which participated in the war with Finland in 1939-1940. The sources for the work are archival materials - reports on the combat work of the Air Force of the combined arms armies during the conflict, on the use of certain types of aircraft, as well as military command work documents. In addition, the study contains published materials from compilations - documents of the Main Military Council, the Headquarters of the High Command, the command of the Leningrad Military District, as well as the conclusions and minutes of meetings of the Main Military Commission and the Air Force Commission. The aim of the work is to study various conditions and factors which inluenced the work of Soviet pilots during this conflict. The study examined the initial plans and tactics of the Soviet command for the use of aviation, their evolution in the course of hostilities. In addition, various problems and emergency situations which Soviet pilots faced with during the war were analyzed in this study. For the sake of completeness of the study at the end of the article attention is paid to the post-war analysis of the participation of the Soviet aviation in hostilities, and those problems which the Soviet command drew attention to are considered. The main factor underlying the entire combat work of the Soviet aviation at the initial stage of conflict was the fact that for the Soviet command the war with Finland was the first large-scale clash with another state, when a large number of aircraft were to participate in the hostilities. The Soviet leadership simply did not have experience in such operations, did not know how to use aviation correctly and what those operations required for. It were namely these facts which determined the initial not entirely successful tactics of using aviation, the poor preparedness of air reconnaissance. In addition, misunderstanding of the conditions of the future theater of operations played a significant role. Soviet air units were not equipped with the necessary uniforms and machinery. Weather conditions, in turn, also made their own adjustments to the work of aviation. At the same time, it is necessary to point out the insufficient training of pilots.

Аляска – Сибирь – трансконтинентальный воздушный мост Великой Отечественной войны (1941–1945 гг.) и его геопространственное обеспечение советскими геодезистами и картографами

The purpose of the article is to find out the determining role and basic content of geospatial support of legendary airline Alaska – Siberia in the period of Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), its scientific and practical foundations, created in the period of prewar development of domestic geodesy, its organization structures, ensuring proper level of topographic and geodetic territorial knowledge of the country, and also scientific and industrial culture of its development. One of the most important objects of geo-spatial support in the prewar and initial period of the Second World War was the Alaska-Siberia transcontinental air bridge, which became the result and symbol of the military cooperation between the USSR and the USA, which delivered in the period 1942–1945 to Soviet Air Force about 10 thousand fighters, bombers and transport aircrafts, which played a huge and victorious role in the Second World War. The prewar achievements of Soviet geodesy and cartography in the field of topographic and geodetic knowledge of the country, minimization of "white spots" in the areas of the future air route, problems and solutions in relation to surveys, design and construction of airfields, which determined the required network of AlSib nodal points, are characterized. A number of names of participants in the creation of the route have been identified, among which, in particular, Safronov Sergey Niko-laevich, a surveyor engineer, later a well-known teacher and scientist, associate professor of NIIGAiK – SSGA, now SSUGT, was named.

The Soviet Press of the Great Patriotic War about the French Squadron “Normandie-Niemen“

The article is devoted to the participation of French pilots of the Normandy squadron in battles on the Soviet-German front as part of the Red Army in 1943-1945. After the defeat of France at the first stage of World War II (1940), the occupation of its territory by Germany and the organization of the Resistance movement “Fighting France” in London by General Charles de Gaulle, the pilots joined him expressed a burning desire to fight the enemy in the skies over Soviet soil. Their participation in the ranks of the Soviet Air Force was a unique event in the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1945-1945). The article analyzes the information of the Soviet press during the war years about the French squadron “Normandie-Niemen”, which fought in the Soviet Air Force on the Soviet-German front. It is shown that Soviet readers during the Great Patriotic War could get a very complete and reliable idea of the military exploits of French pilots, find out the names of heroes, get acquainted with the military everyday life of officers, appreciate their patriotism and sincere friendly feelings for the Soviet Union and its people. Along with stories about the air battles of the Normandy, the articles of Soviet correspondents contained information about the history of France, how the pilots reacted to the defeat of their country, how and where they fought in the first stage of the Second World War. The press of the war years gave brief sketches of the everyday life of French fighters on Soviet soil, about the curious events that happened to the pilots of the squadron. On the example of newspaper publications 1943-1945. about the military alliance of our and French pilots, you can get an idea of how the cooperation of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition developed and strengthened.

