Sort Of Autonomy Research Articles

The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics

The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics

Can Blockchain Solve the Dilemma in the Ethics of Genomic Biobanks?

In discussions on the ethics of genome collections and biobanks, the main worry about whether we are permitted to collect and use individuals' genomic and genetic data is the potential for the violation of individuals' right to informational privacy. Yet, if we do not permit these endeavors, we risk giving up on the future benefits of biomedical research. In this paper, I describe a private venture in blockchain genomics that seeks to provide an apt solution to concerns about potential privacy violations in genome collections and biobanks. I then provide some reasons to doubt the kind of solution to the dilemma that such start-ups propose. I argue that the sort of autonomy that grounds the value of the right to informational privacy cannot be secured with blockchain technology alone. So, blockchain genomics ventures are insufficient to establish the permissibility of genome collections and biobanks. I then discuss an additional ethical challenge to genomic biobanks. This challenge takes the form of doubting that future benefits that result from biomedical research dependent on genomic databases will outweigh the costs. Despite criticisms of genomic research, I claim that it is reasonable to think that future net benefits will be gained from research on such databases. Therefore, I conclude that there remains a dilemma in the ethics of genomic biobanks.

‘Venus flytrap’ soft robot gets a grip

Pity the poor insect that wanders onto a Venus flytrap. Just a couple false steps into the carnivorous plant’s trigger hairs, and the leaves snap shut, dooming the bug. Inspired by the Venus flytrap’s ability to distinguish between insects and other stray bits of matter, Tampere University of Technology scientists Arri Priimagi, Hao Zeng, and Owies M. Wani have created a soft robot that acts with the same sort of autonomy. Their optical flytrap distinguishes between objects that reflect or scatter light and those that do not before grabbing the reflective ones. “It’s very difficult in soft robotics to develop systems that make decisions by themselves,” says Priimagi, who led the research team. Most soft robots, he says, don’t react to their environment but instead require some sort of external activation. His team’s solution was to incorporate an optical fiber into a liquid crystalline elastomer. When the light strikes a

Human Autonomy and Theological Ethics

It is argued here that we have good reason to aspire to be autonomous in certain ways that deserve a place in the theory of virtue, but not in some of the ways that have figured most prominently in theories of moral obligation. This grounds an argument that the sorts of autonomy to which we have reason to aspire need not be enemies of theological ethics. The focus is on the relation of autonomy to obligation in sections 1-4, and on the relation of autonomy to love in section 5.

Onus Orbis Terrarum: About a Possible Shift in the Definition of Sovereignty

Starting with an insight from Peter Sloterdijk about the enduring notion of Empire in the European idea of sovereignty, this article explores a problem common to the discipline of International Relations, and more generally, geopolitics as well as social theory: the very origin of the notion of an entity endowed with some sort of autonomy over a territory. It is argued that the notion of a bounded entity triggers many artifacts that explains, in part, the failure and denial of world politics, especially over the question of climate change.

The Division of Linguistic States and Problem of Democracy

A person has different identities ‐ religious, political, caste, linguistic, professional and so on. Thus one may be Hindu by religion, Gandhibadi by political ideology, Bangali by language, teacher by profession, Brahmin by caste, etc. Another person may be a converted Christian by religion, Marxist by political ideology, Dalit by caste, Santali by language, a skilled worker by profession. Different individuals having different types of religions, caste, linguistic and other identities create major problems for maintaining a democratic set up. History teaches us that in a society where people fight against each other to save their identities, democracy cannot flourish. Two groups ofp eople having two different religious identities or caste identities or linguistic identities are frequently engaged in conflict with each other and the powerful group tries to dominate the weaker group. One of the suggested solutions of the problem is to ensure same sort of autonomy for people having a particular identity in such a way that the other community cannot interfere with its way of life. According to Ambedkar formation of a state for a group of people having a particular linguistic identity is a suggested way out for resolving the conflict between two groups of people having two different linguistic identities.

How to Reconcile Physicalism and Antireductionism about Biology

Physicalism and antireductionism are the ruling orthodoxy in the philosophy of biology. But these two theses are difficult to reconcile. Merely embracing an epistemic antireductionism will not suffice, as both reductionists and antireductionists accept that given our cognitive interests and limitations, non-molecular explanations may not be improved, corrected or grounded in molecular ones. Moreover, antireductionists themselves view their claim as a metaphysical or ontological one about the existence of facts molecular biology cannot identify, express or explain. However, this is tantamount to a rejection of physicalism and so causes the antireductionist discomfort. In this paper we argue that vindicating physicalism requires a physicalistic account of the principle of natural selection, and we provide such an account. The most important payoff to the account is that it provides for the very sort of autonomy from the physical that antireductionists need without threatening their commitment to physicalism.

Critical readings: progress files and the production of the autonomous learner

Progress files represent a major policy initiative involving the use of Personal Development Planning (PDP) aimed at the production of autonomous learners who are capable of planning for their own career and personal futures. The paper is organized in three parts and argues for a more critical approach, which locates PDP as part of broader shifts within educational policy and practice. The first part of the paper explores the lack of conceptual clarity associated with the term PDP. It argues that ‘evidence’ of ‘what works’ is unlikely to yield useful knowledge for practitioners as long as this evidence is based on untheorized accounts of PDP. The second part of the paper explores the concept of reflection, which underpins PDP, and argues for greater critical engagement with the conditions of reflection and an understanding of the limitations of reflection. The final part of the paper takes up the broader theme of individualization and returns to the major theme of the paper that the sorts of autonomy that are assumed in the practices of PDP are neither neutral nor an accomplished fact.

When Freedom Isn't Free: The Costs of Judicial Independence in Bush v. Gore

In an earlier article, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 So. Cal. L. Rev. 535 (1999), I developed a taxonomy of meanings for the idea of that draws on Sir Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative and positive concepts of liberty. The constraints on judicial action range along a rough continuum ? from those that raise concerns even under an exclusively negative conception of judicial independence, such as freedom from physical intimidation or freedom from direct pecuniary consequences, to those that pose problems only under an extremely robust positive conception, such as freedom from review by higher courts, freedom to ignore precedents, and freedom to pursue a conception of the good or the just that flies in the face of enacted statutes. In this essay, prepared for a symposium at Ohio State, I apply that framework to the litigation surrounding the presidential election of 2000. I show how that litigation implicated a number of aspects of judicial independence. With respect to the justices of the Florida Supreme Court, I discuss questions such as the effect of their status as popularly elected officials, the peculiar relationship among the branches of government in presidential election cases, and their position within the judicial hierarchy. With respect to the members of the United States Supreme Court, I discuss the implications for judicial independence of potential personal stakes in the outcome of the litigation; individual Justices' desire to influence the future composition of the Court; and the Court's freedom from direct political control. Finally, I discuss the ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore reflects two particularly assertive and troubling assertions of judicial independence. First, the Court saw itself as free to determine the meaning of Florida law for itself, without regard to the views of the Florida Supreme Court. Second, the per curiam opinion asserted the Court's freedom from the pervasive constraints on an individual judge's ability to pursue her own ends that precedent and stare decisis normally impose. The litigation surrounding the presidential election of 2000 illustrates a central point about judicial independence: we need to ask quite carefully what constraints judges ought to be free from, and what constraints judges ought to be bound by. In the end, judicial independence is not a single concept, but a constellation of different sorts of autonomy. Not every assertion of judicial autonomy is equally justifiable. Particularly when courts adopt aggressively independent stances, we must measure assertions of judicial autonomy against the competing claims of other actors within our system of democratic self-government.