Sort Of Creature Research Articles

Swim your ground: Towards a black and blue humanities

ABSTRACT This essay engages with the prevailing metaphor in our talk about ecological crisis: humanity’s carbon “footprint.” As a fitting place to begin thinking about humanity's excessive footprint and dominating interface with the planet, I suggest humanity’s first large-scale encounter with the deep sea during the transatlantic age of exploration and colonization. Or the opportunity our species had to learn that an earthling is hardly the sort of creature whose interface with a mostly blue planet can be rightly typified as a standing. Critiquing the global rise of what I call the “stand your ground subject,” I suggest the drowned Africans remembered in Olaudah Equiano’s narrative as the “inhabitants of the deep,” as a more promising place for the humanities to begin, in Alice Walker’s words, to “reclaim a proper relationship to the world” through an oceanic recalibration of the human.

A World Unto Itself: Human Communication as Active Inference.

Recent theoretical work in developmental psychology suggests that humans are predisposed to align their mental states with those of other individuals. One way this manifests is in cooperative communication; that is, intentional communication aimed at aligning individuals’ mental states with respect to events in their shared environment. This idea has received strong empirical support. The purpose of this paper is to extend this account by proposing an integrative model of the biobehavioral dynamics of cooperative communication. Our formulation is based on active inference. Active inference suggests that action-perception cycles operate to minimize uncertainty and optimize an individual’s internal model of the world. We propose that humans are characterized by an evolved adaptive prior belief that their mental states are aligned with, or similar to, those of conspecifics (i.e., that ‘we are the same sort of creature, inhabiting the same sort of niche’). The use of cooperative communication emerges as the principal means to gather evidence for this belief, allowing for the development of a shared narrative that is used to disambiguate interactants’ (hidden and inferred) mental states. Thus, by using cooperative communication, individuals effectively attune to a hermeneutic niche composed, in part, of others’ mental states; and, reciprocally, attune the niche to their own ends via epistemic niche construction. This means that niche construction enables features of the niche to encode precise, reliable cues about the deontic or shared value of certain action policies (e.g., the utility of using communicative constructions to disambiguate mental states, given expectations about shared prior beliefs). In turn, the alignment of mental states (prior beliefs) enables the emergence of a novel, contextualizing scale of cultural dynamics that encompasses the actions and mental states of the ensemble of interactants and their shared environment. The dynamics of this contextualizing layer of cultural organization feedback, across scales, to constrain the variability of the prior expectations of the individuals who constitute it. Our theory additionally builds upon the active inference literature by introducing a new set of neurobiologically plausible computational hypotheses for cooperative communication. We conclude with directions for future research.

Persuasive Ironies:

Persuasive Ironies:

Talking about Something

In Talking about Nothing Azzouni defends a unified nominalist treatment of hallucinated objects, fictional objects and mathematical objects. I focus on his views about fictional objects, in particular, his objections to fictional realism. Azzouni's view is that fictional characters do not exist, i.e., ‘that the characters and events depicted aren't real; they correspond to nothing at all’ (Azzouni 2010: 3). However, he rejects any account of fictional discourse that replaces the ‘empty’ names of fictional characters with descriptions, or that in any other way seeks to make fictional discourse meaningful by reinterpreting it. He argues that when we use the ‘empty’ names of fictional characters to ‘refer’, our discourse has all the essential hallmarks of singular, object-directed speech. I will argue that Azzouni's arguments have an unintended consequence: they clear away many of the obstacles to commonsense realism about fictional objects. In fact, a fictional realist of a certain stripe can agree with almost everything Azzouni says, except for the bit about there being no fictional objects. The fictional realism I suggest denies that, in order to qualify as existent, fictional objects should be judged against non-fictional objects. Fictional entities are very different sorts of creatures from non-fictional entities, but they exist in a quite ordinary way.