Aviation industry during the siege of Leningrad (on the materials of the City Committee of the CPSU (b)

The subject of this research is the aviation industry during the siege of Leningrad. This topic is gaining relevance due to the recently published documents dedicated to the work of the higher party authorities in the period from 1941 to 1944. In the summer-autumn of 1941, Leningrad was detached from the “main land”. In these conditions, the full operational control over resource base of the city fell on the shoulders of the Soviet and party authorities, who received additional powers, and thus, responsibilities. The author provides an alternative outlook on the activity of the Leningrad plants under the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry of the USSR, not from the perspective of classical reconstruction of the history of aviation industry in the USSR during the war, but a specific managerial task that was resolved by the party leadership using the general resource base. The conclusion is made that despite the evacuation of the vast majority of production facilities of aviation industry during the war, the resource base was adapted to the specific tasks of the Leningrad Front. The city manufactured the industrial products in accordance with the orders and requirements of the Soviet Air Force. Mobilization of the Leningrad industrial base for the tasks of aviation units during the war years in many ways became a crucial factor in maintaining the combat effectiveness of the Air Force, namely during the rough winter of 1941/1942, when the replenishment of aviation units with new equipment ceased  for the most part.

Flying with the Stars: Performance, Loyalty, and Awards in the Soviet Air Force during WWII

One of the main debates in the study of authoritarianism concerns whether autocrats promote and reward agents based on performance or ideological loyalty to stave off the threat of elite coups. Yet autocrats often face existential crisis situations, particularly military conflict, where their survival depends on the performance of lower-level cadres defending the regime. In this paper, we develop a new theoretical framework for understanding how autocrats manage bureaucratic selection under crisis. Introducing the concept of ‘bounded meritocracy’, we theorize that although merit dominates decisions over rewards and promotions, autocrats also strategically prioritize other non-merit considerations in order to prevent shirking and defection by out-group members. To test our hypotheses, we combine qualitative archival work with analysis of a new dataset of 2,898 top Soviet fighter pilots during WWII that includes unique measures of individual performance –a number of downed Axis planes– as well as markers of regime loyalty and out-group status. The results show that wartime imperatives led Soviet officials to prioritize merit over party loyalty, while also trumpeting the achievements of non-Slavic aces as part of a propaganda campaign to increase support for the war effort among potentially disloyal minority groups.

ОДИН ІЗ НАЙРЕЗУЛЬТАТИВНІШИХ ЛЬОТЧИКІВ-ВИНИЩУВАЧІВ АНТИГІТЛЕРІВСЬКОЇ КОАЛІЦІЇ. (ДО 100-річчя ВІД ДНЯ НАРОДЖЕННЯ ІВАНА НИКИФОРОВИЧА СТЕПАНЕНКА)

У статті аналізуються книги, публікації, документи та архівні матеріали, присвячені одному з найрезультативніших льотчиків-винищувачів Антигітлерівської коаліції, уродженцю Черкащини двічі Герою Радянського Союзу генерал-лейтенанту авіації Івану Никифоровичу Степаненку. Крім того, за допомогою нових джерел та публікацій, здійснена певна реконструкція життєвого шляху і корекція маловідомих та свідомо прихованих комуністичною цензурою окремих сторінок біографії льотчика. Зокрема, це стосується дитинства та юності Івана Степаненка. Проаналізовано основні етапи становлення І. Н. Степаненка як військового фахівця. Розглянуто його військову діяльність під час Другої світової війни та у повоєнний період. Складено деталізовані рейтинги тридцяти найрезультативніших льотчиків-винищувачів Антигітлерівської коаліції, а також найрезультативніших льотчиків радянських ВПС у протистоянні з німецькими льотчиками.Стаття, присвячена 100-річчю від дня народження одного з найрезультативніших асів Антигітлерівської коаліції, двічі Героя Радянського Союзу генерал-лейтенанта авіації І. Н. Степаненка.

Arctic tourism: Prospects for the development of historical routes

The Arctic region is a platform for international cooperation in research, security, protection of environment, logistics and more. Arctic is the northern façade of the country, reflecting the beauty and splendor of Russian Federation. However, the tourism industry in the region started developing only recently, in the 1950s. It just so happened that at present the main consumers of tourist services in the region are foreign citizens. Tourism increases efficiency of international cooperation, forming connections and promoting the historical, cultural, civil, and patriotic traditions of different nations. Recently, a new trend in international research has emerged – roadology, linked to the development of tourism based on historical routes. For arctic tourism, this new development is extremely relevant. Climate-related transport difficulties in the Arctic region are the main obstacle to increasing tourist flows. The use of historical routes built on traditional routes and paths of nomads, military, Soviet Air Force, sports competitions or discoverers, facilitates creating most optimal and interesting tours already containing points of tourist interest associated with historical events. The article suggests different types of historical routes, the use of which will allow developing tourist routes and setting clear goals for tour operators forming them. When creating tourist routes, we can use expert scores and ratings of points of tourist interests. The article provides examples of Arctic tours, allowing increasing the attractiveness of the region.

Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959 by Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia

Reviewed by: Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959 by Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia Olavi Arens Shen, Zhihua, and Yafeng Xia. Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. The authors provide a well-researched volume on a crucial decade-and-half period in Chinese history that centers on the relationship of Mao Zedong and the Peoples' Republic of China with the Soviet Union. Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, who previously have written extensively on the subject matter, have used both Chinese and Russian archival material for the study and have critically assessed existing western literature on the topic. At Yalta, Stalin obtained concessions from Roosevelt at the expense of China as the price for the Soviets entering the war against Japan. Among the concessions were the Chinese Changchun Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), Dalian (Dairen), and Lüshun (Port Arthur). As a result of joint US and Soviet pressure, the Chinese Nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi was forced to agree to the concessions when it signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1945). Shortly after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao visited Moscow, where he was able to renegotiate with Stalin a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in which Stalin renounced Russia's traditional points of interest in Manchuria. In return, Stalin gained Chinese recognition for the independence of Outer Mongolia. In an interpretation that I have not encountered previously, the authors suggest that Stalin's interest in Korea and his authorization of Kim Il-sung's plan to attack South Korea played a role in Stalin's decision to concede control of Manchuria to China. During the Korean War, Chinese intervention was supported by massive Soviet aid in the forms of military equipment and Soviet air force units to provide air cover [End Page 222] for Chinese forces. The war cemented the Sino-Soviet alliance. However, the figures the authors cite (that the Soviet air force shot down 1,097 enemy planes and that Soviet anti-aircraft downed 212, while Soviet losses amounted to 335 airplanes and 120 pilots) are questionable (p. 87). The heyday of Sino-Soviet cooperation occurred during the early years of Nikita Khrushchev, who was willing in 1954–1958 to aid Chinese economic development in a major way. Soviet aid in credits amounted to $1.3 billion (other sources say $2.65 billion). A major part of the aid was military—through advisers and equipment, the Soviets enabled China to build a navy and an air force. The aid eventually included the initiation of a peaceful nuclear energy program in 1954 that blossomed when Khrushchev agreed to provide aid for a Chinese nuclear weapons program (1957). In 1958, Khrushchev had second thoughts and pulled back the aid. The authors do not see the 1956 Secret Speech by Nikita Khrushchev and Mao's reaction to it as the beginning of the rift between the two nations (Mao said of the speech that Stalin was 30 percent wrong and 70 percent right). Indeed, the Chinese played a role in helping the Soviets pacify Eastern Europe in 1956. Mao was becoming an increasingly important political actor in the world communist movement. The relationship between the two began to deteriorate after the Moscow Conference of 1957. Personality played a role. Mao clearly felt superior in intellect to Khrushchev. Khrushchev was the head of a recognized great power that conducted world diplomacy with the United States and espoused a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition with the capitalist countries. Mao's Peoples' Republic of China was still unrecognized by many states, including the United States. Because of China's history of struggle and civil war, Mao saw revolutionary struggle against world capitalism as natural. At this point, Mao foolishly embarked on the Great Leap Forward and the Peoples' Commune Movement, which were advertised as distinctly Chinese shortcuts to communism. The failure of these approaches only embittered Mao toward the Soviets. Foreign policy issues with regard to Taiwan and India exacerbated tensions even further. Mao horrified the Soviets and the East Europeans by nonchalantly dismissing the destructiveness of nuclear war...

Космический опыт Джона Гленна в сравнении с опытом Ю. А. Гагарина и Г. С. Титова: замечания специалистов Центра подготовки космонавтов ВВС СССР. 1962 г.

Космический опыт Джона Гленна в сравнении с опытом Ю. А. Гагарина и Г. С. Титова: замечания специалистов Центра подготовки космонавтов ВВС СССР. 1962 г.

