Source Of Moral Motivation Research Articles

Les choix moraux du psychopathe sous le prisme de la théorie de l’identité morale

GoalsContrary to the hypothesis that psychopaths do not possess the moral discernment required to think about their actions on the basis of certain moral reasons, several studies suggest the presence of a gap between what these individuals evaluate, judge, or recognize and what they actually choose to do. While theories of moral motivation designed to account for this discordance generally favor either rationalist or emotivist positions, recent work in experimental philosophy as well as in moral psychology tends to give an increasingly central place to the notion of moral identity, which would constitute an additional – and ultimately truly decisive – source of moral motivation, drawing on norms that are not objective and impersonal, but subjective and personal. MethodAfter having shown that our moral reasoning and our affects are not in themselves sufficient to shed light on the origin – and the intra- and inter-individual variability – of our moral decisions, we present the personological conception of the moral self and the normative relationship to oneself that it supposes. We then discuss the nature of the relationship between psychopathic personality and moral identity. ResultsSome research with adults has shown that differences in moral judgment skills do not predict the levels of psychopathic traits assessed. However, subjects who function psychopathically would only minimally – and anecdotally – incorporate moral traits into their self-concept. They would find it difficult to perceive or conceive of themselves as moral agents shaped and defined by a series of ethical commitments. DiscussionThe motivational influence of the moral self on our moral choices rests on a self-referential process that resembles a third-order reflection consisting in questioning – and then conforming to – the kind of person I want to be, that I have to be; to evaluate the degree of conformity of my momentary desires with what I wish to desire on the moral domain. This presupposes, as we will see, a kind of extraction, of detachment from the present, in order to identify – and thus identify with – past moral resolutions. ConclusionWe finish by defending the thesis according to which psychopathy could, in some cases at least, result from the subject's inability to mentally “time travel,” thus compromising the capacity to distance or to disengage oneself from a present desire, or to situate it in the competitive “space” of previously (self)contracted normative requirements. Such temporal inefficiency disrupts the movements of identification with particular moral commitments; paralyzes the prospective impulses projecting the person we will be if we make such and such a choice; and, moreover, neutralizes the narrative process that contributes to the construction of our moral identity by assigning us moral dispositions or tendencies to which we ultimately refer when it comes to making moral decisions.

Emotion and Judgment: Two Sources of Moral Motivation in Mèngzǐ

David Nivison has argued that Mengzǐ 孟子 postulates only one source of moral motivation (namely “heart” as the locus of moral emotions or feelings), whereas Mengzǐ’s rival thinkers such as Gaozǐ 告子 or the Mohist Yi Zhī 夷之 additionally postulate “maxims” or “doctrines” that are produced by some sort of moral reasoning. In this essay I critically examine this interpretation of Nivison’s, and alternatively argue that moral emotions in Mengzǐ, basically understood as concern-based construals, are often an insufficient source of moral action, and an additional source of moral motivation, specifically a conviction or judgment of what is the right thing to do in a certain situation in question, is often necessary for one to complete a moral action. This implies that Mengzǐ should be interpreted to postulate two sources of moral motivation just as his rival thinkers do, namely moral emotion on one hand and judgment and practical reasoning on the other.

The theory and politics of solidarity and public goods

For over forty years, economic inequality and distributive justice have been two of the primary concerns of political philosophers. This volume addresses these issues in a novel way, by focusing on the concepts of solidarity and public goods as both descriptive and normative frameworks. Solidarity links the social, political and moral together, in a distinctively political approach that recognizes the social sources of power on the one hand and sources of moral motivation on the other. Public goods such as education, healthcare, and transport systems are indispensable to the forging of solidarity, but at the same time they may become sources of oppression or injustice, when they fail to respect individual autonomy or when they calcify majoritarian preferences. The essays in this volume explore different features of the political, moral and civic approaches to solidarity. The moral theory of solidarity is advanced in one case as an intrinsically valuable concept of social connectedness and in another as an approach of epistemic deference; a structural account of solidarity theorizes about action against racial oppression, and a power-relations account points at the urgency of the affective, non-rational dimensions of solidarity. The social value of property and its moral implications are articulated through the lens of French 19th Century ‘Solidarism’ and as a complementary theory to left-libertarianism. Public goods are defended as instrumental to solidarity, in one case within a liberal framework and in another within a human-perfectionism framework. By providing a series of thought-provoking debates about social obligations and justice, the volume re-establishes solidarity and public goods as pertinent concepts for theorizing about social justice and inequality.