Referenzbeziehungen zwischen Mensch und Tier bei Hildegard von Bingen

In “De animalibus”, the 7th book in the “Liber simplicis medicinae”, Hildegard von Bingen describes the characteristics of four-footed land animals. Some of these have a special relationship with humans in that they embody moral qualities. An explanation for this is already given in the preface, which states that human intelligence recognizes these qualities, declaring that “You are this or that sort of creature”. Since the relationship that animals have with nature shares a degree of similarity with that of man’s, they can be regarded as symbolic representatives for particular human traits and characteristics. The article at hand presents Hildegard von Bingen’s descriptions of the monkey, the lion, the bear, the rabbit, the dog, the cat, the wolf, the lynx, and the donkey. While the monkey just mimics man’s behaviour and is imperfect in both settings, the lion embodies will power. The bear on the other hand stands for unbridled sexual desire, while in the rabbit the gentleness of a sheep is united with the bounce of a deer. The lynx is regarded as hedonistic, the donkey as stupid, and the wolf as surrounded by dangerous sylphs. In Hildegard’s depictions, exotic and native animal species display rather extraordinary behavioural traits, and the medieval Christian world view of the author conveys unexpected relationships between humans and animals. In addition to empirical observation and experience, Hildegard also relies on folkloristic beliefs and magical practices related to explanatory models of her time. She allows largely unknown sources into her animal lore but never strays from her ultimate goal of having it serve to instruct people. In doing so, Hildegard removed herself far from the common tradition of medieval animal portraits.

"I used to dream of lupus as some sort of creature": Chronic illness as an internal object.

This study examines the place occupied by chronic illness in the inner lives of 15 women suffering from Systemic Lupus Erythematosus (SLE). A phenomenological analysis of illness narratives demonstrates that sufferers construe their illness as a protagonist or, using an object-relations informed perspective, as an internal object. That is, with time sufferers constituted a mental representation of SLE that in itself has the power to influence the sufferers' affective states and behaviors. An insight into these "illness relations" is conducive to a better understanding of the "lived experience" of SLE for disabled, economically disadvantaged women. Through their experience, the study of risk and resilience in chronic illness may be advanced.

Sorting Symbol Strings

Atheme Throughout All Grade Bands of the Algebra Standard of the NCTM's Principles and Standards for School Mathematics is the ability of students to “represent and analyze mathematical situations and structures using algebraic symbols” (p. 222). In the band for grades 6–8, this theme is further articulated as asking students to “develop an initial conceptual understanding of different uses of variables” (p. 222). Although variables sometimes occur alone, more often they occur in expressions, equations, and inequalities. We will refer to letters and numbers combined in equations, inequalities, and expressions as “symbol strings” as do Chazan and Yerushalmy (2003). The role of the variable is often determined by the symbol string in which it occurs; therefore, if students understand the different kinds of symbol strings, they will understand the roles that variables play. We have developed activities that ask students to identify, describe, compare, and classify symbol strings—in other words, to develop a feel for symbol strings. Chazan and Yerushalmy (2003) discuss it in this way: “Skilled performance [in school algebra] involves developing a feel for symbol strings … that indicates what sorts of creatures they are and what should be done with them.”