Command and Control of the Soviet Air Force during Combat Actions in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Command and Control of the Soviet Air Force during Combat Actions in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Эффективность усилий советских летчиков-истребителей в Великой Отечественной войне

Abstract On the basis of 1 114 data on the fighter pilots of the Soviet Air Force, participated in the Great Patriotic War, collected and systematized by M. Bikov in the reference book “Aces of the Great Patriotic War. The most productive pilots in 1941–1945”, 2007 analyzed this elite group in terms of age, military ranks, the time of participa-tion in hostilities, the number of brought Nazi aircraft, government awards. The said person in this source were born in the first quarter of the twentieth century and were at the age of 40 years during the war. Their contribution to the conquest of the air was 23 974 individually and 3 315 collectively brought enemy aircraft, 27 289 combat vehicles (24,5 for each), or 48 % of the total number killed in the Soviet-German front. Among 1 114 people, 579 became Heroes of the Soviet Union, including 58 (every tenth) posthumously. Deadweight loss in the target population reached 243 people (29 %), or about one-third.Keywords: the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, Fighter pilot, ace, air supremecy state awards, ranks, Red Army Air Force, Fighter Wing.Плодотворное изучение самой масштабной войны ХХ в. в пери-од празднования 70-й годовщины ее победоносного завершения невозможно без оценки качественных показателей эффективности ведения боевых действий противоборствующими сторонами на суше, в воздухе и на море. К настоящему времени в основном восстанов-лена общая картина боевых действий, определены количественные показатели привлеченных к участию в стратегических операциях военнослужащих, боевой техники, а также их потери. Вместе с тем продолжает преобладать «валовый» подход по принципу «и мы в конце картины победим!». Из издания в издание, например, сообща-ется о 57 тысячах немецких самолетов, уничтоженных советскими летчиками в 1941–1945 гг. (Советские 1968: 438; Военно-воздушные силы 1985: 148).

Hardesty, Von and Grinberg, Ilya. Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II (review)

REVIEWS 387 any case, Finland was a side-feature of a wider bluff. After two more wars to try in vain to get its lost lands back, Finland had to settle for a recognition of its independence. This was more than the Baltic States were accorded. Sander’s work on the Winter War is to a significant degree a compendium both of Russian and Finnish material. In his treatment of the sleeplessness of both armies, the key is the lack of reserves. The utter weariness of the Finnish troops defending the last days in the Mannerheim Line as it began to break down makes Sander write in anger that the Finnish High Command would simply have done better had it taken the men out of the trenches. And while in general Sander is on the side of the Finns, there is plenty he finds critical in the behaviour of some of the Finnish brass. In particular, he notes that, in contrast to the situation in Moscow, the censorship authorities were antagonistic to foreign newsmen. As to newsmen, there were also newswomen. One was Martha Gellhorn, Hemingway’s girlfriend. Another was her friend, Virginia Cowles. Undoubtedly, theformerlady’sstatement,‘Ilikethosewhofight’,appliedtoherfriend’soutlook, too. In their reportage, they did not flinch. Gellhorn’s reporting had already been noted by Eleanor Roosevelt, but the President himself was not to be drawn into the battle, though his financial help for Finland raised a US loan (sic) from four million dollars to ten million dollars. With respect further to FDR, Sander has an interesting piece of news from the New York Times of 11 February 1940 when FDR was heckled by a student mob. Were the youngsters calling for Finland? No they were not: their voices rang for the Soviet Union. Sander could equally well have found such sentiments in Britain or France. TheburdenofthisworkisnonethelessoftheclumsyruthlessnessoftheSoviet system. If you were hesitant when the advance was on, the politruk might shoot you in the back. Of the 5,600 prisoners-of-war returned by Finland to Russia, 500 were executed in their homeland for voluntarily surrendering to the Finns. Others got hard labour. Turku George Maude Hardesty, Von and Grinberg, Ilya. Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II. Modern War Studies. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2012. xix + 428 pp. Illustrations. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $34.95. In 1982, Von Hardesty of the Smithsonian Institution produced Red Phoenix, a landmark study of the air war between Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. An excellent book in its own right, Red Phoenix proved all the more remarkable for its ability to penetrate the clouds of Soviet propaganda that surrounded SEER, 93, 2, APRIL 2015 388 its subject and to reconstruct that subject’s history without access to primary sources. Since the USSR’s collapse, archival revelations have transformed the Soviet-studies field, and several fine studies have dealt specifically with the aviation history of the Lenin and Stalin eras. But as a standard work on the Soviet-German air war, nothing written in English during the post-Soviet years managed to supersede Hardesty’s work. That is, not until the 2012 publication of Red Phoenix Rising, an updated and extensively revised version of Red Phoenix. Although Red Phoenix Rising retains the basic structure of the original, it is substantially longer and more lavishly illustrated. Its text has been fleshed out with more narrative vignettes and case-studies. Most important, Hardesty and his new co-author, Ilya Grinberg, have enlisted the aid of numerous Russian researchers, thereby incorporating a massive wealth of new facts and findings, all drawn from key archives. The end result has been to radically extend the academic usefulness of an important book that deserves a continued readership. The book’s title sums up its main story. Like the mythical bird it is compared to, the Soviet Air Force (VVS) arose from the ashes of near-destruction in the summer of 1941, gained strength during the titanic struggles of 1942–43, and used its fully-fledged might to wrest victory from the once-superior Luftwaffe in 1944–45. Seven chapters guide the reader through this tale. The first discusses the early days of Operation...

