Sort Of Union Research Articles

Marriage and the Metaphysics of Bodily Union

One current line of argument against the legalization of same-sex marriage, advocated primarily by the New Natural Lawyers, is that marriage is a pre-political insti tution that has, as an essential element, a bodily union requirement. They argue that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union in their sexual activities and thus cannot meet the structural requirements of marriage. Accordingly, they argue that the same-sex marriage debate must be framed as a debate about what marriage is, and not, as it was in the anti-miscegenation precedents, about who can get married. I argue that their position, which promulgates a set of pernicious stereotypes about same-sex couples, is, first of all, internally inconsistent. According to their own metaphysical principles about bodily un ion, they provide no rational basis for the claim that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union and thus that same-sex couples cannot be married. Second, I argue for a deflationary account of the significance of bodily union. While same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, can realize bodily union, this sort of union has no moral signifi cance and thus cannot be the factor that distinguishes marriages from other sorts of rela tionships. Finally, I suggest that they have no basis for their claims about the inferiority of same-sex relationships.

“And All the Baptists in Kentucky Took the Name United Baptists ”: The Union of the Separate and Regular Baptists of Kentucky

“And All the Baptists in Kentucky Took the Name United Baptists”: The Union of the Separate and Regular Baptists of Kentucky Keith Harper (bio) The summer of 1801 found Kentuckians in a season of unprecedented religious fervor. Led by men like James (“Preaching Jim”) McGready, the fire of the Great Revival spread quickly throughout the commonwealth. Scores of anxious Kentuckians left their fields, shops, and homes to mind their spiritual estates. Some estimate that the famous Cane Ridge Revival alone drew in an excess of twenty thousand souls as the revivals claimed converts by the hundreds. It was, as Paul Conkin describes it, “America’s Pentecost.”1 Amidst the furor of the revival, the Separate and Regular Baptists of Kentucky agreed to lay aside their differences and became “United Baptists.” At first glance, this union appears to be a natural fit. After all, both groups shared many of the same theological perspectives as well as a common polity, or way of conducting church business. [End Page 3] Both believed the Bible to be completely true. Both baptized new believers by immersion. Both believed in local-church autonomy. Both hired their own ministers and managed their own resources. Upon finalizing their union, Kentucky Baptist historian J. H. Spencer noted that “the distinguishing appellatives, ‘Regular’ and ‘Separate’ were dropped, and all the Baptists in Kentucky took the name United Baptists.”2 Theological similarities notwithstanding, achieving unity among early-national Baptists was neither as natural nor easy as one might assume. The issues bearing on union between Regular and Separate Baptists are complex and open to further inquiry along numerous lines.3 For Kentucky Baptists, the actual process by which they achieved their union is a compelling story in its own right. In fact, the Union of 1801 actually constituted the fourth attempt to bring these two groups together since 1785. Offering a plausible explanation for how they finally achieved union is not easy, but it is clear that between 1785 and 1801 most Kentucky Baptists wanted some sort of union. Ultimately, they achieved it, thanks to a combination of trusted leadership, precedent, and their many similarities. Furthermore, the union between Kentucky Baptists meant more than surrendering their “Separate” and “Regular” identities. As both parties modified their respective theologies, they created a doctrinal consensus that facilitated mutual recognition and allowed for cooperation between the two groups. Beyond mere religious fraternity, the Union of 1801 indicates that the Kentucky Baptists of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries were determined to frame any such fellowship around carefully articulated theological parameters. [End Page 4] Baptists in Colonial America Baptists became a regular feature of the American religious landscape in the early-seventeenth century. Not surprisingly, early American Baptists resembled their British brethren. There existed three main groups. The General Baptists held to an Arminian theology characterized by the belief that Christ died for all, without exception. The Particular Baptists held to a Calvinistic theology and preached that Christ died only for the elect, whom God chose before creation. The Seventh-Day Baptists maintained that Christians should worship on Saturday, not Sunday. Most Baptists maintained local-church independence but remained connected through “associationalism.” Churches formed associations for mutual fellowship, edification, and preservation of doctrinal integrity. They provided a forum whereby attendees might discuss current events and debate theological issues. Associations also conducted a limited amount of business, and their decisions, though not binding, carried considerable weight.4 Over time, the Philadelphia Association became especially prominent. Organized in 1707, this association introduced a measure of stability and organization among American Calvinistic Baptists by supplying preachers to churches which had no ministers and sending itinerants into areas with no churches. Before long, the association had extended its influence far beyond the Philadelphia area with the Philadelphia Confession of Faith (1742), which mirrored the Second London Confession (1689), except in affirming the “laying on of hands” and hymn singing.5 By the middle of the seventeenth century, the colonies began to experience a wave of revivals. Established ministers disdained and discouraged “revival exercises” in which converts wept, writhed, and [End Page 5] swerved from despair to spiritual ecstasy. Not surprisingly, many Christians, especially the new converts (New Lights), favored...

