Southeast Asian States Research Articles

Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia. By Michael L. Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 237p. $49.95.

With his systematic study of the effects of timber windfall booms on the institutions of four Southeast Asian states, Michael Ross informs the often emotional debate about the relative costs and benefits of “openness” to international trade. Ross investigates the effects of such windfall booms in the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak on state institutions and finds that their openness to international trade has rendered these states institutionally vulnerable. In so doing, he makes an important extension to the contributions of Peter Gourevitch and Peter Katzenstein, who have focused on the effects that different state institutions have had on national responses to exogenous—usually unpleasant—shocks in European countries (e.g., see Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times, 1986, and Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, 1978). Contrary to expectations, Ross finds that positive shocks (revenue windfalls) have generally corrosive effects not only on the economy (the “Dutch disease” syndrome) but also—and this is the heart of Ross's contribution—on the very institutions of the state. How this institutional corrosion sets in, why it does so, and why the effects prove to be so debilitating are the principal foci of this book.

Southeast Asia and the politics of vulnerability

The economic and political crises that have engulfed Southeast Asia over recent years should not have come as such a surprise. A consideration of the region's historical position and economic development demonstrates just what formidable obstacles still constrain the nations of Southeast Asia as they attempt to restore growth and stability. This paper places the Southeast Asian experience in historical context, outlines the political and economic obstacles that continue to impede development, and considers some of the initiatives that have been undertaken at a regional level in the attempt to maintain a degree of stability and independence. Despite the novelty and potential importance of initiatives like the Asean +3 grouping, this paper argues that the continuing economic and strategic vulnerability of the Southeast Asian states will continue to profoundly shape their politics and limit their options.

Chinese Big Business and the Wealth of Asian Nations (review)

Reviewed by: Chinese Big Business and the Wealth of Asian Nations Paul Bolt (bio) Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown . Chinese Big Business and the Wealth of Asian Nations. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2000. xii, 328 pp. Hardcover £55, ISBN 0-333-75344-5. In this work Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown sets out to explain both the success of Southeast Asian economies and their collapse during the Asian economic crisis of 1997 by examining businesses owned by ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. While recognizing that large Chinese conglomerates have contributed to Southeast Asia's economic growth, Brown is also very critical of ethnic Chinese firms, stating that "their institutional make-up bore the seeds of economic collapse" (p. 5). The reasons for this include the family control of conglomerates, recklessness in finance enabled in part by partnerships with multinationals and the state, the failure to invest in research and development, and fraud. [End Page 71] Brown's book is thick with data on various firms and sectors dominated by Southeast Asia's ethnic Chinese. The inclusion in Brown's title of "Wealth of Asian Nations" holds two ironies. First, Brown's analysis ends with the Asian economic crisis, a period when Asian wealth was falling precipitously. Second, the title reminds the reader of Adam Smith's classic work. However, Smith would certainly disapprove of the economic system Brown describes, which can best be labeled crony capitalism. Throughout Chinese Big Business several themes or arguments that are of interest to students of business organization or Asian affairs stand out. The first concerns methodology. For her own work Brown rejects the approach that focuses on trade policies and macroeconomic variables as being insufficient for understanding Asian business. She also rejects the perspective that attempts to explain ethnic Chinese business performance through Chinese culture, ethnicity, and networks. Instead, Brown takes a thematic approach, using case studies of Chinese firms in particular economic sectors and examining their structures, strategies, relationships, and performance. Brown argues that such an approach provides the broader context of Chinese business performance, especially specific linkages to foreign multinationals and the state, and thus generates insights that a macro or cultural approach cannot provide. For instance, based on her study of specific industries, particularly textiles, Brown concludes that the "flying geese" model of economic development is flawed (pp. 132-137). Japanese investments and industrial restructuring do not fully account for the growth of the Southeast Asian textile industry, as the flying-geese model might suggest. Instead, Southeast Asian states have experienced a diverse mixture of capital- and labor-intensive textile and garment manufacturing, rather than moving sequentially through stages of growth from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production. Similarly, ASEAN states did not move linearly from import substitution to export-oriented industrialization. Instead, local conditions and state policies played an important role in the development of the textile industry. These patterns, Brown argues, can only be understood through a specific study of the textile sector rather than by relying on macroeconomic data and abstract models. Brown devotes the second chapter to the "continued primacy of the family" (p. 17) in Chinese enterprises. Although the organization of business has changed over time and become more complicated (see the structure of the Hong Leong Group, Malaysia, pp. 22-23, and P. T. Astra International's organizational chart, pp. 54-55), ultimate control has usually remained in families. This has been achieved in part through creative financing as well as the very complexity of the organizational structures of the Chinese conglomerates. Brown's cases demonstrate that family control has at times resulted in unfortunate consequences. For example, bickering among Yeo family members contributed to the takeover of [End Page 72] Yeo Hiap Seng (Singapore) by Ng Teng Fong. Brown argues: "Family control and finance were at the heart of Chinese business impermanence," leading to recurring instability across Chinese enterprises (p. 282). In addition to family ties, Chinese firms have often been characterized as having close links with Southeast Asian states. Brown notes that the state has aided Chinese firms in numerous ways. For example, Soeharto's regime assisted Astra and provided it with a protected environment, as well as knowledge...