Strategic Factors Affecting the Chinese Decision to Participate in the Korean War: the Period from the War Initiation and North Korean Request for Chinese Military Involvement

China has almost no intention to participate in the Korean war in its early phrase. This intention had been changed by the involvement of the formidable American military forces. This study examines how the Chinese perception of the war involvement developed as the war situation changed. Through this analysis it evaluates several issues and disagreements related to the Chinese participation decision; First, China had prepared to participate into the war in the very beginning of the North Korean preparation. Second, the Chinese decision was materialized after the American forces became involved. Third, the Chinese government insisted that the assistant of the Soviet air force should be a precondition for its war participation. Fourth, the decision was made in the middle of August when the war appeared to be dragged for long. To properly evaluate these issues this study covers the period from the start of the war to Kim’s request for Chinese war participation on Semester in 1950.

Red phoenix rising: the Soviet Air Force in World War II

Red phoenix rising: the Soviet Air Force in World War II

Out of the Blue: The Forgotten Story of the Soviet Air Force in World War II

Out of the Blue:The Forgotten Story of the Soviet Air Force in World War II Von Hardesty (bio) The activities of the Soviet Air Force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily or VVS) rank among the least-chronicled aspects of World War II. In the early 1980s, Von Hardesty, curator of the Aeronautics Division of the Smithsonian Institution's Air and Space Museum, wrote Red Phoenix, a groundbreaking account of the VVS from 1941 to 1945. Hardesty has teamed up with Ilya Grinberg, a professor in the department of technology at the State University of New York College at Buffalo, to significantly revise this classic narrative, which necessarily drew from uncritical and ultra-patriotic Soviet memoirs. In Red Phoenix Rising: The Society Air Force in World War II (University of Kansas Press, 2012), Hardesty and Grinberg have taken advantage of declassified Russian archival material made available over the past three decades to provide a comprehensive and riveting account of the VVS's epic confrontation with the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht. We publish Hardesty's overview of the book, "Out of the Blue," along with an interview that senior editor Donald A. Yerxa conducted with Grinberg in July 2012. The Russo-German War (1941-1945) began with an awesome display of air power. On the morning of June 22, 1941, in the predawn darkness, Luftwaffe bombers struck forward air bases of the Soviet Air Force (Voyenno-voz-dushnyye sily—VVS). The highly scripted plan for invasion, codenamed Operation Barbarossa, targeted the VVS as the first victim of the war. The preemptive raids brought fiery devastation to the exposed and ill-prepared Soviet air defenses. Huge numbers of aircraft were destroyed in place. A few Soviet aircraft did get airborne, only to be swiftly shot down by marauding German fighters. Estimates vary, but one Russian archival source suggests that by the second day the VVS may have lost as many as 3,922 aircraft, with the downing of only seventy-eight German planes. This brutal attrition would persist throughout the summer months with the final tally of Soviet losses edging toward 10,000 planes. The initial salvos of the war transformed the VVS air bases into graveyards of burned out and damaged aircraft. In the annals of air warfare, there was no precedent for such devastation. The resulting image of ruin and humiliation became fixed in Western perceptions of the Soviet Air Force. If, however, we transport ourselves forward in time, to May 1945, we encounter another image of the Soviet Air Force. This portrait is equally vivid and dramatic, but at odds with the extraordinary wreckage and paralysis wrought by Operation Barbarossa. The Soviet Union launched the long-awaited assault on Berlin. The battle-seasoned VVS, now organized into highly mobile air armies, deployed over 7,500 operational aircraft. Soviet fighters swept the last remnants of the Luftwaffe from the skies. And, more important, the Soviet air juggernaut of fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft flew thousands of sorties in direct air support for the advancing Red Army. As the war drew to a close, the VVS boasted an inventory of 20,000 aircraft, the largest tactical air force in the world. Now for the first time, the VVS exerted unchallenged air Click for larger view View full resolution Soviet IL-2 ground-attack airplanes preparing to takeoff, February 1, 1945. © Yevgeny Khaldei/Corbis. s-premacy over the vast periphery of Soviet-controlled territory from Berlin to the Far East. These two snapshots of the Soviet Air Force, separated by nearly four years, evoke a sharp contrast, one not easy to reconcile or explain. The first image from 1941 is familiar to us; the second, less so, for many complicated reasons. Even Western accounts of World War II dealing narrowly with the theme of air power are prone to ignore this forgotten episode. For Russians, the air war in the East has remained a meaningful part of a larger national epic, the Great Patriotic War. For the VVS, the war years were a time of great fluidity and challenge, a context for one of the most remarkable military reversals in history. There is a lost human dimension to the story as well. Few are...

