Sources Of Democratic Legitimacy Research Articles

National Parties as Multilevel Organizations in the EU. A Comparative Case Study of Flanders, Denmark and the Netherlands

AbstractThis article scrutinizes national political parties' organizational linkages with the European level. Such linkages not only provide parties with information from the European level, but also provide the EU with a source of democratic legitimacy. By applying an inductive research design and qualitatively reconstructing the organizational linkages of 15 parties in Flanders, the Netherlands and Denmark, this article shows that not only national parties' concrete organizational practices, but also their underlying strategies for engaging the European level differ notably. Importantly, parties' multilevel organizational strategies differentiate between an ‘internal’ dimension (linkages with their ‘own’ EU‐level agents) and an ‘external’ dimension (linkages with their Europarty). Building on these case studies, the article presents an original typology of multilevel party organization in an EU context, providing researchers with an empirically grounded and ideal‐typical benchmark for understanding the organization and behaviour of national parties in the EU.

Deliberative constitutionalism and judicial review

Deliberative constitutionalism is an emerging field that combines constitutional theory – and its emphasis on legal limits to political power – with deliberative democratic theory – and its idea of political deliberation as the source of democratic legitimacy. This combination creates a new framework to address questions of legitimacy that arise in constitutional democracies. The article contributes to this growing area of research by exploring its potential to address the legitimacy of judicial review. First, the article argues that this potential lies in the integration of constitutional theory with a systemic approach to deliberative democracy and the nested idea of a deliberative system. Second, the article draws on this integration to account for the legitimacy of judicial review as an institution embedded in – and shaped by – a deliberative, representative, system.

A Populist International?: ALBA's Democratic and Autocratic Promotion

This article analyzes the ambiguities of Bolivarianism on democracy. Led by Hugo Chávez, Bolivarianism was an ideology and a strategy of regime transformation and democratization. Its populist language identified internal and external enemies such as US imperialism and elites that served US interests. This meant that the complexity of national and international politics was simplified in these countries to a struggle between two antagonistic camps: neoliberalism vs. the socialism of the twenty-first century; bourgeois-liberal democracy against real democracy; and US led Pan-Americanism vs. Latin Americanism. Bolivarian leaders made clear that clean elections were the only source of democratic legitimacy, and they were at the forefront of the opposition to the military coup d'état of 2009 in Honduras for example. While promoting elections as the only tool to elect and remove leaders, Bolivarian leaders simultaneously undermined democracy from within by concentrating power in the hands of the president, packing the courts with cronies, and using the legal system to punish critics. The paper unravels how Chávez diffused his model of regime transformation, and how Bolivarian leaders learned from his successes.

Contributions and Limits of Rortian Pragmatism for Political Agonism

Fil: Penelas, Federico Carlos. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofia y Letras. Instituto de Filosofia ; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata; Argentina

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

AbstractThis article seeks to explore the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has interpreted and applied the principle of democracy. It examines first the democratization process upon which the EU has embarked since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and how that transformation was a positive reaction to those voices arguing that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Next, it is argued that the CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way which is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at EU level, namely the Member States and the peoples of Europe. Accordingly, that understanding of the principle of democracy is illustrated by some relevant examples taken from the case law of the CJEU and the European General Court (‘EGC’). Those examples show that the CJEU has strived to protect the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the only political institution of the EU whose members have, since 1979, been elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Yet, they also show that the principle of democracy is not limited to protecting parliamentary prerogatives. That principle, like all EU constitutional principles, pervades the whole of EU law and, as such, must be read in light of societal changes. As democracy within the EU is not limited to the participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process but also encompasses other forms of governance, in particular rule-making by administrative agencies and the achievement of consensus by social partners, it is for the EU judiciary to make sure that those other forms of governance remain as democratic as possible. This can be achieved, inter alia, by making sure that they enjoy sufficient representation or are subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the CJEU and the EGC also take into account new mechanisms which seek to strengthen the principle of democracy, such as the principle of transparency. In so doing, they aim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by providing sufficient means for EU citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Finally, it is contended that the principle of democracy, as interpreted by the CJEU, draws inspiration from national democracies. In so doing, the CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship.

Tektonische Machtverschiebungen – die Krise als Auslöser und Verstärker des institutionellen Wandels

ZfP Zeitschrift für Politik , Seite 220 - 241

Participation and the role of law after Lisbon: A legal view on Article 11 TEU

Participation in EU governance has been largely kept outside the realm of law. Article 11 TEU has the potential to change this status quo, despite the fact that, with the exception of the European citizens' initiative, it represents more the recognition of previous institutional practices than an innovation proper. This contribution presents a normative interpretation of Article 11 TEU and analyses the implications of the distinct transformation this Treaty article postulates: the transition from participation based on a logic of participatory governance to participation that concretizes democracy as a "value" or a founding principle of the Union, and that responds to the respective normative yardsticks, such as equality and transparency. This is the main challenge posed by Article 11 TEU. While acknowledging that law is not the only way of giving effect to the prescriptions of this Treaty article, this contribution discusses the role of law in operating the normative shift mentioned. It analyses why different EU institutions may be urged to reconsider the role of law with regard to participation, in view not only of Article 11 TEU - as law may be needed to guarantee the conditions that ensure participation as a source of democratic legitimacy in the EU - but also of other Treaty provisions.

Multi‐level Democracy: Deliberative or Agonistic? The Search for Appropriate Normative Standards

This article compares two contrasting conceptions of deliberative supranationalism, which together suggest a third alternative. All three draw on both the practical and idealizing aspects of communication theory, but each proposes a different view of the European constitutional model, the normative principles on which the European Union (EU) is to be based, and the Constitution for Europe. The first, by Joerges & Neyer, defends a ‘non‐majoritarian’ view in which democratic legitimacy is based primarily upon mutual recognition and Europe’s ‘multiple demoi’. The second, by Eriksen & Fossum, proposes a ‘majoritarian’ scheme based upon a European hierarchy of law, direct accountability to a ‘general public’ and ‘one constitutional demos’ as the ultimate source of European democratic legitimacy. The article concludes with a non‐consensual ‘complex majoritarian’ approach to multi‐level democracy aimed at combining the advantages of the first, polycentric and non‐hierarchical model with agonistic freedoms of citizens in a polity which finds its sources of democratic legitimacy in various modes of democratic representation as well as multiple access points and communication channels that open up EU decision making to European publics.

Path-Dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto Players: National Parliaments in the European Union

According to the prevailing concept of 'dual legitimacy', national parliaments constitute an important source of democratic legitimacy in the EU. Reinforced parliamentary scrutiny and control of the national representatives in the Council of Ministers seem to contribute to a more democratic Europe. However, if parliaments tie the hands of their governments when they negotiate at the European level, effectiveness of policy-making is jeopardised and national interests may be defeated. Realising this dilemma, members of national parliaments develop strategies to deal with conflicting requirements of national party politics and European policy-making. These strategies and their implications for democracy are influenced by the path-dependent institutional changes in national parliamentary systems. They therefore vary considerably between member states.