Southeast Asia: a modern history

Adopts a narrative and a comparative approach to the modern history of Southeast Asia. The author views this region as unique, but also as part of wider human experiences. He compares the experiences of Southeast Asian states, peoples and regimes, linking experiences with those of other world regions. Author from Uni of Auckland.

Bugis Migration and Modes of Adaptation to Local Situstions

Bugis migrants from South Sulawesi, Indonesia, have been at the center of several recent regional conflicts. In order to explain their role in these conflicts, historic and ethnographic accounts of Bugis migration and settlement, as well as interviews with recently repatriated migrants, are presented, and current theories of frontier/state relations are brought to bear. This article suggests that Bugis migrants have often acted as agents of assimilation in concert with existing elites, and that this pattern has become anachronistic in post-Suharto Indonesia. (Indonesia, Bugis, migration, ethnic groups, conflict) ********** Observers of Indonesian society have frequently commented on its seemingly extraordinary ability to hold itself together in spite of its geographic fragmentation and sociocultural diversity. The recent eruption of violent ethnic and religious conflicts has shown us how very real the problem of national integration is in Indonesia. With the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and the granting of independence to East Timor in 1999, other long-suppressed separatist movements are reemerging. Within the framework of assimilation, this article addresses questions concerning the role of migration and the settlement of peoples outside their homelands as a factor in the economic and political integration of the region and the Indonesian state. (1) This essay is informed by my research on Bugis migration, by the ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, especially between Bugis migrants and local populations in East Timor, West Timor, Ambon, Central Sulawesi, and West Papua, and by Kopytoff's (1987) and Scott's (1998a, 1998b) models for the historical understanding of frontiers and their relationship to metropoles. It relies upon the historical and ethnographic accounts of the Bugis, both in their homeland of South Sulawesi and in the diaspora, as well as press accounts of recent ethnic conflicts between Bugis and indigenous ethnic groups in East Timor, West Timor, Ambon, and West Papua. As such, it is meant to help clarify the social and cultural forces that give rise to these conflicts and to provide the basis for further research on a problem critical to the future of the Indonesian nation and the safety and security of its ethnically diverse population. One of the region's largest and most widely dispersed ethnic groups, the Bugis, whose homeland is South Sulawesi, has helped shape the processes of regional and national integration and disintegration, past and present. Over several centuries, Bugis migrants and settlers have developed a reputation for their ability to insinuate themselves into and eventually dominate local economies and social orders. In particular, the history of Bugis migration is best understood through a frontier model in which, as Scott (1999) has suggested, Southeast Asian states have encouraged assimilation as a means to control populations. Ironically, as I will show, the sensibility of migrants has not been one of mere assimilation into existing social orders. Rather, Bugis migrants more often reconstruct their own social orders based upon their own shared beliefs and practices in a manner described by Kopytoff (1987). Specifically, from the early colonial period through the end of Suharto's New Order, Bugis migrants have extensively allied with elites and acted as agents of assimilation, imposing upon local peoples ways they promoted as economically and politically progressive and socially and culturally correct. Unfortunately, their alliance with the New Order was a major factor in the current wave of ethnic and religious conflict, causing thousands of migrants and a large number of Bugis settlers to flee the violence. FRONTIERS AND THE NEW SOCIAL ORDERS Kopytoff's (1987) introduction to The African Frontier presents a brilliantly cogent model for the historical understanding of frontiers and their relationship to metropoles in sub-Saharan Africa. …