Skeptic Purgatives: Therapeutic Arguments in Ancient Skepticism

Skeptic Purgatives: Therapeutic Arguments in Ancient Skepticism MARTHA NUSSBAUM ASTHE MEDICALARTSTANDSto the body, so philosophy stands to the soul. This analogy, which lies deep in the Greco/Roman philosophical tradition, becomes especially important in the Hellenistic schools. Drawing on still earlier precedents , Aristotle had elaborated the analogy in a number of areas, using it to clarify his conception of philosophy's techniques and goals. But Aristotle had also questioned the analogy, holding that in a number of important respects the philosophical teacher must not emulate the medical doctor (see section 3 below ). Epicureans, Stoics, and skeptics, by contrast, embrace the analogy in a far more wholehearted way. The appropriateness of the analogy is taken for granted by all three schools. That is why it can be used, as it is in all of them, as both a heuristic and ajustificatory device, contributing both to the imagining of new philosophical procedures and to the justification of already existing practices . The analogy serves, as well, to organize the competition of these schools with one another, and of all of them with Aristotelianism. A close study of the uses of the medical analogy in a school can thus show us a great deal about how it sees itself, how it understands the relationship between its characteristic techniques of argument and the goal of human happiness. The philosopher is a doctor of the human soul. How does and how should he proceed in that capacity ? What types of arguments will he use? And how can he justify his claim that philosophical arguments, which might seem to be refined and rather weak "medical" instruments, have the requisite curative power?' ' This article is chapter 8 in my The Therapy of Desire: Theoryand Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, The Martin Classical Lectures 1986 , and forthcoming. It has been revised only to avoid direct reference to the arguments of other chapters; but it remains closely linked to those arguments. Other chapters in the book have been published in article form as follows: [52~] 522 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:4 OCTOBER i991 The aim of this paper is to investigate the therapeutic strategies of Greek skepticism, comparing these with "medical" practices in the other schools. This project requires a detailed imagining of the life of a pupil in the course of skeptical therapy. For if we are to understand how philosophical medicine works, our theme must be the daily life of philosophical argument as well as its logical form, the social character of the school as well as its theoretical basis. Let us, then, imagine the course of skeptical therapy by choosing as our "case study" an allegedly historical figure: the courtesan Nikidion, introduced by Diogenes Laertius as a pupil in the Epicurean school.~ We choose a pupil already committed to Epicureanism since we must begin by imagining, from the point of view of skepticism, the difficulties and dissatisfactions that will be likely to inhere in the dogmatic way of life--the motivations she would allegedly have, within her Epicurean life, for going over to skepticism. Nikidion is, then, let us imagine, a believing Epicurean. And Epicurus, embracing the medical analogy, will have taught her a view of philosophy that he shares, up to a point, with the other "dogmatic" schools of the day, Stoics and Peripatetics. For all of these teach the pupil that human health requires having many definite beliefs, including ethical beliefs. Aristotle's attitude to ethical belief seems less dogmatic and more open-ended than Epicurus's; but he too holds that the good human life cannot be lived without beliefs--some of which will be held very firmly indeed. Both agree that Nikidion must go through life with some well-defined views about how the world operates, about what sort of creature, in that world, she is, and also about what she is aiming for. Though no single belief of hers will be treated as entirely unrevisable in Aristotle's programme--with the exception of the basic principles of logic that must, he believes, ground all coherent discourse--at any point she must hold at least some of her beliefs firm and use these as a basis Chapter 5 (on Epicurus and...

That Obscure Object of Desire

In the fifties, Quine sounded a call to arms against all sorts of creatures of darkness: propositions, meanings, non-existent objects, and the like.' Since then, many of those creatures have found safe haven in other possible worlds or in Meinongian appendages of the actual one, with one notable exception: objects of desire. The anomaly has gone largely unnoticed; in the present paper, I want to focus on it, and make it into an Archimedean turning point for a conceptual revolution of the Kantian variety.

The Man Behind the Librarian: the Results of an Enquiry

THERE is, of course, a man (if he isn't a woman) behind the librarian. When the librarian leaves his office or the counter, the man steps forth. What sort of creature is he? A few professions stamp themselves so deeply on their followers that they have even developed something approaching a type of physical feature. The military man, the lawyer, and the parson are the outstanding examples. The teacher is a particularly pronounced type, but not a physical type; it is in manner, way of speaking, etc., that he advertises his calling. The librarian has no outward signs. If someone says “So‐and‐so looks like a librarian,” he is probably thinking in terms of the old‐time librarian, spectacled, round‐shouldered, peering, and surrounded by an astral aura derived from the immemorial dust that time has dropped gently on his books. The modern librarian, at any rate the public librarian, has long shaken off these out‐worn signs of his craft. He might be anybody or somebody, and carries with him no smell of the midnight oil or suggestion of ancient and ponderous lore. Yet no man can live among books, work on books, think on books, and contact all sorts of people in their relation to books, without effects on his mind, his outlook, and maybe his habits. It was a good idea, therefore, of the Editor to try and discover something of the man behind the librarian, by means of that ubiquitous, if often irritating, instrument, the questionnaire. The number sent out was thirty‐one, and twenty‐two replied; far too limited an enquiry on which to found any dogmatic conclusions, but as the librarians questioned were of both sexes, of different types of libraries, town and county, large and small, it may be considered perhaps as affording a useful cross‐section of the profession in its unprofessional aspect. There were ten questions; these are given below, with a brief summary of the nature of the answers.

Notes on Three Cuban Birds

ON• hears rumors from time to time, especially while collecting in Tropical America, concerning all sorts of creatures which one seeks but never finds. I still believe that the "Taquache" of the Trinidad Mountains may be, or may have recently been, a living Nesophontes. Running down another clue led to getting ]ivlng specimens of Capforays nana, previously known only from fossil remains. Another chance, years ago, brought about my meeting with Fermin Z. Cervera.