Source Of Moral Knowledge Research Articles

Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Moral Knowledge

Abstract In the wake of Locke’s Essay, empiricists faced the challenge of giving an empiricist account of the origins of moral knowledge. Locke did not rise to this challenge and relied on revelation as the source of moral knowledge. Other empiricists, including Hume and Hutcheson, opted for either emotivism or subjectivism. Clarke and others opted for rationalism and non-naturalism. In contrast, Catharine Cockburn’s meta-ethics combined Locke’s empiricism with naturalism. She held that moral good is natural good and that natural good is known just as any other matters of natural fact are known: empirically. Cockburn’s position was unusual for its time, and the full originality and appeal of her meta-ethical position have not been fully appreciated.

The sources of moral knowledge

The sources of moral knowledge

Remembering what is right

According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle’s on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring.

Понимание вопросов нравственного воспитания и развития в сурдопедагогике

The article substantiates the relevance and necessity of realizing the goal of a comprehensive study of the conditions and areas of moral development. It considers the main problems arising in the process of researching the moral education and development of the children with hearing impairments. It also discusses the problems of choice and application of methods in the diagnostics of moral development. The article systemizes the approaches to solving the issue of differentiating the criteria of moral development and reveals the significance of these criteria for deaf education activity. In the process of moral education, children with hearing impairment due to the peculiarities of their speech and cognitive development face problems and difficulties in understanding ethical issues, standards, concepts and rules. The results of a comprehensive study of the moral development of children with hearing impairment show uneven development of the components of different areas and their moral conscience; sources of moral knowledge are limited and insufficiently used, the ability to define ethical concepts is not precise, it is narrow and associative. In this regard, there is a need for special educational and correctional efforts, but the possibility of carrying out and the content of the moral development correction are currently the debatable issues. The article shows the contradictory criticism of the moral development. It also promotes the idea about the positive impact of the correction, and its value regarding the problems of moral education. It emphasizes the need to use a variety of educational tools in correctional and pedagogical work to activate the behavioral, axiological and cognitive areas in the process of the phased implementation of the moral development program.

Is R. Rorty’s Moral Philosophy Possible? Antifoundationalism and Kant’s Criticism

This article aims to answer the main question raised – is Rorty’s moral philosophy possible? To what extent is it possible to treat it as an authentic theory? Rorty’s criticism of Kant and the Kantians, as one of the key points of contemporary moral philosophy, determines the posture in the moral domain and provides a certain place in discourse. The article states that, despite the fact that Rorty’s moral philosophy is not based on a particular theoretical concept, it can be considered as a fragmented whole consisting of several parts, one of which is the agent’s openness to the choice of moral identity. At the same time, we will critically question the position of Rorty himself – while maintaining the suspicion towards the sources of moral knowledge, he maintains an insufficient distance with one of his own sources of moral knowledge, namely historical progress.

Common Notions and Instincts as Sources of Moral Knowledge in Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding

In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz.

Pragmatic Neuroethics: Lived Experiences as a Source of Moral Knowledge.

In this article, we present a pragmatic approach to neuroethics, referring back to John Dewey and his articulation of the "common good" and its discovery through systematic methods. Pragmatic neuroethics bridges philosophy and social sciences and, at a very basic level, considers that ethics is not dissociable from lived experiences and everyday moral choices. We reflect on the integration between empirical methods and normative questions, using as our platform recent bioethical and neuropsychological research into moral cognition, action, and experience. Finally, we present the protocol of a study concerning teenagers' morality in everyday life, discussing our epistemological choices as an example of a pragmatic approach in empirical ethics. We hope that this article conveys that even though the scope of neuroethics is broad, it is important not to move too far from the real life encounters that give rise to moral questions in the first place.