Economic integration in northeast Asia: Preconditions and possible trajectories

When in November 2001, the leaders of the Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian states met for the “ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) plus three (China, Japan and Korea),” President Kim Dae‐Jung of South Korea proposed the exploration for an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and thereby opened a new chapter of East Asian integration. The special Northeast Asian perspective on regional co‐operation became clear by the simultaneous decision to hold annual meetings of finance and trade ministers of China, Japan and Korea. At the same time, bilateral agreements, like a free trade area between Japan and Singapore, the tentative large free trade area between ASEAN and China and the work‐in‐progress on a Korean‐Japanese Free Trade Area, show the devotion and sometimes even obsession of current policy‐making with reaching regional trade agreements. Regional integration, it seems, is finally on the Northeast Asian agenda. In this paper, the preconditions and perspectives of economic integration in Northeast Asia will be explored. Since economic integration is in various ways linked to political factors, the second section discusses the geo‐political situation of Northeast Asia today. The third section deals with the economic perspectives of different forms of trade integration, followed by an analysis of various attempts for greater macro‐economic and financial co‐operation and a short conclusion.

Regional Conflict and Cooperation: The Case of Southeast Asia

This case study examines Southeast Asian states' transition from conflict to cooperation during and after the Cold War. Our objective is to dissect this particular case in order to understand in more general terms the conditions that can turn a regional order around, in either a cooperative or conflictive direction. The case is important because of the dramatic economic rise of Southeast Asia in the midst of national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity, the wide diversity in power attributes and socio-economic development, the severe economic and political crisis that afflicted the region in the late 1990s, and the remaining unresolved disputes within the region. The case draws special attention to the impact of both internationalization and domestic politics on the way these states managed their regional relations. These two forces — internationalization and domestic politics — seemingly operate from above and below the level of the region, respectively. Yet they are strongly related. Southeast Asian leaders chose to integrate their countries into the global economy at a time when most other industrializing states resisted it. The strategy of export-led industrialization was expected to improve living standards, providing leaders with a means to enhance political control at home. Accordingly, their domestic political economies had to be adjusted to facilitate accelerated economic growth. Preventing extensive military investments was one important requirement for avoiding governmental and payments deficits, high interest rates, inflation, and other such effects detrimental to growth and foreign investment. A related prerequisite was stability — domestic and regional, political and economic — that would provide a secure environment for such investments. Regional cooperation can thus be interpreted as a natural choice when seeking to enhance stability and investments, and to prevent a harmful arms race.

Rituals, Risks and Rivalries: China and ASEAN in the coming decades

This paper argues that Sino‐ASEAN relations, despite reassurances and determination by both sides to increase interactions and cooperation, have some remaining areas of contention and contestation. After its long isolation, self-imposed or otherwise, the PRC has been able to integrate itself successfully into the political life, economies, and security interests of the region. The PRC's market potentials, military capabilities and its enormous size have both excited and threatened the Southeast Asian states. While the Southeast Asian states have been willing to engage this emerging regional power, they are also wary of the potential risks when dealing with it. Increasing trade, investment, and cultural levels between the two regions have made both sides increasingly aware of the opportunities and challenges involved. The relationship is not without problems, although there is a general consensus that it is on a much better footing than in recent decades. The present developments of their relationships and in the next decade are analyzed under three categories: rituals, risks and rivalries.

Is there a Sovietology of South-East Asian studies?

This article provides an indictment of the study of South-East Asian international relations by confronting head-on the problems that have arisen within this field, in particular the way in which Western academics ended up colluding with deeply illiberal regimes in the area, which excluded dissenting opinions, often by deliberately denouncing these opinions as ‘polemical’. This study uses the discipline of Sovietology to explore the reasons why South-East Asian studies developed into a closed community of scholarship, often hostile to dissenting viewpoints. The disciplines bear comparison because they both manifestly failed to predict the cataclysms that befell their respective areas of study. The analysis identifies similarities in the way in which the two disciplines seemed to ignore sceptical voices and evolved a shared belief in ‘system stability’. As a result, both Soviet studies and the study of South-East Asian international relations developed serious methodological flaws. However, this study argues that South-East Asian studies suffered even more severe disciplinary shortcomings than its Sovietological counterpart because the academic space was further de-intellectualized by the pervasive influence of the authoritarian South-East Asian developmental state which blurred the distinction between scholarship and bureaucracy and which succeeded in co-opting Western academics. The result was to create a field of study that promulgated the tyranny of the single truth, which erroneously perceived South-East Asia as a region of domestic tranquillity and regional order. What, in fact, emerged was an intellectual culture of self-censorship that kept South-East Asian studies within tacit, self-regulated boundaries.