Red Phoenix Rising: An Interview With Ilya Grinberg

Red Phoenix Rising:An Interview With Ilya Grinberg Donald A. Yerxa and Ilya Grinberg Donald A. Yerxa: What were the principal factors that enabled the Soviet Air Force to survive the devastating initial Luftwaffe onslaught; then to gradually reach quantitative, qualitative, and operational parity with the Germans; and eventually to achieve dominance in the air war against Germany? Ilya Grinberg: This is the core question. How the VVS survived is one of the most stunning military reversals in World War II. By June 1941 the VVS had 15,599 combat aircraft. Out of this number, 9,890 aircraft where at the western frontier. Even with the devastating losses in June, the residual number of aircraft still exceeded the number of aircraft deployed by the Luftwaffe (2,764). It took time to move air units from the inner regions of the country, but everything was thrown into the battle, even inferior or obsolescent aircraft. This bought time and it allowed the beleaguered VVS to form new units. And here is a critical point to keep in mind, one that escaped notice at the time: many pilots survived the onslaught of the opening days of Barbarossa. There are several factors that allowed the VVS to regroup and then fight back, each year with increasing effectiveness. This was a war of total mobilization, [End Page 25] not just for the VVS, but for the entire military and the nation. The Germans were surprised at the Soviets' resiliency and capacity to strike back. The slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory" animated the war effort on the Soviet side. If you examine the broader historical context closely, you appreciate the fact that the Soviet capacity to wage war could be traced back to the 1930s. This decade laid the foundation. The massive drive for industrialization established a baseline. There was also skillful management on a large scale in this planned economy. In contrast, Germany was planning a lightning war with the focus on swift victory. In the fall of 1941 Hitler even ordered a reduction in aircraft production! As bitter lessons were learned in the first year of the war, a wide circle of aviation and military commanders saw clearly certain priorities, for example: the importance of concentrating armed forces in the narrow breakthrough corridors; the critical factor of coordinating aviation with the ground forces; the need to make use of radio, new tactics, better command and control; and so on. Starting from the Battle of Moscow, the elements of centralization were set in place. And this anticipated the creation of the air armies in 1942. Looking back, it strikes me that the VVS possessed real flexibility and relentless determination in shaping its tactics. This war-induced openness to change became a major factor. The Luftwaffe, I would argue, was a brutal foe, but ironically a good teacher! And there were dramatic advances in technology during the war. The source for these changes came from within the aviation sector and from Lend-Lease aid. The improved performance of the newer type of aircraft allowed Soviet pilots on an ever-increasing scale to enjoy the enhanced capabilities of their new mounts. The VVS did embrace a whole series of new air tactics. It is easy to talk about vertical maneuver and speed and strict orders, but, I would add, it is impossible to adopt a new approach with outdated prewar I-16 and I-153 types—and they were still widely used in 1942. New tactics wedded to modern aircraft performance set the stage for parity with the Luftwaffe. For me, the key and enduring factors were command and control, better intelligence, and the widespread mastery of modern communications. These command and control refinements were made even more dramatic with the relentless and impressive numerical superiority of the Soviet Air Force. By 1944, the numerical superiority and rich combat experience of the VVS made it a highly effective fighting machine, the largest tactical-operational air force in the world. Yerxa: Forging an effective air force requires much more than simply building large numbers of modern airplanes. What were some of the obstacles that the VVS had to overcome to become an effective fighting force...

The Dawn of the Jet Age in Austerity Britain: David Lean's The Sound Barrier (1952)

Every self-respecting country house in the past century housed a cinema. In the early 1950s, the Prime Minister had a choice of venues in which to view his favourite films—on home territory at Char...