The Quest for the New Jerusalem: Jean de Labadie and the Labadists, 1610-1744 (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 6~7 circular" (135). In conclusion, "since the soul is present only in a living body, there must be a genuine soul-body union, yet the soul is powerless to move such a body .... The likely sort of union.., is an epiphenomenalism" (137). "Descartes commits himself to a mind-brain identity, that mind is matter and that matter can think" (i39). Thus, all of us who have worried about mind-body interaction in Descartes have been misled. Soffer's book is an intelligent and stimulating discourse on Descartes' possible materialism. The book also belongs to a growing body of commentaries on Descartes in English in which a scholar reacts to and argues only with other commentators who write in English. Thus, in a book on the relationships among Descartes' metaphysics, physics, moral philosophy, and theodicy, no account is taken of the interpretations of Gouhier, Gilson, Gueroult, Rodis-Lewis, Marion, especially Leroy and Espinas, and a dozen other crucial French commentators, except for one or two brief references as their views are reflected in the works of Caton, Curley, Frankfurt, Grayeff, Kennington, Kenny, Williams, and Wilson, who are Soffer's main protagonists . The only reference in his bibliography not in English is to Descartes' Oeuvres, alphabetized under Adam and Tannery, who are oddly indicated as translators, not editors. He quotes Descartes from Haldane and Ross and Kenny, whose translations are also listed alphabetically not under Descartes but under the translators' names. I suppose that makes a certain sense. I do not mean to imply that Soffer's book is bad. It is a worthwhile contribution to what can only be called the Anglo-American school of Descartes studies, characterized by more stress on analytical implications than on historical context. To be sure, French scholars in turn seldom refer to commentaries in any language other than French. For fully comprehensive studies, you usually must go to the Germans, Dutch, Scandinavians , Italians, Japanese, etc., who not only read, but also take seriously scholarship in languages other than their own. This in itself is an interesting aspect of the history of philosophy of our times. RICHARD A. WATSON Washington University Trevor J. Saxby, The Questfor theNewJerusalem:Jean de Labadieand the Labadists, 16xox744 . International Archives of the History of Ideas, l 15. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987. Pp. xiii + 49 o. DFL 215. This is a fascinating account about a fascinating man and his movement. It is not an easy task to write a biography of Jean de Labadie, the Jesuit from Bordeaux who, after having turned to Protestantism in order to accomplish the God-appointed reform among the Reformed, acted in Geneva as "a second Calvin," and ended up as a separatist. As Gregorio Leti observed, one had never found a preacher or presbyter more feared, respected, and acclaimed than Labadie. Till well into the eighteenth century Labadism was a fashionable label for anything smelling of heterodoxy. Thus Philipp Jakob Spener, the father of German pietism, who had attended some of Labadie's conventicles in Geneva, had to defend himself time and again against the 618 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY a8:4 OCTOBER 199o charge of Labadism. Labadie has been described as a spiritual chameleon, a psychological enigma, in whose intriguing personality a certain duplicity is not to be denied. Emphasizing the need for moral reform, he himself was accused more than once of not living up to his own moral standards. In this connection the great attraction Labadie exerted on women (one need only think of Anna Maria van Schurman, Louise Huyghens, the three sisters Aerssen van Sommelsdyk, the youngest--and prettiest--of whom became Labadie's wife in due time) was used by his opponents as a welcome argument. Most such observations were tendentious, made to discredit Labadie. But several examples can be mentioned which throw doubts upon Labadi6's sincerity, for example his dealings with the Quakers. Still, his personality made quite an impression on some of his learned contemporaries. To the large circle of his correspondents belonged the Basel divines Johannes Buxtorf and Lukas Gernler; he was in contact with John Duty,Jan Amos Comenius (who intended to include Labadie in his plans for a collegium...