Deterrence and Co‑operation in the South China Sea

This article explores the impact of the Spratly Islands dispute on security relations between China and Southeast Asia after the Cold War. It is argued that the dispute reflects and promotes the emergence of a regional order combining deterrence with consultation and limited co-operation. The balance of power between China, Southeast Asia, and the United States promotes the emergence of a structure of deterrence. Within this structure, the approaches of China and Southeast Asia to diplomacy and international law allow for the development of a regional dialogue and a code of conduct based on consultation and co-operation on non-controversial issues. Consequently, the seeds of an order are emerging in the South China Sea that combines the extremes of deterrence and co-operation. Introduction The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are located at the intersection of the security spheres of China and Southeast Asia. As such, the dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei over this area is not merely a difference of opinion on rights to territory and maritime space. It brings to the fore incompatibilities between the practices China and the countries of Southeast Asia normally employ to ensure peace and stability in their regional environment. The implications of this dispute for the development of mechanisms of deterrence and co-operation between China and the countries of Southeast Asia have tended to be overlooked in the scholarly debate. The Spratly dispute is treated as a peripheral, yet potentially explosive, aspect of Sino--Southeast Asian relations. It is regarded as a product rather than a determinant of their security practices. [1] The Spratlys have been a sore point in the relationship between China and the Southeast Asian claimant states for decades . The dispute oscillates between conflict and co-operation without reaching the stage of crisis or resolution. [2] This protracted stalemate suggests that the dispute is at the fringes of the security agendas of China and Southeast Asia, compared with more pressing security concerns such as the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s and the Taiwan problem. At the same time, the nationalist overtones inherent in the justifications of territorial and maritime claims, coupled with a continuous military build-up in the Spratly area, suggests that the dispute will at some point wreak havoc on peace in the South China Sea. The problem with the dominant approaches to the study of the Spratly dispute is the tendency to overlook the fact that, in the 1990s, it has turned into an arena where the compatibility of the security practices of China and Southeast Asia were tested. During the Cold War, Chinese security policies were directed against the subregional environment of Northeast Asia. By contrast, most of the countries of Southeast Asia formulated their security outlook within the confines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the increasing importance of the maritime resources of the South China Sea, and the allowances for extensive maritime zones in international law, have made China and Southeast Asia increasingly important variables in each other's security equations. This article argues that the Spratly dispute has profound implications for regional peace and stability because it promotes the development of a new order in the South China Sea between China and the Southeast Asian states. [3] By bringing representatives of contending security practices together around an issue of conflict, the Spratly dispute has changed the security practices of China and Southeast Asia. The dispute highlights differences in the approach of the two entities to the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law. As the contending parties attempt to find solutions to the problems coming to the fore, the seeds of a new order emerge, representing a compromise between the security practices employed by China and Southeast Asia. …