John Gay and the Birth of Utilitarianism

This article concerns John Gay's 1731 essay ‘Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality’. Gay undertakes two tasks here, the first of which is to supply a criterion of virtue. I argue that he is the first modern philosopher to claim that universal happiness is the aim of moral action. In other words: Gay is the first utilitarian. His second task is to explain the source of moral motivation. He draws upon the principles of association to argue (a) that we develop benevolent motives by associating the idea of our happiness with that of others and (b) that we come to approve of benevolence by recognizing that our happiness is inextricably connected with the general happiness. While some scholars have taken an interest in Gay's essay, a sustained treatment of its contents does not exist, despite its acknowledged influence on Hume, Hartley, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill.

Compulsion or Attractiveness - A False Dichotomy? A Kantian Perspective on the Sources of Moral Motivation

The essay questions the dichotomy between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ motivation to act morally, asking for the motivational power of Kant’s categorical imperative instead, its functionality as well as its sources. With reference to Christine Korsgaard it can be shown that personal integrity together with the notion of an ideal common world form one single source of motivation, grounded in exercising our autonomy. In a last step this outline of a kantian ethics of automony is related to the notion of God, whose role is illustrated in Kant’s Religion Within in a surprising way.

Agency and communion in A Day in the Life of a thriving older adult

ABSTRACTA quasi-ecological case study of the agentive and communion strivings of a thriving older woman is reported here. Applying a resilience theoretical framework and employing a “Day in the Life” visual methodology, instances of agency and communion and their spiritual implications were explored in the filmed record of the woman’s Day and in the transcriptions of interviews conducted both before and subsequent to filming. Examples of agency included practicing tai chi, inquisitiveness, and maintaining independence through overcoming obstacles posed by older age; examples of communion included reciprocal communication with community members, experiences of friendship and human connection, and care about others. The integration of both personal characteristics was interconnected both during the entire course of the Day and within the several examples described. Integration of agency and communion contributes to a generative pattern of functioning, and serves as a fundamental source of moral motivation, portraying a rich representation of this participant’s thriving in ecological context.

Predicting Adolescents’ Moral Identity from Parenting and Moral Emotions: Empathy and Guilt

The Research suggests that moral identity is an important source of moral motivation. The purpose of this study was to assess the relations between adolescents moral identity, parenting and moral emotions: empathy and guilt. 558 high school students (49% girls, 51% boys; M age: 16) completed Aquino& Reed's moral identity scale, empathy quotient (EQ- Short), trait guilt sub scale of guilt inventory and parenting sub scale of family function scale (FFS). Linear regression analysis showed that democratic parenting style and empathy predicted higher levels of moral identity. Moreover no direct relations were observed between guilt and moral identity. Findings are discussed in light of moral identity, moral emotion and parenting styles. Future research is needed to provide evidence of the causal link in the observed relationships.

Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruism through his account of love. The second gap between moral judgements and motivation is a more fundamental one: Leibniz denies that there are any necessary connections between beliefs and motivation, or even more generally, between perceptions and appetitions.

Exemplars’ Moral Behavior Is Self-Regarding

What fundamentally motivates moral behavior? What is the nature and source of moral motivation? The argument developed in this chapter is that moral action is not merely other-regarding; it also can, and should be, self-regarding. When there is something significant for the self in the moral enterprise, it can legitimately be self-enhancing and, thus, powerfully motivating. The empirical warrant for this argument is found in the study of the psychological functioning of moral exemplars. The research reviewed here indicates that moral exemplars do synergistically integrate their self-promoting agentic motivation in service to their other-promoting communal values. Therein is the powerful motivational impetus for doing good and living rightly.