Moral Epistemology and Ideological Conflict in American Political Behavior*

ObjectiveThe nature and extent of polarization in the American electorate remains fiercely disputed. This study investigates the depth of ideological and value cleavages in political behavior by examining the influence of adherence to three categories of moral epistemology: premodern (morality is absolute, and stems from the guidance of a supernatural source), modern (morality is absolute, and can be determined through scientific and rational means), and postmodern (morality is nonabsolute, and stems from the subjective values of individuals or groups).MethodsMultiple correspondence analysis and multiple regression are used to analyze data from Pew's 2008 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey.ResultsPremodern adherence exerts a general rightward effect and postmodern adherence exerts a general leftward effect on political attitudes. Among politically attentive respondents, moral epistemology promotes ideological constraint across the economic, social, and foreign policy issue domains.ConclusionThese findings indicate that ideological divisions in the American electorate are at least partly reflective of fundamental differences in beliefs about the nature and sources of moral knowledge.

Self-sacrifice and self-affirmation within care-giving.

According to the ethics of care, practices of care are sources of moral knowledge that take human relatedness into account. However, caregivers may also find themselves in situations that demand sacrifices, even to the point where their own self is at stake. This may not only be cause for concern about the risks of caregivers, the result of an unequal distribution of power, but it may as well be a chance for affirmation of one's identity, of self-attestation. As Ricoeur argues, giving of the self or even giving one's life may be the ultimate expression of one's belonging, in friendship, devotion or loyalty. Ricoeur also considers the meaning of giving a gift, which to him does not lie in any return gift, but rather in the gift as offering, as generosity. Giving is first of all a risk, a sacrifice, with only the hope that it will be received. In this article I aim to extend his argument to the realm of caregiving, thereby supporting my claim that some sort of self-sacrifice is implied in the very act of caring for others.

Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruism through his account of love. The second gap between moral judgements and motivation is a more fundamental one: Leibniz denies that there are any necessary connections between beliefs and motivation, or even more generally, between perceptions and appetitions.

An Examination of Disgust and Its Relation to Morality

In his book Yuck!: The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust, Daniel Kelly synthesizes a growing body of research on disgust and briefly explores the philosophical role of the emotion. This paper presents arguments for the position that disgust should not be considered a source of moral knowledge, a position that Kelly suggests but fails to illustrate. The paper also explores implications of this view, specifically concerning the ways we should seek to manipulate our disgust reactions in order to improve moral reasoning.

Empathy as a necessary condition of phronesis: a line of thought for medical ethics

Empathy is a thing constantly asked for and stressed as a central skill and character trait of the good physician and nurse. To be a good doctor or a good nurse one needs to be empathic-one needs to be able to feel and understand the needs and wishes of patients in order to help them in the best possible way, in a medical, as well as in an ethical sense. The problem with most studies of empathy in medicine is that empathy is poorly defined and tends to overlap with other related things, such as emotional contagion, sympathy, or a caring personality in general. It is far from clear how empathy fits into the general picture of medical ethics and the framework of norms that are most often stressed there, such as respect for autonomy and beneficience. How are we to look upon the role and importance of empathy in medical ethics? Is empathy an affective and/or cognitive phenomenon only, or does it carry moral significance in itself as a skill and/or virtue? How does empathy attain moral importance for medicine? In this paper I will attempt to show that a comparison with the Aristotelian concept of phronesis makes it easier to see what empathy is and how it fits into the general picture of medical ethics. I will argue that empathy is a basic condition and source of moral knowledge by being the feeling component of phronesis, and, by the same power, it is also a motivation for acting in a good way.

La conciencia como tribunal

In the first place, the article sheds light on current misunderstandings regarding conscience, particularly where it is understood as an oracle or a voice that works as a privileged source of moral knowledge, without rational mediation. Throngh a survey of philosophers that have described conscience using the image of a court, the article then tries a rehabilitation of neglected aspects of conscience.

Truly Human Sexual Acts: A Response to Patrick Lee and Robert George

The authors argue that Lee and George (hereafter, L/G) use a reductionist anthropology and ethical method to defend a classicist approach to absolute sexual norms. After describing Lonergan's understanding of scotosis, which can distort one's insight into ethical theory and ethical issues, the article demonstrates this distortion in L/G's sexual anthropology. It further argues that, in formulating their sexual anthropology, L/G fail to address the significance of sexual orientation, and that their method inadequately integrates human experience and reason as sources of moral knowledge.

Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge

The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in moral philosophy was revived by the works of G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross. These philosophers reject Kantian deontological ethics and utilitarianism insisting that intuition is the only source of moral knowledge. Recently, there is a renewed interest in intuition by philosophers doing meta-philosophy by reflecting on what philosophers do, and why they disagree. In this essay we plan to take some of this recent literature on intuition and apply it to moral philosophy. We will proceed by (1) defining a conception of intuition, (2) answering some skeptical challenges, (3) delimiting its target, and (4) arguing that intuition is often a source of moral knowledge.

The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral Knowledge

In Roman Catholic moral theology there is an ongoing debate between the proportionalist or revisionist school and the traditionalist school that has developed what is referred to as the ‘New Natural Law Theory’ or ‘Basic Goods Theory’ (BGT). The stakes in this debate have been raised with Pope John Paul II's encyclical Veritatis Splendor (1993) on fundamental moral theology that condemned ‘proportionalism’ or ‘teleologism’ as an ethical theory while utilizing many of the ideas, concepts, and terminology of the BGT, thereby implicitly endorsing that ethical theory. While absolute norms and intrinsically evil acts have frequently been the focus of debate between these two schools, what is it that divides them fundamentally, on the level of ethical method? It is the role and function of reason and experience as two sources of moral knowledge, in part, that distinguish these two versions of natural law on the most basic level. While the BGT has a strict hierarchy of the sources of moral knowledge that posits the hierarchical magisterium as the definitive interpreter of reason and experience, revisionists posit a more dialogical relationship between reason, experience, and the magisterium. On certain ethical issues (e.g., artificial birth control), the experience of the faithful as well as the rational arguments developed by revisionist Catholic moral theologians challenge some of the normative claims of the magisterium. This paper investigates the methodological use of reason and experience in each theory's interpretation of natural law and how and why these two sources of moral knowledge lead to fundamentally divergent normative claims on particular ethical issues.

The Inalienable Right of Conscience

Characterizing conscience is difficult. The way that this term is often used makes it sound as if it is a special power possessed by people. Unlike Bishop Butler, however, and more like recent authors, I deny that conscience is a special faculty that is a source of moral knowledge. Instead, when we speak of conscience, we speak of the act of applying one's moral beliefs to one's own conduct. Conscience is not itself a standard; rather, appeals to conscience involve an agent reflecting on his own past or (projected) future behavior and assessing that behavior in light of his own standards. A person who, in conversation with another, invokes conscience as an apparent justification of a proposed course of action has already made a judgment about that action. Such an appeal borrows its effectiveness from the conviction that one ought (in some sense) to think for oneself about moral matters and then act on one's considered judgments.

Medical ethics, moral philosophy and moral tradition

Medical ethics is commonly assumed to be a form of ‘applied moral philosophy’ in which practical moral judgments are deduced from moral theories. This account of the relationship between moral theory and moral judgment is inadequate in several respects. The deductivist approach often results in inadequate attention being given to social, historical and developmental contexts. It also fails to explain some common phenomena in practical moral reasoning. In contrast to the emphasis in deductivism, a case-centered or casuistic practical ethics insists on immersion in the particularities of cases and on interpretation of details in light of moral maxims and other mid-level forms of moral reasoning. Two features of casuistics that ought to be distinguished but frequently are not, are: (1) the emphasis on immersion and interpretation, and (2) a claim about the relation between moral judgment and moral theory as sources of moral knowledge. Once we consider case-centered moral judgments as sources of moral knowledge, we must also begin to look critically but open-mindedly to moral traditions which, upon examination, appear to be more dynamic and to have more reformist potential than is commonly assumed.

Practising moral judgement within the day care center: A look at the educator's moral decision under stress

Many dilemmas in the day‐care center call for moral decisions. What is the educator's source of moral knowledge? How does s/he apply such knowledge in real life? This paper presents a study which examined these questions within the cognitive developmental approach to moralization (Kohlberg, 1976). It compares the performance of thirty eight experienced early childhood educators on real life moral decision, with their hypothetical moral knowledge. The results suggest that the educators' hypothetical moral knowledge explains 28.9% of the variation in their real life moral decision. The phenomenon of inconsistency between the two types of moral knowledge is explained.