Reexamination of the Lung Khê Citadel in the Red River Delta

The Lung Khê Citadel site is located on the natural levee of the old Dâu River at Lung Khê hamlet, Thành Khu'o'ng village, Thuân Thành district in Bac Ninh Province. The citadel includes a large rectangular walled fort (north wall: 680m, south wall: 520m, east wall: 320m, west wall: 328m).Previous studies have identified the Lung Khê Citadel as the central citadel of Luy Lâu district, which was established as the capital of Chiao Chih (Giao Chi) Prefecture in the Western Han period and was also a place where Si Nhiêp, the prefect of Chiao Chih, resided. Recent studies have reshuffled the previous understanding.Excavations and field research have revealed that the citadel was built in the 2nd century AD and continuous occupation can be confirmed to the end of the 5th or early 6th century AD. A large-scaled bronze workshop has been confirmed in the north central area inside the walls. A mold fragment of a bronze drum found in this area indicates a part of the workshop was used for casting late Heger I type drums. Although the majority of the artifacts are of Chinese-origin, several types, such as end roof tiles, a table-shaped stone mortar (pesani) and kendi, show cultural affinity with artifacts found in Trà Kiêu and Óc Eo, where the early Southeast Asian states were formed.Among the early citadels or fort sites in the Red River Delta, Lung Khe is the largest one next to Cô Loa. The construction of Cô Loa can be dated between the 1st century BC and 1st century AD, but it seems that after its construction Cô Loa was not used for a very long time. On the other hand, the scale, occupation period and material culture of Lung Khê are worthy of the central capital of the Red River Delta, which must have been Long Bien. While there are many historical or legendary relics of Si Nhiêp around Lung Khê, no early document mentions any relation between Si Nhiêp and Luy Lâu. The title Long Ben Hâu conferred to Si Nhiêp as the lord of the district recorded in the San kuo chih is supporting evidence for this hypothesis.The development of the Nan Hai trade from the end of the 1st millennium BC between China and Southeast Asia or further west stimulated the socio-economic development of the Red River Delta as an entrepôt, and the political power at Lung Khê should have been related to trade. However, from the late 3rd or 4th century a change in the trade route may have brought about a decline in the economic position of the Red River Delta. The later period of the Lung Khê Citadel were less connected with the south, so more domestic factors inside the Red River Delta need to be understood in a historical context.

Taiwan and South-East Asia: The Limits to Pragmatic Diplomacy

The relationship between the island of Taiwan and the states of South-East Asia during the 20th century has enjoyed only a limited temporal autonomy. Autonomy was denied during much of the first half of the century because of Japan's colonial rule over the island and because the countries of South-East Asia, with the exception of Thailand, were subject to Western colonialism. It was only with Japan's defeat in the Pacific War and the onset of decolonization, and also with the end of the civil war on the mainland of China that relations between Taiwan as a discrete expression in political geography and independent South-East Asian states began to assume a kind of autonomy.

ASEAN and Non‑interference: A Principle Maintained

leaders have maintained their traditional respect for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states, despite predictions to the contrary as human rights issues have come to the fore in Southeast Asia's politics. Calls for constructive engagement from within and outside ASEAN, in the light of grave human rights abuses in Cambodia and Myanmar, have ultimately gone unheeded by leaders. This overt stance in favour of non-interference seems incongruous with a more subtle, historical approach of actual in each other's affairs. The two are reconciled thus: publicly A SEAN leaders adhere to the vaunted ASEAN way of non-interference while privately, behind-the-scenes, quiet diplomacy interference takes place to resolve issues causing tension between states. This practice contrasts sharply with that of Western countries, which favour intervention for humanitarian reasons. Introduction Since the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 its members have adhered strictly to a principle of non-interference in the affairs of states. Non-interference stems from the traditional notions in international relations of equality of the sovereignty of states (from diminutive Singapore to mammoth Indonesia) and the consequent right to exclusive sovereignty. The respect for non-interference in each other's affairs has been a cardinal principle, and characteristic of concord since ASEAN's creation. In the post-Cold War era, however, the principle has come under strain. A practice contradictory in this respect appeared in connection with political turmoil in three Southeast Asian states, two prospective members (Cambodia and Myanmar), and the other a founding member of (Indonesia). This new practice begs two interrelated questions. Is the principle of sovereign equality of states disappearing? Or, is there a qualitative change in the concept of exclusive sov ereignty and the consequent non-interference? A hypothesis which is explored in this article is that there is a qualitative change in the concept of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of another state. The quality that distinguishes the concept from its traditional sense, strict adherence to non-interference, is the notion that a state will only be considered equal in its sovereignty if it ensures minimum standards of good governance for its citizens. In other words, treat your citizens well and we can do business. An examination of this hypothesis will lead us through, first, a brief discussion of the enshrinement of the concept of exclusive sovereignty as a fundamental principle governing inter-state relations; secondly, members' practice of non-interference; and thirdly, the forces motivating qualitative change in the principle of sovereign equality of states. The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States and Good Governance The concept of sovereignty is an elusive one that is hard to define. As Louis Halle notes in his foreword to Robert Klein's Sovereign Equality Among States: The History of an Idea: [I]nternational relations are determined by the myths that, as surrogates for realities beyond our comprehension, dominate our minds. The myths may represent the realities more or less truly, more or less falsely, with corresponding consequences, for good or evil, when action is taken on the bases they provide. [1] One such myth is that of sovereignty. As Klein shows, throughout history, by a process of analogy with individual personality, the state has acquired a corporate personality. The concept of sovereignty has evolved from being a signifier of the authority of an individual ruler (king, emperor) to a signifier of the authority of the people. The Romans dealt with associations of human beings as real persons; groups of individuals acting together were said to have a single legal personality. Hobbes applied the concept of personality to the territorial state, for the most part identified with the ruler, which permitted pinning on these new political entities rights and duties towards each other. …

Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle's Heroin Trade: Threat and Response

The Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia lies at the heart of the global heroin trade, accounting for roughly 60 percent of all illicit opium production. Narcotics from this part of the world have had an insidious, corrosive, far reaching and, at times, highly destabilizing impact. In particular, they have been linked to an explosion of AIDS, social instability, a lack of economic performance, official corruption and the growing force of organized crime. These effects have been felt, in one form or another throughout Southeast Asia, North America, Australasia, and Northeast Asia. Dealing with the threat posed by the Golden Triangles heroin trade will require a fully inclusive strategy that emphasizes both supply disruption and demand reduction. While certain Southeast Asian states have pledged to intensify the scope and effectiveness of their drug policies, official apathy is widespread and continues to mitigate against effective counter-measures.

ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is a forum and a process involving the fifteen EU member states and the Commission, and ten East Asian countries. It is a product of the emergence of East Asia as an economic powerhouse in the 1990s, and the commercial embrace of Asia by many European countries. However, with the advent of the Asian economic crisis, the economic motivations underlying ASEM could not but be questioned. ASEM has seemingly survived the worst of the Asian economic crisis. But what lies ahead? Can ASEM continue without a fundamental reassessment of its basic rationale? This article is an attempt to chronicle the genesis and development of ASEM, and examine the challenges that lie ahead. Introduction ASEM is the acronym for the Asia-Europe Meeting, a co-operative framework established in March 1996 between Europeans as represented by the fifteen European Union (EU) member states plus the European Commission, and Asians as represented by ten East and Southeast Asian states comprising China, Japan, South Korea, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEM was to be a symbol of Asia's and Europe's rediscovery of each other after a long period of relative neglect. It was first conceived to be the bridge between Asians and Europeans. The declared aim of ASEM was to reinforce the weak link in the triangle of relations between East Asia, North America, and Western Europe. These three regions were then depicted as the growth engines driving the world economy. While transatlantic and transpacific ties were well-established, strong ties between Europe and Asia were missing. To fill this gap, the idea of an Asia-Europe Meeting was initiated by Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in October 1994. There were many reasons behind the alacrity with which the idea of ASEM was taken up. Among them were the development of East Asia into an economic powerhouse, the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, the fears of a fortress Europe, and mutual interest in maintaining an open and multilateral trading system and countering American unilateralism. It was further argued that a balanced relationship among these regions would promote and ensure greater stability and prosperity in the world. The inaugural Summit Meeting of ASEM in Bangkok in March 1996 got off to a good start. The range of initiatives and activities that followed engendered an ongoing process involving summit meetings, ministerial and senior officials meetings, and also expert meetings in various functional areas of co-operation. All these are now collectively referred to as the ASEM process. The plethora of activities in the wake of the Bangkok Summit reflected the initial enthusiasm and optimism of the parties involved. However, scepticism with regard to the long-term sustainability of the process, and criticisms about ASEM being more form than substance, have also been commonplace. Below is an attempt to re-examine the underlying rationale of ASEM and explain its genesis and development thus far. It has been four years since the first Asia-Europe Summit was launched in Bangkok. What has been ASEM's achievements and what are the challenges that lie ahead in view of the various changes now taking place in Europe and Asia? An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Was ASEM a product of the post-Cold War world? Hans Maull and Akihito Tanaka believe that the realities of the changing structure in the post-Cold War environment provide the backdrop for ASEM. More specifically, they offer the following reasons behind the genesis of ASEM: * The growing complexity of relations in a post-Cold War world where military has lost its old dominance, and economic and other forms of soft power have grown in importance. * The rise of new actors such as China, leading to a general diffusion and dissipation of in world politics. …