Building Receptivity

Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac emphasizes values of receptivity and perceptivity that appear to be mutually reinforcing, critical to an ecological conscience, and cultivatable through concrete and embodied experience. His priorities bear striking similarities to elements of the ethics of care elaborated by feminist philosophers, especially Nel Noddings, who notably recommended receptivity, direct and personal experience, and even shared Leopold’s attentiveness to joy and play as sources of moral motivation. These commonalities are so fundamental that ecofeminists can and should see Leopold as a philosophical ally. The three ecofeminist scholars who have devoted the most concerted attention to Leopold’s work argue that his Land Ethic is not, and does not provide a basis for, an ecofeminist ethic. I dispute the main criticisms of these scholars, and conclude that ecofeminists should attend more often to Leopold’s work, which extends possibilities for excellent praxis.

Integrity and the moral complexity of professional practice

The paper offers an account of integrity as the capacity to deliberate and reflect usefully in the light of context, knowledge, experience, and information (that of self and others) on complex and conflicting factors bearing on action or potential action. Such an account of integrity seeks to encompass the moral complexity and conflict of the professional environment, and the need for compromises in professional practice. In addition, it accepts that humans are social beings who must respect and engage with the moral position of others. This account is contrasted with a more traditional view of integrity as the rigid maintenance of consistency between professional practice and deeply held, but inflexible, moral principles. While this strong sense of moral conviction may be valuable as a source of moral motivation, e.g. in the case of whistle-blowers, it is equally likely to lead to dogmatism and hubris. Professionals and their organizations are encouraged to foster the more complex and reflective form of integrity.

A Critical Review of Moral Identity As the Source of Moral Motivation

A Critical Review of Moral Identity As the Source of Moral Motivation

Religiosity and Moral Identity: The Mediating Role of Self-Control

The ethics literature has identified moral motivation as a factor in ethical decision-making. Furthermore, moral identity has been identified as a source of moral motivation. In the current study, we examine religiosity as an antecedent to moral identity and examine the mediating role of self-control in this relationship. We find that intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of religiosity have different direct and indirect effects on the internalization and symbolization dimensions of moral identity. Specifically, intrinsic religiosity plays a role in counterbalancing the negative impact of extrinsic religiosity on the internalization of moral identity. Further, intrinsic religiosity also counterbalances the negative and indirect impact of extrinsic religiosity on symbolization of moral identity via self-control. Lastly, self-control does not play a mediating role in the impact of religiosity on the internalization dimension of moral identity. We conclude that this study presents important findings that advance our understanding of the antecedents of moral identity, and that these results may have implications for the understanding of ethical decision-making.

Identity, Reasoning, and Emotion: An Empirical Comparison of Three Sources of Moral Motivation

Prior research on moral motivation has primarily emphasized moral reasoning and moral emotion; however, identity may also play an important role. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to examine the relative importance of prosocial identity, prosocial moral reasoning, and empathy in predicting prosocial behavior. The sample included 91 university students, ages 19–35 years (M=21.89; SD=3.01; 80% European American; 65% female). Prosocial identity and empathy, but not prosocial moral reasoning, were positively associated with overall prosocial behavior. Exploratory analyses examined how these three sources of prosocial motivation differentially related to six forms of prosocial behavior. Results suggest the importance of considering the roles of all three sources of moral motivation.

Critical Consciousness: An Alternative Pathway for Positive Personal and Social Development

This paper presents a conceptual model of the integrative psychological construct of critical consciousness (CC), defined as a moral awareness which propels individuals to disembed from their cultural, social, and political environment, and engage in a responsible critical moral dialogue with it, making active efforts to construct their own place in social reality and to develop internal consistency in their ways of being. The ontogeny of CC is analyzed in terms of the synergistic interaction between its two main components, structural developmental and moral motivation. The paper describes the cross-cultural interview research which allowed the elaboration of the CC developmental pathway. It posits the dimension of moral motivation as distinguishing the CC pathway, and illustrates the continuum between predominantly moral and expediency motivation through brief case vignettes. The paper differentiates three developmental macrolevels of CC, and illustrates through case vignettes two alternatives of social consciousness at the level of conventional morality—CC and non-CC. Some possible sources of moral motivation in personal history and biography are discussed.