Meister Eckhart's Conception of Union with God

Although Meister Eckhart himself might have been puzzled by the term, he is traditionally known as a mystic. The designation surely does apply, in the sense that Eckhart sought and recommended a kind of union between the soul and God. But as soon as one proceeds to analyze the precise nature of that union, difficulties abound. In recent literature it has become clear that the Christian mystical tradition has employed various distinct concepts of union with God, and scholars have inquired what sort of union one or another mystic sought. This effort has been made, for example, in studies of John Tauler andThe Cloud of Unknowing. In examining these and other mystics, particularly those of the Western medieval tradition, scholars have asked whether they viewed union with God as a momentary experience or as an ongoing way of life, and whether they saw this union as continuous and compatible with ordinary religious experience and knowledge or as discontinuous and incompatible. The present article will attempt to answer such questions in regard to Meister Eckhart, in hopes of clarifying an aspect of his thought which, though fundamental, is most commonly approached only tangentially in the literature.

The God-Man

In a recent issue of Religious Studies, G. G. O'Collins concludes his essay with a question which in his view states ‘the classic problem of Christology’: ‘What is the ontological connection between the Logos and the human existence of Jesus of Nazareth?’ In another recent issue C. J. F. Williams poses the question, ‘What sort of union is a hypostatic union?’ In the literature grown up around Kierkegaard's pronouncements on the notion of the God-man, the following question is discussed: Did Kierkegaard mean to say that the very notion of the God-man is incoherent? Some hold that he did, some that he did not. Yet, however important it is to establish what Kierkegaard himself held concerning this question, there is the far more important question for Christian doctrine of whether the notion of the God-man is incoherent.

Studies on the Eczematous Sensitization: IV. Sensitization to Metadinitrobenzene and Its Relation to 2:4 Dinitrochlorobenzene

In the study of sensitizations to simple chemicals, there are two somewhat ^ related chemical problems. One is the nature of the union between the sensitizing chemical and the tissues of the host in order to engender the eczematous sensitization, and the other is in what chemical respects can a substance that is capable of evoking a reaction in the already sensitized animal deviate from the parent sensitizing compound? It has been reasonably well shown, originally by v Landsteiner (1) and subsequently confirmed by others, that simple chemical compounds which are capable of inducing the eczematous variety of the delayed type of allergic sensitization enter into some sort of union with the tissues of the host. The simplest hypothesis is that a protein conjugate is made. There seems to be direct chemical evidence for this type of union with certain classes of compounds, such as substituted nitro- and halo-benzenes, especially the di-y nitrophenyls. Such a union may not be true for all substances which yield an eczematous sensitization, e.g., nickel, for, as Gell (2) states: Many chemical compounds which act as sensitizers have one general feature in common: they are capable of reacting with a group or groups in the molecule of a protein to form a conjugate. A second type of sensitizer is not able K itself to combine with protein, but may be metabolized in the body to a deriva-tive possessing such powers of combination. There may be a third category of > sensitizers which do not react chemically but form strong adsorption complexes with protein. In any case the conjugate or adsorption complex so formed will > become antigenically distinct from the parent protein, and if the sensitizer gains access to the tissues of an animal the proteins of the latter may be ren- * dered antigenic.

The Arrow, the Hunter, and the State

IN THE study of ancient statecraft one is constantly running across references to a gadget that seems so minor and so mechanical that its great importance is easily overlooked as a key to the nature and origin of empire. It is the contention of this paper that the marked arrow supplies decisive evidence for describing the process by which hunters were able to impose a system of government on the world. The marked arrow not only supports the growing suspicion that the peasant societies of the great river valleys became conquering empires by virtue of a discipline forced on them from without,1 but goes on to show how such a transformation could take place. Whereas only farmers possess the industry and stability necessary to sustain a great state, the marked arrow indicates that it was nomad hunters of the steppe, with their expansive and aggressive ways, who first brought such a state into existence. Both elements, expansion and stability, must be combined if real empire-not a mere adding of fields to fields on the one hand, or the quick plunder of a continent on the other, but a program and technique of permanent, universal rule-is to be achieved. The present study undertakes to show how by using marked arrows in a peculiar way prehistoric hunters solved the problem of exercising dominion over vast and scattered areas, and then applied the same solution to the more difficult problem of welding peasant and nomad cultures into some sort of union, resulting in the great centralized state of historic times. Three basic questions only will be treated: what the marked arrow was, how it worked in exercising its control over the loosely-knit and widely-ranging tribes of the steppes, and how those tribes used it to coerce the unwilling tillers of the soil to cooperate in bringing forth the great state.