Doubts on diffusion: Challenging the assumed Indian origin of Iron Age agate and carnelian beads in Southeast Asia

Iron Age agate and carnelian beads found in Southeast Asia have long been assumed to be Indian imports, often featuring in diffusion-orientated theories of Southeast Asian state development that cite Indian influence as a major causal factor. The origin of these beads is tested here, through a pioneering non-destructive geochemical sourcing study of carnelian beads and potential source material. Our results suggest that many of these beads do not derive from India. Instead, a complex multi-source origin, involving some local Southeast Asian manufacture, appears likely. This finding further erodes the already crumbling foundation of diffusion-based theories of Southeast Asian state development. An alternative, regionally focused, approach to the study of these beads is recommended using geochemical analysis to help trace their trade within Southeast Asia. This will enable a better understanding of their role in, and impact upon, existing prestige goods exchange networks within the region.

Southeast Asia After the Crisis: A Tale of Three Countries

Southeast Asia After the CrisisA Tale of Three Countries Donald K. Emmerson (bio) First came the boom. For at least three of the six years from 1991 through 1996, each of Southeast Asia’s “tiger” economies—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand—enjoyed a rate of economic growth of 8 percent or faster. Each year during this period, the pace of the slowest tiger in the GDP race substantially exceeded the world’s rate of growth. Then came the bust. It began in mid-1997, when persisting signs of weakness in the Thai economy caused a massive lack of confidence in its currency, the baht. Soon the other tigers stumbled too. In 1998 Singapore’s economy slowed dramatically. The economies of Indonesia and Malaysia (and the Philippines) contracted. The decline of the Thai economy, which had begun in 1997, accelerated. By mid-1999 the worst was apparently over for these economies; all four (and the Philippines) are expected to grow again in 2000. But the downturn had been all too real. Much has been written about the causes of the Asian economic crisis. 1 Less has been ventured about its political implications. I want to begin to redress this imbalance by exploring what the economic downturn has meant for democracy: Did the economic shocks that rippled through Southeast Asia in 1997–98 promote, retard, or have no effect on the region’s democratization—and why? As is shown by the first column of figures in the Table on the following page, between 1996 and 1998 all the economies of Southeast Asia either lost speed or actually lost ground. One might have expected that this economic crisis, which had dramatic political repercussions in Indonesia, would also have led to significant changes in levels of political freedom throughout the region. By the imperfect but useful [End Page 35] standards of Freedom House, however, this did not happen: As can be seen in the Table, most Southeast Asian countries became neither more nor less free in 1998, retaining the scores they had received in 1997. Table 1. Economic Shock & Political Freedom in Southeast Asis, 1996–1998 Country Shock Net Fluctuation in Rates of Change in Real GDP, 1996–98 (% points) Freedom Change in Freedom Rating 1997–98 (scale points and categories) Indonesia −21.7 +1.0 (from Not to Partly Free) Malaysia −15.4 −0.5 (still Partly Free) Thailand −13.5 +0.5 (from Partly Free to Free) Cambodia −7.0 no change (still Not Free) Philippines −6.3 no change (still Free) Singapore −6.0 no change (still Partly Free) Vietnam −5.8 no change (still Not Free) Burma −4.0 no change (still Not Free) Brunei −2.6 no change (still Not Free) Laos −1.9 no change (still Not Free) Notes: “Shock” = the difference between the rates of real GDP growth in 1996 and in 1997 + the difference between such rates in 1997 and 1998. As of the end of each year, Freedom House rates countries on a scale from 1.0 (most free) to 7.0 (least free) and classifies them as “Free,” “Partly Free,” and “Not Free.” “Freedom” = the difference between the ratings as of the end of 1997 and the end of 1998. Sources: Asia Yearbook 1999 (Hong Kong: Review, 1999), 88; International Monetary Fund, IMF Economic Reviews: January–April 1999 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), 27; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: May 1999 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1999), 140, 147; Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1997–1998 (New York: Freedom House, 1999), 13. This impression of political continuity despite economic change is reinforced by comparing the ratings for Southeast Asian jurisdictions issued by Freedom House for 1972 (when it first began rating countries and territories in terms of political rights and civil liberties) and 1998. Although Singapore and Vietnam (North Vietnam) received the same scores on both occasions on both variables, the combined totals earned by the ten Southeast Asian states in 1998 for political rights and civil liberties were exactly the same as the totals awarded to the region’s members in these regards 26 years before. 2 As for...

Women on the move: Globalisation and labour migration from south and Southeast Asian states1

(1998). Women on the move: Globalisation and labour migration from south and Southeast Asian states. Global Society: Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 389-403.

Regional security in an expanded ASEAN: A new framework

The admission of new members into ASEAN raises important questions with respect to the organisation's internal dynamics as well as its extra‐ASEAN links. This article explores the principles, which Southeast Asian states would commit to. That is, a viable regional security must rest on the acceptance by Southeast Asian states of ‘rules’, which relate their domestic political structures to their relations with one another. The first is a philosophic rationale for a particular approach to peace and the enunciation of the kind of framework that would embody that philosophy. The framework identifies the realm of possible participants and what mechanisms and systems are needed to construct the peace. The menu is diverse; it includes but is not limited to collective defence, alliance, collective security, security regime and co‐operative security. The security system must eventually move beyond positive prescriptions, preventive diplomacy and dispute settlements to an understanding of what to do in the event of peace being broken. If force is needed to halt aggression or instability, when is it to be used, by whom and for what ends?

Towards One Southeast Asia

Embracing an open-regionalism approach to economic co-operation through the ASEAN Free Trade Area and other initiatives, ASEAN is now expanding membership ultimately to include all of Southeast Asia: Vietnam joined in 1995 and Laos and Myanmar in 1997. This ASEAN enlargement should create important advantages for ASEAN countries, not only because of the inherent economic complementarities between the acceding and existing members states, but also because of the positive implications for regional political stability and international affairs. Nevertheless, great efforts will be needed to integrate Laos and Myanmar into ASEAN. The role of scholars in helping provide information, analysis, and recommendations regarding ASEAN economic deepening and widening will continue to be important in addressing these issues. It gives me great pleasure to contribute to this Special Anniversary Issue of the ASEAN Economic Bulletin in celebration of the Thirtieth Anniversary of ASEAN. I believe that the flexible and exchange of ideas between academicians and professional economists on the one hand, and policy-makers on the other, is valuable for both sides. Policy-makers learn from economic theory and apply the lessons distilled from the work of academicians to real life problems. The complications thrown up by the real world, which policy-makers have to grapple with, in turn become the fodder that further sharpen economic theory. This symbiosis between academicians and policy-makers has been apparent to us in ASEAN for quite some time now. The ASEAN countries have taken this lesson in comparative advantage to heart. We have been exceptional among developing countries embracing liberal trade policies. We have kept our markets relatively and, as a result, our tradable sector has become a major source of growth in the past quarter of a century. The desirability of free trade is a policy lesson that is almost two hundred years old. The idea received its most forceful treatment in David Ricardo's classic theory of comparative advantage, which was in turn developed in response to a real life policy dilemma in nineteenth century England: the corn laws. Another instance in which the work of academicians has proved invaluable to our work is in the area of regional integration. In 1992, ASEAN agreed to create a free trade area in the region. We have now advanced the timetable for the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to the year 2003. Academicians, starting with Jacob Viner, have cautioned policy-makers that there are both welfare enhancing (trade-creation) and welfare reducing (trade-diversion) effects of regional trading arrangements (RTAs). Again we in ASEAN have taken this important caveat on RTAs to heart and have consequently adopted the principle of open regionalism and have encouraged ASEAN countries to continue with their MFN liberalization on a unilateral basis. The Challenges of ASEAN Enlargement Now ASEAN is embarking on another important journey for which it will require the intellectual labours of the economics profession. ASEAN will soon realize its long cherished dream of bringing all Southeast Asian nations under one roof. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995 as its seventh member. At the first informal summit of ASEAN leaders in Jakarta in November 1996, the leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment to the speedy realization of an ASEAN comprising all ten Southeast Asian countries. Laos and Myanmar have already been admitted to ASEAN while Cambodia is bound to join in due course. ASEAN's vision of uniting all ten Southeast Asian states was proclaimed nearly thirty years ago when ASEAN was established. The ASEAN Declaration signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967 stated that the Association is for participation to all States in the Southeast Asian region subscribing to the aims, principles and purposes (of ASEAN). Although it has taken ASEAN at least thirty years to realize its dream, the achievement is no less remarkable. …